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ABSTRACT	  
	  This	   thesis	  explores	   the	  highly	  contested	  ontological	  question	  of	  what	  exists,	   and	   aims	   to	   deflate	   ontological	   debates	   in	   a	   quietist	   fashion,	  whilst	   providing	   an	   original,	   positive	   account	   of	   how	   to	   proceed	   by	  drawing	  upon	  ideas	  from	  Fictionalism,	  Meinongianism,	  and	  Dialetheism.	  	  	  	  I	  follow	  Rudolf	  Carnap	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  metaontological	  question	  of	  how	   ontology	   should	   be	   understood	   and	   practised,	   by	   developing	   a	  critique	  of	  the	  traditional	  realist/antirealist	  positions	  and	  reframing	  the	  ontological	  debate	  accordingly.	  Carnap	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  not	  meaningful	  to	  question	   reality	   in	   an	   external	   sense	   in	  order	   to	   assess	  what	   really	  exists,	  rather	  it	  is	  only	  meaningful	  to	  talk	  in	  an	  internal	  sense	  within	  a	  framework	   about	  what	   exists	   according	   to	   the	   framework	   rules.	   I	   use	  the	  concept	  of	  fictions	  in	  place	  of	  Carnap’s	  frameworks	  to	  argue	  that	  we	  ought	   to	   treat	   much	   seemingly	   ontologically	   committing	   language	   as	  consisting	  in	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  useful	  heuristic	  and	  as	  being	  simply	  fictional.	  This	  reframes	  ontological	  debates	  as	  being	  based	  around	  the	  practical	  advantages	  of	  utilizing	  a	  way	  of	  speaking	  about	  existence	  in	  a	  pragmatic	  fictionalist	  manner.	  The	  aim	  of	  my	  thesis	  is	  thus	  to	  resurrect	  Carnap’s	  metaontology	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  unique	  and	  global	  fictionalism,	  that	   is	   divorced	   from	   the	   antirealism	   usually	   associated	   with	  fictionalism	  and	  based	  on	  quietism	  instead.	  My	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  position	  is	   influenced	  by	  the	  Meinongian	  view	  of	  non-­‐existent	  objects,	  as	  I	   take	  ontological	   commitment	   as	  distinct	   from	  quantificational	   commitment	  in	   order	   to	   allow	   for	   our	   quantificational	   use	   of	   language	   to	   be	  ontologically	  neutral	  and	  metaphysically	  quiet.	  I	  further	  argue	  that	  the	  quietist	  position	  results	  in	  dialetheism	  as	  it	  finds	  itself	  in	  contradictory	  realms	  –	  in	  drawing	  a	  limit	  to	  meaningful	  metaphysics,	  it	  ends	  up	  going	  beyond	   such	   limits.	   My	   thesis	   therefore	   concludes	   that	   in	   redirecting	  metaphysics	  towards	  quietism,	  metametaphysics	  is	  redirected	  towards	  dialetheism,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  position	  I	  call	  ‘Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism’.	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INTRODUCTION	  	  	  Ontology	   is	   the	   study	   of	   existence;	   metaontology	   is	   the	   study	   of	  ontology.	  And	  as	  Cameron	  notes	  above,	  metaontology	  is,	  or	  at	  least	  was,	  highly	  fashionable.	  I	  follow	  that	  fashion	  in	  this	  thesis	  on	  metaontology,	  yet	  in	  a	  supposedly	  unfashionable	  (although	  I	  prefer	  to	  say	  ‘unique	  and	  interesting’)	   way,	   by	   basing	  my	  metaontological	   position	   on	   Carnap’s	  quietism	  whilst	  incorporating	  elements	  of	  Meinongianism,	  Fictionalism,	  and	   Dialetheism.	   Despite	   the	   importance	   of	   Carnap’s	   contribution	   in	  metaontology,	   it	   is	   standardly	   assumed	   that	   his	   critique	   of	   ontology	  failed,	   following	   Quine’s	   criticism	   concerning	   his	   dependence	   on	   the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction.	  Quine	   is	  considered	   to	  be	   the	  reviver	  of	  ontology,	   arguing	   against	   Carnap	  who	   states	   that	   ontology	   cannot	   be	  done.	  Quine	  and	  Carnap	  are	   thus	   seen	  as	   rivals,	   and	   their	  dispute	  has	  largely	  influenced	  and	  provided	  groundwork	  for	  the	  practice	  of	  modern	  ontology.	  But	  recently	  the	  traditional	  evaluation	  of	  their	  dispute	  and	  the	  viability	  of	  ontological	  debates	  have	  come	  into	  question,	  contributing	  to	  the	  thriving	  meta-­‐philosophical	  discussion	  of	  ‘metametaphysics’.	  	  	  	  Historically,	   Quine	   is	   thought	   to	   have	   prevailed	   from	   his	   debate	  with	  Carnap,	   and	   Quinean	   metaontology	   has	   since	   permeated	   philosophy,	  leaving	  Carnap	  behind.	  And	  so,	  in	  defending	  a	  Carnapian	  metaontology,	  my	   thesis	   goes	   against	   this	   historical	   grain.	   Carnap’s	   quietist	   position	  has	  been	  largely	  ignored,	  and	  generally	  taken	  as	  defeated	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Quine’s	   penetrating	   critique,	   though	   recent	   attention	   to	   Carnap1	  has	  suggested	  that	  there	  may	  be	  something	  in	  his	  position	  worth	  reviving.	  I	  will	   show	   that	  Carnap’s	   challenge	   to	  ontology	  ought	  not	  be	  dismissed	  and	  forgotten,	  and	  that	  Carnapian	  positions	  are	  still	  alive	  and	  well.	  My	  thesis	  therefore	  aims	  to	  resurrect	  Carnap’s	  metaontology	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism,	  against	  the	  more	  fashionable	  Quinean	  current.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  Chalmers,	  Manley,	  and	  Wasserman	  (eds.)	  (2009)	  Metametaphysics	  in	  particular.	  
	   10	  In	   this	   Introduction	   chapter	   I	   will	   provide	   a	   simplistic	   outline	   of	  metametaphysics	   with	   regard	   to	   how	   it	   connects	   to	   metaphysics,	  ontology,	  and	  metaontology.	  I	  will	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  this	  thesis	  by	  putting	  forward	  Carnap’s	  and	  Quine’s	  metaontological	  positions,	  detailing	  how	  they	  clarify	  the	  philosophers’	  contribution	  to	  the	  field	  of	  ontology.	  This	  provides	  the	  required	  context	  for	  this	  thesis	  which	  defends	  Carnapian,	  and	   attacks	   Quinean,	   metaontology.	   After	   my	   basic	   outline	   of	   their	  positions	  in	  this	  Introduction,	  I	  provide	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  four	  chapters	  to	  come,	  on	   (1)	  Quiet	  Relativism,	   (2)	  Meinongianism,	   (3)	  Fictionalism,	  and	  (4)	  Dialetheism,	  reviewing	  their	  compatibility	  in	  the	  Conclusion.	  	  	   I.	  What	  is	  Metametaphysics?	  	  	  In	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  be	  concentrating	  on	  the	  ontological	  question	  of	  what	  there	  is	  –	  the	  question	  that	  physicists	  take	  for	  granted,	  the	  question	  that	  metaphysicians	   try	   to	   answer,	   the	   question	   that	   metametaphysicians	  are	  questioning.	  I	  put	  forward	  a	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  approach	  to	  ontological	  questions,	  and	  employ	  Meinongian	  and	  fictionalist	  aspects	  to	  answering	  such	   questions.	   When	   this	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   position	   is	   applied	   to	   the	  realist/antirealist	  debates	   in	  ontology	   (over	  whether	  an	  entity	  exists),	  metaphysics	  is	  forced	  to	  take	  a	  new	  direction	  in	  its	  study	  of	  existence.	  	  	  	  Metaphysics	  is	  a	  branch	  of	  philosophy.	  Metaphysics	  studies	  what	  reality	  is	   really	   like,	   and	   since	   there	   are	  many	   aspects	   of	   reality	   that	   can	   be	  studied	   there	   are	   therefore	  many	   sub-­‐disciplines	   of	   metaphysics.	   For	  example:	  mereology	  (which	  studies	   the	  part-­‐whole	  relation);	  modality	  (which	  studies	  possibility	  and	  necessity);	  the	  philosophy	  of	  time	  (which	  studies	  tense	  and	  time’s	   flow);	  and	  most	   importantly,	  ontology	  (which	  studies	  what	   things	   there	  are	   in	  reality).	   	  The	  excellent	  book	  Ontology	  
and	  Metaontology	  (Berto	  and	  Plebani	  2015)	  discusses	  this	  relationship	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  between	   metaphysics	   and	   ontology,	   and	   helpfully	   explains	   that	   the	  word	   ‘metaphysics’	   is	   used	   to	   encompass	   the	   whole	   of	   reality	   which	  comes	  from	  the	  Greek	  ‘ta	  meta	  ta	  physika’,	  which	  literally	  means	  ‘what	  comes	  after	  physics’.2	  Physics	  is	  commonly	  taken	  as	  the	  scientific	  study	  of	   reality.	   Physicists	   look	   at	   the	   natural,	   material,	   or	   empirical	   world	  and	  the	  things	  that	  exist	  within	  it,	  analysing	  them	  and	  describing	  them.	  Metaphysics	   is	   often	   said	   to	   be	   the	   philosophical	   study	   of	   the	  foundations	   of	   reality	   and	   so	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   fundamentals	   of	  physics,	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  goes	  beyond,	  and	  not	  just	  comes	  after,	  physics.	  	  	  	  Berto	  and	  Plebani	  further	  clarify	  that	  the	  ‘meta-­‐’	  prefix	  is	  used	  here	  as	  in	  foundational	  semantics,	  to	  mean	  a	  higher-­‐level	  (second-­‐order)	  study	  of	   the	   thing	   that	   comes	   after	   the	   ‘meta-­‐’.	   So	   ‘meta-­‐x’	   is	   the	   reflective	  study	  of	   ‘x’.3	  Metametaphysics	  can	  thus	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  higher-­‐level	  study	  of	  metaphysics,	  reflecting	  on	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  metaphysics,	  which	  in	  turn	  may	   reflect	   on	   physics	   as	   a	   study	   of	   reality.	  Metametaphysicians	  reflect	   on	   the	   questions	   that	  metaphysicians	   are	   asking,	   and	   question	  those	  questions’	  meaning.4	  So	  whereas	  physicists	  may	  ask	  ‘what	  are	  the	  laws	   governing	   the	   existent	   things?’	   the	  metaphysicians	  may	   ask	   ‘but	  what	  are	  the	  existent	  things?’	  and	  the	  metametaphysics	  further	  may	  ask	  ‘but	   what	   does	   it	   even	   mean	   to	   exist?’.5	  Our	   metametaphysics	   may	  inform	   our	  metaphysics	  which	   in	   turn	  may	   inform	   our	   physics,	   as	   an	  understanding	  of	  what	  existence	  is	  may	  help	  to	  determine	  what	  things	  exist	   for	   the	   physicists	   to	   study.	   So,	   to	   summarize,	   metaphysics	   is	  concerned	  with	  the	  foundations	  of	  reality,	  whereas	  metametaphysics	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  foundations	  of	  metaphysics.	  And	  likewise,	  ontology	  is	  the	  theory	  of	  existence,	  and	  metaontology	  is	  the	  theory	  of	  ontology.	  I	  now	  discuss	  what	  ontology	  is	  and	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  job	  for	  us	  philosophers.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Berto	  and	  Plebani	  (2015)	  p4	  3	  Berto	  and	  Plebani	  (2015)	  p2	  4	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  that	  all	  metametaphysics	  is	  sceptical	  about	  metaphysics,	  just	  reflective.	  5	  This	   way	   of	   understanding	   the	   relationship	   between	   physics,	   metaphysics,	   and	  metametaphysics	  becomes	  confused	  when	  we	  consider	  naturalist	  metaphysics	  where	  the	  divide	  is	  less	  clear.	  For	  now,	  a	  simplistic	  overview	  of	  the	  connections	  will	  suffice.	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  II.	  Ontology:	  A	  philosopher’s	  job?	  	  	  Ontology	  asks	  the	  question	  ‘what	  exists?’	  and	  philosophers	  (specifically	  metaphysicians)	  have	  taken	  it	  upon	  themselves	  to	  answer	  this	  question.	  But	  is	  it	  really	  the	  philosopher’s	  job	  to	  answer	  what	  exists?	  This	  is	  the	  sort	  of	  question	  that	  metametaphysicians	  are	  asking,	  like	  Carnap6,	  who	  is	  a	   ‘quietist’	  with	  regard	  to	  metaphysics	  (in	  particular	  to	  ontology)	   in	  that	  he	  believes	  that	  philosophers	  keep	  quiet	  on	  the	  subject.	  	  	  	  The	  question	  ‘what	  exists?’	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  either	  a	  single,	  general	  question,	  where	  answers	  consist	  of	  a	  list	  of	  the	  existent	  things,	  or	  as	  the	  plurality	  of	  particular	  existence	  questions,	  such	  as	   ‘do	  numbers	  exist?’,	  which	   can	   be	   answered	   ‘yes’	   or	   ‘no’.	   Those	   who	   answer	   ‘yes’	   for	   a	  certain	  entity	  are	  a	  realist	  about	  that	  entity;	  those	  who	  answer	  ‘no’	  are	  an	  antirealist.	  Quineans	  answer	  the	  general	  question	  ‘what	  exists?’	  with	  ‘everything’,	   whereas	   Meinongians	   answer	   ‘not	   everything’,	   and	  nihilists	  answer	  ‘nothing’.7	  Ontological	  debates	  are	  then	  framed	  around	  constructing	   lists	   of	   existent	   and	  non-­‐existent	   things	   in	   answer	   to	   the	  general	   question,	   giving	   rise	   to	   realist	   and	   antirealist	   positions	   about	  certain	  types	  of	  thing	  in	  answer	  to	  particular	  existence	  questions.	  	  	  	  Many	   areas	   of	   philosophical	   debate	   are	   framed	   along	   this	  realist/antirealist	   divide	   and	   so	   are	   underpinned	   by	   ontological	  considerations.	   The	   whole	   edifice	   of	   these	   debates	   relies	   on	   the	   idea	  that	   it	   makes	   sense	   to	   ask	   ontological	   questions,	   with	   realist	   and	  antirealist	   positions	   being	   motivated	   by	   answers	   to	   such	   particular	  existence	   questions.	   These	   answers	   in	   turn	   place	  metaphysicians	   into	  allist	   (those	   who	   believe	   in	   the	   existence	   of	   all	   of	   the	   controversial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  In	  this	  thesis	  I	  talk	  only	  of	  Carnap	  from	  ‘Empiricism,	  Semantics	  and	  Ontology’	  (1950).	  7	  See	  Quine	  (1948)	  and	  Meinong	  (1960).	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  entities)	  or	  noneist	  (those	  who	  do	  not	  believe	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  any	  of	  the	   controversial	   entities)	   camps.8	  Many	   metaphysicians	   will	   fall	   in	  between	  the	  allist	  and	  noneist	  camps	  by	  being	  realist	  only	  about	  some	  things	   (or	  by	  disagreeing	  as	   to	  what	   is	   to	  count	  as	  a	   ‘thing’).	  Yet	  even	  when	  there	  is	  agreement	  over	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  the	  words	  ‘thing’	  and	  ‘existence’,	  there	  may	  be	  disagreement	  as	  to	  what	  constitutes	  ontology	  by	  disagreeing	  over	  how	  to	  do	  ontology,	  and	  what	  ontology	  is	  the	  study	  
of.	  The	  methodology	   for	  doing	  ontology	   is	  specified	   in	  metaontology	  –	  the	   second-­‐order	   questioning	   of	   how	   the	   first-­‐order	   ontological	  question	   is	  understood	  and	  answered.	  The	  metaontological	   issue	   I	  am	  considering	  here	  is:	  can	  philosophers	  answer	  ontological	  questions,	  and	  can	  they	  contribute	  to	  what	  physicists	  seem	  to	  have	  already	  concluded?	  	  	  	  The	  metametaphysician	  studies	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  philosopher	  can	  contribute	   to	  ontological	  questions,	  and	  an	  aim	  of	  metametaphysics	   is	  to	   clarify	   the	  metaphysicians’	  work.	  The	  metametaphysician	   identifies	  three	  ways	   in	  which	   the	  philosopher	   could	   contribute	   to	   ontology:	   (i)	  Clarifying	  what	  existence	  questions	  mean;	  (ii)	  Outlining	  how	  to	  answer	  existence	  questions;	  (iii)	  Actually	  answering	  existence	  questions.9	  If	  the	  philosopher	  is	  able	  to	  do	  all	  three	  of	  these	  things	  then	  they	  can	  make	  a	  full	  contribution	  to	  ontology.	  Metaphysicians	  traditionally	  have	  indeed	  aimed	  to	  make	  full	  contributions	  by	  answering	  existence	  questions	  and	  putting	  forward	  realist	  and	  antirealist	  positions	  for	  all	  kinds	  of	  entities,	  but	  metametaphysicians	  have	  more	  recently	  been	  putting	  pressure	  on	  whether	   these	   full	   contributions	   are	   legitimate.	   If	   the	   pressure	   of	   the	  metametaphysician	  shows	  the	  philosopher	  to	  be	  unable	  to	  do	  any	  of	  the	  above	  three	  things	  then	  the	  philosopher	  makes	  zero	  contribution	  to	  the	  question	   of	   existence,	   and	   ontology	   will	   be	   deemed	   un-­‐philosophical.	  But,	   if	   the	   philosopher	   can	   do	   some,	   but	   not	   all,	   of	   the	   above	   three	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  I	  use	  these	  terms	  as	  in	  Lewis	  (1990).	  In	  chapter	  2	  I	  use	  ‘noneism’	  as	  in	  Priest	  (2005).	  9	  This	  description	  of	  the	  philosophers’	  contribution	  split	   into	  3	  categories	  is	   inspired	  by	  work	   that	   I	   did	   at	   the	  University	   of	  Nottingham	  during	  my	  Masters	   course	   from	  2010-­‐2011	  in	  the	  Metaphysics	  module.	  I	  thank	  the	  University	  of	  Nottingham	  for	  this.	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  things	   then	   they	   can	   make	   an	   intermediate	   contribution.	   Those	   who	  believe	  that	  philosophers	  cannot	  make	  a	  full	  contribution	  will	  be	  called	  ‘quietists’,	   since	   in	   general	   their	   account	  will	   be	   quiet	   with	   regard	   to	  answering	   questions	   of	   metaphysical	   ontology.	   In	   this	   thesis	   I	   will	  concentrate	  on	  Carnap’s	  metaontology,	  which	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  quietist	  approach	  to	  ontology,	  and	  so	  is	  negative	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  contribution	  a	   philosopher	   can	  make	   to	   ontology.	   I	   will	   compare	   this	  with	  Quine’s	  
metaontology,	  which	  is	  an	  attempted	  realist	  approach	  to	  ontology,	  and	  so	   is	  more	  positive	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   contribution	  a	  philosopher	   can	  make.	   And	   the	   main	   aim	   of	   my	   thesis	   is	   to	   put	   forward	   my	   own	  
metaontology,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  position	  I	  call	  ‘Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism’.	  	  	  	  	   III.	  Carnap’s	  Metaontology.	  	  	  Carnap,	  in	  his	  paper	  ‘Empiricism,	  Semantics,	  and	  Ontology’	  (1950),	  aims	  to	  defend	  ordinary	  language	  usage	  without	  ontological	  commitment,	  in	  order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   speak	   of	   things	   whilst	   being	   quiet	   about	   their	  existence	   in	   the	   metaphysical	   sense.	   He	   illuminates	   the	   question	   of	  existence	  as	  being	  a	  question	  that	  can	  only	  make	  sense	  relative	  to	  what	  he	   calls	   ‘linguistic	   frameworks’.	   Linguistic	   frameworks	   are	   structures	  for	   language	   that	   lay	   down	   rules	   for	   the	  meaning	   and	   usage	   of	   terms	  within	   that	   specific	  domain	  of	  discourse.	  There	  are	  different	   linguistic	  frameworks	   for	   different	   domains	   –	   the	   ‘thing	   framework’,	   ‘number	  framework’,	   ‘property	   framework’,	   and	   so	   on.	   Carnap	   claims	   that	   in	  order	   to	   talk	   about	   entities	   of	   a	   certain	   kind	   we	   first	   construct	   and	  adopt	  a	  framework	  for	  that	  particular	  entity	  before	  we	  can	  question	  the	  existence	   of	   entities	   within	   that	   framework.	   I	   will	   now	   describe	  Carnap’s	   theory	   with	   regard	   to	   how	   it	   suggests	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   a	  philosophical	   contribution	   to	   ontology	   can	   be	   made,	   by	   (i)	   clarifying	  what	  existence	  questions	  mean;	  (ii)	  outlining	  how	  to	  answer	  existence	  questions;	  and	  (iii)	  answering	  existence	  questions,	  in	  sections	  III.i-­‐III.iii.	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  III.i.	  Clarifying	  the	  question.	  	  	  Carnap	  clarifies	  a	  distinction	  between	  two	  kinds	  of	  existence	  questions	  that	  are	  generated	  by	  a	  linguistic	  framework	  for	  a	  particular	  entity:	  	   Internal	   existence	   questions	   (hereon	   IQ):	   “questions	   of	   the	  existence	  of	  certain	  entities…	  within	  the	  framework.”10	  	  External	  existence	  questions	  (hereon	  EQ):	  “questions	  concerning	  the	  existence	  or	  reality	  of	  the	  system	  of	  entities	  as	  a	  whole.”11	  	  	  The	   IQ	   is	   therefore	   asking	   about	   how	   things	   are	   according	   to	   the	  framework	  in	  use,	  whereas	  the	  EQ	  is	  asking	  about	  the	  framework	  in	  use	  as	  a	  whole.	  Another	  way	  of	  articulating	  the	  distinction	  is	  between	  what	  the	   framework	   entails	   internally	   and	   whether	   what	   the	   framework	  entails	   corresponds	  with	  an	  external	   reality.	  We	  can	   comprehend	   this	  distinction	   between	   the	   IQ	   and	  EQ	  by	   recognizing	   how	   the	   two	   could	  manifest	   in	  conversation.	  It	  seems	  that	   in	  every	  day	  life	   if	  one	  were	  to	  ask	   questions	   like	   ‘is	   there	   a	  microwave	   in	   your	   kitchen?’	   or	   ‘is	   there	  something	  wrong	  with	  putting	  a	  kitten	   in	  your	  microwave?’	  we	  would	  respond	  to	  such	  questions	  as	  if	  they	  were	  IQ’s,	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	   there	  do	  exist	  microwaves	   and	  kittens	   for	   us	   to	   be	   talking	   about.	  We	  would	  then	  give	  internal	  answers	  like	  ‘yes,	  I	  purchased	  a	  microwave	  yesterday’	   and	   ‘no,	   as	   long	   as	   you	   don’t	   turn	   the	   microwave	   on’.	  Alternatively,	   it	   is	   perhaps	   only	   in	   the	   philosophy	   room	   that	   these	  questions	  would	   be	   raised	   as	  EQ’s	   regarding	  whether	   there	   really	  are	  physical	  objects	   (like	  microwaves	  and	  kittens)	  or	  moral	   facts	   (like	   the	  wrongness	   of	   kitten	   torture)	   as	   a	   whole,	   existing	   independently	   and	  non-­‐relatively	   to	  our	   linguistic	   frameworks.	  According	   to	  Carnap,	  only	  the	  philosopher	  would	   take	   those	  questions	  as	  EQ’s	  and	  answer	   them	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Carnap	  (1950)	  p21.	  ‘Certain’	  doesn’t	  mean	  ‘token’,	  and	  ‘system’	  doesn’t	  mean	  ‘type’.	  The	  difference	  is	  in	  interpretation	  of	  the	  question,	  as	  framework	  relative/independent.	  11	  Carnap	  (1950)	  p21.	  Carnap	  later	  reforms	  the	  EQ	  as	  being	  pragmatic,	  see	  section	  III.ii.	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  with	  something	   like	   ‘no,	  since	  there	  are	  no	  such	  things	  as	  microwaves	  and	  wrongness’.	   Given	  Carnap’s	   clarification	  of	   existence	  questions	   as	  being	   divided	   into	   IQ’s	   and	   EQ’s,	   the	   philosophical	   debate	   is	   clearly	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  EQ	  –	  the	  external	  metaphysical	  questioning	  of	  what	   things	   really	  exist.	   Carnap	  deems	   the	  EQ	   to	   be	   the	   philosophical	  question,	   in	   particular	   the	   question	   philosophers	   try	   to	   ask	   when	  inquiring	  into	  the	  metaphysical	  status	  of	  a	  thing.	  The	  IQ’s	  are	  deemed	  as	  merely	  relative	   to	   frameworks,	  which	  only	   tell	  us	  what	  a	   framework’s	  rules	  say	  there	  is,	  rather	  than	  what	  there	  really	  is	  (as	  is	  done	  by	  the	  EQ).	  	  	  	  Other	  than	  being	  relative,	  IQ’s	  are	  also	  trivial	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  general	  existence	   questions,	   further	   showing	   that	   it	   is	   not	   the	   IQ	   that	   is	   of	  importance	   to	   philosophers	   when	   doing	   ontology.	   Internally	   to	   the	  thing-­‐framework	  we	  can	  ask	  whether	  there	  are	  microwaves	  and	  kittens,	  and	  whether	   it	   is	  wrong	  to	  put	  one	   inside	  of	   the	  other,	  but	  we	  cannot	  non-­‐trivially	  ask	  whether	   there	  are	   things	  in	  general	  as	  a	  whole,	   since	  the	  framework	  in	  question	  is	  the	  framework	  for	  things	  and	  so	  it	  trivially	  states	  that	  there	  are	  things	  for	  the	  framework	  itself	  to	  govern.	  Relative	  and	   internal	   to	   the	   framework	   that	   governs	   a	   particular	   entity	   X,	   the	  rules	  will	  trivially	  entail	  that	  there	  are	  Xs,	  and	  so	  the	  IQ	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  deliver	  interesting	  metaphysical	  results.	  The	  ontological	  questions	  that	  philosophers	   are	   asking	   are	   thus	   not	   internal,	   as	   to	   answer	   (trivially)	  that	   there	   are	   Xs	   internal	   and	   relative	   to	   the	   X-­‐framework	   is	   not	  sufficient	  for	  being	  a	  realist	  about	  X	  in	  a	  metaphysical	  sense.	  The	  extra	  commitment	   necessary	   for	   realism	   is	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   external,	  absolute,	  framework-­‐independent	  existence	  of	  X,	  regardless	  of	  what	  the	  framework	   that	  governs	  X	  says	   there	   is	  relative	   to	   it.	   It	   is	   thus	   the	  EQ	  that	   is	   of	   ontological	   importance,	   as	   it	   is	   the	   philosophers’	   different	  answers	  towards	  EQ’s	  that	  divide	  them	  into	  realists	  and	  antirealists.12	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  These	  positions	  may	  also	  be	  held	  within	  a	  framework,	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2	  section	  I.	  I	  will	  show	  that	  things	  can	  be	  said	  to	  exist	  (or	  not	  exist)	  according	  to	  the	  frameworks	  rules	  by	   instantiating	   (or	  not)	   the	  existence	  predicate.	  As	  such	   there	  can	  be	   internal	  realists	  and	  antirealists	  about	  certain	  entities	  but	  these	  positions	  are	  not	  metaphysical.	  
	   17	  The	  EQ	  questions	  things	  from	  a	  vantage	  point	  external	  to	  frameworks	  –	  it	   is	   framework	   transcendent.	   To	   ask	   the	   EQ	   ‘are	   there	   Xs?’	   is	   to	   ask,	  outside	   of	   the	   framework,	  whether	   X	   exists.	   According	   to	   Carnap,	   the	  EQ	   cannot	   be	   answered	   when	   understood	   like	   this	   as	   a	   metaphysical	  question	   about	   objective	   existence.	   Carnap	   argues	   that	   the	   EQ	   so	  construed	   is	  misguided	   and	   confused,	   a	  mere	   pseudo-­‐question,	   as	  we	  cannot	   talk	   about	   X	   outside	   of	   the	   framework,	   as	   the	   framework	   is	  precisely	  where	  the	  term	  ‘X’	  gets	  its	  meaning.	  As	  such,	  any	  external	  use	  of	   X	   is	   rendered	   meaningless	   and	   any	   external	   questioning	   of	   X	   is	  stripped	  of	  a	  criterion	  for	  determining	  an	  answer.	  Since	  the	  framework	  for	   the	   system	   of	   X	   provides	   the	   rules	   for	   meaning	   and	   usage	   of	   the	  term	  X,	  to	  speak	  meaningfully	  of	  X	  outside	  of	  the	  X-­‐framework	  is	  simply	  impossible.	  To	  question	  the	  external	  existence	  of	  the	  system	  of	  entities	  as	   a	   whole	   is	   meaningless,	   as	   existence	   is	   derived	   from	   within	   the	  framework.	  The	  concept	  of	  existence	  applies	  only	  within	  a	  framework,	  so	   to	  apply	   it	   externally	   is	  void	  of	  meaning.	  The	  EQ	   is	   thus	  asked	  and	  answered	  externally	  and	  independently	  of	  frameworks	  and	  meaning.	  	  	  It	   is	   this	   metaphysical	   reading	   of	   the	   EQ	   that	   Carnap	   dismisses	   as	   a	  pseudo-­‐question	  to	  reject	  ontology	  (yet	  he	  reforms	  this	  EQ	  as	  pragmatic,	  see	  section	  III.ii).	  Given	  this	  rejection	  of	  the	  metaphysical	  EQ,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  further	  existence	  question	  for	  philosophers	  to	  answer	  other	  than	  those	  internal	  to	  frameworks	  which	  can	  be	  asked	  by	  any	  language	  user.	  The	  EQ	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  asked	  by	  any	  old	  language	  user,	  but	  rather	  solely	  by	  philosophers,	  and	  for	  Carnap	  it	  has	  no	  answer.	  Since	  it	   is	  the	  philosophers	   that	   entertain	   the	   EQ	   when	   doing	   metaphysics,	   Carnap	  deems	  such	  metaphysical	  ontological	  debate	  as	  meaningless.	  This	  type	  of	   position	   that	   ultimately	   stays	   quiet	   on	   the	   metaphysical	   absolute	  facts	  of	  ontology	  is	  called	  ‘quietism’,	  and	  Carnap	  is	  called	  a	  ‘quietist’	  –	  he	  is	  quiet	  with	  regard	  to	  metaphysics,	  as	  to	  be	  loud	  is	  simply	  meaningless.	  In	  contributing	  to	  way	  (i),	  Carnap	  thus	  clarifies	  existence	  questions	  as	  being	  either	  meaningful	  IQ’s	  or	  meaningless	  metaphysical	  EQ’s.	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  III.ii.	  Outlining	  how	  to	  answer	  the	  question.	  	  	  Now	  that	  we	  have	  seen	  how	  Carnap	  contributes	  to	  (i)	   in	  clarifying	  the	  meaningful	  existence	  questions	  as	  being	   internal,	  we	  now	  need	   to	   see	  how	  he	  contributes	  to	  (ii)	  in	  how	  they	  are	  outlined	  as	  being	  answered.	  As	   described	   above,	   internal	   questions	   are	   relative	   questions,	   and	   so	  they	  are	  outlined	  as	  answered	  relative	  to	  framework	  rules.	  So	  existence	  becomes	   framework-­‐relative.	  An	  existence	  question	  such	  as	   ‘are	   there	  numbers?’	  will	   have	  no	   absolute	   answer	  when	   taken	   as	   an	  EQ,	   as	   the	  only	  meaningful	  way	  of	  asking	  the	  question	  will	  be	  when	  it	  is	  taken	  as	  an	  IQ	  relative	  to	  frameworks.	  Independent	  of	  the	  framework,	  there	  will	  not	  be	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question.	  Therefore,	  EQ’s	  are	  meaningless	  and	  ontological	  questions	  become	  relativized	  as	  IQ’s.	  As	  Hylton13	  describes:	  	  Carnap	  holds	   that	   if	  we	   attempt	   to	   ask	   the	  question	   absolutely	  rather	   than	   relative	   to	   a	   particular	   language,	   then	   we	   are	  crossing	   the	   bounds	   of	   sense:	   There	   simply	   is	   no	   absolute	  question	   to	   be	   asked.	   The	   result	   of	   this	   is	   that	   the	   ontological	  question	  vanishes,	  along	  with	  other	  metaphysical	  questions.	  The	  ontological	   question	   was	   precisely	   the	   absolute	   question,	   and	  Carnap	  denies	  it	  any	  meaning.	  	  The	  IQ’s	  are	  meaningful	  since	  they	  ask	  about	  how	  things	  are	  relative	  to	  the	  relevant	  framework	  utilizing	  that	  frameworks	  rules	  to	  give	  meaning	  to	  the	  terms.	  The	  IQ	  is	  divided	  into	  the	  ones	  that	  are	  answered	  trivially	  (i.e.	  are	  analytic	  as	  a	   trivial	  consequence	  of	   the	   framework	   itself),	  and	  others	   that	   are	   empirical,	   or	   analytic	   but	   not	   trivial,	   by	   being	   logical	  consequences	  of	  the	  framework	  rules.	  If	  we	  have	  adopted	  a	  framework	  for	  the	  system	  of	  an	  entity	  X,	  then	  the	  IQ	  ‘are	  there	  Xs?’	  asks	  whether	  X	  exists	  internally	  to	  the	  X-­‐framework	  and	  hence	  is	  of	  the	  former	  category	  (trivial	   and	   analytic):	   the	   framework	   for	   the	   system	   of	   X	   obviously	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Found	  in	  Gibson	  (ed.)	  (2004)	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Quine	  p130	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  includes	   such	   an	   X,	   so	   X	   trivially	   ‘exists’	   within	   and	   according	   to	   the	  framework	  for	  X.	  More	  specific	   IQ’s	  however	  are	  not	  so	  trivial	  and	  fall	  into	   the	   latter	   category:	   they	   would	   be	   answered	   analytically	   or	  empirically	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   X	   by	   the	   rules	   governed	   by	   the	  framework.	  Whether	  the	  question	  is	  answered	  by	  analytic	  or	  empirical	  means	  depends	  on	  the	  framework	  and	  the	  exact	  question	  at	   issue.	  For	  example,	  using	  a	  framework	  of	  ‘animals’,	  the	  IQ	  ‘are	  there	  black	  swans?’	  would	  be	  answered	  empirically.	  Whereas	  a	  mathematical	  question,	  on	  the	   other	   hand,	   like	   ‘is	   there	   a	   prime	   between	   2	   and	   4?’	   is	   answered	  from	  within	  a	  number	   framework	  analytically	  using	   the	  mathematical	  rules	  to	  deduce	  an	  answer.	  Hence,	  IQ’s	  are	  outlined	  as	  being	  answered	  trivially,	  empirically,	  or	  analytically,	  relative	  to	  the	  frameworks	  rules.	  	  	  So	  which	   frameworks	  are	  our	   internal	  existence	  questions	  relative	  to?	  For	  Carnap	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  pragmatic	  choice,	  where	  in	  order	  to	  choose	  frameworks	   we	   ask	   ‘which	   are	   the	   most	   useful?’.	   This	   usefulness14	  is	  measured	  by	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  discourse	  itself,	  where	  this	  usefulness	  for	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  discourse	  cannot	  be	  spelled	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  truth	  (even	  when	   the	   aim	   of	   the	   discourse	   may	   seem	   to	   be	   truthfulness)	   since	  frameworks,	   for	   Carnap,	   do	   not	   aim	   at	   truth.	   In	   Carnap’s	   words,	   we	  adopt	   frameworks	   that	   are	   “fruitful	   [and]	   conducive	   to	   the	   aim	   for	  which	   the	   language	   is	   intended.”15	  Once	   a	   framework	   is	   selected	   as	  being	  practical	  and	  is	  thus	  adopted,	  the	  language	  of	  the	  things	  internal	  to	  that	  framework	  may	  be	  used	  to	  describe	  what	  there	  is	  relative	  to	  that	  framework’s	  rules.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  way	  that	  Carnap	  removes	  the	  confusion	  and	  meaninglessness	  from	  the	  EQ,	  as	  he	  reforms	  it	  from	  a	  metaphysical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  But	  a	  problem	  lurks	  regarding	  whether	  usefulness	   is	  assessed	  against	  a	  reality	  we	  are	   meant	   to	   be	   being	   quiet	   about.	   What	   exactly	   are	   we	   basing	   our	   pragmatic	  considerations	   on	   here?	  What	   is	   it	   that	   is	  making	   one	   framework	  more	   useful	   than	  another?	   It	   seems	   the	  basis	   for	   judgment,	   the	  determiner	  of	  usefulness,	   comes	   from	  external	   to	   frameworks,	   to	   compare	   frameworks	   against.	   Furthermore,	   what	   does	  ‘useful’	  even	  mean?	  In	  order	  to	  choose	  a	  framework	  as	  useful	  we	  would	  need	  a	  higher-­‐order	  framework	  to	  refer	  to	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  meaning	  to	  the	  word	  ‘useful’,	  and	  to	  compare	  frameworks	  internally	  to.	  This	  hierarchy	  is	  given	  in	  chapter	  4	  on	  paradoxes.	  15	  Carnap	  (1950)	  p29	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  question	  into	  a	  pragmatic	  question	  of	  whether	  to	  adopt	  the	  framework	  or	  not.	  So,	  legitimate	  EQ’s	  are	  about	  which	  frameworks	  to	  adopt	  and	  are	  matters	   of	   pragmatism	   rather	   than	   metaphysical	   reality	   –	   they	   are	  metaphysically	  quiet.	  Adopting	  a	  framework	  means	  nothing	  more	  than	  accepting	  a	  language	  form	  as	  practical,	  and	  nothing	  more	  ontological	  or	  metaphysical	  should	  be	  read	  into	  it.	  Pragmatics	  are	  just	  pragmatics.	  	  	  This	  pragmatic	   turn	  would	  remove	   the	  confusion	   from	  ontology	   if	   the	  metaphysical	  debate	  became	  a	  pragmatic	  debate	  over	  whether	  to	  adopt	  certain	  frameworks	  (as	  opposed	  to	  a	  debate	  over	  external	  facts	  about	  a	  metaphysical	  reality).	  This	  would	  result	   in	  entities	  X	  being	  considered	  existent	  if	  it	  is	  practical	  to	  have	  talk	  of	  them	  as	  existing.	  The	  ontological	  debate	  would	  thus	  be	  transformed	  into	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  pragmatic	  virtues	   of	   accepting	   a	   system	   of	   entities,	   rather	   than	   an	   evaluation	   of	  the	   external	   truth	   of	   whether	   the	   system	   of	   entities	   metaphysically	  exists.	   The	   EQ	   ‘are	   there	   numbers?’	   hence	   turns	   from	   a	  metaphysical	  question	   about	   the	   external	   existence	   of	   numbers	   into	   a	   practical	  question	  of	  whether	  to	  adopt	  the	  framework	  for	  the	  system	  of	  numbers	  –	   ‘is	   it	  useful	  to	  adopt	  the	  number	  framework?’.	  The	  new	  direction	  for	  ontology	   is	   that	   of	   quiet	   pragmatism	   rather	   than	   loud	  metaphysics	   in	  order	  to	  be	  meaningful.	  This	  new	  direction	  is	  detailed	  later	  in	  section	  IV.	  	  	  For	  Carnap,	  the	  general	  EQ	  ‘what	  exists?’	  is	  thus	  answered	  by	  deciding	  which	   frameworks	   to	   accept	   and	   the	   internal	   answers	   generated	  relative	  to	  it.	  He	  clarifies	  that	  we	  do	  not	  decide	  on	  a	  framework	  that	  we	  think	  may	   ‘reflect’	   reality.	   This	   is	   because,	   he	   argues,	   the	   EQ	   (or	   any	  external	  existence	  assertion)	   is	  non-­‐cognitive:	  “the	  external	  statement,	  the	  philosophical	  statement…	  is	  devoid	  of	  cognitive	  content.”16	  For	  that	  reason,	   ‘are	   there	   Xs?’	   when	   taken	   as	   an	   EQ	   is	   not	   truth-­‐apt.	   As	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Carnap	  (1950)	  p26.	  I	  (and	  Carnap)	  use	  ‘non-­‐cognitive’	  here	  to	  mean	  ‘not	  truth-­‐apt’.	  Yet	  Kalderon	  (2005a)	  reserves	  ‘non-­‐cognitive’	  to	  mean	  an	  attitude	  less	  than	  belief,	  and	  uses	  ‘non-­‐factive’	  to	  mean	  ‘not	  truth-­‐apt’.	  See	  chapter	  3	  footnotes	  213	  and	  222.	  	  
	   21	  metaphysical	  EQ	   it	   is	  not	   truth-­‐apt	  because	   it	   is	  meaningless,	  and	  as	  a	  pragmatic	   EQ	   it	   is	   not	   truth-­‐apt	   because	   practical	   considerations	   are	  not	   evidential	   for	   reality.	   Hence	   settling	   on	   the	   best	   frameworks	   to	  adopt	   need	  not	   be	   those	   that	   are	   best	  matched	   to	   an	   external	   reality.	  Due	   to	   the	   non-­‐cognitive	   nature	   of	   the	   EQ,	   accepting	   a	   framework	  allows	  us	   to	   talk	   of	  what	   exists	  within	   the	   framework	  but	   it	   does	   not	  reflect	   or	   impact	   on	   any	   external	   ontology.	   Therefore,	   our	   internal	  language	  usage	  and	  our	  external	  pragmatic	   framework	  choices	  will	  be	  metaphysically	   quiet	   and	   ontologically	   neutral,	   hence	   Carnap	   is	   a	  quietist.17	  Carnap	   has	   thus	   contributed	   to	   (i)	   in	   clarifying	   existence	  questions	  as	  being	  internal	  (IQ)	  or	  external	  (EQ),	  and	  has	  contributed	  to	  (ii)	  in	  outlining	  how	  to	  answer	  such	  questions	  via	  analytic	  or	  empirical	  means	  for	  IQ’s	  and	  via	  pragmatic	  framework	  choice	  for	  EQ’s.	  	  	  	  III.iii.	  Answering	  the	  question.	  	  	  If	   philosophers	   are	   interested	   in	   EQ’s,	   then	   their	   contribution	   to	  answering	  ‘what	  exists?’	  is	  only	  intermediate,	  since	  according	  to	  Carnap	  philosophers	  can	  contribute	  to	  (i)	  our	  understanding	  of	  such	  existence	  questions	  by	  clarifying	  the	  questions	  as	  external	  and	  hence	  being	  either	  meaningless	  or	  pragmatic,	  and	  to	  (ii)	  outlining	  how	  to	  answer	  existence	  questions	  as	  either	  impossible	  or	  being	  a	  pragmatic	  decision	  regarding	  acceptance	  of	  a	   framework,	  but	  philosophers	  cannot	  contribute	  to	  (iii)	  the	  actual	  answering	  of	  them.	  This	  is	  because	  it	  is	  either	  impossible	  to	  answer	   the	  EQ	   if	   it	   is	  meaningless,	   or	   it	   is	   the	  work	   of	   the	   specialists	  within	  the	  field	  of	  which	  the	  framework	  refers	  to	  if	  the	  EQ	  is	  pragmatic.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Hopefully	  it	  is	  clear	  to	  see	  that	  Carnap	  (1950)	  has	  established	  his	  quietism	  and	  the	  meaninglessness	   of	   metaphysics	   independently	   of	   any	   Verificationist	   principle,	   so	  Verificationism	  will	  not	  be	  addressed	  in	  this	  thesis	  other	  than	  in	  chapter	  4	  sections	  I.ii	  and	  III.i,	  regarding	  the	  Verificationist’s	  self-­‐reference	  problem.	  Carnap’s	  IQ’s	  are	  either	  empirically	   or	   analytically	   answered,	   as	   Verificationist	   meaningful	   propositions	   are	  empirically	   or	   analytically	   verifiable,	   however	   since	   there	   are	   other	   ways	   to	   be	  meaningful	  for	  Carnap	  (by	  being	  answered	  trivially	  or	  pragmatically)	  then	  there	  is	  no	  exact	  parallel	  between	  the	  Verificationist	  and	  Carnapian	  principles	  of	  meaningfulness.	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  It	   cannot	  be	   the	  philosopher’s	   job	   to	  decide	  which	   framework	   is	  most	  practical	  for	  the	  mathematicians,	  for	  instance,	  as	  Leng	  describes:	  	   In	   the	   case	  of	  mathematics,	  pure	  mathematicians	   can	  be	   left	   to	  answer	  the	  internal	  questions	  that	  arise	  regarding	  their	  theories,	  and	   natural	   scientists	   to	   answer	   the	   practical	   questions	  regarding	   whether	   to	   adopt	   these	   theories	   as	   part	   of	   our	  description	   of	   the	   world.	   In	   each	   case,	   on	   Carnap’s	   view;	   a	  positive	   answer	   to	   an	   internal	   question	   within	   a	   given	  framework,	   or	   a	   decision	   to	   adopt	   a	   particular	   framework,	  suggests	   nothing	   of	   particular	   philosophical	   interest,	   at	   least	  regarding	  ontology.18	  	  	  Carnap	  states	  that	  for	  philosophers	  to	  choose	  which	  framework	  is	  best	  for	  other	  disciplines	  like	  mathematics	  for	  example	  “is	  worse	  than	  futile;	  it	  is	  positively	  harmful	  because	  it	  may	  obstruct	  scientific	  progress.”19	  As	  such,	   Carnap	   clarifies	   that	   it	   is	   not	   the	   philosophers’	   job	   to	   answer	  pragmatic	  EQ’s.	  But	  worse,	  if	  it	  is	  conceded	  that	  the	  pragmatic	  EQ	  is	  not	  the	   existence	   question	   that	   ontologists	   are	   interested	   in	   (since	   they	  were	  rather	  more	  interested	  in	  metaphysics	  than	  pragmatics),	  then	  the	  philosopher	   cannot	   even	   meaningfully	   ask	   the	   existence	   question	   let	  alone	  answer	  it.	  Ontology	  therefore	  becomes	  impossible	  and	  doomed	  as	  an	  unphilosophical	  project	   from	  the	  start.	  The	  metametaphysician	  has	  then	  outlined	  the	  (lack	  of)	  work	  for	  the	  philosopher	  as	  amounting	  to	  (i)	  clarifying	  the	  ontological	  existence	  question	  and	  (ii)	  how	  to	  answer	   it,	  but	  not	  including	  (iii)	  actually	  answering	  it.	  What	  is	  left,	  in	  what	  I	  have	  called	  ‘Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Ontology’	  in	  the	  next	  section	  IV,	  is	  to	  answer	  the	  IQ’s	   of	   what	   exists	   within	   pragmatically	   chosen	   frameworks.20	  I	   will	  now	   outline	   the	   effects	   of	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Ontology	   for	   realism	   and	  antirealism	  in	  the	  next	  section	  (and	  fictionalism	  in	  chapter	  3	  section	  III).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Leng	  (2005)	  p286	  19	  Carnap	  (1950)	  p35	  	  20	  In	  chapter	  2	  section	  I,	  I	  argue	  that	  IQ’s	  are	  answered	  with	  a	  (metaphysically	  quiet)	  existence	  predicate	  which	  allows	  realist/antirealist	  positions	  to	  be	  formed	  internally.	  
	   23	  IV.	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Ontology.	  	  	  So	  far,	  Carnap	  has	  clarified	  that	  the	  ontological	  existence	  question	  that	  is	   of	   importance	   to	  metaphysicians	   is	   the	   external	   question	   (the	   EQ).	  Given	   that	   the	  EQ	   is,	   on	   Carnap’s	   recommendation,	   reformulated	   as	   a	  pragmatic	  question,	  the	  ontological	  debate	  would	  thus	  be	  transformed	  into	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  practical	  virtues	  of	  accepting	  a	  system,	  rather	  than	  what	   it	  was	   traditionally	   –	   a	  debate	  over	  whether	   the	   things	   the	  system	  presupposes	  really	  exist.	  The	  EQ	  ‘are	  there	  Xs?’	  is	  now	  replaced	  by	  the	  question	  ‘is	  it	  useful	  to	  adopt	  the	  X-­‐framework?’.	  Using	  Carnap’s	  methodology,	   it	   is	  this	  that	  is	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  debate	  that	  remains:	  not	  the	  existence	  of	  entity	  X,	  but	  the	  usefulness	  of	  an	  X-­‐framework	  (and	  what	   is	  said	  to	  exist	  relative	  to	   it).	  As	  discussed	   in	  chapter	  3,	  with	  the	  transformation	  of	  frameworks	  into	  fictions,	  ontology	  becomes	  the	  study	  of	   which	   fictions	   are	   useful	   to	   adopt,	   and	   these	   fictions	   will	   provide	  answers	  to	  (non-­‐metaphysical)	  existence	  questions.	  What	  we	  say	  exists	  is	  what	  is	  most	  useful	  to	  say	  exists	  (and,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2,	  what	  falls	  under	  the	  internal	  predicate	  for	  ‘exists’).	  Any	  further	  metaphysical	  question	   is	   rendered	  meaningless.	  Metaphysical	   debates	  of	   reality	   are	  rejected,	  and	  the	  remaining	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  debate	  is	  merely	  pragmatic.	  I	  now	  show	  how	  quietism	  affects	  metaphysical	  realism	  and	  antirealism.	  	  	  IV.i.	  Realism.	  	  	  Take	  the	  existence	  question	  ‘Is	  there	  a	  prime	  number	  between	  2	  and	  4?’.	  This	  can	  be	  interpreted	  in	  two	  different	  ways,	  according	  to	  Carnap:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  an	  internal	  question	  (IQ):	  ‘Is	  3	  a	  prime	  number?’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  an	  external	  question	  (EQ):	  ‘Does	  3,	  or	  any	  number,	  really	  exist?’	  	  
	   24	  The	   Carnapian	   quietist	   argues	   that	   the	   EQ	   is	   meaningless	   unless	  understood	  pragmatically.	  The	  traditional	  ontologist	  contrary	  to	  Carnap,	  says	  the	  metaphysical	  reading	  of	  the	  EQ	  can	  be	  answered	  meaningfully	  and	  to	  answer	  such	  EQ’s	  positively	  (with	  a	  ‘yes’)	  is	  exactly	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  realist	  about	  the	  things	  in	  question	  (and	  an	  antirealist	  otherwise):	  To	  not	  only	  answer	  that	  3	  is	  a	  prime	  number,	  but	  to	  further	  say	  that	  there	  
really	  are	  numbers	  like	  3,	  is	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  a	  realist	  about	  numbers.	  It	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  claim	  that	  according	  to	  the	  number-­‐framework	  there	  are	  numbers	   (for	   that	   is	   trivial),	   the	   extra	   commitment	   necessary	   to	   be	   a	  realist	   is	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   existence	   of	   numbers	   externally	   to	   the	  number-­‐framework.	   It	   is	   the	  answer	   to	   the	  EQ	   that	  carries	   the	  weight	  and	   sets	   apart	   the	   traditional	   realists	   from	   the	   antirealists	   about	   a	  certain	  entity.	  Since	  the	  traditional	  realist	  is	  therefore	  defined	  by	  their	  positive	  answer	  to	  EQ’s,	  I	  call	  this	  position	  ‘E-­‐realism’	  (E	  for	  external).	  	  	  	  This	  traditional	  realist	  (E-­‐realist)	  about	  an	  entity	  X	  argues	  that	  X	  really	  exists.	  They	  answer	  the	  metaphysical	  EQ	  with	  ‘yes,	  Xs	  really	  exist’.	  Since	  they	  cannot	  meaningfully	  ask	  or	  answer	  the	  EQ	  in	  this	  way,	  according	  to	  Carnap,	   then	   all	   they	   can	   say	   is	   that	   it	   is	   conducive	   to	   adopt	   the	  framework	   that	   governs	   entity	   X	   and	   answer	   the	   reformulated	  
pragmatic	   EQ	   with	   ‘yes,	   X-­‐talk	   is	   useful’.	   The	   realist	   position	   then	  amounts	   to	  merely	   a	  position	   that	   adopts	   the	  X-­‐framework	   (as	   this	   is	  what	  it	  is	  to	  answer	  the	  pragmatic	  EQ	  with	  a	   ‘yes’).	  However	  since	  the	  people	  who	  talk	  of	  X	   include	  those	  that	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  X,21	  then	  all	  must	  have	  accepted	  and	  adopted	  the	   framework	   for	  X	   to	  give	   their	  talk	  meaning.	  Realism	  therefore	   loses	  all	   sense	  of	  what	   it	   traditionally	  stands	  for	  (since	  it	  encompasses	  anyone	  who	  utilizes	  the	  language	  of	  X	  by	  talking	  of	  X	  internally	  to	  the	  adopted	  X-­‐framework,	  in	  order	  to	  speak	  of	   X’s	   existence	   or	   non-­‐existence),	   and	   as	   a	   consequence	   is	   either	  rendered	   confused	   or	   simply	   describes	   any	   position	   that	   adopts	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  This	  may	  prove	  problematic	  for	  true	  negative	  existential	  claims,	  such	  as	  (Christmas	  spoiler	  alert…)	  ‘Santa	  Claus	  does	  not	  exist’,	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2	  sections	  I	  and	  IV.	  
	   25	  framework	   for	   whichever	   thing	   is	   in	   question.	   Simply	   to	   talk	   of	   X	  meaningfully	   entails	   being	   a	   realist	   about	   X	   since	   the	   X-­‐framework	   is	  adopted.	  Such	  a	   ‘realism’	  is	  not	  the	  external	  realism	  that	  ontology	  as	  a	  practice	  was	  aiming	  for,	  and	  insofar	  as	  adopting	  a	  framework	  as	  being	  useful	   is	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  to	  answer	  the	  pragmatic	  EQ	  positively,	  this	  pragmatic	  EQ	  cannot	  be	  fit	  for	  ontology	  which	  remains	  impossible.	  	  	  	  Carnap	  notes	  in	  his	   ‘Empiricism,	  Semantics,	  and	  Ontology’22	  paper	  that	  Quine	   construes	   Carnap	   as	   a	   ‘platonic	   realist’23,	   but	   through	   personal	  communication	  with	  each	  other	  they	  clarified	  that	  this	  realism	  was	  not	  the	   realism	   of	   Plato’s	   metaphysical	   doctrine	   of	   universals	   but	   rather	  just	   referred	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   Carnap	   accepts	   a	   particular	   linguistic	  framework	   that	   contains	   universals	   (in	   order	   to	   talk	   of	   them	  meaningfully).	  Since	  such	  ‘realism’	  is	  not	  that	  of	  traditional	  E-­‐realism	  as	  described	  above,	  Carnap	  finds	  Quine’s	  usage	  of	  the	  word	  ‘realism’	  here	  to	   be	   misleading.24 	  For	   Carnap,	   ‘realism’	   is	   reserved	   to	   name	   the	  position	  of	  those	  who	  believe	  they	  are	  doing	  metaphysical	  ontology,	  and	  so	   the	  word	   is	   rendered	  meaningless.	  Carnap’s	  quietist	  project	   is	   thus	  not	  to	  be	  construed	  as	  ‘realism’.	  I	  will	  not	  be	  using	  the	  term	  ‘realist’	  for	  Carnap	  since	  it	  is	  misleading	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Carnap	  points	  out,	  but	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  Quine	  considers	  this	  position	  to	  be	  realist	  –	  in	  so	  far	  as	  one	  answers	  the	  pragmatic	  EQ	  with	  a	  ‘yes’	  by	  accepting	  and	  adopting	  a	  framework	  for	  being	  useful.	  I	  pull	  apart	  this	  Quinean	  usage	  of	  ‘realism’	  from	   the	   metaphysical	   usage	   of	   ‘realism’	   to	   avoid	   confusion,	   naming	  them	  I-­‐realism	  (for	  internal-­‐realism)	  and	  E-­‐realism	  respectively	  (and	  in	  chapter	   1	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   I-­‐realism	   is	   not	   real	   realism).	   As	   Burgess	  recognizes:	   “there	   is	  hardly	  any	  bit	  of	  philosophical	   terminology	  more	  diversely	  used	  and	  overused	  and	  misused	  than	  the	  R-­‐word.”25	  I	  discuss	  I-­‐realism	  in	  section	  V	  but	  first	  I	  will	  describe	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  antirealism.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Carnap	  (1950)	  note	  5	  23	  Quine	  (1951a)	  and	  Quine	  (1948)	  24	  Carnap	  (1950)	  note	  5.	  More	  on	  this	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  1	  section	  V.	  25	  Burgess	  (2004)	  p19	  
	   26	  IV.ii.	  Antirealism.	  	  	  Antirealists	  about	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  entity	  may	  answer	  the	  IQ	  with	  either	  a	   ‘yes’	   or	   ‘no’	   (depending	   on	   the	   type	   of	   antirealist)	   whilst	   crucially	  maintaining	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  relevant	  EQ	  is	  ‘no’	  (claiming	  that	  the	  thing	   in	   question	   does	   not	   really	   exist).	   For	   example,	   they	  may	   say	   in	  answer	  to	  the	  IQ	  that	  there	  is	  a	  prime	  number	  between	  2	  and	  4,	  whilst	  answering	  the	  EQ	  that	  there	  really	  are	  no	  numbers.	  But	  Carnap	  argues	  that	   the	   IQ	   can	   only	   be	  meaningfully	   answered	  once	   the	  EQ	  has	   been	  answered	   with	   a	   pragmatic	   ‘yes’	   of	   acceptance	   of	   the	   framework	   in	  question	  (in	  order	  to	  utilize	  the	  language	  internal	  to	  it	  meaningfully).	  	  	  	  Antirealism	  would	  therefore	  no	  longer	  be	  a	  viable	  ontological	  position	  according	  to	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian.	  We	  cannot	  answer	  IQ’s	  about	  an	  entity	  X	  until	  we	  have	  accepted	  the	  X-­‐framework	  to	  give	  meaning	  to	  our	  IQ’s,	  and	   this	   acceptance	   of	   the	   framework	   is	   what	   Carnap	   describes	   as	  answering	  the	  pragmatic	  EQ	  with	  a	  non-­‐cognitive	  ‘yes’	  of	  acceptance.	  In	  not	  accepting	  the	  framework	  for	  X	  by	  answering	  the	  EQ	  ‘no’	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  non-­‐existence	  of	  the	  entity,	  the	  antirealist	  then	  has	  no	  framework	  to	  work	  within	  to	  ask	  and	  answer	  IQ’s.	  Thus,	   traditional	  antirealism	  is	  impossible	  and	  unassertable,	  because	  we	  cannot	  talk	  about	  X	  or	  assert	  X’s	   non-­‐existence	  meaningfully	   without	   being	   ‘realist’	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  accepting	  the	  X-­‐framework	  (but	  this	  isn’t	  realism	  for	  Carnap,	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  section).	  The	  antirealist	  therefore	  cannot	  talk	  of	  X	  at	  all,	  not	  even	  to	  deny	  X’s	  existence,	  if	  they	  are	  to	  reject	  the	  X-­‐framework.26	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  In	  order	  to	  retain	  meaningful	  talk	  of	  non-­‐existents,	  I	  will	  put	  forward	  a	  predicate	  for	  ‘exists’	  that	  is	  internal	  and	  metaphysically	  quiet,	  thus	  suitable	  for	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian.	  In	  this	  way,	  a	  framework	  that	  includes	  meaning	  and	  usage	  rules	  for	  a	  particular	  non-­‐existent	   entity	  will	   have	   to	   be	   adopted	  by	   answering	   the	   pragmatic	   EQ	  with	   a	   ‘yes’,	  and	   internal	   to	   this	   framework	   we	   can	   meaningfully	   assert	   the	   non-­‐existence	   of	  entities	   that	   are	   so	   described	   by	   their	   framework	   to	   not	   instantiate	   the	   existence	  predicate	  E!.	  We	  can	   then	  meaningfully	   spoil	  Christmas	   for	   the	  kids	  by	  saying	   ‘Santa	  Claus	  does	  not	  exist’,	  by	  adopting	  a	  framework	  that	  includes	  Santa-­‐talk,	  where	  Santa	  does	  not	  instantiate	  the	  ‘exists’	  predicate.	  See	  chapter	  2	  sections	  I	  and	  VII	  for	  more	  E!.	  
	   27	  This	   reframing	   of	   ontology	   according	   to	   Carnap’s	   quietism	   therefore	  destroys	  the	  possibility	  of	  realism	  and	  antirealism	  (as	  E-­‐realism	  and	  E-­‐antirealism)	   traditionally	   metaphysically	   construed.27	  I	   will	   consider	  Quine’s	  critiques	  of	  Carnap’s	  quiet	  metaontological	  approach	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  1,	  and	  will	  show	  that	  Quine’s	  critique	  fails	  and	  is	  self-­‐defeating.	  I	  will	   also	  compare	  Quine’s	  more	  positive	  metaontology	   to	   that	  which	  Carnap	  prescribes,	  and	  I	  will	  conclude	  that	  Quine’s	  approach	  is	  actually	  no	  more	  positive	   than	  Carnap’s,	  both	  most	  accurately	  being	  described	  as	  ‘quietist	  relativist’	  positions.	  I	  will	  provide	  further	  argument	  against	  Quine’s	  metaontology	   in	   chapter	  2,	   in	  order	   to	   continue	   to	  motivate	  a	  Carnapian	   metaontology.	   But	   before	   that,	   in	   the	   next	   section	   of	   this	  introduction,	  I	  put	  forward	  Quine’s	  position	  as	  ‘I-­‐realism’	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  traditional	  realism	  as	  E-­‐realism.	  Once	  I-­‐realism	  has	  been	  clarified,	  we	  will	  then	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  attack	  it	  in	  the	  two	  coming	  chapters.	  	  	  	   V.	  Quine’s	  Metaontology.	  	  	  We	  have	  so	  far	  experienced	  two	  extremes:	  ‘Quietism’	  as	  the	  rejection	  of	  metaphysical	   ontology,	   and	   ‘E-­‐realism’	   as	   a	   metaphysical	   ontological	  position.	  Yet	  Quine	  attempts	  to	  find	  a	  middle	  way	  in-­‐between	  these	  two	  extremes	   in	   order	   to	   save	   realism.	   Those	   like	   Quine	   who	   fall	   on	   this	  middle	  path	  are	  not	  quite	  E-­‐realist	  (since	  they	  reject	   the	  metaphysical	  reading	   of	   the	   EQ)	   yet	   they	   also	   are	   not	   quite	   quietists	   (since	   they	  believe	   the	   rejection	   of	   the	   EQ	   should	   not	   lead	   to	   being	   quiet	   about	  ontology).	  This	   in-­‐between	  position	  is	  held	  by	  Quine,	  who,	   like	  Carnap	  rejects	   the	   questioning	   of	   things	   in	   an	   external	   way,	   however	   unlike	  Carnap	  claims	  to	  not	  then	  be	  quietist	  about	  ontology	  because	  he	  argues	  that	  realism	  should	  not	  be	  equated	  with	  E-­‐realism	  but	  rather	  should	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Yet	  one	  could	  respond	  that	  their	  model	  of	  ontology	  does	  in	  fact	  allow	  for	  antirealism	  by	  rejecting	  a	  theory	  involving	  entity	  X	  by	  refusing	  to	  go	  in	  for	  X-­‐talk	  altogether,	  whilst	  talking	   about	   this	   rejection	   from	   within	   another	   theory.	   Carnap	   however	   does	   not	  consider	  this	  rejection	  to	  have	  metaphysical	  significance	  since	  it	  is	  merely	  pragmatic.	  
	   28	  considered	   as	   I-­‐realism.	   For	   Quine,	   the	   ontological	   question	   ‘what	  exists?’	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  IQ,	  not	  an	  EQ.28	  To	  be	  I-­‐realist	  is	  to	  be	  ontologically	  committed	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  things	  to	  which	  you	  answer	  IQ’s	  positively	  (within	  adopted	  practical	  scientific	  frameworks).	  Quine’s	   I-­‐realism	   thus	   aims	   to	   save	   ontology	   in	   the	   face	   of	   Carnap’s	  quietism.	  I	  will	  now	  provide	  the	  details	  of	  Quine’s	  I-­‐realist	  position.	  	  	  	  Quine	  in	  his	  paper	  ‘On	  What	  There	  Is’	  (1948)	  argues	  that	  the	  ontological	  question	   ‘what	   exists?’	   should	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   quantificational	  question,	  and	  answered	  via	  a	  quantificational	  analysis	  of	  the	  ontological	  commitments	   of	   the	   best	   overall	   scientific	   theory	   of	   the	   world.	   We	  should	   judge	   a	   theory	   to	   be	   best,	   and	   hence	   accept	   its	   ontology,	   in	   a	  similar	   way	   to	   how	   we	   judge	   (and	   accept)	   scientific	   theories	   and	  Carnapian	   linguistic	   frameworks	   –	   by	   what	   is	   reasonably	   the	   most	  simple	  that	  fits	  our	  experiences,	  thus	  being	  the	  most	  useful	  to	  adopt:	  	   Our	   acceptance	   of	   an	   ontology	   is…	   similar	   in	   principle	   to	   our	  acceptance	   of	   a	   scientific	   theory,	   say	   a	   system	   of	   physics:	   we	  adopt,	   at	   least	   insofar	   as	   we	   are	   reasonable,	   the	   simplest	  conceptual	  scheme	  into	  which	  the	  disordered	  fragments	  of	  raw	  experience	  can	  be	  fitted	  and	  arranged.29	  	  	  To	  answer	  existence	  questions	  we	  first	  regiment	  the	  propositions	  of	  the	  best	  scientific	  theory	  into	  a	  first	  order	  quantificational	  language,	  and	  we	  can	   then	   extrapolate	   what	   exists	   from	   within	   its	   domain	   of	  quantification.	  So	  far	  then	  Carnap	  would	  be	  in	  agreement	  with	  Quine’s	  method:	   we	   pick	   what	   is	   best	   to	   adopt,	   where	   ‘best’	   is	   pragmatically	  qualified,	  and	  then	  answers	  about	  existence	  are	  derived	  internally	  (for	  Carnap,	  internal	  to	  frameworks,	  for	  Quine,	  internal	  to	  theories).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  The	   issue	   of	   whether	   Quine	   rejects	   the	   EQ	   or	   whether	   he	   collapses	   the	   IQ/EQ	  distinction	  is	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  1	  section	  I.	  It	  suits	  Quine’s	  position	  to	  think	  of	  it	  as	  ‘internal’	  and	  so	  the	  name	  ‘I-­‐realism’	  fits	  despite	  his	  views	  on	  the	  IQ/EQ	  distinction.	  	  29	  Quine	  (1961)	  p16-­‐17	  
	   29	  Quine	  argues	   that	   to	   ask	   ‘do	  numbers	  exist?’	   is	   to	   see	  whether,	  under	  the	  best	  scientific	  theory	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  domain	  of	  quantification	  has	  to	  include	  numbers	  internally	  to	  it	  for	  that	  theory	  in	  use	  to	  be	  true	  as	  a	  
whole.	  This	  is	  where	  Quine’s	  holism	  manifests	  as	  a	  standard	  for	  judging	  the	  commitments	  of	  a	   theory:	  we	  are	  ontologically	  committed	  to	  what	  the	  variables	  of	  quantification	  have	  to	  include	  in	  their	  range	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  whole	  theory	  true	  such	  that	  the	  theory	  is	  verified	  (or	  falsified)	  as	  a	  complete	  unit	  by	  our	  experiences.	  For	  Quine,	  if	  the	  best	  theory	  says	  ‘there	  are	  numbers’,	  then	  there	  have	  to	  be	  numbers	  in	  the	  range	  of	  the	  quantifiers	   for	   that	  sentence,	  which	   is	  asked	  relative	  to	  that	   theory,	   to	  be	   interpreted	   as	   true.	   Those	   things	   that	   have	   to	   exist	   for	   the	   best	  scientific	   theory	   to	   be	   true	  will	   constitute	   the	   domain:	   “Our	   question	  was:	  what	  objects	  does	  a	  theory	  require?	  Our	  answer	   is:	   those	  objects	  that	   have	   to	   be	   values	   of	   variables	   for	   the	   theory	   to	   be	   true.”30	  Therefore,	  under	  a	  true	  best	   theory,	  everything	  that	   is	  quantified	  over	  in	   the	   domain	   (by	   being	   bound	   by	   quantifiers)	   exists,	   hence	   Quine’s	  slogan	  (TB)	  “to	  be	  is	  to	  be	  the	  value	  of	  a	  bound	  variable.”31	  This	  slogan	  TB	   is	  Quine’s	   criterion	   for	  ontological	   commitment,	  which	   is	   the	  basis	  for	  his	  metaontology	  –	  to	  answer	  what	  we	  should	  take	  to	  exist	  we	  look	  to	  the	  bound	  variables	  in	  our	  best	  scientific	  theory.	  	  	  	  Quine,	  who	  aims	  to	  save	  ontology	  from	  quietism	  through	  his	  I-­‐realism,	  plans	   to	   establish	   ontological	   commitments	   from	   our	   language	   usage.	  Quine	   thus	   puts	   forward	   his	   criterion	   (TB)	   for	   what	   our	   ontological	  commitments	  are,	  and	  manifests	  them	  via	  translation	  into	  classical	  first	  order	   predicate	   calculus.	   Quine	   believes	   that	   we	   speak	   in	   an	  ontologically	   committing	  way	   in	  natural	   language	  by	   the	  use	  of	   (what	  he	  sees	  as	  quantificational)	  idioms	  like	  ‘there	  exists’	  and	  ‘there	  are’:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Quine	  (1969)	  p96	  31	  Quine	   (1948)	   p36.	   This	   quantificational	   criterion	   for	   ontological	   commitment	   as	  defined	  by	  Quine’s	  slogan	  TB	  is	  rejected	  in	  chapter	  2	  section	  III:	  I	  say	  quantificational	  commitment	   is	   not	   to	   be	   conflated	   with	   ontological	   commitment,	   and	   thus	   being	   a	  value	  of	  a	  bound	  variable	  is	  not	  to	  be	  conflated	  with	  being	  an	  existent	  thing.	  
	   30	  There	  is	  certainly	  commitment	  to	  entities	  through	  discourse;	  for	  we	  are	  quite	  capable	  of	  saying	   in	  so	  many	  words	  that	  there	  are	  black	   swans,	   that	   there	   is	   a	   mountain	   more	   than	   8800metres	  high,	  and	   that	   there	  are	  primes	  above	  100.	  Saying	   these	   things,	  we	   also	   say	   by	   implication	   that	   there	   are	   physical	   objects	   and	  abstract	  entities;	  for	  all	  the	  black	  swans	  are	  physical	  objects	  and	  all	  the	  prime	  numbers	  above	  100	  are	  abstract	  entities.32	  	  We	  commit	  ourselves	  to	  an	  ontology	  containing	  numbers	  when	  we	   say	   there	   are	   prime	   numbers	   larger	   than	   a	   million;	   we	  commit	   ourselves	   to	   an	  ontology	   containing	   centaurs	  when	  we	  say	  there	  are	  centaurs;	  and	  we	  commit	  ourselves	  to	  an	  ontology	  containing	  Pegasus	  when	  we	  say	  Pegasus	  is.33	  	  	  For	   Quinean	   I-­‐realists,	   then,	   to	   assert	   a	   quantificational	   claim	   is	   to	  accept	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  thing	  in	  question,	  for	  to	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  something	   you	   have	   chosen	   to	   talk	   about	   and	   be	   ontologically	  committed	  to	  is	  to	  be	  intellectually	  dishonest.34	  To	  talk	  of	  a	  thing	  places	  it	  in	  the	  domain	  and	  once	  it	  is	  quantified	  over	  we	  ought	  to	  accept	  that	  it	  exists	  in	  order	  to	  be	  honest.	  Quine	  finds	  any	  other	  practice	  ‘deplorable’,	  and	  claims	  that	  regimentation	  into	  first	  order	  logic	  is	  to	  be	  the	  method	  of	  demonstrating	  order	  and	  honesty	  in	  our	  ontological	  commitments:	  	  	   We	   find	   philosophers	   allowing	   themselves	   not	   only	   abstract	  terms	   but	   even	   pretty	   unmistakable	   quantifications	   over	  abstract	   objects…	   and	   still	   blandly	   disavowing,	   within	   the	  paragraph,	   any	   claim	   that	   there	   are	   such	   objects…	   In	   our	  canonical	   notation	   of	   quantification,	   then,	   we	   find	   the	  restoration	  of	  law	  and	  order.35	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Quine	  (1976)	  p128	  33	  Quine	  (1961)	  p9	  34	  Putnam	  (1979)	  p347.	  This	  shows	  that	  Quine’s	  theory	   is	   to	  be	   interpreted	  as	  being	  normative,	  regarding	  what	  we	  ought	  to	  be	  considered	  ontologically	  committed	  to.	  	  35	  Quine	  (2013)	  p223	  
	   31	  To	   be	   I-­‐realist,	   therefore,	   is	   to	   be	   ontologically	   committed	   to	   the	  existence	  or	  reality	  of	  the	  things	  about	  which	  you	  answer	  IQ’s	  positively.	  Quine	  is	  careful	  to	  stipulate	  that	  it	  is	  only	  those	  uses	  of	  quantificational	  idioms	  made	  seriously	  with	  regard	  to	  our	  best	  scientific	  theory	  that	  will	  be	   the	   assertions	   to	  whose	   ontology	  we	   ought	   to	   regard	   ourselves	   as	  ontologically	   committed	   to.	   And	   he	   then	   requires	   that	   best	   scientific	  theory	   to	   be	   regimented	   into	   first	   order	   logic	   in	   order	   to	   reveal	   its	  ontological	   commitments.	   Science	   speaks	   of	   things	   and	   as	   such	   those	  things	   are	  members	   of	   the	   domain	   of	   quantification,	   and	   the	  Quinean	  move	   is	   to	   then	   say	   that	  whatever	   is	   in	   this	   domain	  will	   provide	   our	  ontology.36 	  Quantification	   is	   thus	   the	   means	   by	   which	   we	   display	  ontological	   commitment,	   and	   for	   Quine,	   there	   is	   nothing	   more	   to	  realism	  than	  being	  committed	  to	  such	  quantificational	  claims.37	  	  	  For	  Quine,	   there	   is	   no	   requirement	   to	   acknowledge	   any	  metaphysical	  external	  existence	  of	  entity	  X	  to	  be	  a	  realist	  about	  X,	  as	  if	  you	  seriously	  assert	  ‘there	  are	  Xs’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  your	  best	  scientific	  theorizing	  then	  that	   is	   enough,	   according	   to	   the	   Quinean	   I-­‐realist,	   to	   be	   ontologically	  committed	  to	  X.	  (This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  Carnapian	  quietist	  for	  whom	  ontology	   is	   an	   external	  matter,	   and	   thus	   internal	   existence	   assertions	  will	   have	   no	   ontological	   significance).	   For	   I-­‐realism,	   simply	   to	   state	  seriously	   that	  3	   is	   a	  prime	  number,	   for	   instance,	   is	   all	   that	   there	   is	   to	  realism	   and	   to	   be	   ontologically	   committed	   to	   numbers.	   And	   for	   I-­‐realists,	  there	  is	  nothing	  more	  added	  to	  the	  assertion	  ‘there	  is	  a	  prime	  number	  between	  2	  and	  4’	  by	  ‘and	  there	  really	  are	  numbers	  like	  3’.38	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  And	  the	  Quinean	  small	  print	  states	  that	  this	  ontology	  may	  not	  be	  the	  correct	  one	  if	  our	  best	  scientific	  theory	  is	  not	  the	  correct	  one,	  hence	  Quine’s	  fallibilism.	  So	  we	  ought	  to	  take	  it	  as	  our	  ontology	  since	  it	  is	  the	  closest	  we	  can	  get	  but	  also	  ought	  to	  recognize	  that	  it	  may	  not	  be	  the	  true	  ontology.	  This	  is	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  1	  sections	  I.ii	  and	  IV.	  37	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  chapter	  2	  sections	  IV-­‐V	  that	  realism	  cannot	  be	  defined	  in	  Quine’s	  way	  through	  quantificational	  commitment	  since	  the	  quantifiers	  in	  both	  natural	  and	  formal	  languages	  are	  ontologically	  neutral	  and	  non-­‐committal.	  Rather	   I	  will	  put	   forward	  an	  existence	  predicate	  in	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  some	  form	  of	  existential	  commitment.	  	  38	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  chapter	  1	  section	  II	  that	  there	  will	  be	  some	  quantificational	  sentences	  that	  we	  assert	  that	  we	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  be	  ontologically	  committed	  by,	  which	  will	  show	  that	  the	  Quinean	  I-­‐realist	  will	  need	  to	  somehow	  limit	  their	  committing	  assertions.	  
	   32	  Quine	   takes	   all	   statements	   in	   natural	   language	   to	   be	   (in	   principle	   at	  least)	  regimented	   into	  a	  quantified	   first	  order	   logical	  statement	  which	  will	   manifest	   its	   ontological	   commitments.	   After	   specifying	   which	  sentences	  are	  fit	  for	  ontological	  commitment	  in	  natural	  language	  (those	  within	  our	  best	  scientific	   theorizing),	   the	  next	  step	   in	  Quine’s	  strategy	  for	  I-­‐realism	  is	  to	  search	  through	  the	  terminological	  resources	  in	  formal	  language	   to	   determine	   what	   should	   carry	   and	   manifest	   ontological	  commitment.	  Quine	  decides	  that	  the	  bearer	  for	  ontological	  commitment	  is	   the	   quantifier	   ∃	   in	   first	   order	   logic,	   after	   eliminating	   all	   other	  candidates.39	  	  So,	  in	  stating	  ‘3	  is	  a	  prime	  number’	  one	  is	  actually	  stating	  Na∧Pa	  which	   entails	  ∃x(Nx∧Px),	  which	   for	  Quine	   is	   read	   ‘there	  exists	  something	   that	   is	   a	   number	   and	   is	   prime’.	   This	   is	   how	   ontological	  commitments	   are	   derived	   from	   language	   –	   through	   regimentation,	  which	  is	  intended	  to	  display	  the	  underlying	  logical	  form	  of	  our	  natural	  language.	  We	  can	  thus	  deduce	  ontology	  from	  the	  regimentation	  of	  our	  best	   scientific	   theory,	   by	   looking	   to	   what	   is	   quantified	   over	   in	   the	  domain.	  Quine’s	  I-­‐realism	  thus	  clarifies	  existence	  questions	  as	   internal	  to	   the	   best	   scientific	   theory,	   and	   outlines	   that	   we	   answer	   them	   via	  looking	   to	  what	   is	  quantified	  over	   in	   the	  domain	  of	   that	   theory.	  Quine	  hence	  resurrects	  ontology	  in	  part	  as	  a	  philosophical	  project	  (and	  in	  part	  a	  scientific	  project),	  by	  deriving	  existence	  from	  our	  regimented	  science.	  This	  completes	  my	  description	  of	  Carnapian	  and	  Quinean	  metaontology.	  	  	  I	  now	  give	  chapter	  summaries	  before	  attacking	  Quinean	  metaontology	  and	  I-­‐realism	  in	  chapter	  1.	  Then,	  in	  chapter	  2	  I	  provide	  the	  Meinongian	  aspect,	   in	   chapter	   3	   the	   Fictionalist	   aspect,	   and	   in	   chapter	   4	   the	  Dialetheist	  aspect,	  of	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietist	  position	  that	  I	  defend	  in	  this	  thesis.	  In	  the	  Conclusion	  chapter	  I	  will	  put	  to	  rest	  any	  remaining	  worries	  about	  the	  compatibility	  of	  these	  diverse	  aspects	  in	  the	  position.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Quine	   rejects	  names	  as	   carrying	  ontological	   commitment	  by	  defining	  names	  away	  using	   Russell’s	   theory	   of	   descriptions,	   and	   denies	   that	   predicates	   carry	   ontological	  commitment	  as	  this	  would	  commit	  us	  to	  ‘redness’	  etc.	  See	  Quine	  (1948)	  for	  details.	  
	   33	  VI.	  Chapter	  Summaries.	  	  	  VI.i.	  Chapter	  1:	  Quiet	  Relativism.	  	  	  This	  chapter	  compares	  Quine’s	  position	  on	  ontology	  to	  that	  of	  Carnap’s.	  My	  aim	  is	  to	  show	  that	  they	  do	  not	  hold	  rival	  positions,	  as	  is	  historically	  assumed,	  but	  should	  both	  be	  understood	  as	  what	  I	  call	  ‘quiet	  relativists’.	  I	  will	  do	  this	  by	  examining	  Quine’s	  critique	  of	  Carnap	  which	  is	  meant	  to	  set	   them	   apart.	   I	   explore	   their	   apparent	   differences	   regarding	  pragmatism	  and	  truth,	  which	  ultimately	  derive	   from	  Quine’s	  attack	  on	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction,	  and	  as	   it	   turns	  out	   their	   similarities	  outweigh	  their	  differences.	  It	  is	  widely	  held	  that	  Quine’s	  place	  in	  history	  with	   regard	   to	   ontology	   is	   that	   he	   revived	   it	   in	   the	   face	   of	   Carnap’s	  deflation	   of	   it.	   This	   chapter	   rewrites	   this	   misinterpretation	   of	   Quine,	  clarifying	   him	   not	   as	   reviving	   ontology	   but	   rather	   as	   quiet	   about	  ontology,	   defusing	   the	   presumed	   rivalry	   with	   Carnap,	   and	   re-­‐establishing	   quietism	   as	   a	   live	   position.	   This	   chapter	   helps	   to	   set	   the	  scene	   ready	   to	   present	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   position	   that	   my	   thesis	  develops	   as	   a	   natural	   progression	   of	   the	   ensuing	   debate	   between	  Carnap,	  Quine,	  and	  Yablo,	  and	  to	  explain	  and	  defend	  Carnap’s	  quietism	  with	  the	  help	  of	  Yablo’s	  distinction	  between	  the	  metaphorical/literal	  in	  place	  of	   the	   internal/external	  distinction.	   I	  will	   focus	  on	   showing	   that	  Quine’s	   arguments	   against	   Carnap	   do	   not	   work,	   and	   also	   that	   such	  arguments	  are	  self-­‐defeating.	   I	  will	   further	  argue	  that	  Quine’s	  position	  that	   I	   have	   called	   I-­‐realism	   contains	   significant	   inconsistency	   in	  attempting	   to	   be	   a	   realist	   position	   that	   should	   lead	   to	   its	   rejection.	   I	  conclude	   that	   Quine’s	   I-­‐realism	   is	   not	   a	   form	   of	   realism,	   and	   should	  more	  accurately	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  quiet	  relativism,	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  Carnap’s	  position.	  Such	  a	  conclusion	   is	  not	  vital	   to	   the	  core	  aim	  of	  my	  thesis	   to	  develop	   ‘Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism’,	  but	   it	  helps	  motivate	  why	  Carnapian	  quietist	  positions	  need	  not	  be	  rejected	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  Quine.	  
	   34	  VI.ii.	  Chapter	  2:	  Quiet	  Meinongianism.	  	  	  Now	   that	   the	   context	   has	   been	   provided	   and	   the	   scene	   has	   been	  sufficiently	  set,	  we	  are	  finally	  ready	  to	  get	  into	  the	  more	  exciting	  task	  of	  attacking	   Quine’s	   I-­‐realism	   by	   developing	   the	   Meinongian	   aspect	   of	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism.	  This	  chapter	  does	  that	  by	  addressing	  the	  issue	  of	   quantifier	   commitment	   in	   English	   and	   first	   order	   logic	   to	   explore	  whether	   quantification	   is	   ontologically	   loaded.	   I	   aim	   to	   show	   that	  instead	  of	   the	  quantifier	  being	   the	   logical	   regimentation	   for	  existence,	  we	  can	  talk	  about	  existence	  with	  a	  quiet	  internal	  predicate	  for	  ‘exists’	  in	  order	   to	   split	   the	   domain	   of	   things	   in	   a	   Meinongian	   inspired	   way.	   I	  argue	   that	   quantification	   in	   English	   and	   first	   order	   logic	   can	   be	  interpreted	   as	   ontologically	   neutral,	   by	   describing	   how	   quantifier	  commitments	   are	   not	   to	   be	   conflated	   with	   ontological	   commitments.	  Quantificational	   terms	   in	  natural	   language	   like	   ‘some’,	   and	  quantifiers	  in	  formal	  language	  like	   ‘∃’,	  are	  ontologically	  neutral,	  and	  thus	  domains	  need	   not	   be	   restricted	   to	   include	   only	   existent	   things.	   Rather	   the	  domain	  can	  contain	  all	  sorts	  of	  things,	  and	  those	  that	  exist	  are	  those	  in	  the	  domain	   that	   instantiate	   the	  predicate	   for	   ‘exists’.	  The	  main	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  therefore	  to	  reject	  the	  Quinean	  methodology	  that	  states	  that	   an	   ontology	   can	   be	   read	   off	   straight	   from	   our	   quantified	  regimented	   discourse	   and	   to	   show	   that	   languages	   are	   ontologically	  neutral	   and	   metaphysically	   quiet	   in	   a	   Carnapian	   way,	   whilst	   putting	  forward	   a	   unique	   and	   preferable	   account	   of	   Meinongianism	   that	   is	  compatible	   with	   the	   quietism	   of	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian.	   Since	   I	   show	  quantification	   in	   English	   and	   first	   order	   logic	   to	   be	   not	   ontologically	  loaded	   in	   the	   Quinean	  way,	   Quine	   cannot	   derive	   an	   ontology	   to	   be	   a	  realist	   about	   either	   directly	   from	   a	   natural	   language	   like	   English	   or	  indirectly	   through	   formal	   languages	  studied	  by	   logicians	  by	   looking	  to	  what	  is	  quantified	  over.	  I	  therefore	  conclude	  that	  Quinean	  I-­‐realism	  fails	  and	  Carnapian	  quietism	  prevails	   in	   the	   form	  of	   a	  quietist	   version	  of	   a	  basic	  form	  of	  Meinongianism	  from	  their	  metaontological	  debate.	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  VI.iii.	  Chapter	  3:	  Quiet	  Fictionalism.	  	  	  After	   spending	   much	   of	   the	   previous	   chapters	   1	   and	   2	   attacking	  Quinean	  metaontology,	   I	  will	   now	   describe	   a	   central	   part	   of	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Quietist	   metaontology	   that	   I	   am	   developing	   in	   this	   thesis:	  Fictionalism.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  address	  what	  it	  is	  that	  we	  talk	  about	  if	   our	   talk	   is	   quiet	  with	   regard	   to	  metaphysical	   existence.	   I	  will	   argue	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  consider	  our	  talk	  as	  fictional,	  as	  I	  will	  contend	  that	  our	  use	   of	   language	   is	   more	   helpfully	   thought	   of	   as	   being	   constituted	   by	  webs	   of	   various	   fictions.	   The	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   will	   be	   a	   revolutionary	  fictionalist,	   born	  out	  of	  hermeneutic	  quietism.	   I	   describe	  what	   I	  mean	  by	  ‘fictionalism’	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  coupled	  with	  the	  quietism	  of	  Carnap,	  to	  create	  a	  quietist	   fictionalist	   (and	  Meinongian)	  position	   for	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian.	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  put	  forward	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnpian	  position	  that	  I	  defend	  in	  my	  thesis,	  and	  to	  show	  how	  it	  can	  be	  formulated	  as	  a	  fictionalist	  position.	  I	  believe	  that	  Carnap’s	  quietism	  can	  be	   helpfully	   reinterpreted	   as	   a	   type	   of	   fictionalism,	   and	   also	   that	  fictionalism	  is	  best	  construed	  as	  a	  type	  of	  quietism.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietist	   version	   of	   fictionalism	   is	   original	   and	   differentiated	   from	  traditional	   fictionalism	   by	   being	   divorced	   from	   antirealist	   roots	   and	  married	  to	  quietism	  instead.	  It	  is	  also	  original	  by	  taking	  a	  global	  scope	  rather	   than	   being	   fictionalist	   about	   particular	   types	   of	   discourse	   or	  entity	  only.	  Despite	  lacking	  the	  main	  aspect	  of	  traditional	  fictionalism	  as	  being	   antirealist,	   it	   retains	   the	   heart	   of	   fictionalism	  with	   regard	   to	   its	  pragmatic	   evaluation	   of	   discourses	   independently	   of	   truth.	   The	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	  states	  that	  we	  can	  judge	  our	  ways	  of	  talking	  not	  by	  how	  well	  they	  match	  up	   to	  an	  ontology	  but	  by	  how	  useful	   they	  are.	  And	   in	   line	  with	  traditional	  fictionalist	  positions,	  they	  take	  a	  discourse	  to	  be	  useful	  without	   saying	   anything	   about	   its	   truth,	   since	   they	   are	   quiet	   on	   the	  matter	  of	   truth	  as	  well	  as	  ontology.	  This	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  position	   finds	  significant	   allies	   in	   the	  works	   of	   Thomasson	   (2015)	   and	  Price	   (2011)	  whose	  positions	  I	  distinguish	  from	  mine	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  chapter.	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  VI.iv.	  Chapter	  4:	  Quiet	  Dialetheism.	  	  	  	  Having	   fully	   described	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Quietism	   as	   being	   Meinongian	  and	  Fictionalist,	  I	  now	  put	  forward	  what	  I	  consider	  the	  most	  interesting	  problem	   for	   such	  a	  Carnapian	  position	   to	  be.	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	   discuss	  the	   paradox	   of	   self-­‐reference	   and	   how	   this	   arises	   for	   global	   positions	  such	  as	  Carnap’s	  quietism.	  I	  will	  show	  that	  applying	  Carnap’s	  theory	  to	  itself	  results	  in	  a	  dilemma,	  both	  horns	  of	  which	  lead	  to	  a	  contradiction.	  I	  argue	   that	   a	   plausible	   way	   for	   the	   Carnapian	   to	   respond	   to	   such	   a	  dilemma	   is	   to	  bite	   the	  contradictory	  bullet	   in	   the	   form	  of	  dialetheism,	  and	   therefore	   accept	   the	   truth	   of	   the	   paradoxical	   contradictory	  sentence	   formed	  when	   the	   theory	  refers	   to	   itself.	  The	  paradox	  of	   self-­‐reference	   occurs	   for	   Carnap	  when	  we	   question	   the	   status	   of	   his	   own	  position	  and	  ask	  whether	  he	  considers	  the	  claims	  of	  his	  theory	  itself	  to	  be	  understood	  as	   internal	  or	   external	   to	   linguistic	   frameworks.	  Either	  way,	   we	   end	   up	   in	   contradiction,	   derived	   from	   analogues	   of	   the	   Liar	  Paradox	   and	   Russell’s	   Paradox	   –	   i.e.	   paradoxes	   of	   self-­‐reference.	   In	  presenting	   the	  self-­‐reference	  problem	  for	  Carnap	  I	   follow	  Priest	   in	  his	  formulation	   of	   self-­‐referential	   paradoxes	   exhibiting	   contradictions	   at	  the	   limits	   of	   thought.	   It	   turns	   out	   that	   Carnap,	   in	   attempting	   to	   put	  forward	   an	   anti-­‐metaphysical	   view,	   ends	   up	   in	   such	   contradictory	  realms	   that	   are	   typical	   of	   other	   anti-­‐metaphysical	   views	   that	   draw	   a	  limit	   to	   thought.	   I	   conclude	   by	   construing	   Carnap	   as	   an	   ‘implicit’	  dialetheist	   and	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Quietist	   as	   an	   ‘explicit’	   dialetheist.	  Dialetheism	   is	   inevitable	   in	   metametaphysics,	   as	   metametaphysical	  views	  aim	  to	  draw	  a	  limit	  to	  thought,	  particularly	  a	  limit	  to	  metaphysics.	  This	   is	   my	   metametametaphysical	   result	   –	   that	   metametaphysics	   is	  dialetheist.	   I	   therefore	  end	  on	  a	  bombshell:	   in	  redirecting	  metaphysics	  towards	  quietism,	  metametaphysics	  is	  redirected	  towards	  dialetheism.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  metametaphysics	  and	  be	  quiet,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  dialetheist.	  Dialetheism,	  Meinongianism,	   Fictionalism,	   and	   Quietism,	  may	   be	   seen	  as	  incompatible	  –	  I	  explain	  why	  they	  are	  not	  in	  the	  Conclusion	  chapter.	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CHAPTER	  1:	  
QUIET	  RELATIVISM	  	  	  The	   debate	   between	   Quine	   and	   Carnap	   revolves	   around	   whether	  ontological	   questions	   are	   meaningful.	   In	   the	   Introduction	   chapter	   I	  outlined	  Carnap’s	  and	  Quine’s	  metaontological	  positions,	  where	  Carnap	  argued	  that	  ontology	  was	  not	  a	  meaningful	  enterprise	  and	  Quine	  argued	  that	  it	  was.	  Generally	  Quine	  is	  taken	  to	  have	  won	  this	  debate,	  yet	  I	  argue	  that	  Quine’s	   critiques	   against	  Carnap	   fail.	   I	   thus	   challenge	   the	   general	  view	   that	   Quine	   defeated	   Carnap,	   reviving	   Carnap’s	   quietism	   against	  Quine’s	  attack.	  This	  chapter	  analyses	  the	  disagreement	  between	  Carnap	  and	  Quine	  in	  order	  to	  resurrect	  Carnapian	  quietism,	  and	  so	  the	  chapter	  is	  spent	  mostly	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  my	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietist	  position	  to	  come	  in	  chapters	  2-­‐4	  where	  the	  more	  fun	  stuff	  happens	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	   compare	   Quine’s	   position	   on	   ontology	   with	   that	   of	  Carnap’s.	  My	  aim	  is	  to	  show	  that	  they	  do	  not	  hold	  rival	  positions,	  as	  is	  historically	   assumed,	   but	   rather	   should	   both	   be	   understood	   as	   ‘quiet	  relativists’.	   I	   do	   this	  by	  examining	  Quine’s	   critique	  of	  Carnap	  which	   is	  meant	   to	   set	   them	  apart,	   in	   sections	   I.i	   -­‐	   I.iii:	   I	   explore	   their	   apparent	  differences	  regarding	  pragmatism	  (I.i)	  and	  truth	  (I.ii),	  which	  ultimately	  derive	  from	  Quine’s	  attack	  on	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction	  (I.iii).	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  their	  similarities	  outweigh	  their	  differences	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  Quine	  is	  more	  properly	  understood	  as	  being	  quiet	  about	  ontology,	  with	   the	   only	   meaningful	   discussion	   of	   existence	   being	   relative	   to	  theory,	  similar	  to	  Carnap.	  This	  chapter	  clarifies	  Quine	  not	  as	  the	  reviver	  of	  ontology	  but	  rather	  as	  quiet	  about	  ontology,	  defusing	  the	  presumed	  rivalry	  with	  Carnap,	  and	  re-­‐establishing	  quietism	  as	  a	  live	  and	  plausible	  position.	   Furthermore,	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   Quine’s	   I-­‐realism	   taken	   as	   a	  form	  of	  realism	  is	  self-­‐defeating	  in	  sections	  II-­‐III,	  and	  is	  therefore	  better	  recast	  as	  a	  form	  of	  quietist	  relativism	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  sections	  IV-­‐V.	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  I.	  Quine	  on	  Carnap.	  	  	  For	  Carnap,	   the	  only	  ontology	  we	  can	  do	   is	   the	  pragmatic	   choosing	  of	  frameworks	  and	  the	  answering	  of	  internal	  questions	  (IQ)	  relative	  to	  it.	  Ontology	  is	  to	  this	  extent	  merely	  the	  study	  of	  what	  exists	   internally	  to	  frameworks	   and	   which	   frameworks	   are	   most	   useful	   to	   adopt.	   Quine	  disagrees	   that	   ontology	   is	   merely	   that,	   as	   he	   argues	   that	   pragmatic	  methods,	  like	  Carnap’s	  choosing	  of	  frameworks,	  do	  in	  fact	  deliver	  realist	  results	   about	   reality	   thus	   aiming	   to	   revive	   ontology.	   Historically	  speaking,	  Carnap	  and	  Quine	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  rivals,	  yet	  in	  fact	  they	  are	  very	  similar.	  They	  were	  in	  close	  correspondence	  for	  many	  years	  (as	  documented	  by	  Creath40),	  and	  Quine	  states	  that,	  despite	  the	  differences	  to	  be	  mentioned	  later	  on	  in	  sections	  I.i	  -­‐	  I.iii,	  “noone	  has	  influenced	  my	  philosophical	  thought	  more	  than	  Carnap.”41	  Both	  Carnap	  and	  Quine	  are	  logical	   empiricists,	   and	   are	   anti-­‐metaphysics	   in	   favour	   of	   being	   pro-­‐science.	  They	  both	  are	  motivated	  by	  an	  anti-­‐prior-­‐philosophy	  attitude,	  which	   is	   due	   to	   their	   shared	   adoption	   of	   theory	   holism,	   resulting	   in	  Carnap’s	  quietism	  and	  Quine’s	  naturalism	  towards	  ontology.	  	  	  	  Quine,	   like	  Carnap,	  promotes	  a	  pragmatically	  based	  ontological	   theory	  where	  answers	  about	  existence	  are	  extrapolated	  internally.	  Where	  the	  two	  philosophers	   differ	   from	  each	  other	   lies	   in	  what	   this	   pragmatism	  means	  for	  reality	  and	  thus	  the	  philosophical	  status	  of	  being	  ‘internal’	  –	  for	  Quine	  realism	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  internal	  enquiry,	  hence	  his	  I-­‐realism,	  whereas	   for	  Carnap	   it	  cannot,	  hence	  his	  quietism.	  Despite	   the	  similarities	   noted	   between	  Quine’s	   and	   Carnap’s	   positions,	   Quine	   still	  regards	  his	  project	  as	  essentially	  different	   to	   that	  of	  Carnap’s	   (namely	  because	   he	   derives	   realism	   from	   it	   rather	   than	   quietism).	   Yet	   I	   will	  argue	  that	  I-­‐realism	  is	  quiet	  (and	  so	  Quine	  is	  quietist)	  in	  section	  V,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Creath	  (1990)	  41	  Quine	  (1951a)	  p203	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  that	  Quine	   is	  more	   relativist	   than	   realist	   in	   section	   IV.	  Before	   arguing	  for	  this	  reading	  of	  Quine,	  I	  will	  first	  describe	  and	  diffuse	  his	  differences	  with	   Carnap	   regarding	   pragmatism	   and	   truth,	   and	   defend	   Carnap	  against	  Quine’s	  attacks	  based	  on	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction.	  	  	  I.i.	  On	  pragmatism.	  	  	  For	   both	   Carnap	   and	   Quine,	   we	   can	   answer	   existence	   questions	  internally	   from	  within	   the	   best	   framework	  or	   scientific	   theory,	  where	  which	   is	   best	   is	   to	   be	   chosen	   pragmatically.	   So,	   similar	   to	   Carnap’s	  approach	  to	  frameworks,	  Quine	  appeals	  to	  pragmatic	  virtues	  to	  decide	  which	   scientific	   theory	   is	   best.	   Unlike	   Carnap,	   Quine	   believes	   these	  pragmatic	  considerations	  lead	  us	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  matter.	  Therefore,	  for	  Quine,	  answers	  to	  IQ’s	  will	  provide	  answers	  to	  existence	  questions.	  Hence	  Quine	   considers	   himself	   a	   realist	   (the	  position	   I	   call	   I-­‐realism).	  Carnap,	   conversely,	   believes	   choosing	   frameworks	   pragmatically	   will	  have	  no	  ontological	  significance	  as	  your	  choice	  will	  not	  reflect	  the	  truth	  –	  there	  is	  no	  truth	  of	  the	  matter	  external	  to	  frameworks	  for	  our	  choice	  of	   framework	  to	  map	  on	  to	  or	  correspond	  to.	   It	   is	  because	  of	   this	   that	  seeing	   what	   there	   is	   relative	   and	   internal	   to	   our	   chosen	   linguistic	  frameworks	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient	  for	  realism	  according	  to	  Carnap	  (yet	  it	  
is	  sufficient	  for	  Quine),	  hence	  Carnap’s	  quietism	  towards	  ontology.	  	  	  	  According	  to	  Carnap,	  there	  can	  be	  useful	  frameworks,	  but	  not	  a	  ‘correct’	  framework.	  Quine	  disagrees	  and	  is	  ultimately	  trying	  to	  track	  down	  the	  ‘correct’	  scientific	  theory	  by	  finding	  which	  one	  is	  ‘best’.	  When	  pragmatic	  choice	  is	  evidence	  for	  truth	  then	  the	  commitments	  of	  the	  best	  scientific	  theory	  or	  framework	  will	  indirectly	  lead	  us	  to	  the	  correct	  ontology,	  thus	  Quine’s	   search	   for	   the	   best	   is	   indirectly	   a	   search	   for	   the	   truth.	   This	  revives	  ontology	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  our	  pragmatic	  answers	  to	  existence	  
	   40	  questions	  are	  no	  longer	  considered	  as	  merely	  pragmatic,	  but	  rather	  are	  evidential	  for	  reality	  (in	  the	  only	  sense	  it	  can	  have).42	  So	  for	  Quine	  there	  
are	  objectively	  truthful	  answers	  to	  what	  exists,	  and	  we	  can	  get	  to	  these	  answers	  via	  pragmatic	  methods,	  thus	  recovering	  ontology.43	  	  	  Quine	   objects	   to	   Carnap’s	   quietist	   theory	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   Carnap	  argues	  that	  the	  pragmatic	  external	  question	  (EQ)	  is	  not	  fit	  for	  ontology	  
simply	   due	   to	   its	   being	   pragmatic.	   Quine	   states	   that	   being	   pragmatic	  does	   not	   entail	   being	   void	   of	  metaphysical	   implication,	   as	   this	   is	   how	  scientific	  theories	  are	  valued,	  and	  these	  scientific	  theories	  count	  as	  true	  
despite	   their	  being	  chosen	  pragmatically.	  And	  so	   the	  argument	  goes,	   if	  scientists	   can	   get	   to	   the	   truth	   on	   pragmatic	   grounds,	   then	   so	   can	  we	  answer	  EQ’s	  truthfully	  on	  pragmatic	  grounds.	  However	  this	  can	  be	  only	  as	  strong	  as	  a	  conditional	  argument	  from	  Quine	  against	  Carnap,	  because	  it	   is	  precisely	  whether	  pragmatic	  considerations	  are	  guides	  to	  truth	  or	  reality	   that	   is	   in	   question.	   Thus	  Quine	  must	   not	   presuppose	   that	   they	  are	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  science)	  as	  this	  would	  just	  beg	  the	  question	  against	  Carnap	   who	   states	   that	   pragmatic	   considerations	   are	   metaphysically	  neutral	  and	  not	  evidential	  for	  truth.	  So,	  if	  pragmatic	  considerations	  lead	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  matter,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  for	  the	  EQ	  to	  be	  non-­‐cognitive	  and	  void	  of	  metaphysical	  implications.	  Then,	  if	  pragmatics	  are	  
evidential,	  both	  Carnapian	  and	  Quinean	  methodologies	  for	  ontology	  can	  be	  used	  for	  answering	  existence	  questions	  truthfully	  via	  the	  pragmatic	  choice	  of	  linguistic	  frameworks	  and	  scientific	  theories	  respectively	  and	  deducing	  what	  exists	  from	  internal	  to	  them	  with	  the	  IQ.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Carnap	  may	   agree	   that	   this	   is	   the	   only	   sense	   in	   which	  we	   can	   have	   evidence	   for	  reality,	  but	  disagrees	  that	  this	  is	  deserving	  of	  the	  name	  ‘ontology’	  (Carnap	  (1950)	  note	  5).	  This	  is	  discussed	  further	  in	  section	  V	  to	  show	  that	  the	  debate	  between	  Carnap	  and	  Quine	   is	  merely	   terminological,	   as	   Quine	   applies	   the	  word	   ‘ontology’	  where	   Carnap	  does	   not,	   since	   Carnap	   treats	   ontology	   as	   necessarily	  metaphysical,	   and	  Quine	   does	  not.	  Terminological	  issues	  return	  with	  how	  Quine	  uses	  ‘thing’	  in	  chapter	  2	  section	  VII.	  43	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  next	  section	  I.ii	  that	  Quine’s	  position	  exhibits	  a	  tension	  between	  his	   views	   on	   pragmatism	   (where	   pragmatic	   considerations	   are	   evidential	   for	   truth)	  and	   his	   views	   on	   immanent	   truth	   (where	   the	   standards	   set	   by	   the	   pragmatically	  chosen	  theory	  are	  the	  only	  standards	  of	  truth).	  Quine’s	  supposed	  search	  for	  truth	  by	  searching	  for	  the	  best	  is	  thus	  searching	  for	  the	  best	  which	  will	  call	  itself	  true.	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  just	  provides	  more	  reason	  to	  reject	  the	  Quinean	  position	  as	  a	  form	  of	  realism.	  	  
	   41	  Quine	   argues	   that	   we	   can	   pragmatically	   choose	   Carnapian	   linguistic	  frameworks	  as	  being	  evidential	   for	   reality	  because	   the	   conventions	  of	  how	  we	  speak	  according	  to	  our	  frameworks	  are	  responsive	  to	  empirical	  evidence	   so	   that	   the	   frameworks	   adopted	   point	   towards	   the	   truth.	  Quine	  argues	  in	  his	  ‘Two	  Dogmas	  of	  Empiricism’	  (1951b)	  that	  how	  the	  world	   is	  will	   confirm	   or	   disconfirm	   how	  we	   speak	   and	   thus	   verify	   or	  falsify	  theories	  and	  frameworks	  as	  a	  whole,	  hence	  conventions	  (and	  our	  best	  scientific	  theories	  and	  frameworks)	  are	  grounded	  in	  truth.	  There	  is	  therefore	   no	   permanent	   status	   of	   being	   a	   convention,	   or	   being	  purely	  pragmatic,	  as	  it	  is	  all	  empirically	  tested	  by	  the	  world.	  Thus	  we	  can	  read	  ontologically	   from	   within	   our	   pragmatically	   chosen	   frameworks	   or	  theories	  (and	  so	  from	  our	  IQ’s).	  If	  nothing	  is	  permanently	  a	  convention,	  then	   nothing	   is	   purely	   pragmatic,	   and	   if	   nothing	   is	   purely	   pragmatic	  then	  our	  choice	  of	  theory	  or	  framework	  is	  grounded	  in	  reality.44	  	  	  	  This	  objection	  to	  Carnap’s	  dismissal	  of	  ontology	  is	  therefore	  founded	  on	  Quine’s	  more	  fundamental	  attack	  that	  nothing	  is	  true	  solely	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  meaning	  or	  by	  convention,	  as	  all	  will	  have	  some	  empirical	  element	  to	  determine	   their	   truth.	   This	   is	   known	   as	   Quine’s	   attack	   on	   Carnap’s	  internal/external	  distinction	  by	  means	  of	  guilt	  by	  association	  with	   the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction,45	  which	  we	  will	   turn	  to	   in	  section	  I.iii.	   It	  turns	   out	   that	   if	   Quine’s	   attack	   on	   the	   internal/external	   via	   the	  analytic/synthetic	   cannot	   be	   upheld,	   then	   neither	   can	   his	   attack	   from	  pragmatism,	   and	   without	   this	   pragmatic	   distinction	   between	   them,	  Quine	  and	  Carnap	  will	  be	  equally	  quiet	  and	  seem	  very	  similar	  indeed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Quine	   argues	   that	   practical	   reasons	   can	   be	   evidential,	   and	   so	   Carnap’s	   pragmatic	  choosing	  of	   frameworks	  could	  be	  evidential	   for	   their	   truth.	  But	  what	  Quine	  needs	  as	  an	   argument	   against	   Carnap	   is	   that	   practical	   reasons	   are	   always	  evidential,	   so	   that	  Carnap’s	   practical	   reasons	   cannot	   be	   claimed	   to	   be	   the	  merely	  pragmatic	   (and	   non-­‐evidential)	   type.	   The	   question	   then	   is	  whether	  Quine	   does	   consider	   the	   practical	   to	  
always	  be	  evidential,	  or	  whether	  he	  sometimes	  allows	  for	  the	  merely	  practical	  –	  this	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  sections	  II	  and	  III	  of	  this	  chapter	  to	  show	  I-­‐realism	  to	  be	  self-­‐defeating.	  45	  Yablo	  (1998)	  
	   42	  I.ii.	  On	  truth.	  	  	  Before	  discussing	  how	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction	  allows	  for	  Quine	  to	  derive	  truth	  from	  the	  pragmatic	  choice	  of	  scientific	  theory,	  first	  it	   is	  important	  to	  recognize	  Quine’s	  views	  on	  truth	  itself.	  I	  plan	  to	  show	  that	  Quine	  displays	  some	  inconsistency	  with	  regard	  to	  his	  views	  on	  (a)	   the	  truth	  derived	   from	  our	  best	  scientific	   theory,	  and	  (b)	  the	  ontology	  derived	  from	  our	  best	  scientific	  theory.	  It	  seems	  as	  though	  Quine	   makes	   a	   distinction	   between	   our	   theory-­‐independent	   ontology	  and	   theory-­‐derived	   ontology,	   whereas	   he	   does	   not	   make	   such	   a	  distinction	  between	  theory-­‐independent	  truth	  and	  theory-­‐derived	  truth.	  This	   can	   be	   shown	   by	   looking	   at	   quotes	   from	   Quine	   that	   display	   his	  opinions	  on	  correspondence-­‐like	  theories	  of	  truth	  (where	  what	  is	  true	  corresponds	  to	  reality)	  to	  see	  how	  he	  agrees	  with	  the	  correspondence	  theorists	  that	  there	  is	  an	  independent	  reality	  to	  correspond	  to.	  Firstly,	  the	  quote	  below	  implies	   that	  Quine	  does	  acknowledge	  an	   independent	  reality	  that	  our	  science	  aims	  to	  capture	  (rather	  than	  aims	  to	  create):	  	   Science,	  though	  it	  seeks	  traits	  of	  reality	  independent	  of	  language,	  can	   neither	   get	   on	   without	   language	   nor	   aspire	   to	   linguistic	  neutrality.	   To	   some	   degree,	   nevertheless,	   the	   scientist	   can	  enhance	  objectivity	  and	  diminish	  the	  interference	  of	  language	  by	  his	  very	  choice	  of	  language.46	  	  It	  seems	  here	  that	  Quine	  is	  arguing	  that	  our	  best	  scientific	  theory	  aims	  to	  reflect	  reality,	  yet	  the	  theory	  needs	  to	  be	  specified	  in	  a	  language	  and	  thus	   will	   not	   succeed	   in	   achieving	   anything	   completely	   language	  independent	   (or	   external,	   as	   Carnap	   puts	   it).	   Therefore	   the	  metaphysical	  claim	  is	  that	  there	   is	  a	  language	  independent	  reality,	  and	  the	  epistemological	  claim	  is	  that	  we	  struggle	  in	  articulating	  it.	  However	  in	  choosing	  the	  best	  scientific	  theory,	  and	  then	  regimenting	  it	  into	  first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Quine	  (1976)	  p222	  
	   43	  order	  predicate	   logic,	   this	   language	  will	   be	   the	   closest	   to	   an	  objective	  description	   of	   reality,	   and	   will	   be	   the	   closest	   to	   the	   correct	   theory.	  Hence	  Quine’s	  role	  for	  regimentation	  in	  deriving	  an	  ontology.	  So,	  in	  line	  with	   the	   correspondence	   theorists,	   Quine	   agrees	   that	   there	   is	   some	  independent	   reality	   to	   correspond	   to,	   yet	   against	   the	   correspondence	  theorists,	  Quine	  argues	  that	  such	  independence	  is	  impossible	  to	  achieve.	  	  	  We	  can	  further	  see	  that	  Quine	  acknowledges	  an	  ontology	  to	  correspond	  to,	  by	  his	  distinguishing	   it	   from	  the	  ontology	  derived	   from	  a	   theory.	   If	  we	  understand	  the	  IQ/EQ	  as	  being	  the	  distinction	  between	  what	  there	  is	  internally	  or	  relative	  to	  a	  theory,	  and	  what	  there	  really	  is	  absolutely	  or	   independent	   of	   theory,	   then	   Quine	   holds	   that	   this	   is	   a	   legitimate	  distinction	  (although	  not	  put	  in	  terms	  of	  IQ/EQ),	  as	  demonstrated	  here:	  	  	   Now	   to	   determine	  what	   entities	   a	   given	   theory	   presupposes	   is	  one	   thing,	   and	   to	   determine	   what	   entities	   a	   theory	   should	   be	  allowed	   to	   presuppose,	   what	   entities	   there	   really	   are,	   is	  another.47	  	  Clearly	   ‘what	  entities	  a	  given	   theory	  presupposes’	  are	  entities	  derived	  internally	   relative	   to	   a	   theory	   –	   the	   answers	   to	   IQ’s.	   Likewise,	   ‘what	  entities	  there	  really	  are’	  are	  entities	  that	  are	  external	  and	  independent	  of	   theories	   –	   the	   answers	   to	   EQ’s.	   So	   Quine	   here	   explicitly	   marks	   a	  distinction	  between	  those	  entities	  arrived	  at	  by	  answering	  IQ’s	  and	  EQ’s,	  and	   allows	  not	   only	   for	   an	   IQ/EQ	  distinction48	  but	   importantly	   in	   this	  context	   a	   distinction	   between	   theory-­‐independent	   reality	   and	   theory-­‐derived	  reality.	  Thus,	  again	  Quine	  acknowledges	  an	  independent	  reality.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Quine	  (1976)	  p129	  48	  This	  displays	  yet	  another	  tension	  in	  Quine’s	  position,	  of	  whether	  he	  can	  maintain	  his	  views	  on	  pragmatism	  which	  are	  based	  on	  a	  denial	  of	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction,	  whilst	  also	  holding	  something	  like	  a	  IQ/EQ	  distinction	  which	  he	  claims	  is	  based	  on	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction	  he	  rejects.	  If	  Quine	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  theory-­‐independent	  reality	  and	  theory-­‐derived	  reality	  then	  he	  would	  not	  do	  so	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  IQ/EQ	  distinction	  if	  he	  wished	  to	  reject	  that	  distinction	  (despite	  their	  similarities).	  	  
	   44	  However,	  here	  Quine	  rejects	  a	  correspondence	  theory	  as	  meaningless:	  	  The	  fundamental-­‐seeming	  philosophical	  question,	  ‘How	  much	  of	  our	  science	  is	  merely	  contributed	  by	  language	  and	  how	  much	  is	  a	  genuine	  reflection	  of	  reality?’	  is	  perhaps	  a	  spurious	  question…	  We	  can	   improve	  our	  conceptual	  scheme,	  our	  philosophy,	  bit	  by	  bit	  while	  continuing	  to	  depend	  on	  it	  for	  support;	  but	  we	  cannot	  detach	   ourselves	   from	   it	   and	   compare	   it	   objectively	   with	   an	  unconceptualized	   reality.	   Hence	   it	   is	  meaningless,	   I	   suggest,	   to	  inquire	  into	  the	  absolute	  correctness	  of	  a	  conceptual	  scheme	  as	  a	  mirror	   of	   reality.	   Our	   standard	   for	   appraising	   basic	   changes	   of	  conceptual	   scheme	   must	   be,	   not	   a	   realistic	   standard	   of	  correspondence	  to	  reality,	  but	  a	  pragmatic	  standard.49	  	  	  So	   in	   this	   quote	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   choice	   of	   ‘best’	   scientific	   theory	   is	  made	  pragmatically,	  rather	  than	  chosen	  based	  on	  how	  well	   the	  theory	  ‘mirrors’	   our	   reality,	   because	   such	   a	   comparison	   between	   reality	   and	  the	  theory	  is	  meaningless	  (which	  sounds	  very	  Carnapian).	  But	  again	  the	  meaninglessness	   of	   this	   mirroring	   is	   due	   to	   the	   epistemological	  concern50	  of	   not	   being	   able	   to	   reflect	   it,	   rather	   than	   the	   metaphysical	  concern	   of	   there	   not	   being	   such	   an	   independent	   reality	   to	   reflect.	  Therefore,	   it	   seems	   that	   there	   is	   a	   realistic	   standard	   to	   compare	   our	  theory	   to	   with	   regard	   to	   ontology.	   We	   may	   not	   be	   able	   to	   meet	   this	  standard,	  but	  the	  point	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  reality	  out	  there	  independent	  of	  our	   theories	   to	   provide	   the	   standard.	   But	   due	   to	   the	   epistemological	  concern,	  Quine	  states	  we	  should	  use	  a	  pragmatic	  standard	  instead,	  and	  given	  his	  views	  on	  pragmatism	  leading	  to	  truth	  we	  then	  get	  a	  tension.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Quine	  (1961)	  p78-­‐79	  50	  This	  epistemological	  concern	  drives	  Quine	  towards	  his	  fallibilism	  which	  argues	  that	  our	  best	  theory	  may	  not	  be	  the	  correct	  one	  as	  there	  is	  some	  independent	  truth	  that	  we	  are	   aiming	   at	   (so	   that	   we	   can	   be	   wrong).	   Quine’s	   fallibilism	   is	   thus	   also	   clearly	   in	  tension	  with	  his	  immanent	  truth.	  This	  epistemological	  concern	  however	  could	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  more	   than	   just	   epistemological,	  as	   for	  Quine	  reality	  underdetermines	   theory	  and	  so	  we	  always	  need	   to	  add	  some	  carving	   to	   the	  world,	   and	   therefore	   there	   is	  no	  unconceptualized	  reality	  and	  we	  just	  fit	  our	  concepts	  to	  our	  conceptualized	  world	  in	  the	  best	  way	  possible.	  So	  it	  is	  not	  just	  epistemological,	  but	  rather	  also	  metaphysical.	  
	   45	  This	  tension	  is	  between	  his	  pragmatism	  and	  truth.	  We	  saw	  in	  section	  I.i	  that	   for	   Quine	   pragmatic	   considerations	   are	   evidential	   –	   evidence	   for	  
truth.	  However,	   truth,	   for	  Quine,	   is	   immanent,	  and	   is	  derived	  from	  the	  theory	  itself.	  There	  is	  thus	  no	  independent	  truth	  for	  pragmatic	  choice	  to	  be	  evidential	  for,	  as	  is	  made	  clear	  in	  the	  following	  quotes	  from	  Quine:	  	   It	   is	   a	   confusion	   to	   suppose	   that	   we	   can	   stand	   aloof	   and	  recognise	   all	   the	   alternative	   ontologies	   as	   true	   in	   their	   several	  ways...	  It	  is	  a	  confusion	  of	  truth	  with	  evidential	  support.	  Truth	  is	  immanent,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  higher.	  We	  must	  speak	  from	  within	  a	  theory,	  albeit	  any	  of	  various.51	  	  	   There	  is	  no	  extra-­‐theoretic	  truth,	  no	  higher	  truth	  than	  the	  truth	  we	  are	  claiming	  or	  aspiring	  to	  as	  we	  continue	  to	  tinker	  with	  our	  system	  of	  the	  world	  from	  within.52	  	  	  So	   whatever	   truth	   we	   determine	   internally,	   or	   from	   within,	   our	   best	  scientific	   theory,	   this	   is	   the	   only	   truth	   that	   there	   is	   to	   aim	   for.	   With	  regard	  to	  ontology,	  then,	  to	  be	  consistent,	  Quine	  would	  have	  to	  say	  that	  whatever	   ontology	   is	   determined	   by	   our	   best	   scientific	   theory	   is	   the	  only	  true	  ontology,	  yet	  we	  saw	  that	  Quine	  acknowledges	  the	  existence	  of	   an	   independent	   reality	   to	   compare	   theories	   against	   and	   for	   our	  pragmatic	   considerations	  of	   theory	   choice	   to	  be	   evidential	   for.	  This	   is	  clearly	  in	  tension	  with	  Quine’s	  views	  on	  immanent	  truth,	  where	  what	  a	  theory	   presupposes	   will	   simply	   be	   what	   is	   true	   and	   there	   will	   be	   no	  further	  question	  of	  truth	  to	  ask.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  further	  question	  of	  truth	  to	  ask,	  then	  there	  should	  not	  be	  an	  independent	  reality	  to	  compare	  the	  truth	   of	   theories	   against.	   Furthermore,	   if	   truth	   is	   immanent,	   then	   in	  what	   sense	   are	   pragmatic	   considerations	   evidential,	   what	   are	   they	  evidence	   for	   if	   not	   an	   independent	   reality?	   Quine’s	   reason	   for	   not	  comparing	  theories	  against	  this	  reality	  was	  due	  to	  the	  difficulty	  in	  doing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Quine	  (1981)	  p21-­‐22	  	  52	  Quine	  (1975)	  p327	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  so.	  Perhaps	  the	  difficulty	  is	  just	  so	  great	  that	  the	  truth	  gained	  from	  the	  independent	   reality	   is	   not	   worth	   acknowledging.	   We	   can	   aim	   for	   as	  much	   language	   independence	   and	   objectivity	   as	   we	   like	   through	  choosing	   the	  most	   neutral	   language	   to	   regiment	   our	   best	   theory	   into,	  but	   ultimately	   what	   comes	   out	   as	   true	   according	   to	   that	   theory	   is	  described	  by	  Quine	  to	  be	  the	  only	  truth	  that	  there	  is.	  Therefore	  Quine’s	  position	  on	  truth	  being	  immanent	  seems	  inconsistent	  with	  pragmatism.	  	  	  The	   problem	   here	   in	   Quine’s	   view	   is	   his	   insistence	   that	   pragmatic	  considerations	  are	  evidential,	  yet	  the	  thing	  they	  are	  evidential	  for	  is	  just	  whatever	  the	  pragmatic	  theory	  dictates.	  So	  the	  theory	  is	  just	  evidential	  for	   itself!	   This	   is	   not	   very	   helpful.	   For	   Carnap,	   reality	   and	   truth	   are	  relativized	   to	   framework	   choice,	   and	   this	   choice	   is	   pragmatic,	   but	   the	  difference	  with	  Quine	   is	   that	  Carnap’s	  pragmatic	   choice	  does	  not	   self-­‐justify	   the	   framework	  as	   true.	   For	  Carnap,	   all	   frameworks	   are	   equally	  true	  as	  there	  is	  nothing	  independent	  to	  compare	  them	  to,	  though	  some	  will	   be	   more	   practical	   than	   others,	   and	   again	   this	   practicality	   is	   not	  evidential	   for	   anything	   other	   than	   being	  more	   practical.	   This	   is	   what	  Quine	   ultimately	   disagrees	   with,	   since	   for	   him	   pragmatic	   factors	   can	  make	  some	   theories	  more	  correct	   than	  others	  and	   the	  most	  correct	   is	  titled	   ‘best’	   (yet	   problematically	   what	   is	   ‘correct’	   is	   derived	   from	   the	  theory	  as	  truth	  is	  immanent).	  The	  important	  similarity	  to	  note	  between	  Quine	  and	  Carnap	  is	  that	  both	  acknowledge	  the	  external	  questioning	  of	  reality	   as	   meaningless,53	  yet	   they	   then	   differ	   since	   for	   Carnap	   it	   is	  metaphysically	   meaningless	   and	   for	   Quine	   only	   epistemologically	   so.	  They	   further	  deviate	   in	  Quine	  postulating	   the	   internal	   reality	  as	  being	  
the	  ontology	  whereas	  for	  Carnap	  it	   is	  only	  what	  is	  useful	  to	  talk	  about,	  which	  derives	  from	  their	  differences	  regarding	  pragmatics	  and	  truth.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Perhaps	  both	  Quine	   and	  Carnap	   could	   accept	   a	   real	  world	   that	   their	   theories	   and	  frameworks	  are	  describing,	  and	   just	  deny	   that	  we	  can	  question	  or	   talk	  about	  such	  a	  world	  independently.	  They	  then	  differ	  since	  Carnap’s	  point	  is	  that	  the	  truth	  about	  that	  world	  can	  only	  be	  true	  relative	  to	  meaning	  convention,	  and	  Quine’s	  point	  is	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  special	  about	  meaning	  convention.	  This	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section	  I.iii.	  
	   47	  Quine	   acknowledges	   that	   what	   a	   discourse	   commits	   us	   to	   and	   what	  there	   is	   are	   different	  matters,	   but	   they	   are	   connected	  with	   regard	   to	  whether	  the	  discourse	  is	  true	  by	  being	  internal	  to	  the	  ‘correct’	  scientific	  theory.	   His	   pragmatism	   comes	   in	   when	   we	   choose	   one	   theory,	   along	  with	  its	  commitments,	  over	  another	  because	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  true	  and	  what	  it	  says	  exists	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  correspond	  to	  the	  real	  existents.	  In	   this	  sense	  Quine	   is	  a	   fallibilist,	  as	   the	  ontology	  we	  derive	   internally	  from	  our	  best	  scientific	  theory	  may	  not	  be	  the	  true	  ontology,	  as	  our	  best	  theory	  may	  not	  be	  the	  ‘correct’	  one,	  it	  is	  only	  likely	  to	  be	  so.	  The	  fallibilist	  in	   Quine	   thus	   acknowledges	   that	   their	   theory	  may	   be	  wrong.	   Quine’s	  paper	   ‘On	  What	   There	   Is’	   would	   thus	   be	  more	   accurately	   named	   ‘On	  What	  There	  Might	  Be’!	  However,	  given	  that	  for	  Quine	  truth	  is	  immanent,	  whichever	  scientific	  theory	  is	  chosen	  as	  best	  will	  be	  the	  theory	  that	  sets	  what	   is	   to	   count	   as	   true	   in	   a	   way	   that	   manifests	   a	   tension	   with	   this	  fallibilism.	  If	  we	  ought	  to	  believe	  as	  true	  what	  our	  theory	  tells	  us,	  then	  we	  cannot	  also	  acknowledge	  that	  our	  theory	  may	  in	  fact	  not	  be	  the	  true	  one.	  This	  is	  the	  tension	  between	  Quine’s	  immanent	  truth	  and	  fallibilism.	  	  	  To	  summarize	  so	   far,	   for	  Quine,	   in	  accepting	   the	  best	   scientific	   theory	  on	  pragmatic	   grounds	  we	  also	   count	   it	   as	   true	   in	   an	   immanent	   sense,	  and	   we	   take	   it	   seriously	   in	   telling	   us	   truths	   about	   the	   world	   and	   its	  ontology.	  Therefore	  for	  Quine	  an	  ontology	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  internal	  to	   our	   best	   scientific	   theory	   and	   such	   an	   ontology	   should	   be	   taken	  seriously,	  as	  this	  ontology	  is	  connected	  to	  reality	  by	  being	  one	  and	  the	  same	   thing.	   For	   Carnap,	   our	   choice	   of	   linguistic	   framework	   based	   on	  pragmatic	  considerations	  shows	  that	  framework	  not	  to	  be	  more	  correct	  but	   only	   more	   practical,	   and	   thus	   should	   not	   be	   taken	   any	   more	  seriously	  than	  merely	  a	  helpful	  way	  of	  talking.	  Carnap	  recognizes,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  an	  adopted	  framework,	  that	  alternative	  frameworks	  are	   equally	   ‘true’	   (as	   there	   is	   no	   external	   truth	   to	   compare	   them	  against)	  but	  differ	   in	  practicality,	  whereas	  for	  Quine,	   from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  adopted	  theory,	  no	  other	  could	  be	  equally	  as	  true	  since	  truth	  
	   48	  is	   immanent	  (and	  so	  the	  adopted	  theory	  sets	  the	  standard	  for	  truth	  to	  which	  all	  other	  theories	  are	  subject	  to	  and	  fall	  short	  of).	  I	  too	  attempted	  to	  spell	  out	  a	  few	  tensions	  in	  the	  Quinean	  picture	  which	  provide	  reason	  to	  either	  reject	  it	  or	  to	  reinterpret	  it	  as	  a	  quietist	  relativism	  as	  I	  will	  do	  in	  sections	  IV-­‐V	  of	  this	  chapter.	  The	  tensions	  were:	  (1)	  between	  Quine’s	  fallibilism	  where	  the	  standard	  of	   truth	   is	   independent	  and	  truth	  being	  classed	  as	  immanent;	  (2)	  between	  truth	  being	  classed	  as	  immanent	  and	  pragmatics	   being	   evidential	   for	   an	   independent	   standard	  of	   truth;	   (3)	  between	  pragmatics	  being	  evidential	  which	  derives	  from	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	   analytic/synthetic	   distinction	   whilst	   acknowledging	   an	  internal/external	   distinction	   which	   derives	   from	   accepting	   an	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction	  (according	  to	  Quine,	  see	  section	  I.iii).	  	  	  	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  shown	  so	  far	  that	  Quine	  aims	  to	  deviate	  from	  Carnap,	  and	  thus	   objects	   to	   Carnap,	   based	   on	   the	   significance	   of	   pragmatic	   choice	  and	   the	   truth	   gained	   from	   such	   a	   decision	   of	   scientific	   theory	   or	  linguistic	   framework.	   For	   Carnap,	   the	   choice	   is	   merely	   pragmatic,	  whereas	   for	   Quine	   such	   pragmatic	   choice	   is	   evidential	   for	   immanent	  truth.	   Therefore,	   ontology	   based	   on	   pragmatic	   considerations	   is	   a	  serious	  project	  for	  Quine,	  and	  he	  attacks	  Carnap’s	  dismissal	  of	  it	  on	  that	  basis.	  Quine’s	  argument	  against	  the	  insignificance	  of	  pragmatics	  derives	  from	  his	  denial	  of	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction,	  discussed	  next.	  	  	  	  I.iii.	  On	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction.	  	  	  Quine	  attacks	  Carnap’s	  internal/external	  (IQ/EQ)	  distinction	  by	  guilt	  of	  association	   with	   the	   analytic/synthetic	   distinction.	   Quine’s	   attack	   on	  Carnap’s	  framework	  choice	  being	  merely	  pragmatic	  (which	  for	  Quine	  is	  evidential)	   is	   also	   based	   on	   Quine’s	   denial	   of	   the	   analytic/synthetic	  distinction.	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   these	   attacks,	   we	   first	   must	  
	   49	  recognize	  what	  Quine	  means	  by	  the	  analytic	  and	  synthetic.	  In	  his	  paper	  ‘Two	  Dogmas	  of	  Empiricism’	  (1951b),	  Quine	  argues	  that	  no	  definition	  of	  the	   two	  words	  can	  be	  given,54	  and	   this	   is	  part	  of	  his	  argument	  against	  there	  being	  a	  distinction.	  But	  here	  are	  rough	  definitions	  to	  work	  with:	  	  	  To	   be	   analytic	   is	   to	   be	   true	   in	   virtue	   of	  meaning,	   definition,	   or	  convention.	  Analytic	  statements	  may	   include	   the	  necessary	  and	  the	  a	  priori.	  	  To	  be	  synthetic	   is	  to	  be	  true	   in	  virtue	  of	  empirical	   facts	  or	  how	  the	   world	   is.	   Synthetic	   statements	   may	   include	   the	   contingent	  and	  the	  a	  posteriori.	  	  Quine	   argues	   that	   Carnap’s	   derivation	   of	   the	   meaninglessness	   of	  ontological	  questions	  (other	  than	  being	  a	  pragmatic	  matter	  of	  linguistic	  framework	   choice)	   cannot	   be	   reached	   without	   Carnap	   admitting	   an	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction.	  Quine	  therefore	  regards	  the	  debate	  over	  analyticity	  as	  being	  very	  relevant	  to	  Carnap’s	  quietist	  position:	  	  	  It	   is	   only	   by	   assuming	   the	   cleavage	   between	   analytic	   and	  synthetic	   truths	   that	   [Carnap]	   is	  able	   to	  declare	   the	  problem	  of	  universals	   to	   be	   a	   matter	   not	   of	   theory	   but	   of	   linguistic	  decision.55	  	  	  An	  issue	  has	  persisted	  between	  us	  [Quine	  and	  Carnap]	  for	  years	  over	   questions	   of	   ontology	   and	   analyticity.	   These	   questions	  prove	  to	  be	  interrelated;	  their	  interrelations	  come	  out	  especially	  clearly	   in	   Carnap’s	   paper	   ‘Empiricism,	   Semantics,	   and	  Ontology’.56	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Quine	  (1951b)	  attempts	  to	  show	  that	  no	  definition	  of	  analyticity	  can	  be	  given,	  and	  hence	  it	  should	  be	  rejected	  –	  he	  goes	  through	  examples	  using	  meaning,	  synonymy,	  and	  interchangeability,	  all	  failing	  on	  grounds	  that	  I	  do	  not	  have	  space	  to	  evaluate	  here.	  55	  Quine	  (1976)	  p124	  56	  Quine	  (1976)	  p126	  
	   50	  Quine	  first	  attacks	  Carnap	  for	  utilizing	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction	  with	   regard	   to	   making	   his	   IQ/EQ	   distinction.	   Quine	   (mis)interprets	  Carnap	  as	  making	  the	  distinction	  between	  internal	  and	  external	  reading	  of	  questions	  like	  ‘are	  there	  things	  that	  are	  P?’	  in	  terms	  of	  P,	  and	  Quine	  argues	   that	   the	   IQ/EQ	   distinction	   cannot	   be	   conceived	   in	   this	  way	   in	  terms	  of	  P,	   thus	  Carnap’s	  IQ/EQ	  fails.	  For	  Quine,	   it	   is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  there	  are	  some	  predicates	  P	  such	  that	  ‘are	  there	  things	  that	  are	  P?’	  is	  an	  IQ	   and	   for	   other	   Ps	   it	   is	   an	   EQ.	   Rather,	   Quine	   argues	   that	   Carnap’s	  distinction	   needs	   to	   be	   conceived	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   analytic/synthetic	  distinction:	   there	   are	   some	   predicates	   P	   such	   that	   the	   question	   is	  answered	  analytically	  by	   the	   framework	  and	  there	  are	  others	   that	  are	  not	  answered	  in	  this	  way.	  For	  Quine	  there	  is	  no	  way	  of	  comprehending	  the	   IQ/EQ	   distinction	   without	   the	   analytic/synthetic	   distinction.	   But	  since	  Quine	  believes	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  accurately	  separate	  the	  analytic	  from	  the	  synthetic,	  then	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  IQ/EQ	  distinction	  cannot	  be	  made	  either.	  However	  Quine	  misinterprets	  Carnap	  in	  assuming	  that	  the	  IQ/EQ	  distinction	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  articulated	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  predicate	  P.	  	  	  Quine	  sees	  Carnap	  as	  stating	  the	  difference	  maker	  between	  the	   IQ/EQ	  as	  being	  the	  predicate	  P	  in	  question.	  For	  Quine	  the	  distinction	  cannot	  be	  made	  that	  way,	  and	  he	  shows	  this	  with	  a	  category/subclass	  distinction:	  	  	   It	  begins	  to	  appear,	  then,	  that	  Carnap’s	  dichotomy	  of	  questions	  of	  existence	   is	   a	   dichotomy	   between	   questions	   of	   the	   form	   ‘are	  there	  so-­‐and-­‐sos?’	  where	  the	  so-­‐and-­‐sos	  purport	  to	  exhaust	  the	  range	  of	  a	  particular	   style	  of	  bound	  variables,	   and	  questions	  of	  the	   form	   ‘are	   there	   so-­‐and-­‐sos?’	   where	   the	   so-­‐and-­‐sos	   do	   not	  purport	   to	   exhaust	   the	   range	   of	   a	   particular	   style	   of	   bound	  variables.	   Let	  me	   call	   the	   former	   questions	   category	   questions,	  and	  the	  latter	  ones	  subclass	  questions.57	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Quine	  (1976)	  p130	  
	   51	  Quine	   gives	   an	   example	   of	   a	   subclass	   question	   as	   ‘are	   there	   prime	  numbers	   between	   10	   and	   20?’,	   with	   the	   corresponding	   category	  question	  as	  ‘are	  there	  numbers?’,	  where	  the	  subclass	  is	  meaningful	  (and	  thus	  alike	  with	  the	  IQ)	  and	  the	  category	  is	  meaningless	  (and	  thus	  alike	  with	  the	  EQ).	  The	  category	  stands	  for	  the	  name	  of	  the	  type	  of	  thing	  and	  subclass	  stands	  for	  particulars	  of	  that	  type	  of	  thing.	  It	  is	  the	  difference	  between	   the	   predicates	   ‘prime	   number	   between	   10	   and	   20’	   and	  ‘number’	   that	   distinguishes	   the	   former	   as	   subclass	   and	   the	   latter	   as	  category,	   and	   in	   turn	   as	   an	   IQ	   and	  EQ	   respectively.	  Quine	   argues	   that	  this	   an	   unsatisfactory	   division	   since	   “there	   is	   no	   evident	   standard	   of	  what	  to	  count	  as	  a	  category,	  or	  category	  word.”58	  This	  parallel	  between	  the	  IQ/EQ	  and	  subclass/category	  is	  incorrect	  however,	  as	  it	  is	  plausible	  to	   consider	   subclass	   questions	   as	   external	   and	   category	   questions	   as	  internal.	  And	  Quine	  acknowledges	  in	  the	  end	  that	  the	  subclass/category	  “is	   a	  distinction	  which	   [Carnap]	   can	  perfectly	  well	   discard	   compatibly	  with	  the	  philosophical	  purpose	  of	  the	  paper	  under	  discussion.”59	  	  	  	  The	   error	   in	   Quine’s	   attack	   above	   is	   that	   he	   misconstrues	   Carnap’s	  position	   –	   Carnap	   does	   not	   attempt	   to	   make	   the	   distinction	   between	  IQ’s	  and	  EQ’s	  in	  terms	  of	  different	  predicates	  P	  that	  they	  question.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  Carnap	  would	  distinguish	  between	  types	  of	  P	  such	  that	  some	  are	   to	  be	  questioned	   internally	  and	  some	  externally.	  Rather,	   the	  distinction	  between	  IQ	  and	  EQ	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  which	  thing	  P	  we	  are	   talking	  about,	  but	  how	  we	  are	   talking	  about	  P.	  All	  questions	  about	  the	   existence	   of	   P	   can	   be	   asked	   both	   internally	   and	   externally60	  (and	  maybe	  answered	  both	  analytically	  and	  synthetically),	  so	   it	  depends	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Quine	  (1969)	  p91	  	  	  59	  Quine	  (1951a)	  p210.	  As	  stated	  in	  footnote	  10,	  the	  IQ/EQ	  is	  not	  a	  token/type	  divide.	  60	  For	  example,	  the	  question	  	  ‘are	  there	  pink	  flowers?’	  could	  be	  considered	  both	  as	  an	  internal	   question	   within	   the	   theory	   as	   to	   whether	   some	   flowers	   are	   pink,	   or	   as	   an	  external	  question	  about	  the	  ‘real’	  existence	  of	  flowers	  of	  a	  particular	  sort.	  When	  asked	  as	   in	   IQ,	   it	   could	   be	   answered	   analytically	   if	   there	  were	   some	   rule	   that	   stated	   that	  flowers	   come	   in	   all	   colours,	   or	   it	   could	   be	   answered	   synthetically	   by	   experience	   of	  seeing	   a	   pink	   flower	   or	   not.	   Therefore,	   the	   predicate	   P	   (in	   this	   case	   ‘pink	   flowers’)	  does	   not	   determine	  whether	   the	   question	   asked	   is	   internal	   or	   external,	   nor	   does	   it	  determine	  whether	  the	  question	  is	  to	  be	  answered	  analytically	  or	  synthetically.	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how	   you	   are	   asking	   the	   question	   as	   opposed	   to	   which	   thing	   you	   are	  asking	   about	   as	   to	   whether	   the	   question	   is	   internal	   or	   external.	   The	  difference	   between	   the	   IQ/EQ	   is	   thus	   due	   to	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	  question,	  not	  due	  to	  what	  you	  are	  questioning	  about	  (the	  predicate	  P).	  	  	  There	   is	   a	   divide	   between	   IQ’s	   and	   EQ’s,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   the	   type	   of	  predicate	  P	  that	  is	  doing	  the	  dividing	  or	  making	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two.	  So	  when	  Quine	  argues	  that	  we	  cannot	  divide	  predicates	  P	  into	  two	   categories	   (whether	   it	   be	   into	   the	   categories	   divided	   up	   by	   the	  internal/external,	  analytic/synthetic,	  or	  category/subclass	  distinctions)	  this	   is	   of	   no	   importance	   or	   hindrance	   to	   Carnap,	   as	   Carnap	  makes	   no	  claim	  to	  there	  being	  such	  a	  divide	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  There	  is	  nothing	  in	  Carnap’s	  explanation	  of	  the	  internal/external	  distinction	  that	  points	  to	  the	   difference-­‐maker	   being	   the	   type	   of	   predicate	   P.	   Rather,	   he	   argues	  that,	  whatever	   the	   predicate,	   its	   existence	  may	   be	   asked	   about	   either	  internally	   or	   externally,	   depending	   on	   whether	   it	   is	   asked	   as	   a	  metaphysical	  question	  or	  not.	  Therefore,	  we	  can	  now	  move	  on	  entirely	  from	   this	   particular	   objection	   regarding	   the	   predicate	   P	   making	   the	  difference	   between	   the	   IQ	   and	   the	   EQ,	   and	   assess	   how	   else	   Quine	  accuses	  Carnap	  of	  depending	  on	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction.	  	  	  	  Quine	   states:	   “Carnap	   thinks…	   that	   the	   question	   what	   a	   theory	  presupposes	   that	   there	   is	   should	   be	   divided	   into	   two	   questions	   in	   a	  certain	  way;	  and	  I	  disagree.”61	  Now	  it	   is	  true	  that	  Carnap	  believes	  that	  things	   can	   be	   questioned	   internally	   to	   a	   theory	   in	   different	   ways,	  namely	   analytically	   and	   synthetically,	   as	   IQ’s	   can	   be	   analytic	   or	  synthetic,	   and	   thus	   that	  what	   a	   theory	   presupposes	   can	   be	   arrived	   at	  from	   deriving	   internal	   answers	   via	   analytic	   or	   synthetic	   means.	  However	  it	  is	  not	  true	  that	  such	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  analytic	  and	  synthetic	  within	  a	   framework	   is	  necessary	   for	  Carnap’s	   theory.	   Such	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Quine	  (1976)	  p127	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  distinction	   could	  be	  dropped	  and	   the	   IQ/EQ	  distinction	  would	   remain	  intact.	   The	   IQ/EQ	   distinction	   divides	   questions	   into	   those	   that	   are	  meaningful	   and	   those	   that	   are	   not,	   and	   then	   the	   meaningful	   internal	  ones	  can	  be	  further	  divided	  into	  those	  answered	  analytically	  and	  those	  answered	  synthetically.	  Therefore,	  that	  Quine	  disagrees	  that	  IQ’s	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  the	  analytic	  and	  the	  synthetic	  is	  of	  no	  hindrance	  to	  Carnap,	  since	  Carnap	  does	  not	  require	  this	  distinction	  for	  his	  own	  more	  primary	  IQ/EQ	  distinction	  to	  hold.	  The	  two	  distinctions	  are	   independent	   in	  his	  theory	  and	  do	  not	  effect	  each	  other.	  The	   lack	  of	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	   analytic/synthetic	   made	   internal	   to	   a	   framework	   does	   not	  automatically	  result	  in	  there	  being	  no	  IQ/EQ	  distinction	  overall.	  	  	  	  Another	  way	   in	  which	  Quine	  objects	  to	  Carnap’s	   theory	   is	  by	  equating	  the	   EQ	   with	   the	   analytic	   and	   the	   IQ	   with	   the	   synthetic,	   and	   so	   by	  denying	   one	   distinction	   he	   automatically	   denies	   the	   other.	   However	  even	  Quine	  recognizes	  that	  such	  a	  parallel	  between	  the	  two	  distinctions	  does	  not	  follow	  Carnap’s	  theory	  accurately,	  but	  Quine	  dismisses	  this:	  	  	   No	  more	   than	   the	  distinction	  between	  analytic	  and	  synthetic	   is	  needed	   in	   support	   of	   Carnap’s	   doctrine	   that	   the	   statements	  commonly	  thought	  of	  as	  ontological	  [EQ’s]…	  are	  analytic…	  True,	  there	  is	  in	  these	  terms	  no	  contrast	  between	  analytic	  statements	  of	  an	  ontological	  kind	  and	  other	  analytic	  statements	  of	  [internal]	  existence	   such	   as	   ‘there	   are	   prime	   numbers	   above	   a	   hundred’;	  but	  I	  don’t	  see	  why	  he	  should	  care	  about	  this.62	  	  	  Quine	  ought	  not	  to	  have	  dismissed	  this	  as	  something	  Carnap	  would	  not	  care	   about	   as	   it	   shows	   precisely	   why	   the	   IQ/EQ	   is	   not	   bound	   up	   or	  parallel	  with	   the	   analytic/synthetic,	   and	   thus	  Carnap	  would	   care	   very	  much	  about	  this	  to	  show	  that	  the	  attack	  on	  him	  by	  guilt	  of	  association	  with	   the	   analytic/synthetic	   distinction	   is	   unfair.	   There	   is	   a	   contrast	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Quine	  (1976)	  p133	  
	   54	  between	  internal	  analytic	  statements	  such	  as	  ‘there	  are	  prime	  numbers	  above	  a	  hundred’	  and	  external	  statements	  such	  as	  ‘there	  are	  numbers’:	  the	  latter	  is	  ascertained	  through	  pragmatic	  (not	  analytic)	  questioning	  of	  whether	   the	   framework	   for	   numbers	   is	   useful	   whereas	   the	   former	   is	  ascertained	  analytically	  through	  the	  rules	  of	  that	  particular	  framework.	  The	   contrast	   is	   even	  more	   important	   when	   the	   external	   statement	   is	  seen	  as	  meaningless	  and	  the	  internal	  analytic	  statement	  is	  meaningful.	  This	   is	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   Carnap’s	   IQ/EQ	   distinction	   and	   thus	   he	   cares	  about	  it	  greatly,63	  and	  would	  not	  want	  to	  allow	  for	  there	  to	  be	  no	  such	  contrast	  just	  because	  they	  are	  both	  seen	  as	  analytic.	  Therefore,	  equating	  the	   EQ	   with	   the	   analytic	   and	   the	   IQ	   with	   the	   synthetic	   does	   not	  accurately	  reflect	  Carnap’s	  theory	  and	  so	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  attack	  it.	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	   in	   Quine	   putting	   forward	   a	   parallel	   between	   the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction	  and	   the	   IQ/EQ	  distinction,	   it	   is	  not	  even	  clear	  that	  Carnap	  would	  regard	  all	  internal	  as	  analytic,	  or	  all	  external	  as	  analytic,	   thus	   destroying	   the	   illusion	   of	   a	   parallel	   between	   the	   two	  distinctions.	   There	   are	   many	   IQ’s	   that	   are	   not	   analytically	   answered,	  like	   ‘are	   there	  black	  swans?’	  which	   is	  answered	  by	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  experience	  of	  a	  black	  swan.	  Carnap	  could	  argue	  no	  EQ’s	  are	  analytical	  due	  to	  being	  unanswerable	  as	  they	  are	  meaningless,	  unless	  understood	  as	  the	  question	  ‘is	  it	  useful	  to	  adopt	  this	  framework?’	  which	  again	  is	  not	  answered	  analytically	  via	  rules	  but	  rather	  synthetically	  with	  regard	  to	  whether	  it	  is	  useful	  by	  fitting	  with	  our	  experiences.	  Yablo	  supports	  this:	  	  	   Existence	  claims	  of	  the	  kind	  Carnap	  would	  call	  analytic	  show	  no	  particular	   tendency	   to	  be	   external…	   [and]	   existence	   claims	   can	  fail	   to	  be	   analytic	  without…	   failing	   to	  be	   external…	  and	   it’s	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Yablo	  (1998	  p236)	  agrees:	  “Internal/external	  was	  supposed	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  felt	  difference	  between	  substantive,	  ‘real	  world’,	  existence-­‐questions	  and	  those	  of	  the	  sort	  that	   only	   a	   philosopher	   could	   take	   seriously.	   ‘Are	   there	   primes	   over	   a	   hundred’	   as	  normally	   understood	   falls	   on	   one	   side	   of	   this	   line;	   ‘are	   there	   numbers’	   as	   normally	  understood	  falls	  on	  the	  other.	  Carnap	  should	  thus	  care	  very	  much	  if	  Quine’s	  version	  of	  his	  distinction	  groups	  these	  questions	  together”.	  
	   55	  clear	  that	  a	  sentence	  that’s	  true	  in	  virtue	  of	  meaning	  [analytic]	  is	  well	   suited	   for	   the	   role	   of	   a	   sentence	   that’s	   untrue	   in	   virtue	   of	  being	  cognitively	  meaningless	  [EQ’s].64	  	  	  Hence	   the	   attack	   on	   the	   reliance	   on	   the	   analytic/synthetic	   is	  unproblematic	   for	   Carnap’s	   internal/external	   distinction	   since	   I	   have	  shown	   that	   the	   two	  distinctions	  are	  not	   identical	  with	  each	  other.	  We	  can	   now	   turn	   to	   Quine’s	   issue	   with	   the	   analytic/synthetic	   distinction	  and	  see	  whether	  this	  has	  any	  other	  repercussions	  for	  Carnap’s	  theory.	  	  	  	  So	  why	   does	   Quine	   believe	   there	   is	   no	   analytic/synthetic	   distinction?	  Quine	   is	   fundamentally	   sceptical	   that	  we	   can	   look	   at	   bits	   of	   language	  and	  compartmentalize	  the	  sentences	  into	  ones	  that	  are	  true	  solely	  with	  regard	   to	   the	   linguistic	   rules	   (the	   analytic)	   and	   the	   ones	   that	   are	   not	  (the	   synthetic).	  He	  believes	   this	  divide	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  because	  he	   argues	   that	   everything	  has	   features	   of	   empirical	   content	   and	   thus	  everything	   is	   partly	   synthetic.	   Because	   of	   this,	   he	   claims	   that	   nothing	  can	   be	   purely	   analytic,	   as	   all	   things	   that	   may	   have	   been	   considered	  analytic	  will	  actually	  have	  elements	  of	   fact	  and	  empirical	  content	   thus	  making	  them	  partially	  synthetic.	  Without	  anything	  falling	  neatly	  on	  one	  side	  of	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  divide	  then	  the	  distinction	  itself	  crumbles.	  	  	  	  Another	   way	   that	   Quine	   makes	   this	   point	   is	   by	   putting	   forward	   the	  analytic/synthetic	   distinction	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   practical/theoretical	  distinction.	  Everything	  will	  be	  in	  some	  sense	  empirically	  tested	  and	  as	  such	  nothing	  will	  be	  purely	  pragmatic	  (like	  the	  EQ)	  as	  the	  practical	  will	  be	  evidential.	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  claim	  that	  we	  can	  have	  practical	  reasons	  to	  
speak	  as	  if	  there	  is	  an	  entity	  X	  and	  theoretical	  reasons	  to	  believe	  there	  is	  an	  entity	  X,	  but	  that	  our	  practical	  reasons	  to	  speak	  a	  certain	  way	  always	  collapse	   into	   theoretical	   reasons	   to	   believe	   in	   the	  way	   that	  we	   speak.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Yablo	  (1998)	  p235-­‐236	  
	   56	  This	  is	  because	  practical	  reasons	  are	  evidential,	  and	  with	  regard	  to	  our	  best	  science	  the	  practical	  reasons	  are	  always	  evidential	  (as	  for	  Quine	  in	  science	  pragmatic	  choices	  point	  towards	  truth),	  so	  reason	  to	  speak	  of	  X	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  in	  X	  (unless	  such	  talk	  can	  be	  dispensed	  with	  in	  our	  best	   scientific	   theory),	   and	   the	   practical/theoretical	   distinction	  collapses.	   Without	   this	   distinction	   nothing	   can	   be	   said	   to	   be	  merely	  pragmatic,	  such	  as	  Carnap’s	  linguistic	  framework	  choice,	  for	  instance.	  	  	  In	  Quine’s	  attack	  on	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction,	  he	  argues	  that	  it	  is	   “nonsense…	   to	   speak	   of	   a	   linguistic	   component	   and	   a	   factual	  component	   in	   the	   truth	   of	   any	   individual	   statement”65,	   and	   as	   such	  there	   can	   be	   no	   distinction	   between	   true-­‐according-­‐to-­‐the-­‐theory	   (or	  framework)	  and	  true-­‐in-­‐reality.	  Therefore	  whatever	  may	  be	  considered	  true	   and	   existing	   internally	   to	   a	   theory	   (or	   framework)	   should	   be	  considered	   true	   and	   existing,	   period.	   (This	   is	   in	   line	   with	   Quine’s	  immanent	   truth,	   yet	   is	   in	   tension	   with	   Quine’s	   fallibilism,	   since	   his	  fallibilism	   requires	   our	   theories	   to	   potentially	   be	   ‘incorrect’	   when	  compared	   to	   an	   independent	   reality	   or	   source	   of	   truth,	   as	   discussed	  earlier	  in	  section	  I.ii).	  Because	  of	  this,	  the	  decision	  to	  adopt	  a	  theory	  or	  framework	  in	  which	  one	  may	  assert	  the	  existence	  of	  X	  is	  itself	  in	  part	  an	  assertion	  that	  X	  exists,	  and	  so	  when	  Carnap	  makes	  claims	  internal	  to	  an	  adopted	  framework	  he	  is	  (according	  to	  Quine)	  also	  making	  an	  assertion	  about	   reality.	   Carnap	   could	   therefore	   not	   be	   a	   quietist,	   if	   this	   sort	   of	  assertion	  is	  to	  be	  taken	  as	  ontologically	  serious.	  If	  to	  be	  true-­‐in-­‐reality	  and	  existing-­‐in-­‐reality	  is	  simply	  to	  be	  true	  and	  existing	  according	  to	  the	  adopted	   best	   theory	   or	   framework,	   then	   the	   quietist	   like	   Carnap	  who	  makes	   internal	   assertions	   under	   the	   assumption	   that	   they	   are	  ontologically	  neutral	  and	  metaphysically	  quiet	  is	  mistaken.	  The	  quietist	  can	  no	   longer	  be	  considered	  quiet	  on	  these	  matters	   if	  making	   internal	  assertions	  are	   sufficient	   for	  providing	   truths	  about	  existence.	  As	   such,	  denial	  of	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction	  in	  turn	  denies	  being	  quiet.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Quine	  (1951b)	  p39	  
	   57	  Quine	  also	  argues	  that	  the	  conventions	  of	  how	  we	  speak	  are	  responsive	  to	  empirical	  evidence.	  He	  states	   that	  how	  the	  world	   is	  will	   confirm	  or	  disconfirm	   how	   we	   speak,	   hence	   conventions	   are	   grounded	   in	   truth.	  Nothing	   is	   true	   solely	   in	   virtue	   of	   its	   meaning	   or	   by	   convention	  (analytic),	   as	  all	  will	  have	   some	  empirical	  measure	   to	  determine	   their	  truth	   (synthetic).	   Therefore	   there	   is	   no	   permanent	   status	   of	   being	   a	  convention,	  or	  being	  purely	  analytic,	  as	  everything	  is	  empirically	  tested:	  	   It	   becomes	   folly	   to	   seek	   a	   boundary	   between	   synthetic	  statements,	  which	  hold	  contingently	  on	  experience,	  and	  analytic	  statements,	  which	   hold	   come	  what	  may.	   Any	   statement	   can	   be	  held	   true	   come	   what	   may,	   if	   we	   make	   drastic	   enough	  adjustments	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  system…	  Conversely,	  by	  the	  same	  token,	  no	  statement	  is	  immune	  to	  revision.66	  	  	  If	  nothing	  is	  permanently	  a	  convention,	  then	  nothing	  is	  purely	  practical,	  as	   this	   is	   exactly	   where	   Quine	   states	   that	   Carnap’s	   pragmatism	   ends	  abruptly	   with	   the	   analytic/synthetic	   distinction	   and	   as	   such	   without	  this	  distinction	  nothing	  is	  any	  longer	  considered	  to	  be	  merely	  practical:	  	  	   Carnap,	   Lewis,	   and	   others	   take	   a	   pragmatic	   stand	   on	   the	  question	   of	   choosing	   between	   language	   forms,	   scientific	  frameworks;	   but	   their	   pragmatism	   leaves	   off	   at	   the	   imagined	  boundary	  between	  the	  analytic	  and	  the	  synthetic.	  In	  repudiating	  such	  a	  boundary	  I	  espouse	  a	  more	  thorough	  pragmatism.67	  	  	  This	   thorough	  pragmatism	   is	  what	   I	  argued	   in	  section	   I.i	   to	  be	  a	  main	  difference	  between	  Quine	  and	  Carnap,	  which	  here	   I	  have	  shown	  to	  be	  based	  on	  Quine’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction.	  Quine’s	  holism	   also	   leads	   him	   to	   reject	   this	   distinction,	   since	   he	   believes	   that	  theories	   have	   meaning	   holistically	   rather	   than	   individual	   sentences	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Quine	  (1961)	  p43	  67	  Quine	  (1951b)	  p43	  
	   58	  having	  their	  own	  particular	  meaning.	  This	  holism	  is	  incompatible	  with	  reductionism,	   which	   Quine	   also	   rejects,	   as	   individual	   sentences	   by	  themselves	   having	   meaning	   is	   exactly	   what	   reductionism	   holds	   and	  holism	  denies.	  Funnily,	  Quine	  gets	  his	  anti-­‐reductionism	  from	  Carnap:	  	  	   Issuing	  essentially	  from	  Carnap’s	  doctrine	  of	  the	  physical	  world	  in	  the	  Aufbau,…	  our	  statements	  about	  the external	  world	  face	  the	  tribunal	   of	   sense	   experience	   not	   individually	   but	   only	   as	   a	  corporate	  body.68	  	  	  	  This	   means	   that	   what	   the	   external	   world	   is	   like	   will	   not	   confirm	   or	  disconfirm	   our	   individual	   statements	   but	   our	   theory	   as	   a	   whole.	  Whether	   Carnap’s	   holistic	   views	   can	   be	   used	   against	   himself	   is	  debatable,	   as	  what	   holism	  will	   appear	   to	   be	   incompatible	  with	   is	   the	  purely	  analytic,	  and	  whether	  Carnap	  requires	  the	  purely	  analytic	  for	  his	  theory	  of	  frameworks	  is	  also	  debatable.	  This	  anti-­‐reductionist	  holism	  is	  in	   tension	   with	   the	   analytic/synthetic	   distinction	   because	   the	   whole	  theory	   (and	   all	   the	   sentences	   within	   it)	   is	   considered	   empirical	  (synthetic).	  Therefore,	  the	  so-­‐called-­‐analytic	  parts	  of	  the	  theory	  will	  get	  confirmed	  by	   the	  whole	   theory,	  which	   itself	   is	   confirmed	  by	  what	   the	  world	  is	  like,	  thus	  these	  so-­‐called-­‐analytic	  parts	  are	  not	  purely	  analytic	  because	  they	  are	  confirmed	  by	  empirical	  (synthetic)	  means.	  Quine	  thus	  collapses	   IQ’s	   into	   EQ’s	   as	   the	   non-­‐analytic	   category	   questions,	   and	  these	   non-­‐analytic	   EQ’s	   are,	   for	   Quine, 69 	  meaningful	   ontological	  questions	  taken	  as	  practical	  questions	  which	  are	  answerable	  insofar	  as	  whole	  theories	  can	  be	  confirmed	  or	  disconfirmed.	  This	  recasting	  of	  the	  IQ/EQ	   upon	   the	   rejection	   of	   the	   analytic	   leaves	   room	   for	   meaningful	  ontology	   in	   Quine’s	   sense,	   and	   thus	   Carnap’s	   pragmatic	   framework	  choice	  is	  no	  longer	  metaphysically	  quiet	  or	  ontologically	  insignificant.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Quine	  (1951b)	  p38	  69	  Quine	  (1951a)	  
	   59	  Given	   that	   Carnap	   allows	   for	   us	   to	   change	   our	   frameworks	   based	   on	  experience	  such	  that	  we	  choose	  the	  most	  useful	  one	  to	  adopt	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  rules	  within	  the	  framework	  are	  thus	  not	  permanently	  conventional	  (analytic)	  as	   they	  are	   responsive	   to	  our	  experience	  which	  means	   they	  are	   empirically	   tested	   (synthetic).	   If	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   then	   Carnap	   no	  longer	   requires	   the	  notion	  of	  analyticity	   for	  his	   frameworks,	  but	   in	   so	  doing	   he	   has	   lost	   the	   battle	   against	   frameworks	   telling	   us	   something	  true	  about	   the	  world	  (as	   it	  would	  concede	  that	   they	  are	  responsive	   to	  the	  world).	  Furthermore,	  with	  the	  rules	  not	  being	  purely	  analytic	  they	  could	  thus	  be	  abandoned	  in	  light	  of	  evidence	  (on	  pragmatic	  or	  synthetic	  grounds),	  and	  they	  would	  therefore	  lose	  sense	  of	  being	  rules	  at	  all	  (due	  to	  the	  ease	  at	  which	  they	  can	  be	  dropped).	  With	  no	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction,	  the	  frameworks	  and	  their	  rules	  (being	  not	  entirely	  analytic)	  will	  be	  as	  synthetic	  as	  anything	  else	  and	  so	  can	  be	  taken	  ontologically	  seriously,	  making	  Carnap’s	  EQ	  not	  as	  meaningless	  as	  he	  had	  hoped	  and	  allowing	   for	   ontology	   to	   be	   read	   from	   IQ’s.	   It	   is	   here	   that	   Quine’s	  argument	  against	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  takes	  its	  strongest	  form	  against	  Carnap,	  by	  not	  allowing	  for	  the	  purely	  practical,	  resulting	  in	  framework	  choice	   being	   evidential	   for	   truth	   and	   the	   pragmatic	   EQ	   being	  metaphysically	  loaded.70	  However	  I	  show	  in	  the	  next	  sections	  II-­‐III	  that	  this	  argument	  fails	  as	  Quine	  requires	  the	  purely	  practical	  in	  his	  I-­‐realism.	  	  	  Quine	  puts	  pressure	  on	  the	  divide	  between	  ‘true	  in	  virtue	  of	  framework	  rules’	  and	  ‘accepted	  in	  virtue	  of	  practical	  decision’.	  Quine	  thinks	  this	  is	  not	   an	   interesting	   dichotomy	   because	   the	   rules	   are	   not	   fixed	   but	   are	  responsive	  to	  pragmatic	  changes	  in	  light	  of	  best	  fit	  with	  observation.	  As	  Yablo	   states:	   “no	   rule	   of	   assertion	   can	   lay	   claim	   to	   being	   indefeasibly	  correct,	  as	  it	  would	  have	  to	  be	  were	  it	  correct	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  meaning.”71	  So	  the	  denial	  of	   the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction	  attacks	  the	   idea	  of	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Yablo	  (1998	  p229)	  argues	  that	  this	  need	  not	  be	  Carnap’s	  defeat,	  but	  rather	  Quine’s	  objections	   call	   for	   a	   recasting	   of	   the	   internal/external	   distinction	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  metaphorical/literal	  distinction	  –	  I	  will	  discuss	  this	  recasting	  in	  chapter	  3	  section	  I.	  	  71	  Yablo	  (1998)	  p237	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  permanent	  body	  framework	  rules.	  But	  this	  shouldn’t	  be	  problematic	  for	  Carnap	  as	  he	  only	  requires	  that	  the	  changes	  made	  to	   framework	  rules	  from	  experience	  be	  practical	  rather	  than	  evidential	   for	  truth,	  as	   ‘truth’	  requires	  an	  external	  vantage	  point	  which	  for	  Carnap	  is	  meaningless.	  	  	  	  Yet	   it	   could	  be	  argued	   that	   if	   the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction	  cannot	  be	  made	   then	  Carnap	   cannot	   get	   a	  notion	  of	   a	   linguistic	   framework72,	  given	   that	   frameworks	   are	   characterized	   and	   individuated	   by	   their	  rules.	   The	   identity	   conditions	   for	   frameworks	   are	   dependent	   on	   their	  rules,	  so	  that	  having	  different	  rules	  entails	  being	  a	  different	  framework.	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  framework	  thus	  requires	  there	  to	  be	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  since	  the	  framework	  rules	  are	  held	  to	  be	  purely	  analytic	  such	  that	  they	  are	  true	  solely	  by	  definition	  rather	  than	  true	  in	  virtue	   of	   how	   the	  world	   is	   (in	   order	   to	   avoid	   a	   connection	  with	   truth	  which	  Carnap	  as	  a	  quietist	  does	  not	  want).	  So	  without	  the	  analytic	  rules	  making	   up	   the	   framework	   there	   is	   no	  way	   of	   differentiating	   between	  frameworks,	   as	   Quine	   takes	   the	   analytic	   statements	   to	   simply	   be	   the	  rules	  that	  define	  which	  framework	  we	  are	  using.	  So,	  Carnap	  may	  need	  the	   analytic/synthetic	  distinction	   for	   frameworkhood,	   not	   the	   IQ/EQ.	   I	  resolve	  this	  in	  chapter	  3	  by	  appealing	  to	  fictions	  instead	  of	  frameworks.	  	  	  In	  conclusion	  of	  this	  section,	  one	  need	  not	  follow	  Quine	  in	  attacking	  the	  distinction	   between	   the	   analytic/synthetic,73	  and	   the	   distinction	   does	  not	  map	   onto	   Carnap’s	   internal/external	   distinction	   anyway.	  Without	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Yablo	   argues	   similarly:	   “the	   analytic/synthetic	   may	   define	   internal/external	   (not	  directly,	   by	   providing	   an	   outright	   equivalent,	   but)	   indirectly	   through	   its	   role	   in	   the	  notion	   of	   a	   framework”	   (1998	   p236)	   and	   “internal/external	   presupposes	  analytic/synthetic	   by	   presupposing	   frameworkhood;	   for	   frameworks	   are	   made	   up	  inter	  alia	  of	  analytic	  assertion	  rules”	  (1998	  p237).	  This	  is	  resolved	  in	  chapter	  3	  section	  I	  where	  I	  reformulate	  Carnapian	  frameworks	  as	  fictions	  to	  help	  fix	  Carnap’s	  problem.	  73	  The	  success	  of	  Quine’s	  objection	  to	  Carnap	  depends	  upon	  the	  success	  of	  his	  denial	  of	  the	   analytic/synthetic	   distinction,	  which	   there	   is	   not	   space	   to	   assess	   properly	   here.	  But	   as	   Thomasson	   (2007)	   and	   Chalmers	   (2011)	   have	   argued,	   Quine’s	   attack	   on	   the	  distinction	  need	  not	   be	   considered	  decisive,	   as	   even	  Quine	  himself	   later	   allows	   that	  analyticity	  “undeniably	  has	  a	  place	  at	  the	  commonsense	  level”	  (Quine	  (1991)	  p270).	  	  
	   61	  defending	   the	   analytic/synthetic	   distinction	  myself,	   I	   instead	   hope	   to	  have	   shown	   that	  Carnap	  need	  not	  depend	  on	   it	   in	  order	   to	  uphold	  an	  IQ/EQ	  distinction	   and	   to	   regard	  metaphysical	   ontology	   in	   the	   form	  of	  EQ’s	   as	   meaningless.	   The	   role	   of	   the	   analytic/synthetic	   distinction	   in	  Carnap’s	   theory	   is	   independent	   of	   both	   the	   IQ/EQ	   distinction	   and	   his	  conclusion	  that	  EQ’s	  are	  meaningless.	  Without	  the	  analytic,	  Carnap	  may	  have	  trouble	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  framework,	  which	  I	  resolve	  in	  chapter	  3	   section	   I	   by	  utilizing	   the	  notion	  of	   fiction	   in	   its	   place.	   I	   have	   shown	  that	   Quine’s	   denial	   of	   the	   analytic/synthetic	   distinction	   is	   what	   leads	  Quine	  towards	  his	  views	  on	  pragmatism,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  pragmatism	  along	  with	  immanent	  truth	  that	  distinguishes	  Quine	  from	  Carnap.	  Sections	  IV	  and	  V	  will	   dissolve	   these	  differences.	  But	  next	   I	  will	   argue	   that	  Quine	  cannot	   deny	   the	   analytic/synthetic	   distinction	   without	   reducing	   his	  own	  position	  to	  quietism,	  resulting	  in	  I-­‐realism’s	  self-­‐defeat.	  I	  will	  look	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Yablo	  to	  support	  and	  motivate	  this,	  in	  order	  to	  show	  that	  Quine	  requires	  a	  distinction	  of	  the	  kind	  he	  rejects,	  which	  will	  prove	  that	  Quine’s	  attack	  on	  Carnap	  fails	  and	  will	  show	  Quine’s	  I-­‐realism	  to	  fail	  too.	  	  	  	   II.	  I-­‐realism	  is	  not	  Realism.	  	  	  Quine’s	   recasting	   of	   the	   practical	   as	   evidential	   (by	   denying	   the	  analytic/synthetic	   distinction)	   makes	   room	   for	   I-­‐realism	   as	   an	  ontological	  position	   (described	   in	   the	   Introduction	  chapter	   section	  V),	  where	  the	  pragmatically	  chosen	  theory	  provides	  the	  ontology.	  I-­‐realism	  states	  that	  we	  read	  off	  ontological	  commitments	  not	  from	  EQ’s	  but	  from	  our	  internal	  assertions	  in	  answer	  to	  IQ’s.	  However,	  many	  assertions	  are	  not	  fit	  for	  deriving	  an	  ontology	  from.	  We	  talk	  about	  many	  things,	  some	  of	  which	  we	  do	  not	   take	   to	  exist,74	  and	   so	  we	  end	  up	  overloading	  our	  ontology	  inappropriately	  by	  insisting	  that	  those	  things	  exist	  and	  that	  we	  are	  committed	  to	  them	  when	  we	  talk	  of	  them.	  Quine’s	  response	  is	  this:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  ‘I	  did	  it	  for	  her	  sake’;	  ‘unicorns	  have	  horns’,	  yet	  no	  commitment	  to	  sakes	  or	  unicorns.	  
	   62	  We	   have	   had	   the	   wit	   to	   posit	   an	   ontology	   massive	   enough	   to	  crumble	   of	   its	   own	   weight…	   The	   moral	   to	   draw	   from	   the	  paradoxes	   is…	  that	  we	  must	   tighten	  our	  ontological	  belts	  a	   few	  holes.75	  	  Quine	   accepts	   that	   there	   are	   sentences	   in	   natural	   language	   that	   may	  seem	  to	  carry	  ontological	  weight	  that	  we	  wish	  to	  not	  be	  committed	  to,	  and	  he	  thus	  proposes	  that	  we	  need	  to	  reduce	  our	  ontology	  by	  reducing	  those	  things	  to	  which	  we	  are	  committed.	  He	  allows	  that	  we	  sometimes	  say	   things	   that	  we	   do	   not	   take	   ontologically	   seriously,	   so	  we	   need	   to	  narrow	   our	   ontologically	   committing	   speech	   down	   to	   only	   particular	  assertions.	  He	  states	  that	  we	  sometimes	  speak	  in	  merely	  practical	  ways,	  even	   in	  science,	   for	  example	  when	  speaking	  as	   if	   there	  are	   frictionless	  planes	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   simplicity	   (instead	   of	   using	   a	   more	   literally	  correct	  but	  more	  complex	  description	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  properties	  of	  real	  planes	  as	   friction	   is	  reduced).	  Such	  uses	  need	  to	  be	   filtered	  out	  of	  our	  ontologically	  committing	  language,	  in	  order	  to	  not	  be	  in	  the	  ontology.76	  The	  problem	  with	  acknowledging	  this	  is	  that	  Quine	  has	  allowed	  for	  the	  ‘merely	  pragmatic’,	  where	  some	  language	  use	  is	  practical	  without	  being	  
evidential.	  Since	   it	  was	  Quine’s	   treatment	  of	   the	  practical	  as	  evidential	  that	  made	  I-­‐realism	  a	  realist	  position,	  the	  position	  is	  thus	  self-­‐defeating.	  	  	  Therefore,	   the	   problem	   for	   Quine’s	   I-­‐realism	   is	   this:	   if	   to	   assert	   is	   to	  commit	   ontologically	   then	   far	   too	   much	   will	   be	   said	   to	   exist,	   yet	   to	  acknowledge	   that	   some	   assertions	   are	   merely	   practical	   requires	   a	  distinction	   that	   Quine	   rejects.	   In	   rejecting	   the	   analytic/synthetic	  distinction,	  Quine	  was	  able	  to	  reject	  Carnap’s	  position	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  it	   claiming	   that	   framework	   choice	   was	   to	   be	   merely	   practical.	   Now	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Quine	  (1969)	  p17.	  If	  we	  do	  not	  tighten	  the	  belt,	  Yablo	  (1998	  p245)	  points	  out	  that	  I-­‐realism	  “overshoots	  the	  mark”	  by	  being	  committed	  to	  too	  many	  things	  –	  see	  section	  III.	  76	  However	  Quine	  tries	   to	  avoid	  this	  problem	  by	  saying	  that	   in	  our	  best	  theory	  there	  will	  be	  no	  merely	  practical	  ways	  of	  speaking	  –	   it	   is	  only	  this	   theory	  that	  we	  endorse	  and	  that	  gives	  us	  our	  commitments.	  Yet	  he	  still	  cites	  some	  practical	  as	  non-­‐committal.	  
	   63	  Quine	   himself	   is	   subject	   to	   that	   criticism.	   Quine	   needed	   all	   practical	  reasons	  to	  be	  evidential,	  such	  that	  nothing	  (like	  the	  choice	  of	  theory	  or	  framework)	   is	  merely	  pragmatic,	  yet	   it	  appears	  he	  must	  now	  allow	  for	  some	  non-­‐evidential	  practical	   reasons	   in	  order	   to	  be	  un-­‐committed	   to	  entities	  in	  merely	  pragmatic	  language	  use.	  As	  Yablo	  further	  describes:	  	   Does	  Quine	  allow	   for	   the	  possibility	  of	  ways	  of	   talking	   that	  are	  useful	   without	   being	   true?...	   It	   seems	   clear	   that	   he	   not	   only	  allows	  for	  it,	  he	  revels	  in	  it.	  The	  overall	  trend	  of	  Word	  &	  Object	  is	  that	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  our	  day	   to	  day	   talk,	   and	  a	  great	  deal	  of	   the	  talk	   even	   of	   working	   scientists,	   is	   not	   to	   be	   taken	   ultimately	  seriously.77	  	  If	  Quine	  allows	  for	  scientists	  to	  use	  practical	  ways	  of	  talking	  that	  are	  not	  evidential,	   then	   even	   our	   best	   scientific	   theories	  may	   contain	   entities	  that	   we	   ought	   not	   be	   ontologically	   committed	   to.	   Quine’s	   I-­‐realism	  cannot	  work	  if	  there	  are	  things	  postulated	  in	  these	  theories	  that	  we	  do	  not	  want	  to	  be	  realist	  about	  but	  will	  end	  up	  being	  committed	  to	  due	  to	  Quine’s	  quantificational	  strategy	   for	  commitment.	  So	   I-­‐realists	  have	   to	  decide	  whether	  they	  are	  to	  be	  realist	  about	  too	  much,	  or	  whether	  there	  is	   a	   way	   of	   limiting	   what	   they	   are	   committed	   to.	   If	   the	   latter,	   the	  question	   is	   how	   can	   I-­‐realists	   make	   a	   distinction	   between	   which	  assertions	   are	   appropriate	   for	  ontological	   commitment	   and	  which	  are	  not?	  How	  can	   the	   I-­‐realist	  distinguish	   the	  practical	  assertions	   that	  are	  evidential	   from	   the	   merely	   practical	   (non-­‐evidential)	   assertions?78	  As	  Quine	   puts	   the	   problem:	   “A	   question	   arises	   of	   what	   to	   count	   as	  reification,	   and	  what	   to	   count	   rather	   as	   just	   a	  useful	   but	  ontologically	  noncommittal	  turn	  of	  phrase.”79	  I	  will	  now	  attack	  how	  Quine	  proposes	  to	  answer	  this	  question,	  which	  will	  show	  I-­‐realism	  to	  be	  self-­‐defeating.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Yablo	  (1998)	  p242	  78	  Yablo	  argues	  that	  the	  practical	  cannot	  be	  distinguished	  from	  the	  non-­‐practical,	  but	  what	  really	  needs	  distinguishing	  is	  the	  evidential	  from	  within	  the	  practical	  -­‐	  section	  III.	  79	  Quine	  (1992)	  p25	  	  
	   64	  Quine	  proposes	  we	  rid	  of	  unwanted	  commitment	  through	  eliminability:	  	   One	   way	   in	   which	   a	   man	   may	   fail	   to	   share	   the	   ontological	  commitments	  of	  his	  discourse	  is,	  obviously,	  by	  taking	  an	  attitude	  of	  frivolity.	  The	  parent	  who	  tells	  the	  Cinderella	  story	  is	  no	  more	  committed	  to	  admitting	  a	  fairy	  godmother	  and	  a	  pumpkin	  coach	  into	   his	   own	   ontology	   than	   to	   admitting	   the	   story	   as	   true.	  Another	   and	   more	   serious	   case	   in	   which	   a	   man	   frees	   himself	  from	  ontological	  commitments	  of	  his	  discourse	  is	  this:	  he	  shows	  how	   some	   particular	   use	   which	   he	   makes	   of	   quantification,	  involving	   a	   prima	   facie	   commitment	   to	   certain	   objects,	   can	   be	  expanded	   into	   an	   idiom	   innocent	   of	   such	   commitments.	   In	   this	  event	   the	   seemingly	  presupposed	  objects	  may	   justly	   be	   said	   to	  be	  explained	  away	  as	  convenient	  fictions,	  manners	  of	  speaking.80	  	  Quine	  argues	  that	  with	  this	  particular	  method	  of	  being	  ‘explained	  away’	  we	  can	  reduce	  our	  ontology	  to	  be	  more	  economical	  and	  appealing:	  	   We	  can	  in	  this	  way	  enjoy	  the	  convenience	  of	  an	  ontology	  of	  sets,	  up	  to	  a	  point,	  without	  footing	  the	  ontological	  bill;	  we	  can	  explain	  the	  sham	  sets	  away	  as	  a	  mere	  manner	  of	  speaking,	  by	  contextual	  definition,	  when	  the	  ontological	  reckoning	  comes.81	  	  	  In	  such	  cases,	  Quine	  thinks	  we	  are	  not	  actually	  ontologically	  committed	  to	  such	   things,	  because	  we	  can	  show	  how	   in	  a	  serious	  context	  we	  can	  dispense	   with	   them82	  and	   express	   our	   best	   scientific	   theories	   only	   in	  literal	  terms	  when	  all	  quantified	  statements	  will	  be	  rightly	  ontologically	  committing.	  	  Quine	  believes	  these	  practical	  but	  unserious	  ways	  of	  using	  natural	   language	   could	   otherwise	   be	   expressed	   in	   fully	   literal	   terms,	  albeit	   in	   a	  more	   complex	  manner,	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   can	   be	   done	  shows	  that	  we	  are	  to	  be	  committed	  only	  to	  the	  serious	  sentences.	  If	  we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Quine	  (1961)	  p103	  81	  Quine	  (1986)	  p69	  82	  I	  argue,	  with	  Yablo	  (1998),	  against	  the	  dispensability	  of	  the	  non-­‐literal,	  in	  section	  III.	  	  	  
	   65	  do	  not	  want	  the	  commitment,	  we	  either	  have	  to	  retract	  the	  statement	  or	  paraphrase	  it	  away	  (this	  constitutes	  Quine’s	  ‘menu’	  in	  Yablo	  2001	  p72):	  	   Many	  of	  our	  casual	  remarks	   in	  the	   ‘there	  are’	   form	  would	  want	  dusting	   up	  when	   our	   thoughts	   turn	   seriously	   ontological.	   Each	  time,	   if	   a	   point	   is	  made	   of	   it,	   the	   burden	   is	   of	   course	   on	   us	   to	  paraphrase	  or	  retract.83	  	  The	   distinction	   then	   between	   assertions	   with	   commitment	   and	   those	  without	   rests	  on	  having	  a	   serious	  attitude	   in	   literal	   terms,	   so	   that	   the	  only	   ontological	   commitments	   that	   the	   I-­‐realist	   takes	   on	   are	   those	  things	   that	   are	   spoken	   about	   seriously	   and	   literally,	   and	   are	  indispensable	  to	  the	  best	  scientific	  theory.	  So	  now	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  just	  to	  assert	  ‘there	  is	  a	  prime	  between	  2	  and	  4’	  as	  an	  answer	  to	  an	  IQ	  is	  to	  be	  realist	  about	  numbers,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  say	  ‘there	  are	  Xs’	  in	  order	   to	   be	   ontologically	   committed	   to	   X.	   Quantification	   alone	   is	  conceded	  to	  not	  be	  enough	  for	  ontological	  commitment.	  Rather	  such	  a	  quantified	  claim	  of	  X	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  literal	  and	  indispensible	  part	  of	  the	  best	  theory,	  and	  talk	  of	  X	  needs	  to	  be	  serious,	  to	  be	  a	  realist	  about	  X.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  2	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  quantification	  alone	  is	  never	  enough	  for	  ontological	  commitment	  since	  quantification	  is	  ontologically	  neutral.	  This	  motivates	  how	  Quine’s	  I-­‐realist	  strategy	  is	  really	  rather	  quiet.	  	  	  The	   concession	   that	   Quine	   makes	   is	   that	   it	   is	   not	   the	   quantificational	  
language	  itself	  that	  is	  doing	  the	  committing	  but	  the	  attitude	  and	  type	  of	  thing	  talked	  about	  that	  determines	  ontological	  commitment.	  Only	  some	  quantified	   sentences	   will	   be	   ontologically	   committing,	   and	   the	   way	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Quine	   (1969)	   p100.	   See	   chapter	   2	   section	   II	   p91	   for	   Quine’s	   ‘menu’.	   Thomasson	  (2015)	  argues	  that	  we	  cannot	  avoid	  commitment	  to	  entities	  by	  avoiding	  use	  of	  certain	  terms.	   Commitment	   is	   only	   hidden	   by	   removing	   a	   term	   ‘s’	   and	   paraphrasing,	   as	   re-­‐writing	  sentences	  that	  quantify	  over	  ‘s’	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘t’	  will	  analytically	  entail	  that	  there	  are	  s’s	  as	   t	  will	  entail	  s.	  Even	   if	  we	  separate	  what	  we	  want	   to	  be	  committed	  to	   from	  what	  we	  do	  not,	  Quine	  won’t	  succeed	  in	  avoiding	  commitment	  just	  by	  using	  different	  terms.	  Furthermore,	  Berto	   (2012)	  p41	  states,	  with	  regard	   to	  paraphrasing	  away	   the	  unwanteds,	  that	  “nobody	  knows	  how	  to	  produce	  such	  systematic	  paraphrases”.	  	  
	   66	  Quine	   proposes	   to	   differentiate	   those	   sentences	   is	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  attitude	  with	  which	  they	  are	  spoken	  and	  the	  theory	  within	  which	  they	  are	  spoken.	  I	  regard	  this	  as	  unsatisfactory	  for	  realism,	  as	  it	  shows	  that	  some	   language	   usage	   is	   quiet,	   motivating	   the	   idea	   that	   language	   is	  naturally	  quiet	  by	  default.84	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  I-­‐realist	  has	  been	  quiet	  all	  along	  when	  they	  use	  natural	  language,	  until	  they	   decide	   that	   they	   are	   asserting	   seriously	   about	   something	   literal	  and	  indispensible	  within	  their	  best	  scientific	  theory.	  It	  is	  only	  then	  that	  quantification	  becomes	  ontologically	  committing.85	  So	  now,	  a	  quantified	  assertion	  made	   by	   the	   I-­‐realist	   and	   the	   quietist	   has	   the	   same	   default	  metaphysical	   status	   of	   being	   quiet.	   This	   diminishes	   the	   difference	  between	  I-­‐realism	  and	  quietism,	  as	  it	  is	  only	  once	  you	  ask	  the	  I-­‐realists	  if	   they	  consider	   their	   talk	  committing	  do	  you	  get	  a	  difference,	  but	   this	  does	   not	   seem	   substantial	   enough	   in	   order	   to	   derive	   realism	   –	   can	   it	  really	  be	   that	  easy	   to	  be	  a	   realist?	  Does	  a	  mere	  attitude	   really	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  ontology?	  Furthermore,	  if	  internal	  use	  of	  quantification	  in	  language	   only	   sometimes	   provides	   us	   with	   ontologically	   committing	  existence	  claims	  then	  in	  what	  sense	  is	  I-­‐realism	  a	  form	  of	  realism?	  	  	  	  I-­‐realism	   appears	   only	   to	   be	   a	   form	   or	   realism	   at	   certain	   times,	  depending	   on	  what	   you	   are	   talking	   about	   and	  how	  you	   are	   talking.	   I-­‐realism	   would	   amount	   to	   quietism	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   time,	   when	   our	  language	   is	  metaphysically	  quiet	  and	  ontologically	  un-­‐committing,	  and	  so	  the	  default	  position	  is	  therefore	  quietism.86	  The	  I-­‐realist	   is	  at	  best	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  However	  Quine	   takes	   it	   that	   the	  default	   is	   literal,	   committing	   talk,	   unless	   you	   can	  explain	   it	   away,	   so	   Quine	   puts	   pressure	   on	   the	   quietists	   to	   explain	   why	   their	   talk	  should	  not	  be	  taken	   literally.	  Quine	  thinks	  that	  the	  non-­‐serious	  uses	  are	  parasitic	  on	  the	  serious	  uses,	  rather	  than	  the	  other	  way	  around,	  and	  thus	  thinks	  that	   language	   is	  loud	  until	  you	  can	  prove	  it	  quiet	  (by	  dispensing	  of	  it).	  Against	  Quine,	  I	  will	  be	  showing	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  2	  that	  quantification	   is	  ontologically	  neutral	  and	  thus	  the	  default	  and	  natural	  state	  of	  formal	  and	  natural	  languages	  is	  to	  be	  metaphysically	  quiet.	  85	  This	   further	   motivates	   what	   I	   will	   be	   arguing	   for	   in	   the	   next	   chapter	   2	   that	  quantification	  is	  naturally	  ontologically	  neutral	  and	  metaphysically	  quiet	  and	  only	  at	  times	  will	  our	  sentences	  be	  ontologically	  committing	  (due	  to	  the	  existence	  predicate).	  86	  Here	  Price	   (2011	  p48)	  and	  Wright	   (1993	  p69)	  agree	  with	  me	   that	  quietism	   is	   the	  initial	  position	  from	  which	  we	  have	  to	  be	  shown	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  move,	  so	  the	  onus	  is	  always	  on	  the	  realist	  to	  show	  why	  they	  move,	  as	  the	  default	  position	  is	  quietism.	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  part-­‐time	  realist,	  and	  otherwise	  resorts	  to	  being	  a	  full-­‐time	  quietist.	  If	  I-­‐realism	  is	  the	  position	  that	  takes	  answers	  to	  IQ’s	  as	  ontological,	  then	  if	  we	  start	  to	  limit	  only	  some	  of	  those	  answers	  as	  ontological	  (due	  to	  some	  not	   being	   serious	  within	   the	   context	   of	   the	   best	   scientific	   theory)	  we	  end	   up	   significantly	   diminishing	   the	   defining	   aspect	   of	   I-­‐realism	   as	   a	  type	  of	  realism.	  We	  are	  only	  committed,	  and	  so	  only	  realist,	  at	  certain	  ‘right	   times’.	   I	   therefore	   argue	   that	   I-­‐realism	   is	   not	   realism,	   in	   the	  ontologically	   significant	   sense	   that	   it	   was	   desired	   to	   be.	   The	   same	  argument	  runs	  for	  quantified	  sentences	  (discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  2)	  –	  since	  we	  now	  have	  to	   limit	   those	  sentences	   that	  are	  ontologically	  committing	   to	   only	   the	   serious	   ones	  made	  within	   the	   context	   of	   best	  scientific	  theorizing.	  Quantified	  sentences	  are	  thus	  more	  appropriately	  thought	   of	   as	   being	   ontologically	   neutral	   all	   of	   the	   time,	   except	  when	  specified	  to	  be	  ontologically	  committing	  at	  the	   ‘right	  times’.	   I	  will	  now	  argue	  that	  these	  ‘right	  times’	  cannot	  be	  specified,	  as	  with	  Yablo	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  cannot	  specify	  those	  ontologically	  committing	  sentences.	  	  	  	   III.	  Yablo	  on	  Quine	  on	  Carnap.	  	  	  Quine	  concedes	  that	  internal	  assertions	  in	  answer	  to	  IQ’s	  are	  not	  always	  ontologically	   committing.	   He	   states	   that	   it	   is	   not	   ontologically	  committing	  to	  speak	  in	  a	  merely	  practical	  or	  non-­‐literal	  way,	  so	  he	  will	  need	  a	  literal/non-­‐literal	  distinction	  in	  order	  to	  filter	  out	  the	  unwanteds	  from	  our	  ontological	  commitments.	  Quine	  trusts	  that	  in	  time	  these	  non-­‐literal	   parts	   of	   our	   statements	  will	   be	   eroded	   and	   eventually	   only	   the	  literal	   interpretation	   will	   remain.	   With	   this	   Yablo87	  disagrees	   as	   he	  classes	   some	   non-­‐literal	   (metaphorical)	   discourse	   to	   be	   indispensible	  and	   as	   such	   cannot	   be	   paraphrased	   away	   as	   Quine	   supposes	   it	   can.	  There	   seem	   to	   be	  many	  ways	   of	   speaking	   that	  we	  would	   not	  want	   to	  take	  ontologically	  seriously	  yet	  it	  is	  unclear	  that	  those	  ways	  of	  speaking	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Yablo	  (1998)	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  could	   be	   dispensed	   with.	   Being	   practical	   need	   not	   necessitate	   being	  dispensable.	   And	   indispensability	   need	   not	   necessitate	   truth,	   as	   some	  indispensible	   theories	   can	   be	   treated	   instrumentally.	   Sometimes	  indispensable	   components	   of	   theories	   may	   be	   adopted	   for	   practical	  reasons,	  for	  instance	  by	  providing	  convenient	  forms	  of	  expression	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  metaphor.	  Furthermore,	  Yablo	  claims	  we	  cannot	  do	  without	  the	  metaphorical	   because	   in	   order	   to	   do	   so	  we	   need	   to	   be	   able	   to	   at	  least	  distinguish	  them	  from	  the	  literal,	  which	  he	  argues	  cannot	  be	  done:	  	  	   The	  boundaries	  of	  the	  literal	  are	  about	  as	  blurry	  as	  they	  could	  be,	  the	  clear	  cases	  on	  either	  side	  enclosing	  a	  vast	  interior	  region	  of	  indeterminacy.88	  	   [The	  Quinean]	  needs	   a	  way	  of	   sequestering	  the	  metaphors	   as	   a	  preparation	   for	   some	   sort	   of	   special	   treatment.	   Of	   course,	   we	  have	   no	   idea	   as	   yet	   what	   the	   special	   treatment	   would	   be…	   If	  metaphors	  are	  to	  be	  given	  special	  treatment,	  there	  had	  better	  be	  a	  way	  of	   telling	  which	  statements	  the	  metaphors	  are.	  What	   is	   it?	  Quine	  doesn’t	  tell	  us,	  and	  it	  may	  be	  doubted	  whether	  a	  criterion	  is	  possible.	  	  	  So	  Yablo	  has	  two	  concerns:	  (1)	  Quine	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  what	  the	  special	  treatment	  of	  metaphors	  is	  to	  be;	  and	  (2)	  Quine	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  how	  to	  differentiate	   the	   metaphorical	   from	   the	   literal	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   This	  differentiating	  issue	  is	  the	  bigger	  worry,	  and	  for	  Yablo	  the	  separation	  is	  impossible,	  especially	  on	  a	  Quinean	  model.	  This	   is	  because,	  on	  Quine’s	  model,	   a	  method	   to	   separate	   the	  metaphorical	   from	   the	   literal	  will	   be	  circular,	   based	   on	   the	  method	   of	  working	   out	  what	   exists.	   To	   draw	   a	  literal/metaphorical	  distinction,	  Quine	  needs	  an	  answer	  to	  what	  exists	  (in	  order	  to	  know	  what	  is	  merely	  a	  metaphor).	  But,	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  what	  exists,	  Quine	  needs	  to	  draw	  a	  literal/metaphorical	  distinction	  (to	  not	  be	  ontologically	  committed	  to	  the	  metaphorical).	  As	  Yablo	  explains:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Yablo	  (1998)	  p233	  
	   69	  How	   the	   literality	   issue	   turns	   out	   depends	   on	   how	   the	  ontological	   issue	   turns	  out…	  [Quine’s]	  advice	   is	   to	  countenance	  numbers	   iff	   the	   literal	   part	  of	   our	   theory	  quantifies	  over	   them;	  and	  to	  count	  the	  part	  of	  our	  theory	  that	  quantifies	  over	  numbers	  literal	  iff	  there	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  numbers.89	  	  	  	  Both	  steps	  in	  Quine’s	  strategy	  are	  thus	  flawed	  –	  not	  only	  is	  it	  circular	  in	  distinguishing	   the	   literal	   from	   the	   metaphorical,	   but	   the	   method	   of	  paraphrasing	   away	   metaphors	   as	   if	   they	   were	   distinguishable	   and	  dispensable	  is	  also	  not	  possible.	  Yablo	  cites	  three	  types	  of	  metaphorical	  language	  that	  are	  indispensable	  as	  they	  cannot	  be	  paraphrased	  away	  in	  the	   Quinean	   way:90	  (1)	   Representationally	   Essential	   Metaphors:	   ‘The	  average	   star	   has	   2.4	   planets’.	   For	   these	   sentences	   there	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   a	  literal	   alternative,	   so	   the	   metaphor	   is	   needed	   for	   the	   content	   to	   be	  expressed.	  In	  the	  example	  given	  we	  cannot	  assert	  the	  non-­‐metaphorical	  version	   (without	   reference	   to	   an	   average	   star)	   of	   the	   sentence	   as	   it	  would	   be	   infinitely	   long,	   and	   the	   finite	   version	   would	   still	   refer	  metaphorically	   to	   mathematical	   entities	   that	   we	   may	   not	   want	   to	   be	  ontologically	   committed	   to.	   (2)	   Presentationally	   Essential	   Metaphors:	  ‘Crotone	  is	  in	  the	  arch	  of	  the	  boot’.	  Here	  there	  is	  a	  literal	  paraphrase	  for	  the	  content	  available,	  but	   it	  does	  not	  have	  the	  same	  force	  or	  cognitive	  effect	   as	   the	  metaphor.	   The	  metaphor	   is	   needed	   for	   this	   force,	   as	  we	  cannot	  understand	  what	   the	  content	   is	  about	  without	   the	  accessibility	  provided	  by	  the	  metaphor.	  In	  the	  example	  given,	  to	  think	  of	  the	  location	  of	  Crotone,	  we	  need	  to	  imagine	  Italy	  as	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  boot,	  and	  so	  we	  cannot	   escape	   the	  metaphor	   if	  we	  want	   to	   understand	   the	   content	   in	  this	  way.	   (3)	  Procedurally	  Essential	  Metaphors:	   ‘Juliet	   is	   the	  sun’.	  This	  type	  of	  metaphor	  is	  such	  that	  we	  do	  not	  even	  know	  what	  the	  content	  is,	  and	   also	   do	   not	   know	   what	   part	   of	   the	   sentence	   is	   literally	   tracking	  reality	  and	  what	  is	  not.	  The	  metaphor	  is	   indispensible	  here	  as	  there	  is	  no	  other	  choice,	  as	  we	  would	  not	  be	  sure	  what	  the	  literal	  alternative	  is.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Yablo	  (1998)	  p258	  90	  These	  examples	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Yablo	  (1998)	  p253-­‐255	  
	   70	  Yablo	   concludes	  metaphor	   to	   be	   indispensable	   using	   the	   above	   three	  types	  as	  examples,	  and	  states	  that	  Quine	  does	  not	  argue	  against	  this:	  	   Three	   grades	   of	   metaphorical	   involvement,	   then,	   each	  with	   its	  own	   distinctive	   rationale.	   The	   Quinean	   is	   in	   effect	   betting	   that	  these	  rationales	  are	  short-­‐term	  only	  –	  that	  in	  time	  we	  are	  going	  to	  outgrow	  the	  theoretical	  needs	  to	  which	  they	  speak…	  If	  he	  has	  an	  argument	  for	  this,	  though,	  Quine	  doesn’t	  tell	  us	  what	  it	  is.91	  	  	  For	   ontology	   to	   be	   a	   meaningful	   enterprise	   Quine	   needs	   a	   clear	  literal/non-­‐literal	   distinction92	  so	   that	   our	   internal	   assertions	   can	   be	  taken	   to	   be	   ontologically	   committing	   in	   the	   appropriate	   ‘right	   times’,	  otherwise	  we	  will	   find	   ourselves	   committed	   to	   the	   objects	   quantified	  over	  in	  both	  non-­‐literal	  and	  literal	  discourse.	  Therefore,	  if	  Yablo	  is	  right,	  without	   a	   clear	   literal/non-­‐literal	   distinction	   there	  will	   be	   no	   serious	  project	  of	  ontology,	  since	  both	  the	  IQ	  and	  EQ	  will	  be	  meaningless.	  The	  IQ	   is	  meaningless	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  ontology	  as	  what	  we	  extrapolate	  internally	   from	   theories	  will	   unavoidably	   include	   commitments	   of	   the	  non-­‐literal	  as	  well	  as	   literal	  discourse.	  And	  the	  EQ	  is	  meaningless	  as	   it	  asks	  what	  there	  is	  purely	  literally,	  yet	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  separate	  out	  the	  purely	   literal.	  Quinean	  methodology	   for	  realism	  will	  not	  work,	  since	   it	  rests	  on	  extrapolating	  ontological	  commitment	  from	  internal	  assertions	  made	  in	  a	  natural	  language	  that	  includes	  the	  non-­‐literal.	  Without	  being	  able	   to	   distinguish	   our	   non-­‐literal	   from	   our	   literal	   utterances,	   the	  distinction	   between	   our	   internal	   assertions	   that	   should	   be	   taken	  ontologically	   seriously	   and	   those	   that	   should	   not	   will	   be	   impossible.	  Without	   distinguishing	   the	   committing	   assertions	   from	   the	   non-­‐committal,	  the	  I-­‐realist	  is	  either	  committed	  to	  everything	  that	  they	  talk	  about	  or	  will	  have	  to	  concede	  to	  not	  be	  committed	  to	  anything	  at	  all.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Yablo	  (1998)	  p254-­‐255	  92	  Price	  (2011	  p51)	  agrees	   that	  a	   factual/non-­‐factual	  distinction	   is	  required	  which	   is	  problematic	  as	  we	  are	  owed	  an	  account	  of	  why	  some	  language	  is	  merely	  practical	  and	  some	  is	  evidentially	  practical,	  or	  we	  slide	  to	  take	  everything	  as	  practical:	  “All	  discourse	  would	  thus	  be	  construed	  as	  fictional	  discourse,	  and	  the	  contrast…	  would	  be	  lost.”	  	  
	   71	  But	  regardless	  of	  whether	  Yablo	  is	  right	  about	  the	  impossibility	  of	  both	  distinguishing	  and	  dispensing	  with	  the	  non-­‐literal,	  Quine’s	  position	  still	  suffers	  since	  it	  acknowledges	  the	  merely	  practical	  whilst	  requiring	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  merely	  practical,	  and	  thus	  is	  self-­‐defeating	  regardless	  of	  being	  defeated	  by	  Yablo.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  practical	  is	  seen	  as	  evidential	  of	   truth,	   for	  Quine,	   shows	   that	  nothing	   is	  merely	  practical.	  Thus	  Quine	  cannot	  divide	  assertions	  into	  those	  that	  are	  ontologically	  committal	  and	  those	   that	   are	   not,	   since	   that	   divide	   rests	   upon	   a	   distinction	   that	   he	  rejects.	  In	  order	  not	  to	  be	  ontologically	  committed	  to	  unwanted	  things,	  Quine	   marked	   a	   difference	   between	   the	   purely	   pragmatic	   and	   the	  factual	   –	   a	  distinction	   that	  he	  himself	  denies	   in	  his	   arguments	  against	  Carnap’s	  quietism,	  as	  it	  is	  based	  on	  what	  Quine	  considers	  an	  impossible	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction.	  Quine	  acknowledges	  a	  literal/non-­‐literal	  distinction	  as	  being	  between	  those	  assertions	  that	  are	  fit	  for	  ontological	  commitment	  and	  those	  that	  are	  not.	  And	  so	  regardless	  of	  whether	  Yablo	  is	  right	  about	  whether	  this	  distinction	  can	  be	  made,	  Quine	  requires	  such	  a	  distinction	  to	  allow	  for	  non-­‐commitment	  to	  the	  non-­‐literal.	  Yet	  Quine	  rejected	   such	   a	   distinction	   as	   it	   is	   based	   on	   the	   analytic/synthetic	   to	  allow	  for	  pragmatics	  to	  be	  evidential	  in	  I-­‐realism.	  As	  Yablo	  describes:	  	   [Quine’s]	  program	  for	  ontology	  thus	  presupposes	  a	  distinction	  in	  the	  same	  ballpark	  as	  the	  one	  he	  rejects	  in	  Carnap.	  And	  he	  needs	  the	  distinction	   to	  be	   tolerably	  clear	  and	  sharp;	  otherwise	   there	  will	   be	   no	   way	   of	   implementing	   the	   exemption	   from	  commitment	  that	  he	  grants	  to	  the	  non-­‐literal.93	  	  	  If	  nothing	   is	  purely	  practical	   then	  this	   includes	  non-­‐literal	  elements	  of	  our	  language	  that	  Quine	  wished	  to	  avoid	  commitment	  to	  by	  saying	  they	  
were	   purely	   practical.	   However,	   to	   be	   ‘purely	   practical’	   is	   to	   admit	   a	  distinction	   between	   the	   analytic/synthetic,	   such	   that	   some	   things	   can	  remain	  merely	  a	  matter	   of	   pragmatics	   and	   always	   retain	   the	   status	   of	  being	   a	   convention.	   So	   Quine	   is	   stuck	   in	   a	   situation	  where	   he	   rejects	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Yablo	  (1998)	  p233	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  precisely	  what	  he	  needs	  in	  order	  for	  his	  I-­‐realism	  to	  be	  feasible.	  Quine	  rejects	   the	   distinction	   between	   linguistic	   and	   factual	   components	   of	  truth,	   yet	   requires	   non-­‐literal	   talk	   to	   be	   ontologically	   free	   (and	  hence	  purely	  practical).	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  do	  both,	  Quine	  needs	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  how	  the	  distinction	  between	  literal	  and	  non-­‐literal	  assertion	   differs	   from	   the	   distinction	   between	   linguistic	   and	   factual	  truth	  (and	  thus	  between	  the	  analytic	  and	  the	  synthetic).	  Furthermore,	  if	  Yablo	   is	   right,	   Quine	   needs	   a	   substantial	   practical/theoretical	  distinction	  that	   is	  not	  based	  on	  being	  dispensable/indispensible	  as	   for	  Yablo	   some	   practical	   claims	   are	   not	   dispensable.	   Without	   such	   a	  difference	  between	  these	  distinctions,	  Quinean	  methodology	  fails.	  	  	  	  So,	   despite	   Quine’s	   efforts	   to	   rid	   philosophy	   of	   the	   analytic/synthetic	  distinction,	  he	  too	  requires	  a	  distinction	  of	  this	  kind	  in	  order	  to	  support	  his	   own	   I-­‐realism.	   Quine	   cannot	   both	   attack	   Carnap’s	   framework	  adoption	   for	   being	   merely	   pragmatic,	   and	   allow	   for	   some	   internal	  assertions	   to	   be	   merely	   pragmatic.	   Either	   he	   allows	   for	   the	   merely	  pragmatic	   (which	   requires	   the	   analytic/synthetic	   distinction)	   or	   he	  does	   not,	   but	   he	   cannot	   deny	   it	   to	   attack	   Carnap’s	   quietism	   and	   then	  utilize	  it	  to	  save	  his	  I-­‐realism.	  I-­‐realism	  requires	  the	  denial	  of	  the	  merely	  practical	   in	   order	   for	   pragmatic	   considerations	   to	   be	   evidential	   and	  metaphysically	   significant	   (so	   that	   I-­‐realism	   is	   ontological).	   Yet	   I-­‐realism	   requires	   the	   acceptance	   of	   the	   merely	   practical	   in	   order	   for	  some	   internal	   assertions	   to	   not	   be	   ontologically	   committing.	   If	   the	  merely	  practical	   (that	  we	   cannot	  dispense	  with)	   is	   always	   in	  our	  best	  theories	   then	   I-­‐realism	  over-­‐commits,	   and	  we	   cannot	  work	  out	  which	  things	  we	  are	  over-­‐committed	   to	  because	  we	  cannot	  distinguish	   these	  merely	  practical	   from	  the	  rest.	   I	  conclude	  this	  section	  that	   I-­‐realism	  is	  not	   realism	   as	   it	   suffers	   from	   self-­‐defeat.	   If	   Yablo	   is	   right	   about	   the	  indispensability	  of	  the	  non-­‐literal,	  then	  I-­‐realism	  cannot	  be	  realism.	  And	  
regardless	  of	  whether	  Yablo	  is	  right,	   I-­‐realism	  is	  self-­‐defeating	   in	  trying	  to	  be	  a	  realist	  position.	  So	  I	  now	  show	  I-­‐realism	  to	  be	  relativist	  instead.	  
	   73	  IV.	  Quine	  as	  a	  Relativist.	  	  	  In	  the	  last	  two	  sections	  I	  argued	  that	  I-­‐realism	  is	  not	  a	  form	  of	  realism,	  and	  that	  Quine	  suffers	  from	  self-­‐defeat	  in	  trying	  to	  formulate	  it	  as	  a	  type	  of	  realist	  ontological	  position.	  There	  will	   therefore	  not	  be	  much	  left	   to	  separate	  Quine’s	  position	  from	  Carnap	  as	  both	  will	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  hold	   a	   form	  of	   quietism	   and	  not	   realism.	   In	   this	   section	   I	   now	   aim	   to	  show	   that	  Quine’s	  position	   is	   a	   type	  of	   relativism	  on	  its	  own	  terms,	   so	  that	  independent	  of	  Yablo’s	  critique	  above,	  Quine’s	  position	  is	  relativist	  and	  not	  realist.	  This	  relativism	  is	  derived	  internally	  from	  I-­‐realism	  and	  as	   a	   consequence	   of	   his	   ‘Ontological	   Relativity’	   (1969).	   I	   will	   discuss	  these	  two	  levels	  of	  relativity	  in	  turn.	  Once	  we	  chip	  away	  at	  I-­‐realism	  we	  can	   see	   that	   there	   is	  nothing	   realist	   about	   it	  due	   to	   its	   relativism	   that	  manifests	   internally,	   and	   once	   we	   learn	   the	   lesson	   from	   ‘Ontological	  Relativity’	   the	   realism	   from	   I-­‐realism	   floats	   away	   even	   further.	   I	   thus	  hope	  to	  show	  that	  relativism	  applies	  equally	  to	  both	  Carnap	  and	  Quine,	  in	  a	  quietist	  manner,94	  despite	  Quine’s	  aims	  otherwise.	  Therefore	   they	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  rivals	  but	  as	  allies	  against	  metaphysical	  ontology.	  	  	  IV.i.	  Relativism	  from	  I-­‐realism.	  	  	  For	  Quine,	  what	  exists	   (or	  what	   can	  be	  said	   to	  exist)	   is	  relative	   to	   the	  best	  scientific	  theory,	  making	  him	  a	  self-­‐confessed	  relativist.	  Quine’s	  I-­‐realism	  says	  nothing	  about	  reality,	  rather	  just	  the	  commitments	  of	  this	  best	  scientific	  theory.	  Yet	  what	  the	  theory	  is	  committed	  to	  ontologically	  need	  not	  mean	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  ‘what	  there	  really	  is’.	  As	  Quine	  himself	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Some	  take	  relativism	  to	  be	  a	  kind	  of	  realism,	  incompatible	  with	  quietism.	  For	  me,	  a	  relativist’s	   utterances	   are	   quiet	   with	   regard	   to	   what	   really	   exists	   (since	   they	   deny	  sense	  in	  what	  really	  exists	  as	  they	  only	  talk	  about	  relative	  existence).	  So	  quietism	  and	  relativism	  are	  compatible.	  And	  since	  I	  take	  relativism	  to	  deny	  absolute	  existence,	  (and	  realism	  as	  E-­‐realism	  is	  absolutist),	  relativism	  is	  not	  a	  realist	  position	  in	  this	  sense.	  	  	  	  
	   74	  puts	   it:	   “We	   have	   moved	   now	   to	   the	   question	   of	   checking	   not	   on	  existence,	   but	   on	   imputations	   of	   existence:	   on	   what	   a	   theory	   says	  exists.”95	  Quine	  argues	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  believe	  what	  our	  best	  theories	  say	  there	  are,	  but	  this	  side	  steps	  the	  question	  of	  what	  exists,	  by	  instead	  questioning	   our	   normative	   duty	   to	   be	   intellectually	   honest	   in	   being	  committed	  to	  our	  best	  theory.	  Rather	  than	  telling	  us	  what	  exists,	  Quine	  tells	  us	  what	  we	  ought	  to	  believe	   exists.	  He	  acknowledges	  a	  difference	  between	  asking	  what	  entities	  a	  theory	  presupposes	  exists	  (what	  exists	  relative	  to	  the	  theory	  –	  the	  IQ)	  and	  what	  entities	  really	  do	  exist	  (what	  exists	   absolutely	   and	   non-­‐relatively	   –	   the	   EQ).	   He	   conflates	   the	   two	  types	  of	  existence96	  in	  his	  I-­‐realism,	  as	  discussed	  earlier	  with	  regard	  to	  his	   views	   on	   pragmatism	   and	   immanent	   truth,	   and	   so	   closes	   the	   gap	  between	  what	  the	  theory	  says	  exists	  and	  what	  can	  be	  truly	  said	  to	  exist.	  	  	  As	  we	  saw	  earlier	  in	  section	  I.ii,	  Quine	  holds	  that	  truth	  is	  immanent.	  In	  an	   obvious	   sense	   then,	  what	   is	   true	   is	  whatever	   that	   theory	   holds,	   as	  truth	  is	  immanently	  tied	  to	  theory.	  Truth	  is	  thus	  relative	  to	  theory,	  and	  each	   theory	  says	  of	   itself	   that	   it	   is	   true.	  Relativism	   is	  not	  only	  derived	  from	  Quine’s	   views	  on	   truth	  but	   is	   also	   a	   feature	   of	   being	   an	   internal	  ‘realist’.	   From	   an	   internal	   method	   of	   enquiry	   Quine	   wants	   to	   derive	  external	  answers,	  and	  from	  the	  question	  of	  existence	  relative	  to	  the	  best	  theory	  he	  wants	  to	  derive	  non-­‐relative	  absolute	  answers.	  There	  is	  thus	  a	  mismatch	  between	  Quine’s	  method	  and	  result.	  Against	  Quine,	  I	  argue	  that	   from	   internal	   questions	   come	   only	   internal	   answers,	   and	   from	  relative	  questions	  only	  relative	  answers.	  He	  attempts	   to	  utilize	  a	   first-­‐order	   relativist	   method	   of	   deriving	   ontological	   commitments	   (from	  what	   is	   quantified	   over	   internally	   to	   a	   theory)	   to	   attain	   second-­‐order	  absolute	  results	  of	  an	  ontology.97	  Absolutism,	  and	  so	  realism,	  cannot	  be	  reached	  from	  Quine’s	  internal	  method	  –	  only	  quietist	  relativism	  can.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Quine	  (1969)	  p93	  	  96	  This	  is	  derived	  from	  Quine	  conflating	  quantificational	  and	  ontological	  commitment.	  97	  Price	  (2011)	  p50.	  Here	  Price	  agrees	  that	  Quine	  should	  be	  read	  as	  a	  quietist,	  and	  that	  his	  methods	  are	  only	  suitable	  for	  deriving	  quietist	  results	  rather	  than	  realist	  results.	  
	   75	  Since	  Quine	  desires	  to	  be	  an	  absolutist,	  such	  that	  there	  is	  one	  superior	  and	  correct	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  exists,	  there	  must	  therefore	  be	  one	  best	   scientific	   theory	   that	  correctly	  provides	  such	  an	  ontology.	  However	   if	   there	  were	  more	   than	  one	   theory	   that	   comes	  out	   as	   ‘best’	  according	   to	  our	  pragmatic	   ranking,	   then	   there	  will	  be	  more	   than	  one	  correct	   answer	   to	   existence	   questions	   relative	   to	  whichever	   theory	   is	  
your	  best.	  Quine	  leaves	  open	  this	  possibility	  that	  there	  could	  be	  a	  tie	  for	  ‘best’	  so	  that	  two	  theories	  have	  equally	  good	  ontologies:	  	  	   We	  found	  that	  two	  ontologies,	  if	  explicitly	  correlated	  one	  to	  one,	  are	   empirically	   on	   a	   par;	   there	   is	   no	   empirical	   ground	   for	  choosing	  the	  one	  rather	  than	  the	  other.98	  	  	   Simplicity,	   as	   a	   guiding	   principle	   in	   constructing	   conceptual	  schemes,	   is	   not	   a	   clear	   and	   unambiguous	   idea;	   and	   it	   is	   quite	  capable	  of	  presenting	  a	  double	  or	  multiple	  standard.99	  	  Bestness,100	  which	   is	   calculated	   by	   simplicity,	   fit	   and	   fruitfulness,	   is	   a	  quality	   that	   is	   relative	   in	   itself	   with	   regard	   to	   communities	  who	  may	  discover	  what	  is	  best	  for	  them	  and	  not	  best	  for	  others.	  Therefore	  what	  exists	  will	  be	  relative	  to	  which	  theory	  you	  have	  chosen	  as	  best,	  which	  is	  chosen	  relatively101	  thus	  absoluteness	  of	  existence	  has	  to	  be	  abandoned.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Quine	  (1992)	  p34	  99	  Quine	  (1961)	  p17	  100	  Yablo	  asks	   if	  a	  best	   theory	  could	  have	  equally	  good	  ontologies	  resulting	   from	  it	  –	  related	  to	  Quine’s	  ‘Ontological	  Relativity’	  discussed	  in	  section	  IV.ii.	  Yablo	  further	  asks	  if	  ‘best’	  is	  circular:	  “Suppose	  a	  best	  theory	  were	  found;	  why	  shouldn’t	  there	  be	  various	  ontologies	  all	  equally	  capable	  of	  conferring	  truth	  on	  it?	  Isn’t	  a	  good	  theory	  in	  part	  an	  ontologically	  plausible	  one,	  making	  the	  approach	  circular?”	  (1998	  p230)	  	  101	  Quine	   could	   accept	   this	   as	   merely	   epistemological	   due	   to	   his	   fallibilism.	   He	   is	  interested	   in	   what	   we	   ought	   to	   believe	   exists,	   and	   that	   might	   be	   relative	   to	   the	  evidence	  we	  have,	  which	   is	   relative	   to	   the	   best	   theory	  we	  have.	  Other	   communities	  may	   have	   alternative	   theories,	   incompatible	   with	   ours,	   that	   make	   it	   reasonable	   to	  believe	  in	  a	  different	  ontology.	  Nevertheless,	  perhaps	  Quine	  could	  say	  that	  there	  is	  just	  one	  ontology,	  and	  merely	  dispute	  over	  which	  theory	  gets	   it	  right.	   In	  this	  dispute,	  we	  are	  warranted	   in	   claiming	   that	   our	   theory,	   rather	   than	   another,	   is	  most	   likely	   to	   be	  right	  (whilst	  realizing	  that	  we	  amend	  it	  in	  the	  future),	  so	  the	  dispute	  is	  over	  what	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  now	  which	  for	  Quine	  is	  our	  current	  best	  theory.	  But	  here	  Quine	  still	  ought	  to	  consider	  himself	  ontologically	  quiet,	  as	  there	  would	  be	  no	  way	  of	  telling	  if	  the	  theory	  chosen	  as	  best	  will	  be	  the	  one	  that	  has	  got	  it	  right,	  if	  there	  is	  just	  one.	  
	   76	  This	   relativism	   counts	   against	   realism.	  Quine	   tries	   to	   resist	   relativism	  by	  insisting	  on	  an	  absolute	  answer	  to	  what	  there	  is	  and	  this	  is	  given	  by	  the	  best	  theory,	  but	  if	  ‘best’	  is	  itself	  relative	  to	  different	  communities,	  or	  is	   calculated	  using	   relative	  means,	   then	  anything	   that	  bestness	  entails	  will	  also	  be	  relative.	  Having	  options	  for	  ‘best’	  undermines	  commitment	  to	  one	  absolute	  theory	  (and	  so	  undermines	  being	  a	  realist),	  which	  then	  entails	   relativism.	   I	   have	   thus	   been	   arguing	   that	   Quine	   is	   a	   quiet	  relativist	  as	  opposed	   to	  an	  absolute	  realist.	  This	   is	   the	  case	  due	   to	  his	  internal	  approach	  to	  what	  there	  is	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  realism	  so	  defined	  comes	  as	  a	  package	  deal	  with	  an	  external	  method	  and	  absolutism.	  I	  now	  demonstrate	  how	  relativism	  is	  derived	  from	  his	  ‘Ontological	  Relativity’.	  	  	  IV.ii.	  Relativism	  from	  ‘Ontological	  Relativity’.	  	  	  	  The	   ontological	   relativism	  derived	   from	  Quine’s	   I-­‐realism	   is	   not	   to	   be	  conflated	  with	  his	  ‘Ontological	  Relativism’	  (1969)	  that	  rather	  provides	  a	  
second	  level	  of	  relativism	  to	  Quine’s	  position.	  Quotes	   from	   ‘Ontological	  Relativity’	   will	   shed	   light	   on	   how	   relativism	  manifests	   in	   his	   internal	  method	  to	  show	  how	  he	  is	  more	  relativist	  than	  realist.	  For	  example:	  	  I	   philosophize	   from	   the	   vantage	   point	   only	   of	   a	   provincial	  conceptual	   scheme	   and	   scientific	   epoch,	   true;	   but	   I	   know	   no	  better.102	  	  	  This	  implicitly	  states	  that	  we	  have	  to	  accept	  that	  we	  are	  in	  no	  epistemic	  position	  to	  derive	  absolute	  answers	  about	  ontology	  and	  instead	  we	  can	  only	   work	   relative	   to	   our	   own	   community’s	   conceptual	   scheme	   and	  theories	  which	  we	  pick	  as	  best	  for	  our	  community,	  as	  that	  is	  the	  best	  we	  can	  do,	  but	  the	  best	  we	  can	  do	  may	  not	  be	  correct	  in	  carving	  nature	  at	  the	  absolute	  joints.	  We	  only	  have	  our	  concepts.	  More	  quotes	  show	  this:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Quine	  (1969)	  p25	  
	   77	  The	   whole	   bag	   of	   ontological	   tricks	   may	   be	   correlated	   with	  elements	   of	   the	   native	   language	   in	   any	   of	   various	   mutually	  incompatible	  ways,	   each	   compatible	  with	   all	   possible	   linguistic	  data,	   and	   none	   preferable	   to	   another	   save	   as	   favored	   by	   a	  rationalization	  of	  the	  native	  language	  that	  is	  simple	  and	  natural	  to	  us.103	  	   When	   we	   compare	   theories…	   on	   the	   score	   of	   what	   sorts	   of	  objects	  there	  are	  said	  to	  be,	  we	  are	  comparing	  them	  in	  a	  respect	  which	   itself	   makes	   sense	   only	   provincially…	   There	   is	   a	   notion	  that	   our	   provincial	   ways	   of	   positing	   objects	   and	   conceiving	  nature	  may	  be	  best	  appreciated	  for	  what	  they	  are	  by	  standing	  off	  and	   seeing	   them	   against	   a	   cosmopolitan	   background	   of	   alien	  cultures;	  but	  the	  notion	  comes	  to	  nothing,	  for	  there	  is	  no	  place	  to	  stand.104	  	   Ontology	  is	  internally	  indifferent…	  to	  any	  theory	  that	  is	  complete	  and	  decidable.105	  	  These	  quotes	  say	  the	  evidence	  available	  to	  us	  works	  as	  much	  in	  favor	  of	  a	   range	   of	   alternative	   ontologies	   which	   are	   incompatible	   with	   one	  another	  but	  are	  equally	  good,	  so	  that	  the	  evidence	  likewise	  could	  speak	  as	  much	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  range	  of	  theories.	  Having	  ‘no	  place	  to	  stand’	  shows	  that	  we	   cannot	   get	   to	   absolute	   answers	   because	  we	   could	   not	   get	   an	  overall	  best	  theory	  for	  every	  community	  that	  works	  for	  everyone	  as	  this	  requires	  a	  Gods	  eye	  view	  of	  the	  world,	  or	  a	  superior	  view	  from	  nowhere,	  unmarred	  by	  relativistic	  community	  aspects.	  The	  privileged	  community	  with	  the	  absolute	  best	  theory	  does	  not	  exist,	  rather	  each	  community	  has	  their	  own	  best	  theory	  which	  is	  equally	  as	  correct	  and	  good	  as	  the	  other	  communities	  best	  theories,	  so	  ontology	  is	  relativized	  to	  a	  community	  of	  inquirers.	  This	  is	  the	  first	  level	  of	  relativism	  described	  in	  section	  IV.i.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Quine	  (1969)	  p4-­‐5	  104	  Quine	  (1969)	  p6	  105	  Quine	  (1969)	  p63	  
	   78	  But	  in	  ‘Ontological	  Relativity’	  Quine	  is	  adding	  another	  level	  of	  relativity	  to	  this	  relativism	  derived	  directly	  from	  I-­‐realism,	  in	  saying	  that	  there	  is	  also	  relativity	  in	  one’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  ontological	  commitments	  of	  others:	   “there	   is	   no	   absolute	   sense	   in	   speaking	   of	   the	   ontology	   of	   a	  theory.”106	  So	  at	  the	  first	  level	  in	  section	  IV.i,	  relativism	  manifests	  since	  there	  is	  no	  absolute	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	  about	  what	  there	  is	  (since	  we	  are	  all	  stuck	  with	  what	  our	  best	  theory	  says	  there	  is,	  and	  we	  recognize	  that	  other	  communities	  will	  have	  different	  ‘best’	  theories).	  	  And	  now	  here	  at	  the	  second	  level,	  relativism	  comes	  about	  as	  there	  is	  no	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	  as	   to	   what	   a	   theory	   says	   there	   is,	   since	   working	   this	   out	   involves	  interpretation	   and	   applying	   our	   own	   theory,	   and	   there	   could	   be	  multiple	  adequate	  interpretations.107	  Hence	  the	  two	  levels	  of	  relativism.	  	  	  At	   times	   Quine	   accepts	   that	   there	   are	   two	   levels	   of	   relativity	   in	   his	  position,	   but	   at	   other	   times	   sticks	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   ontology	   is	   an	  objective,	  viable	  project.	  Acknowledging	  the	  double-­‐relativism	  however	  counts	   against	   his	   I-­‐realist	   position	   and	   moves	   him	   directly	   into	   the	  quietist	  camp	  where	  ontology	  is	  impossible	  and	  meaningless:	  	  	   Ontology	   is	   indeed	  doubly	  relative.	  Specifying	   the	  universe	  of	  a	  theory	   makes	   sense	   only	   relative	   to	   some	   background	   theory,	  and	  only	  relative	  to	  some	  choice	  of	  a	  manual	  of	  translation	  of	  the	  one	  theory	   into	  the	  other...	  We	  cannot	  know	  what	  something	   is	  without	  knowing	  how	  it	  is	  marked	  off	  from	  other	  things.	  Identity	  is	  thus	  of	  a	  piece	  with	  ontology.	  Accordingly	  it	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  same	  relativity,	  as	  may	  be	  readily	  illustrated.108	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Quine	  (1969)	  p60	  107	  This	  double	  relativism	  finds	  Quine	  in	  a	  predicament.	  He	  sometimes	  seems	  to	  accept	  one	  type	  of	  relativism	  (the	  indeterminacy	  of	  translation	  found	  in	  his	  1969	  ‘Ontological	  Relativity’)	   yet	  denies	   another	   type	  of	   relativism	   (that	  derived	   from	  his	   I-­‐realism	  as	  described	   in	  section	   IV.i	  which	   is	  often	  also	  attributed	   to	  Carnap’s	  quietism).	  Others	  have	  noted	  that	  Quine	  exhibits	  both	   types	  of	  relativism	  but	   is	   in	  denial	  of	   it	  so	  as	   to	  distinguish	  himself	  from	  Carnap.	  See	  Gibson	  (ed.)	  (2004)	  p128	  for	  details	  on	  this	  point.	  108	  Quine	  (1969)	  p54-­‐55	  	  
	   79	  Thus	   ontology	   can	   be	   multiply	   relative,	   multiply	   meaningless	  apart	  from	  a	  background	  theory.	  Besides	  being	  unable	  to	  say	  in	  absolute	   terms	   just	   what	   the	   objects	   are,	   we	   are	   sometimes	  unable	   even	   to	   distinguish	   objectively	   between	   referential	  quantification	   and	   a	   substitutional	   counterfeit.	   When	   we	   do	  relativize	   these	  matters	   to	   a	  background	   theory,	  moreover,	   the	  relativization	  itself	  has	  two	  components:	  relativity	  to	  the	  choice	  of	   background	   theory	   and	   relativity	   to	   the	   choice	   of	   how	   to	  translate	  the	  object	  theory	  into	  the	  background	  theory.109	  	  Quine	   cannot	   be	   a	   realist	   with	   these	   relativist	   aspects,	   and	   most	  importantly	  the	  relativism	  enters	  at	  the	  first	  level	  of	  best	  theory	  choice,	  due	   to	   his	   internal	   approach	   that	   comes	   with	   relativism,	   and	   this	  prevents	   I-­‐realism	  from	  absolutism.110	  Furthermore,	   it	   is	  worth	  noting	  that	  Quine’s	  fallibilism	  and	  his	  views	  about	  immanent	  truth	  both	  imply	  a	  quietist	  relativist	  position	  –	  his	  fallibilism	  shows	  that	  he	  is	  quiet	  as	  he	  acknowledges	  that	  his	  theory	  could	  be	  wrong,	  and	  his	  immanent	  truth	  shows	   that	   he	   is	   relativist	   as	  whichever	   theory	   you	   are	   in	  will	   be	   the	  true	  one	  and	  hence	  truth	  is	  relative	  to	  theory.	  Having	  shown	  that	  Quine	  enjoys	  Carnap’s	  relativism,	  I	  now	  show	  that	  he	  enjoys	  his	  quietism	  too.	  	  	   V.	  Quine	  as	  a	  Quietist.	  	  	  What	   the	  quietists	   are	   quiet	   about	   is	   the	   external,	   absolute,	   objective,	  truth	   of	   a	  metaphysical	   ontology,	   and	   since	   Quine	   is	   also	   quiet	   about	  this	  he	  should	  consider	  himself	  a	  quietist	  relativist	  too.	  If	  quietism	  is	  to	  be	  defined	  as	  being	  quiet	  with	  regard	  to	  metaphysical	  existence,	  and	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  Quine	  (1969)	  p67	  	  110	  Quine	  even	  explicitly	  rejects	  absolutism,	  which	  again	  seems	  to	  be	   in	   tension	  with	  his	  realist	  aims	  that	  derive	  from	  his	  immanent	  truth	  and	  views	  on	  pragmatism:	  “It	  is	  meaningless	   to	  ask	   this	  absolutely;	  we	  can	  meaningfully	  ask	   it	  only	  relative	   to	  some	  background	  language.”	  Quine	  (1969)	  p49.	  He	  therefore	  explicitly	  endorses	  relativism.	  
	   80	  turn	   if	   realism	   is	   about	   metaphysical	   existence,	   then	   quietists	   by	  definition	  are	  all	  those	  who	  are	  quiet	  with	  regard	  to	  realism.	  Quine	  and	  the	  quietists	  (like	  Carnap)	  say	  the	  same	  things,	  as	  they	  make	  the	  same	  internal	  assertions,	  and	  so	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  nothing	  more	  that	  meets	  the	   eye	   (or	   ear)	   to	   make	   Quine	   a	   realist	   and	   the	   quietists	   not,	   nor	  anything	   that	  makes	   Carnap	   a	   quietist	   and	   Quine	   not.	   So	   really	   there	  should	   not	   be	   any	   label	   to	   divide	   them,	   since	   they	   are	   practically	  indistinguishable.	  Quine	  seems	  to	  conclude	  on	  a	  note	  that	  is	  in	  obvious	  agreement	  with	  Carnap	  as	  to	  the	  tolerant	  relativist	  quietist	  approach	  to	  ontology,	  which	  Carnap	  also	  notes,	  in	  the	  two	  quotes	  respectively:	  	  	   In	   earlier	   pages	   I	   undertook	   to	   show	   that	   some	   common	  arguments	  in	  favor	  of	  certain	  ontologies	  are	  fallacious.	  Further,	  I	  advanced	   an	   explicit	   standard	   whereby	   to	   decide	   what	   the	  ontological	  commitments	  of	  a	  theory	  are.	  But	  the	  question	  what	  ontology	   actually	   to	   adopt	   still	   stands	   open,	   and	   the	   obvious	  counsel	  is	  tolerance	  and	  an	  experimental	  spirit.111	  	   With	  respect	  to	  the	  basic	  attitude	  to	  take	  in	  choosing	  a	  language	  form	  (an	   ‘ontology’	   in	  Quine's	   terminology,	  which	   seems	   to	  me	  misleading),	   there	   appears	   now	   to	   be	   agreement	   between	   us:	  ‘the	  obvious	  counsel	  is	  tolerance	  and	  an	  experimental	  spirit’.112	  	  So	  here	  Quine	  has	  acknowledged,	  in	  agreement	  with	  Carnap,	  that	  what	  there	  really	  is	  differs	  to	  what	  a	  theory	  says	  there	  is,	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	   theory	   (and	   thus	   the	   ontology	   to	   adopt)	   is	   open	   and	  we	   should	   be	  tolerant	  towards	  competing	  theories.	  Their	  positions	  are	  both	  relativist,	  and	  their	  shared	  tolerance	  and	  experimental	  spirit	  ought	  to	  be	  quietist	  rather	   than	   realist	   to	   acknowledge	   this	   relativism	   to	   theories.	   With	  regard	  to	  Carnap’s	  disliking	  of	  Quine’s	  terminology	  in	  the	  usage	  of	  the	  word	  ‘ontology’,	  he	  states	  the	  following,	  reconfirming	  their	  similarities:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Quine	  (1961)	  p19	  112	  Carnap	  (1950)	  note	  5	  
	   81	  Quine	  has	  repeatedly	  pointed	  out	   the	   important	   fact	   that,	   if	  we	  wish	  to	  find	  out	  what	  kind	  of	  entities	  somebody	  recognizes,	  we	  have	  to	  look	  more	  at	  the	  variables	  he	  uses	  than	  at	  the	  constants	  and	  closed	  expressions…	  I	  am	  essentially	  in	  agreement	  with	  this	  view,	  as	  I	  shall	  presently	  explain.	  [But]	  I	  should	  prefer	  not	  to	  use	  the	   word	   ‘ontology’	   for	   the	   recognition	   of	   entities	   by	   the	  admission	   of	   variables.	   This	   use	   seems	   to	   me	   to	   be	   at	   least	  misleading;	  it	  might	  be	  understood	  as	  implying	  that	  the	  decision	  to	   use	   certain	   kinds	   of	   variables	  must	   be	   based	   on	   ontological	  metaphysical	   convictions	   [whereas]	   the	   decision	   to	   use	   certain	  types	   of	   variables	   is	   a	   practical	   decision	   like	   the	   choice	   of	   an	  instrument.113	  	  Since	   Carnap	   chooses	   linguistic	   frameworks	   pragmatically,	   and	   Quine	  chooses	  the	  best	  scientific	  theory	  pragmatically,	  as	  opposed	  to	  choosing	  the	  ones	  that	  fit	  premade	  ‘ontological	  metaphysical	  convictions’,	  Carnap	  argues	  that	  the	  word	  ‘ontology’	  gives	  the	  wrong	  impression	  –	  it	  gives	  a	  
metaphysical	  impression	  (and	  metaphysical	  impressions	  are	  always	  the	  wrong	   kind	   of	   impression	   for	   a	   good	   and	  honest	   anti-­‐metaphysician).	  Quine	  acknowledges	  how	  Carnap	  finds	  his	  use	  of	  ‘ontology’	  misleading,	  which	  suggests	  it	  was	  a	  terminological	  dispute	  between	  them	  all	  along:	  	  	   When	   I	   inquire	   into	   the	   ontological	   commitments	   of	   a	   given	  doctrine	  or	  body	  of	   theory,	   I	  am	  merely	  asking	  what,	  according	  to	   that	   theory,	   there	   is.	   I	  might	   say	   in	   passing,	   though	   it	   is	   no	  substantial	   point	   of	   disagreement,	   that	   Carnap	   does	   not	   much	  like	  my	  terminology	  here.	  Now	  if	  he	  had	  a	  better	  use	  for	  this	  fine	  old	   world	   ‘ontology’	   I	   should	   be	   inclined	   to	   cast	   about	   for	  another	  word	  for	  my	  own	  meaning.	  But	  the	  fact	  is,	  I	  believe,	  that	  he	  disapproves	  of	  my	  giving	  meaning	  to	  a	  word	  which	  belongs	  to	  traditional	  metaphysics	  and	  should	  therefore	  be	  meaningless.114	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  Carnap	  (1956)	  p42-­‐43	  114	  Quine	  (1976)	  p126	  
	   82	  Furthermore,	  Quine	  eventually	  comes	  around	  to	  noting	  that	   ‘ontology’	  is	   best	   left	   to	   apply	   to	   the	  debate	  within	  metaphysics	   (and	  not	   to	   the	  pragmatic	  choosing	  of	  linguistic	  frameworks	  or	  scientific	  theories)	  and	  furthermore	   is	   meaningless	   and	   empty	   when	   considered	   absolutely	  rather	  than	  relatively,	  leaving	  him	  very	  quiet	  about	  ontology	  after	  all:	  	   In	   their	   elusiveness,	   at	   any	   rate	   –	   in	   their	   emptiness	   now	   and	  again	  except	  relative	  to	  a	  broader	  background	  –	  both	  truth	  and	  ontology	  may	  in	  a	  suddenly	  rather	  clear	  and	  even	  tolerant	  sense	  be	  said	  to	  belong	  to	  transcendental	  metaphysics.115	  	  So	   here	   Quine	   agrees	  with	   Carnap	   that	   ontology	   is	   really	   about	  what	  there	  really	  is	  rather	  than	  what	  there	  is	  relative	  to	  theory,	  and	  so	  places	  it	   in	   the	   absolute	   realm	   of	   metaphysics.	   And	   since	   Quine	   also	   agrees	  with	  Carnap	  that	  metaphysics	  is	  meaningless,	  Quine	  can	  be	  shown	  to	  be	  a	  quietist.	  The	  only	  way	  of	  saving	  ontology	  from	  this	  meaninglessness	  is	  to	   practice	   it	   in	   a	   relative	   rather	   than	   absolute	  way	   –	   for	   Carnap	   this	  was	  relative	  to	  linguistic	  frameworks	  and	  for	  Quine	  this	  was	  relative	  to	  the	   best	   scientific	   theory.	   Therefore	   Quine	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   be	   not	  only	   quietist	   about	  metaphysics	   but	   also	   relativist	   about	   ontology,	   in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Carnap.	  The	   fact	   that	  Quine	  uses	   the	  word	   ‘ontology’	  where	   Carnap	   does	   not	   is	   simply	   a	   terminological	   dispute	   between	  them,	  and	   furthermore	   the	   fact	   that	  Quine	  uses	   the	  word	   ‘realism’	   for	  his	   position	   where	   Carnap	   does	   not	   is	   also	   a	   terminological	   dispute.	  Rather,	   their	   positions	   are	   very	   similar,	   being	   both	   quietist	   and	  relativist.	  Quine	  may	  have	  wanted	  his	  position	   to	  be	  realist	  due	   to	  his	  acknowledging	  that	  there	  is	  an	  external	  reality	  out	  there,	  but	  due	  to	  his	  fallibilism	  and	  relativism	  he	  ends	  up	  being	  nothing	  but	  quiet	  about	  that	  reality.	   I	   therefore	  hope	   to	  have	   shown	   that	  Quine’s	   I-­‐realism	   is	  more	  appropriately	   interpreted	   as	   a	   quietist	   relativism,	   very	   much	   like	  Carnap’s	  own	  position,	  and	  thus	  they	  are	  in	  agreement	  and	  not	  rivals.116	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Quine	  (1969)	  p68	  	  116	  My	  conclusion	  is	  similar	  to	  Price	  (2011)	  in	  the	  paper	  ‘Metaphysics	  after	  Carnap’.	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  VI.	  Conclusion.	  	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	   hope	   to	   have	   resolved	   some	   historically	   mistaken	  assumptions	   –	   that	   Quine	   and	   Carnap	   are	   rivals,	   and	   that	   Quine’s	  criticisms	   defeat	   Carnap’s	   position.	   Quine,	   having	   conceded	   that	  ontology	  is	  metaphysical,	  and	  further	  argued	  that	  ontological	  questions	  are	  meaningless	  unless	  relative,	  is	  thus	  in	  all	  important	  respects	  on	  the	  same	   team	  as	  Carnap,	   and	  what	   I	  have	  argued	   is	   that	   this	   team	   is	   the	  quietist	   relativist	   team.117	  Ultimately	   they	   are	   both	   anti-­‐metaphysics,	  and	  so	  the	  difference	  between	  Quine’s	  I-­‐realism	  and	  Carnap’s	  quietism	  becomes	  one	  of	   terminology.	  Such	  a	  conclusion	   is	  not	  vital	   to	  the	  core	  aim	   of	  my	   thesis	   to	   develop	   ‘Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism’,	   but	   it	   helps	   to	  motivate	  why	  Carnapian	  positions	  need	  not	  be	  rejected	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  Quine.	   Having	   shown	   that	   Quine’s	   attacks	   on	   Carnap’s	   quietism	   fail,	   I	  hope	   to	   have	   shown	   that	   Carnap’s	   position	   is	   not	   to	   be	   ignored	   or	  standardly	   assumed	   as	   defeated.	   The	   purpose	   of	   the	   Introduction	  chapter	   and	   this	   chapter	   1	  was	   to	   set	   the	   scene	   ready	   to	   present	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietist	  position	  that	  develops	  as	  a	  natural	  progression	  out	  of	   the	  Quine-­‐Carnap	  debate	  and	  Yablo’s	  response	  to	   it.	   In	   the	  next	  chapter	   2	   I	  will	   develop	   the	  Meinongian	   aspect	   of	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	  position,	  in	  chapter	  3	  I	  will	  develop	  the	  fictionalist	  aspect	  motivated	  by	  Yablo,	  and	  in	  chapter	  4	  I	  will	  develop	  the	  dialetheist	  aspect.	  But	  first,	  in	  the	   next	   chapter	   2,	   I	   will	   attack	   Quinean	   metaontology	   from	   the	  ontological	  neutrality	  of	  quantification	  in	  formal	  and	  natural	  languages,	  in	  order	  to	  further	  motivate	  the	  rejection	  of	  Quinean	  I-­‐realism	  and	  the	  adoption	   of	   Carnapian	   quietism,	   and	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   unique	   and	  attractive	  coupling	  of	  a	  basic	  form	  of	  Meinongianism	  with	  quietism.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Of	  course,	  there	  are	  other	  interpretations	  of	  Quine’s	  theory,	  but	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  put	  forward	  a	  plausible	  one	  with	  quotes	  for	  evidence.	  Anyhow,	  Quine	  himself	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  no	  determinately	  correct	  interpretation	  of	  theories,	  and	  so	  this	  must	  apply	  to	  his	   own	   theory	   too.	   Quine’s	   own	   theory,	   by	   its	   own	   lights,	   can	   thus	   not	   have	  determinate	   sense,	   even	   though	   he	   puts	   the	   theory	   of	   indeterminacy	   forward	   quite	  sensibly.	  Quine	  therefore	  experiences	  self-­‐reference	  problems.	  The	  contradiction	  that	  arises	  from	  self-­‐reference	  appears	  in	  Carnap’s	  position	  too,	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  4.	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CHAPTER	  2:	  
QUIET	  MEINONGIANISM	   	  	  The	   dispute	   between	   Quine	   and	   Carnap	   addresses	   the	   issue	   of	  ontological	   commitment	   and	  how	   it	  may	  be	  derived	   from	  natural	   and	  formal	  languages,	  and	  the	  metaphysical	  significance	  and	  implications	  of	  the	   language	   usage.	   For	   Quine,	   quantification	   in	   natural	   language	   is	  ontologically	   committing,	   and	   to	   speak	   positively	   and	   seriously	   of	  things	  is	  enough	  to	  take	  them	  to	  exist.	  For	  Carnap,	  such	  language	  usage	  is	  ontologically	  neutral,	  and	  one	  can	  speak	  freely	  without	  commitment	  to	  realism.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  argue	  that	  quantification	  is	  not	  ontologically	  committing	  and	  I	  show	  that	  instead	  we	  can	  talk	  about	  existence	  with	  a	  predicate	   for	   ‘exists’.	  We	  would	  quantify	  over	  non-­‐existents	  as	  well	  as	  existents,	  thus	  quantification	  must	  be	  ontologically	  neutral,	  developing	  a	  picture	  similar	  to	  Meinongianism.	  I	  aim	  to	  put	  forward	  a	  Meinongian-­‐	  inspired	  quietism	  about	  quantification,	  to	  show	  that	  the	  Quinean	  cannot	  derive	  an	  ontology	   to	  be	  a	   realist	   about	  either	  directly	   from	  a	  natural	  language	  like	  English	  or	  indirectly	  through	  the	  formal	  language	  of	  first	  order	  logic	  by	  looking	  to	  what	  is	  quantified	  over,	  and	  so	  I-­‐realism	  fails.	  	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	   show	   that	   quantification	   is	   ontologically	   neutral,	   by	  describing	   how	   quantifier	   commitments	   are	   not	   to	   be	   conflated	   with	  ontological	   commitments.	   Quantificational	   terms	   like	   ‘some’,	   and	  quantifiers	  like	  ‘∃’,	  are	  non-­‐committal,	  so	  domains	  are	  not	  restricted	  to	  include	  only	  existents.	  I	  first	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  Carnap	  and	  Quine	  establish	  an	  existent/non-­‐existent	  divide,	  then	  I	  revisit	  Quine’s	  problem	  from	  chapter	  1	  of	  quantifying	  over	  the	  non-­‐literal	  in	  section	  II.	  Section	  III	  outlines	  and	  attacks	  how	  Quine	  derives	  ontology	  from	  quantification,	  and	  sections	  IV-­‐V	  argue	  against	  Quine	  by	  showing	  how	  quantification	  in	  natural	   and	   formal	   languages	   are	   ontologically	   neutral	   respectively.	   I	  will	  then	  finish	  with	  a	  picture	  of	  my	  quietist	  version	  of	  Meinongianism.	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  I.	  The	  existent/non-­‐existent	  divide.	  	  	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  Introduction	  chapter	  section	  V,	  Quine	  is	  an	  I-­‐realist.	  I-­‐realism	   involves	   being	   ontologically	   committed	   to	   internal	   quantified	  existence	   claims	   of	   the	   frameworks	   that	   we	   have	   chosen	   to	   adopt	   in	  presenting	   the	   best	   theoretical	   account	   of	   the	   world.	   This	   is	   due	   to	  Quine’s	  slogan	  ‘to	  be	  is	  to	  be	  a	  value	  of	  a	  bound	  variable’	  (TB).	  Since	  we	  are	  only	  committed	  to	  those	  internal	  claims	  that	  are	  true	  relative	  to	  and	  made	  within	  adopted	  frameworks,	  Quine	  can	  retain	  a	  realist/antirealist	  distinction.	   This	   distinction	   amounts	   to,	   on	   one	   side,	   the	   frameworks	  whose	   internal	   quantified	   existence	   claims	  we	  do	   accept	   (because	  we	  adopt	   those	   frameworks	  and	   their	  domains	  of	  quantification),	   and,	  on	  the	   other	   side,	   the	   frameworks	   whose	   internal	   quantified	   existence	  claims	  we	  do	  not	   accept	   (since	  we	  do	  not	   adopt	   those	   frameworks	  or	  their	   domains).	   The	   Quinean	   I-­‐realists	   appear	   better	   off	   than	   the	  Carnapian	   quietists	   with	   regard	   to	   retaining	   an	   existent/non-­‐existent	  distinction,	   as	   it	  appears	   difficult	   for	   a	   Carnapian	   to	  mark	   a	   sufficient	  difference	  between	  those	  things	  we	  ordinarily	  take	  to	  exist	  (like	  horses)	  and	   those	   that	   we	   do	   not	   (like	   unicorns).	   Yet	   appearances	   can	   be	  deceiving:	  I	  argue	  that	  actually	  it	  is	  the	  Quinean	  who	  is	  in	  trouble	  here.	  	  	  For	   the	   Quinean	   I-­‐realist,	   ontological	   commitments	   are	   made	   by	  choosing	  to	  adopt	  things	  in	  considered	  scientific	  theories.	  One	  can	  be	  I-­‐realist	   about	   horses	   when	   in	   fully	   serious	   theoretical	   mode	   and	  choosing	   to	   have	   horse-­‐talk	   amongst	   the	   commitments	   of	   one’s	   final	  best	   theory.	  Likewise,	  one	  can	  be	   I-­‐antirealist	  about	  unicorns	  when	   in	  fully	  serious	   theoretical	  mode	  and	  choosing	  not	   to	  adopt	  unicorn-­‐talk.	  The	  Quinean	  can	  say	  ‘I	  believe	  in	  horses	  because	  they	  have	  made	  their	  way	  into	  my	  best	  theory	  and	  as	  such	  I	  quantify	  over	  them’	  and	  ‘I	  do	  not	  believe	   in	   unicorns	   because	   they	   are	   not	   amongst	   the	   quantifier	  commitments	   of	   my	   best	   theory’.	   It	   is	   this	   that	   marks	   Quine’s	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  existent/non-­‐existent	  divide	  –	  the	  inclusion/exclusion	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  quantification	  of	  the	  best	  scientific	  theory.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  find	  out	  what	  we	   ought	   to	   believe	   exists,	  we	   look	   to	  what	   is	   quantified	   over	   in	   our	  best	   scientific	   theory,	   and	   anything	   that	   is	   not	   in	   that	   domain	   can	   be	  said	   to	   not	   exist.	   This	   retains	   an	   existent/non-­‐existent	   divide	   of	   the	  required	   kind,	   however	   as	   I	   will	   show,	   the	   distinction	   cannot	   be	  successfully	  made	  in	  this	  way	  with	  quantification	  and	  domain	  inclusion.	  	  	  Carnap	   could	   try	   to	   make	   an	   existent/non-­‐existent	   divide	   along	   the	  same	  lines	  as	  Quine	  regarding	  adoption:	  Carnap	  could	  say	   ‘I	  choose	  to	  talk	   in	   terms	   of	   horses	   rather	   than	   unicorns	   because	   horses	   are	  quantified	   over	   in	   my	   adopted	   frameworks’.118	  But	   the	   difference	   is,	  unlike	   Quine,	   that	   does	   not	   mean	   Carnap	   believes	   in	   horses	   and	   not	  unicorns,	  as	  Carnap	   just	  does	  not	   find	  unicorn-­‐talk	  practical	   (and	  thus	  not	   best	   to	   adopt).	   The	   non-­‐adoption	   of	   linguistic	   frameworks	   due	   to	  pragmatic	   considerations	   is	   all	   that	   Carnap	   can	   appeal	   to	   in	   order	   to	  differentiate	  between	  the	  reality	  of	  horses	  and	  unicorns.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  do	  anything	  to	  differentiate	  their	  ontological	  status,	  as	  ontologically	  they	  are	  on	  a	  par	  (since	  what	  really	  exists	  does	  not	  make	  sense).	  Carnap	  does	  not	  have	  a	  way	  of	  privileging	  one	   framework	  over	  another	  aside	  from	  regarding	   its	  practicality,	   so	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	   the	  unicorn	  framework	   unicorns	  will	   exist,	   and	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   horse	  framework	  horses	  will	  exist,	  and	  it	  seems	  that	  is	  the	  end	  of	  the	  matter.	  	  	  	  The	   only	   distinction	   that	   seems	   to	   be	  made	   is	  which	   frameworks	   are	  practical	   and	  which	   are	   not.	   Quine,	   unlike	   Carnap,	   reads	   into	   the	   fact	  that	  the	  horse	  framework	  is	  more	  practical	  than	  the	  unicorn	  framework	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  Eklund	  (2006b	  p102)	  where	  we	  rule	  yetis	  out	  because	  there	  is	  no	  match	  with	  empirical	  observation	  and	  so	  it	  is	  impractical	  to	  speak	  of	  yetis	  as	  existing.	  Likewise,	  within	  our	   ‘thing’	   framework	   its	   standards	  of	   evidence	   say	   that	   it	   is	  more	  natural	   to	   speak	   of	   horses	   rather	   than	   unicorns	   because	   nothing	  will	   fall	   under	   the	  concept	  of	  ‘unicorn’	  according	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘unicorn’	  in	  our	  framework	  rules.	  	  
	   87	  and	  argues	  that	  finding	  the	  horse	  framework	  more	  practical	  is	  a	  reason	  for	   taking	   seriously	   its	   ontology	   and	   not	   the	   ontology	   of	   the	   unicorn	  framework.	   For	   Carnap,	   the	   only	   ranking	   of	   frameworks	   that	   can	   be	  done	  is	  by	  pragmatic	  virtues	  but	  this	  has	  no	  ontological	  significance,	  so	  all	  we	   can	  do	   is	   choose	  pragmatic	   frameworks	   to	   extrapolate	   internal	  existence	  from,	  and	  this	  will	  entail	  nothing	  about	  external	  existence.	  For	  Quine,	  again	  all	  we	  can	  do	  is	  pragmatically	  choose	  scientific	  theories	  to	  extrapolate	  internal	  existence	  from,	  yet	  Quine	  argues	  that	  this	  internal	  existence	   is	  precisely	   the	  existence	   that	   realists	   are	   searching	   for.	   For	  Quine,	  as	  detailed	  in	  chapter	  1	  section	  I,	  pragmatic	  virtues	  are	  evidence	  for	  truth,	  but	  not	  for	  Carnap.	  Since	  Carnap	  does	  not	  read	  into	  practical	  decisions	   in	  order	  to	  be	  quiet,	   it	   leaves	  him	  seemingly	  unable	   to	  draw	  the	   required	   distinction	   between	   existent	   things	   like	   horses	   and	   non-­‐existent	  things	  like	  unicorns	  where	  Quine	  seems	  to	  be	  able	  to	  do	  so.	  Yet	  I	  will	  show	  that	  Carnap	  is	  actually	  better	  off	  than	  Quine	  in	  this	  regard.	  And	  besides,	  the	  Carnapian	  need	  not	  be	  troubled	  by	  this	  anyway	  since	  as	  a	  quietist	  they	  are	  not	  expected	  to	  provide	  any	  more	  of	  a	  distinction	  between	   horses	   and	   unicorns	   than	   between	   those	   entities	   which	   are	  useful	   to	   talk	   about	   and	   those	   which	   are	   not.	   To	   demand	   a	   more	  thorough	  explanation	  of	  why	  we	  talk	  of	  horses	  existing	  and	  unicorns	  as	  not	  is	  simply	  to	  beg	  the	  question	  against	  the	  Carnapian	  who	  claims	  that	  the	  explanations	  do	  not	  go	  any	  deeper	  than	  that	  of	  linguistic	  practicality.	  	  	  Despite	   that,	   the	   Carnapian	   can	   in	   fact	  make	   the	   required	   distinction	  anyway.	  We	  seem	  to	  be	  able	  to	  say,	  quite	  common	  sensically,	  that	  there	  are	   no	   unicorns,	   and	   as	   such	   Charlie-­‐the-­‐Unicorn	   does	   not	   exist.	   The	  Carnapian	  could	  say	  that	  this	  is	  a	  (failed)	  attempt	  at	  external	  existence	  talk.	  Or	  the	  Carnapian	  could	  accommodate	  for	  an	  existent/non-­‐existent	  divide	  that	  is	  not	  metaphysical	  (so	  is	  acceptable	  to	  them	  as	  quietists)	  by	  responding	   that	   ‘non-­‐existence’	   is	   a	   consequence	   of	   (or	   is	   implicitly	  stated	  by)	  the	  meaning	  rules	  for	  the	  language	  laid	  down	  internal	  to	  the	  linguistic	  framework.	  I	  will	  propose	  that	  my	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  allows	  for	  a	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  of	   individuals,	   that	   horses	  instantiate	  and	  unicorns	  do	  not.	  This	  allows	   for	   internal	   true	  negative	  existentials,	  so	  that	  ‘Charlie-­‐the-­‐Unicorn	  does	  not	  exist’	  is	  true	  internal	  to	  and	  relative	  to	  the	  framework,	  and	  an	  existent/non-­‐existent	  divide	  is	  made	  using	  this	  predicate.	  There	  are	  thus	  two	  ways	  to	  understand	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  claims	  of	  (non-­‐)existence:	  (1)	  by	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  framework	  implying	  (non-­‐)existence;	  and	  (2)	  by	  the	  existence	  predicate.	  	  	  To	   ‘exist’	   is	   to	   be	   described	   as	   existing	   according	   to	   the	   linguistic	  framework,	   and	   as	   such	   is	   an	   internal	   predicate	   of	   existence.	   This	  existence	  predicate	  is	  a	  way	  of	  dividing	  the	  things	  quantified	  over	  into	  those	   described	   as	   existing	   and	   those	   that	   are	   not,	   internally	   to	   the	  framework.	  Therefore	   this	  predicate	   is	  metaphysically	  quiet,	   since	   the	  existence	   it	   is	   predicating	   is	   internal	   rather	   than	   external,	   and	   is	   thus	  consistent	  with	  Carnap’s	  quietism.	  A	  framework	  can	  describe	  things	  as	  existing	   according	   to	   the	   framework’s	   rules,	   and	   those	   things	  will	   fall	  under	   the	   existence	   predicate.	   I	   refrain	   from	   saying	   this	   existence	   is	  ontological	   since	   the	   use	   of	   that	   word	   is	   misleading.	   We	   gain	   a	   thin,	  metaphysically	  quiet,	  type	  of	  existential	  commitment	  with	  the	  existence	  predicate,	   not	   a	   full-­‐blown	   ontological	   commitment.	   Quine	   explicitly	  does	  not	  endorse	  an	  existence	  predicate,	  and	  rather	  believes	  existence	  is	  tied	  to	  quantification.	  However,	  as	  shown	  in	  chapter	  1	  sections	  II-­‐III	  and	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  Quine	  cannot	  successfully	  select	  those	  things	  to	  which	  he	  does	  want	  to	  be	  committed	  to	  using	  quantification,	  because	  of	  the	  non-­‐literal	  sneaking	  into	  the	  domains	  of	  our	  best	  scientific	  theories.	  I	   argue	   that	   Quine’s	   attempt	   at	  making	   such	   a	   division	   is	   faulty.	   And	  now	  I	  will	  discuss	  how	  Quine	  falls	   into	  problems	  by	  treating	  existence	  as	  quantificational	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  predicate,	  regarding	  the	  non-­‐literal.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  I	   treat	   this	   existence	   predicate	   as	   primitive	   and	   intuitive	   as	   a	   property	   that	   only	  some	  things	  have,	  similar	  to	  Berto	  (2012)	  p71:	  “What	  does	  commit	  us	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  something?	  The	  fast	  answer	  is:	  to	  state	  that	  it	  exists...	  Such	  existential	  commitment	  is	   formally	   expressed	  by	   a	  designated	  existence	  predicate,	   ‘E’.”	   I	  will	   be	  writing	   this	  predicate	   as	   ‘E!’.	   The	   existence	  predicate	   is	   denied	   in	  Kant’s	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason	  (1781),	  which	  I	  do	  not	  have	  space	  to	  discuss.	  But	  see	  section	  VII	  for	  more	  on	  E!.	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  II.	  The	  predicament	  from	  loaded	  quantification.	  	  	  Quine’s	  I-­‐realism	  depends	  on	  our	  internal	  assertions	  being	  able	  to	  be,	  at	  the	  appropriate	  times,	  ontologically	  committing,	  via	  quantification.	  The	  standard	  Quinean	  view	  is	  that	  quantifiers	  do	  the	  ontological	  committing	  in	   languages.	   It	   is	   part	   of	   this	   view	   that	  quantified	   sentences	   are	  only	  true	  when	  the	  thing	  they	  purport	  to	  quantify	  over	  really	  exists,	  so	  that	  reference	  to	  an	  existent	  thing	  is	  required	  for	  truth.	  So	  in	  order	  for	  our	  internal	  assertions	  to	  be	  true,	  the	  entities	  spoken	  about	  must	  exist.	  This	  is	  in	  part	  based	  on	  the	  Quinean	  assumption	  that	  to	  be	  in	  the	  domain	  is	  to	  exist,	  given	  TB	  (to	  be	  is	  to	  be	  a	  value	  of	  a	  bound	  variable).	  We	  cannot	  speak	  of	  anything	  that	  is	  not	  in	  our	  domain,	  and	  so	  whatever	  we	  speak	  about	  we	  are	  ontologically	  committed	  to.	  This	  problematically	  commits	  us	  to	  too	  much,	  given	  the	  alleged	  indispensability	  of	  the	  non-­‐literal.	  	  	  	  We	  saw	  in	  chapter	  1	  section	  III,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  Yablo,	  that	  we	  have	  to	  talk	   about	   the	   literal	   and	   non-­‐literal	   together	   in	   one	   voice.	  Without	   a	  way	  of	  paraphrasing	  away	  the	  non-­‐literal,	  and	  moreover	  without	  a	  way	  of	   distinguishing	   which	   are	   the	   non-­‐literal	   assertions	   that	   require	  paraphrasing	   away,	  we	   are	   left	  with	   a	  mixture	   of	   the	   literal	   and	  non-­‐literal	  posits	  in	  the	  domains	  of	  our	  theories.	  If	  the	  non-­‐literal	  posits	  are	  forever	   with	   us	   then	   they	   will	   be	   quantified	   over	   and	   wrongly	  ontologically	   committed	   to	   on	   the	   Quinean	   model.	   This	   motivates	   a	  change	   in	   how	   we	   treat	   quantification,	   to	   accommodate	   for	   the	   non-­‐literal	  posits	   that	  are	   inevitably	  quantified	  over	   in	   the	  domain	  but	  are	  not	   fit	   for	  being	  part	  of	  our	  ontology.	   If	  we	  are	   to	   talk	  about	   the	  non-­‐literal	  (which	  for	  Yablo	  we	  cannot	  help	  but	  do),	  then	  the	  non-­‐literal	  is	  in	  the	  domain,	   and	   so	  we	  quantify	  over	   the	  non-­‐literal.	  Domains	  have	   to	  include	   the	   non-­‐literal	   because	   we	   cannot	   separate	   them	   from	   the	  literal	   (according	   to	   Yablo)	   and	   thus	   we	   will	   not	   get	   purely	   literal	  domains.	  My	  solution	  is	  to	  treat	  domains	  as	  being	  ontologically	  neutral.	  	  
	   90	  The	   predicament	   over	   how	   we	   talk	   truthfully	   about	   non-­‐existent	  entities	  or	  in	  a	  non-­‐literal	  way	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  predicament	  of	  being	  ontologically	   committed	   to	   that	   which	   we	   quantify	   over.	   Thus	   the	  predicament	  is	  dissolved	  when	  quantification	  is	  unloaded	  and	  domains	  are	  ontologically	  neutral,	   since	   this	  allows	   for	  us	   to	   talk	  of	   things	   that	  end	   up	   in	   our	   domain	   without	   being	   automatically	   ontologically	  committed	  to	  them	  due	  to	  quantifying	  over	  them.	  This	  allows	  Carnap	  to	  be	  ontologically	  uncommitted	  in	  language	  use,	  which	  is	  what	  he	  wants	  for	  ontologically	  unconcerned	  enquirers.	  To	  deny	  loaded	  quantification	  is	  to	  deny	  Quine’s	  I-­‐realist	  methodology	  which	  centres	  around	  TB.	  This	  chapter	   thus	   attacks	   Quine’s	  methodology	   (section	   III)	   and	  motivates	  quietism	  in	  both	  natural	  (section	  IV)	  and	  formal	  (section	  V)	  languages,	  by	  putting	  forward	  a	  quietist	  version	  of	  Meinongianism	  (section	  VII).	  	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	  will	   show	   that	   the	  existence	   of	   the	  objects	   found	   in	  a	  domain	  of	  quantification	  is	  never	  required	  for	  quantified	  language	  to	  be	  used	  in	  a	  meaningful	  or	  truthful	  way.	  Rather,	  our	  quantified	  assertions	  are	  ontologically	  un-­‐committing,	  yet	   this	  will	  not	   result	   in	   them	  being	  meaningless	  or	  false.	  We	  can	  speak	  meaningfully	  and	  truthfully	  without	  having	   an	   existent	   thing	   to	   be	   speaking	   about	   or	   to	   be	   ontologically	  committed	  to.	  Instead,	  the	  thing	  we	  speak	  of	  is	  simply	  a	  member	  of	  the	  domain,	   but	   that	  member	   need	   not	   be	   an	   existent	   thing	   (instantiating	  the	  predicate	  for	  ‘exists’),	  which	  is	  the	  result	  of	  denying	  Quine’s	  view	  of	  ontologically	  loaded	  quantification.	  In	  rejecting	  such	  loaded	  quantifiers,	  I	  not	  only	  attack	  I-­‐realism	  but	  also	  any	  view	  that	  requires	  our	  terms	  to	  refer	   to	   an	   existent	   thing	   in	   order	   for	   usage	   of	   those	   terms	   to	   be	  meaningful	  or	  true.	  Such	  views	  are	  orthodoxy	  in	  modern	  philosophy,120	  and	   are	   a	   main	   motivator	   for	   positions	   like	   fictionalism	   that	   try	   to	  resolve	   the	   predicament	   over	   how	   discourse	   of	   non-­‐existents	   is	   used	  without	  commitment	  (see	  chapter	  3	  section	  V.ii	  on	  this	  predicament).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  See,	   for	  example,	  Frege	  (1892),	  Russell	   (1905),	  and	  van	  Inwagen	  (2001).	  Debates	  in	  scientific	  realism	  particularly	  are	  founded	  on	  this	  view,	  as	  they	  revolve	  around	  the	  predicament	  of	  being	  committed	  to	  whatever	  science	  refers	  to,	  including	  the	  abstract.	  
	   91	  As	   Yablo	   describes,	   there	   is	   a	   Quinean	   ‘menu’121	  to	   deal	   with	   such	   a	  predicament,	  including	  (1)	  paraphrasing	  away	  the	  problematic	  so-­‐and-­‐so’s	  to	  avoid	  commitment;	  (2)	  to	  stop	  talking	  of	  the	  so-­‐and-­‐so’s	  to	  avoid	  commitment;	  and	  (3)	  to	  bite	  the	  bullet	  and	  just	  be	  committed	  to	  the	  so-­‐and-­‐so’s.	  To	   this	  menu	  Yablo	  adds	   fictionalism:	   (4)	   to	   treat	   talk	  of	   the	  so-­‐and-­‐so’s	  as	  fictional	  to	  avoid	  commitment	  (defended	  under	  quietism	  in	  chapter	  3).	  This	  menu	  is	  crucially	  missing	  the	  Meinongian	  option	  that	  I	  defend	  in	  this	  chapter:	  (5)	  we	  talk	  truthfully	  of	  the	  so-­‐and-­‐so’s	  as	  such	  talk	  does	  not	  bring	  ontological	   commitment	   anyway.	   It	   seems	  Quine’s	  menu	  is	  offered	  only	  in	  restaurants	  for	  those	  on	  a	  strictly	  non-­‐Meinong	  diet.	   I	   propose	   that	   we	   ditch	   such	   restaurants	   as	   the	  menu	   is	   not	   so	  appetizing,	  and	  instead	  head	  to	  a	  Meinong-­‐friendly	  cafe	  for	  a	  serving	  of	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism	  that	  is	  quietly	  fictionalist	  and	  Meinongian	  (see	  the	  Conclusion	  chapter	  for	  their	  proposed	  compatibility).	  Quine’s	  menu	  is	  as	  dismissive	  of	  Meinong	  as	  Meinong	  is	  dismissive	  of	  the	  predicament	  itself.	  In	  denying	  that	  quantification	  is	  ontologically	  committing,	  one	  is	  not	  forced	  to	  eat	  off	  Quine’s	  menu	  as	  the	  predicament	  (and	  debates	  that	  revolve	  around	  this	  predicament)	  is	  dissolved.	  I	  will	  now	  reject	  Quine’s	  loaded	  quantification	  by	  denying	  how	  he	  restricts	  domains	  to	  existents.	  	  	   III.	  Quinean	  loaded	  quantification.	  	  	  To	  be	  quantified	  over	  in	  our	  best	  scientific	  theory	  is	  Quine’s	  ontological	  criterion.	   Quine	   however	   does	   not	   argue 122 	  for	   this	   criterion	   of	  ontological	  commitment,	  and	  provides	  only	  the	  following	  minimal	  (and	  unsatisfactory)	  justification	  for	  ontologically	  loading	  the	  quantifiers:	  	  	   It	   is	   the	   existential	   quantifier…	   that	   carries	   existential	   import.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Yablo	  (2001)	  p72.	  I	  reject	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  in	  chapter	  1	  section	  III.	  (3)	  is	  like	  Platonism.	  	  122	  Berto	  (2012)	  p31	  seems	  to	  agree	  with	  me	  here:	  “There	   is	  no	  argument	  positively	  supporting	   the	   thesis	   that	   existential	   commitment	   is	   expressed	   by	   quantification:	  Quine	  assumes	  that	  a	  domain	  of	  quantification	  can	  encompass	  only	  existing	  things.”	  	  
	   92	  This	  is	  just	  what	  existential	  quantification	  is	  for,	  of	  course.	  It	  is	  a	  logically	  regimented	  rendering	  of	  the	  ‘there	  is’	  idiom.123	  	  	  Variables	   of	   quantification,	   ‘something’,	   ‘nothing’,	   ‘everything’,	  range	  over	  our	  whole	  ontology,	  whatever	  it	  may	  be.124	  	  	   The	   artificial	   notation	   ‘∃x’	   of	   existential	   quantification	   is	  explained	  merely	  as	  a	  symbolic	  rendering	  of	  the	  words	  ‘there	  is	  something	  x	  such	  that’.	  So,	  whatever	  more	  one	  may	  care	  to	  say	  about	   being	   or	   existence,	   what	   there	   are	   taken	   to	   be	   are	  assuredly	   just	   what	   are	   taken	   to	   qualify	   as	   values	   of	   ‘x’	   in	  quantifications.	  The	  point	  is	  thus	  trivial	  and	  obvious.125	  	  	  This	  is	  as	  much	  explanation	  that	  we	  will	  get	  from	  Quine,	  as	  he	  claims	  it	  is	   simply	   ‘trivial	  and	  obvious’,	  but	   I	  aim	   to	   try	   to	   find	  and	  understand	  some	   justification	   for	   the	   loading.	   I	  will	   explore	   two	   possible	   reasons	  why	   the	  Quinean	  may	   conclude	   that	   the	   quantifier	   carries	   ontological	  commitment:	  (1)	  because	  ∃	  is	  a	  regimentation	  of	  the	  ordinary	  language	  ‘there	   exists’	   idiom	   and	   this	   already	   carries	   ontological	   commitment;	  (2)	   because	   ∃	   is	   ontologically	   loaded	   by	   virtue	   of	   its	   semantics.126	  	  These	   reasons	   correspond	   to	   the	   two	   issues	   I	   clarify	   later	   in	   this	  chapter:	  (1)	  whether	  quantification	  in	  natural	  language	  is	  ontologically	  committing;	   and	   (2)	   whether	   quantification	   in	   formal	   language	   is	  ontologically	  committing.	  I	  argue	  that	  quantification	  in	  both	  English	  and	  first	   order	   logic	   are	   ontologically	   neutral	   in	   sections	   IV	   and	   V	  respectively.	  But	  firstly,	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  section	  III,	  I	  explore	  if	  there	  is	  anything	   nearing	   an	   argument	   from	   Quine	   for	   ontologically	   loading	  quantification,	  looking	  to	  other	  elements	  of	  his	  philosophical	  picture	  for	  clues	  or	  justification.	  In	  particular	  I	  will	  look	  to	  Quine’s	  set	  theory,	  and	  his	  slogans	  about	  entities,	  identity,	  and	  values	  of	  bound	  variables.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  Quine	  (1969)	  p94	  	  124	  Quine	  (1961)	  p13	  125	  Quine	  (1992)	  p26	  126	  Azzouni	  (2004)	  	  
	   93	  Quine	  begs	  the	  question	  against	  those	  who	  are	  quiet	  about	  ontology	  by	  stating	   that	  quantification	   is	   ontologically	   committing	  without	   reason.	  Quine	  conflates	  quantifier	  commitment	  with	  ontological	  commitment127,	  as	  he	  aims	  to	  derive	  ontological	  commitments	  using	  the	  commitments	  of	  quantification.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  hope	  to	  show	  that	  the	  commitments	  that	  Quine	  achieves	  through	  this	  quantificational	  strategy	  is	  simply	  the	  (ontologically	  neutral)	  quantifier	  commitments,	  and	  as	  such	  these	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient	  for	  a	  purported	  ontological	  position	  such	  as	  I-­‐realism.	  The	  quantifier	  commitments	  are	  thus	  not	  appropriate	  for	  being	  treated	  as	   ontological	   commitments,	   since	   the	   quantifier	   only	   commits	   in	   an	  ontologically	  neutral	  way	  to	  what	  is	  in	  the	  domain	  rather	  than	  to	  what	  exists.	  Quantifier	   commitments	   are	   about	   the	  domain,	   and	  ontological	  commitments	  are	  about	  existence.128	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  a	  domain	  should	  not	   be	   equated	   with	   the	   set	   of	   existent	   things,	   hence	   separating	   the	  commitments	   one	   gains	   from	   quantifying	   over	   a	   domain	   and	   the	  commitments	  one	  gains	  from	  speaking	  of	  existence.	  Quine	  conflates	  the	  two	  types	  of	  commitment	  (the	  quantificational	  and	  ontological),	  which	  ontologically	  loads	  his	  quantifier	  in	  a	  way	  that	  I	  will	  argue	  against	  here.	  	  	  	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  however	  that	  it	  would	  be	  unfair	  to	  describe	  Quine	  as	  giving	  a	  ‘loaded’	  reading	  to	  the	  quantifier,	  as	  Quine	  does	  not	  distinguish	  between	  a	   loaded	  and	  a	  neutral	   reading.	  Quine	  does	  not	  observe	  ∃	   as	  loaded	  because	  he	  sees	  no	  contrast	  class	  of	  ‘unloaded’,	  as	  quantification	  just	  is	  about	  existence	  for	  him.	  For	  Quine,	  what	  ontological	  commitment	  
is	   is	   to	   be	   committed	   to	   the	   truth	   of	   a	   quantified	   claim	   in	   our	  regimented	   best	   scientific	   theory,	   as	   there	   is	   no	   other	   sort	   of	  commitment.	   Quine	   accepts	   that	   what	   actually	   exists	   is	   a	   different	  matter	  to	  what	  a	  theory	  takes	  to	  exist	  (quantificational	  commitments),	  but	   for	   Quine	   these	   only	   “explicitly	   separate	   with	   respect	   to	   alien	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  These	  terms	  are	  from	  Azzouni	  (2004)	  who	  distinguishes	  the	  types	  of	  commitment.	  	  128	  Azzouni	  (2004)	  p126.	  There	  is	  also	  existence	  derived	  internally	  to	  a	  framework	  by	  the	  existence	  predicate	  that	  gives	  quiet	  existential	  commitments.	  See	  sections	  I	  and	  VII.	  
	   94	  discourses.”129	  However	  I	  aim	  to	  show	  that	  they	  necessarily	  separate.	  I	  argue	  that	  ‘quantifier	  commitment’	  is	  not	  the	  commitment	  required	  for	  ontology,	   as	   being	   in	   your	   domain	   is	   not	   equivalent	   to	   being	   in	   your	  ontology.	  Quine	  thinks	  domains	  do	  provide	  an	  ontology	  and	  it	  is	  due	  to	  his	  restriction	  on	  domains	  that	  secures	  this.	  It	  is	  this	  restriction130	  that	  ‘loads’	  his	  quantifier.	  I	  describe	  Quine	  as	  holding	  that	  domains	  are	  to	  be	  restricted	   to	   the	   existent	   things,	   but	   this	  may	   be	  misleading	   as	  Quine	  more	   accurately	   restricts	   ‘things’	   to	   only	   the	   existents.131	  My	   talk	   of	  domain	   restriction	   to	   existent	   things	   should	   thus	   be	   read	   as	   Quine’s	  restriction	  on	  things	  themselves.	  And	  now	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  restrictions.	  	  	  III.i.	  Domain	  restrictions	  from	  SET,	  NE,	  and	  TB.	  	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  show	  that	  Quine’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  set-­‐theoretic	  version	  of	  model	  theory	  (named	  ‘SET’)	  and	  the	  following	  two	  slogans132	  ‘NE’	  and	  ‘TB’	  contribute	  to	  his	  ontological	  loading	  of	  the	  quantifier	  ∃:	  	  
SET:	  	   Domains	  are	  sets	  
NE:	  	   “No	  entity	  without	  identity”	  	  
TB:	  	   “To	  be	  is	  to	  be	  the	  value	  of	  a	  bound	  variable”	  	  	  Quine’s	   slogan	   TB	   is	   intended	   as	   a	   descriptive	   tool	   to	   find	   out	   what	  exists	   –	   our	   ontology	   will	   be	   made	   up	   of	   those	   things	   bound	   by	  variables	   in	   the	   best	   scientific	   theory.	   ‘To	   be’	   is	   for	   Quine	   to	   be	   an	  existent	  entity,	  and	  to	  be	  a	  ‘value	  of	  a	  bound	  variable’	  is	  to	  be	  quantified	  over	  in	  the	  domain.	  So	  TB	  states	  that	  to	  be	  an	  existent	  thing	  is	  to	  be	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  quantification.	  I	  reject	  TB	  since	  it	  entails	  quantification	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  Quine	  acknowledges	  that	  our	  quantifiers	  range	  over	  what	  the	  theory	  takes	  to	  exist.	  What	  really	  exists	  will	  be	  what	  the	  correct	  theory	  takes	  to	  exist:	  this	  is	  his	  fallibilism.	  130	  Special	  thanks	  goes	  to	  Tom	  Stoneham	  for	  helpful	  discussion	  on	  domain	  restriction.	  131	  I	  discuss	  this	  restriction	  of	  ‘thing’	  in	  section	  VII	  of	  this	  chapter	  on	  Meinongianism.	  132	  Quine	  (1948)	  p24	  
	   95	  ontologically	   loaded.	   But	   TB	   does	   not	   bring	   us	   to	   the	   truth	   of	   what	  exists	   on	   its	   own	   since	   all	   it	   does	   is	   “test	   the	   conformity	   of	   a	   given	  remark	  to	  a	  prior	  ontological	  standard”133	  (the	  standards	   for	   inclusion	  in	   the	   domain,	   and	   the	   standards	   used	   to	   establish	   the	   best	   scientific	  theory)	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  actual	  ontology.	  As	  Quine	  acknowledges:	  	  	   We	   look	   to	  bound	  variables	   in	   connection	  with	  ontology	  not	   in	  order	  to	  know	  what	  there	  is,	  but	  in	  order	  to	  know	  what	  a	  given	  remark	  or	  doctrine,	   ours	  or	   someone	  else’s,	   says	   there	   is…	  But	  what	  there	  is	  is	  another	  question.134	  	  Furthermore,	   TB	   cannot	   tell	   us	   what	   exists	   because	   answering	   ‘what	  exists?’	  with	  ‘every	  thing!’	  is	  trivially	  true	  when	  ‘thing’	  itself	  is	  restricted	  to	  existents.	  (The	  issue	  over	  the	  debate	  of	  what	  is	  to	  count	  as	  a	  thing	  is	  discussed	  in	  section	  VII).	  What	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  know	  what	  exists	  is	  which	  domain	  the	  quantifiers	  are	  ranging	  over,	  and	  to	  understand	  the	  ‘prior	   standard’	   for	   inclusion	   in	   that	   domain.	   Quine	   believes	   that	   all	  things	  in	  the	  domain	  will	  be	  existent,	  due	  to	  his	  insistence	  that	  inclusion	  in	  a	  domain	  (and	  to	  be	  a	  thing)	  is	  ontologically	  loaded.	  This	  is	  driven	  by	  restricting	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  a	  legitimate	  ‘thing’,	  and	  thus	  a	  member	  of	  the	  domain,	  using	  the	  same	  conditions	  that	  are	  required	  for	  existence.	  If	  the	  conditions	  for	  being	  an	  existent	  thing	  are	  also	  the	  conditions	  for	  being	  eligible	   as	   a	  member	   of	   the	   domain,	   then	   restricting	   the	   domain	  with	  those	  conditions	  will	  result	   in	  restricting	  the	  domain	  to	  only	  existents.	  The	  way	  to	  evaluate	  TB	  then	  is	  to	  evaluate	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  included	  in	  a	  domain,	  to	  see	  whether	  this	  domain	  includes	  all	  and	  only	  existents.	  I	  will	  show	  how	  the	  domain	  may	  become	  restricted	  to	  the	  existents	  by	  looking	  to	  SET	  and	  NE	  in	  turn,	  and	  I	  suggest	  rejecting	  these	  in	  favor	  of	  ontologically	   unrestricted	   domains.	   With	   an	   ontologically	   neutral	  domain,	  we	  get	  neutral	  quantification.	  With	  neutral	  quantification,	  we	  get	  neutral	  language	  use.	  And	  therefore	  we	  can	  reject	  Quine’s	  I-­‐realism.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Quine	  (1961)	  p15-­‐16	  134	  Quine	  (1961)	  p15-­‐16.	  This	  supports	  my	  interpretation	  of	  Quine	  as	  a	  quiet	  relativist	  that	  I	  argued	  for	  in	  chapter	  1	  section	  IV,	  since	  he	  is	  quiet	  about	  what	  there	  really	  is.	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• Restriction	  from	  SET.	  	  For	  Quine,	   and	   in	   the	   standard	   set-­‐theoretic	   version	   of	  model	   theory,	  domains	  are	  seen	  as	  sets.	  Domains	  therefore	  will	  for	  Quine	  be	  restricted	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  sets	  are	  restricted.	  Sets	  are	  restricted	  by	  identity,	  since	  sets	  are	  required	  to	  have	  determinate	  identity	  conditions.	  For	  sets	  to	  have	  determinate	  identity	  is	  for	  there	  to	  be	  a	  determinate	  answer	  as	  to	  whether	  one	  set	  a	  is	  identical	  to	  another	  set	  b.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  Frege:	  	  	   If	  we	  are	  to	  use	  the	  symbol	  ‘a’	  to	  signify	  an	  object,	  we	  must	  have	  a	  criterion	  for	  deciding	  in	  all	  cases	  whether	  ‘b’	  is	  the	  same	  as	  ‘a’,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  always	  in	  our	  power	  to	  apply	  this	  criterion.135	  	  	  It	   is	   an	   assumption	   of	   set	   theory	   that	   sets	   meet	   such	   determinate	  identity	  conditions	  (in	  particular	  via	  the	  axiom	  of	  extensionality	  which	  says	  that	  two	  sets	  are	   identical	   iff	   their	  members	  are	   identical).	  So	  set	  theory	   also	   tells	   us	   that	   sets	   are	   identified	   by	   their	  members,	   and	   as	  such	   their	   members	   must	   also	   meet	   these	   determinate	   identity	  conditions	  –	  for	  every	  member	  of	  the	  set,	  there	  is	  a	  determinate	  answer	  as	  to	  whether	  it	  is	  identical	  to	  another	  member	  of	  the	  set.	  Since	  the	  set-­‐theoretic	  version	  of	  model	  theory	  states	  that	  domains	  are	  sets,	  domains	  thus	  take	  on	  these	  same	  conditions.	  Domains,	  and	  members	  of	  domains,	  therefore	  must	   also	   have	   determinate	   identity	   conditions.	   This	   is	   the	  restriction	  from	  SET	  on	  what	  can	  go	  in	  a	  domain:	  all	  members	  must	  have	  
determinate	   identity	   conditions.	  This	   can	   be	   represented	   by	   the	   circle	  below	  being	  the	  domain,	  and	  the	  restriction	  of	  identity	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  domain	  –	  thus	  the	  entry	  requirement	  for	  the	  domain	  is	  identity:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  Frege	  (1884)	  p62	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• Restriction	  from	  NE.	  	  Quine’s	  slogan	  NE	  states	  that	  there	  is	  no	  entity	  without	  identity.	  So	  all	  entities	   must	   have	   determinate	   identity	   conditions.	   This	   may	   sound	  similar	  to	  the	  restriction	  imposed	  by	  SET	  –	  that	  members	  of	  the	  domain	  must	   have	   determinate	   identity	   –	   but	   this	   restriction	   posed	   by	   NE	  applies	   to	   only	   certain	   kinds	   of	   thing.	   An	   ‘entity’	   for	   Quine	   means	   an	  existent	  entity,	  as	  there	  are	  no	  other	  entities	  for	  Quine.	  As	  such,	  his	  NE	  states	  that	  there	  can	  be	  no	  existent	  entity	  without	  determinate	  identity	  conditions.	   Whereas,	   SET	   states	   that	   there	   can	   be	   no	   member	   of	   the	  domain	   (existent	   or	   not)	   without	   determinate	   identity	   conditions.	   So	  the	  restriction	  from	  NE	  on	  what	  can	  go	  in	  a	  domain	  is:	  all	  the	  existents	  
must	  have	  determinate	  identity	  conditions.	  This	  can	  also	  be	  represented	  by	  the	  circle	  below	  being	  the	  domain,	  with	  the	  section	  marked	  off	  for	  all	  of	  the	  existent	  entities	  having	  determinate	  identity	  conditions:	  
	  	  We	  are	  trying	  to	  find	  motivation	  or	  justification	  for	  TB,	  where	  the	  whole	  domain	   is	   restricted	   to	   include	   only	   existent	   things.	   So	   far,	   from	   SET	  and	  NE	  we	  only	  have	  the	  domain	  restricted	  to	  include	  those	  things	  with	  determinate	   identity.	   What	   the	   Quinean	   must	   do	   then,	   is	   to	   hold	   a	  
biconditional	   reading	   of	   NE,	   so	   that	   the	   identity	   restriction	   selects	  all	  
and	  only	  the	  existent	  things	   to	  be	   included	  in	  the	  domain.	  That	  way,	  all	  things	   with	   identity	   must	   be	   existent.	   The	   biconditional	   is	   between	  ‘being	   an	   entity’	   and	   ‘having	   identity’,	   and	   the	   entailment	   is	   read	   as	  going	   in	   both	   directions	   –	   not	   only	   do	   all	   existent	   entities	   require	  identity,	  but	  all	  entities	  with	  identity	  require	  existence.	  So	  we	  read	  NE	  as	   saying	   both	   ‘no	   entity	   without	   identity’	   and	   ‘no	   identity	   without	  entity’.	  These	  are	  the	  two	  directions	  for	  the	  biconditional	  NE:	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  have	  identity	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  Left-­‐Right:	   Entity	   X	   cannot	   exist	   without	   having	   determinate	  identity	  conditions	  as	  in	  order	  to	  exist	  it	  must	  be	  determinately	  distinct	  from	  other	  existents.	  	  Right-­‐Left:	  Entity	  X	  cannot	  have	  determinate	  identity	  conditions	  without	   existing	   as	   existence	   is	   required	   for	   completeness	   or	  determinacy	  (which	  non-­‐existents	  are	  said	  to	  lack).	  	  This	  restriction	  from	  a	  biconditional	  NE	  can	  too	  be	  represented	  below	  with	  the	  circle	  as	  the	  domain,	  and	  now	  with	  the	  biconditional	  reading	  of	  NE	   we	   get	   that	   all	   the	   things	   in	   the	   domain	   that	   are	   existent	   have	  identity	  and	  all	  the	  things	  in	  the	  domain	  with	  identity	  are	  existent:	  	  	  
	  	  From	   the	   biconditional	   NE	  we	   bridge	   the	   gap	   between	   SET	   and	   TB	   –	  SET	   provides	   us	   with	   the	   restriction	   that	   domains	   can	   only	   contain	  things	  with	   determinate	   identity	   conditions,	   and	   the	   biconditional	  NE	  provides	  us	  with	   the	  restriction	   that	   the	  only	   things	  with	  determinate	  identity	   conditions	   are	   existents,	   which	   brings	   us	   to	   TB	   which	   states	  that	  to	  be	  in	  a	  domain	  is	  to	  be	  an	  existent	  entity.	  Therefore,	  we	  derive	  that	   all	   and	   only	   existent	   things	   can	   be	   quantified	   over	   in	   a	   domain,	  hence	   TB	   and	   why	   ∃	   is	   read	   ‘there	   exists’	   by	   the	   Quineans.	   Quine’s	  constraint	   on	  domains	   ensures	   this	   reading	   of	  ∃	   and	   I	   argue	   that	   this	  constraint	  is	  unnecessary.	  I	  will	  now	  reject	  this	  constraint	  by	  proposing	  that	  we	  either	  reject	  the	  restriction	  that	  SET	  imposes	  (that	  all	  members	  of	   domains	   require	   determinate	   identity	   conditions)	   or	   we	   reject	   the	  restriction	  that	  NE	  imposes	  (that	  all	  things	  with	  identity	  are	  existent).	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  III.ii.	  Rejecting	  TB	  via	  SET	  or	  NE.	  	  	  To	  burn	   the	  bridge	   that	   leads	  us	   to	  TB	  we	  can	  deny	   the	  biconditional	  reading	   of	   NE,	   in	   particular	   by	   denying	   the	   direction	   Right-­‐Left	   by	  showing	   that	  non-­‐existents	  can	   have	   identity	   and	  can	   go	   in	   a	  domain,	  and	  thus	  we	  quantify	  over	  non-­‐existents,	  so	  ∃	  is	  neutral.	  To	  do	  this	  we	  need	   to	   find	   non-­‐existents	   which	   meet	   the	   determinate	   identity	  conditions	  imposed	  by	  SET.	  Or,	  we	  can	  simply	  reject	  SET	  by	  denying	  the	  set-­‐theoretic	  version	  of	  model	  theory	  that	  requires	  domains	  to	  be	  sets	  with	  determinate	  identity	  conditions.	  To	  do	  this	  we	  need	  to	  show	  that	  we	  can	  quantify	  over	   things	   that	   lack	  determinate	   identity	   conditions.	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  section	  I	  explore	  these	  options	  of	  rejecting	  SET	  or	  NE.	  	  	  	  Quine’s	  NE	  is	  motivated	  by	  his	  issue	  with	  possible	  fat	  men	  in	  doorways:	  	   Take,	   for	   instance,	   the	   possible	   fat	   man	   in	   that	   doorway;	   and,	  again,	  the	  possible	  bald	  man	  in	  that	  doorway.	  Are	  they	  the	  same	  possible	   man,	   or	   two	   possible	   men?	   How	   do	   we	   decide?	   How	  many	  possible	  men	  are	   there	   in	   that	  doorway?	  Are	   there	  more	  possible	   thin	  ones	   than	   fat	  ones?	  How	  many	  of	   them	  are	  alike?	  Or	  would	  their	  being	  alike	  make	  them	  one?	  Are	  no	  two	  possible	  things	  alike?	   Is	   this	   the	  same	  as	  saying	   that	   it	   is	   impossible	   for	  two	   things	   to	   be	   alike?	   Or,	   finally,	   is	   the	   concept	   of	   identity	  simply	   inapplicable	   to	   unactualized	   possibles?	   But	   what	   sense	  can	  be	  found	  in	  talking	  of	  entities	  which	  cannot	  meaningfully	  be	  said	   to	   be	   identical	   with	   themselves	   and	   distinct	   from	   one	  another?136	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  The	  problem	  with	  the	  possible	   fat	  man	  in	  the	  doorway	  is	   that	   there	   is	  no	  determinate	  answer	  as	  to	  whether	  he	  is	  identical	  to	  the	  possible	  tall	  man	   in	   the	   doorway,	   or	   the	   possible	   smelly	  man	   in	   the	   doorway	   etc.	  Without	   there	   being	   a	   determinate	   answer	   as	   to	   whether	   one	   is	  identical	   with	   another	   is	   for	   those	   things	   to	   be	   lacking	   determinate	  identity	   conditions.	   For	   Quine,	   not	   having	   determinate	   identity	  conditions	  goes	  against	  what	  it	   is	  to	  be	  an	  object	  or	  an	  existent	  entity.	  So	   the	  possible	   fat	  man	  does	  not	  qualify.	  For	  Quine	   this	  may	  be	   just	  a	  plea	   to	  stop	  talking	  about	  possibilia,	  but	   it	  has	   the	  effect	  of	  restricting	  our	  domains	  of	  quantification.	  The	  question	  is	  whether	  NE	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  possible	   fat	  man	  being	  an	  illegitimate	  thing	  to	  talk	  about,	  or	  by	  such	  talk	  problematically	  introducing	  him	  as	  an	  object	  into	  the	  domain	  as	  an	  existent	  thing.	  If	  being	  a	  member	  of	  the	  domain	  has	  no	  ontological	  significance	   and	   only	   signifies	   that	   we	   just	   talk	   of	   that	   thing	   then	   it	  seems	  unproblematic	  to	  talk	  of	  possibilia	  and	  to	  place	  them	  in	  a	  domain	  –	   it	   is	   only	   problematic	   if	   quantification	   is	   ontologically	   loaded	  which	  would	  give	  you	  existent	  possible	  fat	  men.	  Yet	  Quine	  defends	  his	  identity	  constraint	  because	  he	  thinks	  it	  affords	  our	  resultant	  theory	  a	  degree	  of	  clarity	  and	  definiteness.	  But	  what	  I	  want	  to	  demonstrate	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	   to	   impose	   such	   a	   constraint,	   and	   so	   quantification	   without	  Quine’s	  unnecessary	  added	  restriction	  is	  naturally	  ontologically	  neutral.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   biconditional	   NE	   ensures	   that	   all	   and	   only	   existents	   have	  determinate	  identity	  conditions,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  substantial	  and	  potentially	  controversial	  claim	  which	  makes	  Quine’s	  logic	  heavily	  theory-­‐laden.	  We	  need	   not	   accept	   such	   a	   heavy	   load	   with	   our	   logic	   though,	   and	   in	  rejecting	  NE	  we	  can	  reject	  Quine’s	  ontologically	   loaded	  logic.	  Firstly,	   it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  all	  existent	  things	  meet	  Quine’s	  identity	  conditions	  (and	  as	   such	   the	   conditions	   are	   not	   necessary),	   and	   secondly,	   some	   non-­‐existent	  things	  may	  meet	  those	  identity	  conditions	  too	  (and	  as	  such	  the	  conditions	   are	   not	   sufficient).	   By	   not	   being	   necessary	   we	   deny	   the	  direction	   Left-­‐Right	   by	   showing	   that	   we	   can	   have	   an	   entity	   without	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  identity,	  and	  by	  not	  being	  sufficient	  we	  deny	  the	  direction	  Right-­‐Left	  by	  showing	   that	   we	   can	   have	   non-­‐existents	   with	   identity.	   So	   even	   if	   the	  domain	   is	   restricted	   by	   SET	   to	   include	   only	   those	   things	   with	  determinate	   identity	  conditions,	   this	  set	  of	   things	  need	  not	  be	  a	  set	  of	  existent	   things,	   and	   thus	  we	   cannot	   look	   to	   the	  domain	   to	   provide	  us	  with	   an	   ontology.	   Determinate	   identity	   conditions	   do	   not	   pick	   out	   all	  and	  only	   existents,	   so	   even	   if	   the	  domain	   is	   restricted	  by	  SET	   to	  have	  determinate	  identity	  conditions	  this	  does	  not	  restrict	  the	  domain	  to	  all	  and	   only	   existent	   things.	   It	   thus	   seems	   that	   determinate	   identity	   is	  neither	  necessary	  nor	  sufficient	   for	  existence	  or	   ‘thingness’.	  Therefore	  the	  biconditional	  NE	  cannot	  be	  a	  constraint	  on	  domain	  specification.	  	  	  	  As	  stated	  before,	  to	  have	  determinate	  identity	  conditions	  means	  that	  for	  all	   a	   and	   all	   b	   there	   must	   be	   a	   definite	   answer	   as	   to	   whether	   a=b.	  Benacerraf137	  takes	   issue	  with	   this	   claim	  with	   regard	   to	   numbers	   and	  sets,	  by	  showing	  how	  there	   is	  no	  definite	  answer	  as	   to	  which	  sets	   the	  numbers	   are.	   Benacerraf	   notes	   there	   are	   many	   potential	   reductions	  from	   numbers	   to	   sets	   but	   since	   there	   is	   no	   principled	  way	   to	   choose	  between	   them	   then	   numbers	   are	   not	   reducible	   or	   identical	   to	   sets.	   If	  numbers	  exist	  then	  they	  require	  determinate	  identity	  (according	  to	  NE),	  and	  without	  there	  being	  a	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	  as	  to	  which,	  if	  any,	  sets	  they	  are	   identical	   to,	   then	   they	   do	   not	   meet	   this	   condition.	   Many	  philosophers	  of	  mathematics,	  particularly	  in	  the	  structuralist	  tradition,	  take	  the	  lesson	  of	  this	  to	  be	  that	  numbers	  exist	  but	  without	  determinate	  identity,	  denying	  NE.	  So	  here	  identity	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  existence.	  	  	  There	   are	   also	   examples	   within	   modern	   science	   of	   existent	   things	  without	  determinate	   identity	  conditions,	   such	  as	   fermions	  and	  bosons	  in	  Bose-­‐Einstein	  statistics.138	  	  Other	  examples	  to	  show	  that	  determinate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  Benacerraf	  (1965)	  p62	  138	  This	  is	  an	  example	  borrowed	  from	  Cie	  and	  Stoneham	  (2009)	  p87-­‐88	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  identity	   is	  not	  necessary	   to	  be	  an	  existent	  are	   things	   like	   rainbows	  or	  heaps.	  Azzouni139	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  fictional	  characters	  to	  show	  that	  determinate	   identity	   is	   not	   sufficient	   for	   existents	   either	   as	   the	   non-­‐existent	   fictional	   things	   like	  Mickey	  Mouse	  may	  meet	   the	  condition	  by	  stipulation.	  Therefore	   it	   seems	   that	   the	  biconditional	   reading	  of	  NE	   is	  too	  strong,	  and	  by	  rejecting	  it	  in	  some	  direction	  with	  a	  counterexample	  we	  thus	  break	  the	  argument	  that	  leads	  us	  to	  hold	  TB	  and	  load	  ∃.	  	  	  	  But	  if	  we	  feel	  compelled	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  biconditional	  NE,	  then	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	   the	   restriction	  on	  our	  domains	   to	  only	   existents	  we	  would	  thus	   have	   to	   reject	   SET	   instead.	   This	   would	   allow	   for	   things	  without	  determinate	   identity	   into	   the	  domain,	  which	   could	   include	  many	  non-­‐existents,	  and	  the	  biconditional	  NE	  would	  merely	  state	  that	  those	  things	  in	  the	  domain	  with	  determinate	  identity	  will	  also	  be	  those	  things	  in	  the	  domain	  that	  exist.	  To	  reject	  SET	  is	  to	  deny	  the	  set-­‐theoretic	  version	  of	  model	  theory,	  and	  so	  denies	  that	  domains	  are	  sets.	  It	  is	  standard	  to	  take	  domains	  as	  sets	  however	  this	   leads	  to	  problems	  that	  may	  motivate	   its	  rejection	  anyway.	  For	  example,	  when	  domains	  are	  sets	  we	  cannot	  have	  unrestricted	   universal	   quantification.	   This	   is	   because	   unrestricted	  quantification	  would	  require	  an	  unrestricted	  domain,	  and	  if	  the	  domain	  is	   seen	  as	  a	   set	   then	   this	   requires	   that	   set	   to	  be	  unrestricted.	   Such	  an	  unrestricted	  set	  is	  a	  set	  of	  everything,	  which	  will	  therefore	  contain	  itself,	  opening	   the	  way	   to	   Russell’s	   Paradox	   (discussed	   in	   chapter	   4	   section	  II.i).	  Therefore,	   if	  one	  wants	  to	  allow	  for	  unrestricted	  quantification	  or	  an	  unrestricted	  domain,	   as	  Quine	   in	   fact	   seems	   to	   (as	  he	   answers	   the	  question	  of	  what	  exists	  with	  ‘everything!’),	  then	  one	  needs	  to	  deny	  SET	  to	  avoid	  ending	  up	   in	  Russell’s	  Paradox.	  This	  allows	   for	  us	   to	  quantify	  over	  non-­‐existent	  things	  without	  determinate	  identity,	  and	  prevents	  the	  move	  from	  SET	  to	  the	  biconditional	  NE	  to	  TB	  that	  loads	  quantification.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  Azzouni	  (2004)	  p101	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  III.iii.	  Rejecting	  TB	  via	  quantification.	  	  	  If	  Quine	  has	  an	  argument	  for	  TB	  it	  is	  a	  pretty	  poor	  one,	  depending	  on	  a	  problematic	   biconditional	   reading	   of	   NE,	   a	   paradoxical	   acceptance	   of	  SET,	   or	   an	   unmotivated	   statement	   that	   quantification	   being	   loaded	   is	  simply	   ‘trivial	   and	  obvious’.	  We	   can	  deny	  SET	  or	  NE	  as	  demonstrated	  above	  to	  block	  the	  route	  to	  TB,	  or	  we	  can	  provide	  independent	  reasons	  for	  ontologically	  neutral	  quantification	  to	  show	  that	  not	  only	  is	  Quine’s	  loaded	  reading	  unmotivated	  but	  also	  is	  not	  at	  all	  trivial	  or	  obvious.	  I	  will	  now	   focus	   on	   showing	  why	   TB	   is	   wrong	   on	   independent	   grounds	   by	  looking	  at	  what	  quantification	  is	  in	  natural	  and	  formal	  languages.	  	  	  	  As	  stated	  at	  the	  start	  of	  this	  section	  III,	  there	  could	  be	  two	  reasons	  why	  one	  may	  hold	  that	  quantification	  is	  ontologically	  loaded:	  (1)	  because	  ∃	  is	   a	   regimentation	   of	   the	   ordinary	   language	   ‘there	   exists’	   and	   this	   is	  already	   ontologically	   loaded;	   (2)	   because	   ∃	   is	   loaded	   by	   virtue	   of	   its	  semantics.	  These	  reasons	  correspond	  to	  the	  two	  issues	  I	  will	  clarify	   in	  the	   next	   two	   sections	   IV-­‐V	   respectively:	   (1)	  whether	   quantification	   in	  natural	   language	   is	   ontologically	   committing;	   (2)	   whether	  quantification	   in	   formal	   language	   is	   ontologically	   committing.	   I	   argue	  that	  quantification	  in	  both	  English	  and	  first	  order	  logic	  are	  ontologically	  neutral,	  and	  that	  examples	  of	  uses	  of	  quantification	  in	  both	  natural	  and	  formal	   languages	   provide	   evidence	   against	   TB	   and	   do	   not	   support	  Quine’s	   triviality	   thesis,	   whereas	   neutral	   quantification	   is	   consistent	  with	  such	  evidence.	  The	  burden	  of	  proof	  is	  thus	  firmly	  on	  the	  Quinean	  to	  provide	  an	  argument	  (rather	  than	  stating	  that	  it	  is	  simply	  trivial)	  for	  taking	  quantification	  to	  be	  ontologically	  committing	  despite	  prima	  facie	  examples	   that	   suggest	   that	   we	   seem	   happy	   to	   quantify	   over	   things	  without	  taking	  them	  to	  exist.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  look	  to	  examples	  from	  the	   natural	   language	   of	   English	   and	   in	   section	   V	   I	   look	   to	   first	   order	  logic	  to	  provide	  evidence	  that	  quantification	  is	  ontologically	  neutral.	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  IV.	  Natural	  language	  quantification	  is	  neutral.	  	  	  In	   this	   section	   I	   attack	   the	   assumption	   that	   quantification	   in	   natural	  language	  is	  ontologically	  committing.	  Quantified	  statements	  begin	  with	  quantity	  words	  like	  ‘some’,	  ‘all’,	  ‘most’,	  etc.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  explain	  why	   ‘there	   exists’	   is	   not	   synonymous	   with	   ‘some’	   in	   English	   to	   show	  why	   ‘there	   exists’	   is	   not	   quantificational	   (but	   rather	   ‘exists’	   is	   a	  predicate)	   and	   how	   ‘some’	   (along	   with	   other	   quantified	   idioms)	   is	  ontologically	  neutral,	   just	  as	   in	  the	  formal	   language	  of	   first	  order	   logic	  (discussed	   in	  the	  next	  section	  V).	  ∃	  cannot	  represent	  the	  meaning	  and	  logical	  role	  of	  both	  ‘some’	  and	  ‘there	  exists’	  in	  English	  (and	  cognates	  in	  other	  natural	  languages)	  since	  ‘exists’	  is	  not	  quantificational	  (but	  rather	  is	   a	  predicate).	   ‘Some’	  quantifies	  neutrally	  over	   the	  domain,	   a	  domain	  that	  is	  split	  into	  existents	  and	  non-­‐existents	  by	  the	  existence	  predicate.	  So	  ‘some’	  is	  neutral	  quantification	  over	  a	  number	  of	  things,	  and	  ‘exists’	  is	   a	   predicate	   for	   describing	   things	   as	   existing	   according	   to	   the	  framework.	  Thus	  ‘some’	  is	  quantitative	  (about	  the	  amount	  of	  thing)	  and	  ‘exists’	  is	  qualitative	  (about	  the	  type	  of	  thing).	  I	  also	  discuss	  this	  more	  in	  section	  V.	  Here	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  quantified	  sentences	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	   existence	   –	   they	   should	   not	   require	   existence	   for	   their	   truth	   or	  meaning,	  and	  they	  should	  also	  not	  imply	  any	  ontological	  commitment.	  	  	  	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  examples.	  If	  ‘some’	  is	  to	  mean	  ‘at	  least	  one	  existent	  thing’,	  then	   there	   will	   be	   no	   difference	   between	   ‘some’	   and	   ‘there	   exists’.	  Burgess	  and	  Rosen	  for	  instance	  argue	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  understand	  what	  the	  difference	  can	  be.140	  Priest	  responds	  that	   they	  could	  simply	  reflect	  on	   the	   sentence	   “I	   thought	  of	   something	   I	  would	   like	   to	   give	  you	  as	   a	  Christmas	   present	   but	   I	   couldn’t	   get	   it	   for	   you	   as	   it	   doesn’t	   exist.”141	  Here,	   the	   ‘something’	   cannot	  mean	   ‘at	   least	   one	   existent	   thing’	   as	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  Burgess	  and	  Rosen	  (1997)	  p224	  141	  Priest	  (2005)	  p152	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  sentence	  would	  then	  be	  contradictory.	  However,	  other	  quantified	  ‘some’	  sentences	  do	  appear	  to	  be	  ontologically	  loaded,	  like	   ‘some	  chocolate	  is	  in	   my	   fridge’,	   which	   will	   be	   true	   only	   if	   there	   exists	   chocolate	   in	   my	  fridge.	  Here	  however,	   it	   is	  not	  the	   ‘some’	  that	  is	  giving	  the	  appearance	  of	  ontological	  loading,	  rather	  the	  ‘in	  my	  fridge’	  is.	  ‘Some’	  needn’t	  require	  existence,	  but	  to	  be	  ‘in	  my	  fridge’	  does,	  as	  here	  it	  is	  a	  physically	  located	  thing	  to	  which	  it	  seems	  the	  existence	  predicate	  applies.	  Further,	  ‘some’	  
cannot	  require	  existence	  since	  that	  would	  entail	  that	  we	  cannot	  talk	  of	  some	   non-­‐existent	   things	   without	   contradiction.	   For	   example,	   ‘some	  mice	  have	  American	  accents’	  is	  arguably	  true	  due	  to	  Mickey	  Mouse,	  yet	  we	  do	  not	   feel	   that	   the	   truth	   of	   this	   sentence	   commits	   us	   to	  Mickey’s	  existence.	  This	  is	  contrasted	  with	  ‘there	  do	  not	  exist	  mice	  with	  American	  accents’	   to	   articulate	   the	   lack	   of	   commitment	   to	   Mickey	   by	   explicitly	  utilizing	  a	  negated	  existence	  predicate	  of	  ‘exists’	  to	  deny	  his	  existence.	  	  	  	  Priest’s	   Christmas	   present	   example	   above	   is	   a	   variant	   of	   a	   famous	  example	  of	  Strawson’s,142	  who	  points	   to	  a	  dictionary	  of	   legendary	  and	  mythical	   characters	   and	   says,	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   characters,	   ‘some	   of	  these	  exist	  and	  some	  of	   them	  don’t	  exist’.	  The	  seemingly	   loaded	  word	  here	   is	   ‘exist’,	   and	   ‘some’	  must	   be	   considered	   neutral,	   to	   prevent	   the	  contradiction	   in	   the	   second	   disjunct	   which	  would	   come	   out	   as	   ‘there	  exist	  some	  characters	  that	  don’t	  exist’.	  To	  account	  for	  sentences	  such	  as	  this	   without	   contradiction,	   we	   must	   be	   able	   to	   use	   ‘some’	   in	   an	  ontologically	   neutral	   way.	   This	   points	   towards	   the	   ordinary	   usage	   of	  quantification	   in	   natural	   language	   to	   be	   ontologically	   neutral.	  Furthermore,	   there	   may	   be	   no	   way	   of	   making	   sense	   of	   our	   fictional	  practice	   but	   to	   quantify	   over	   fictional	   entities,	   and	   as	   such	   we	   must	  ensure	  that	  quantification	  is	  ontologically	  neutral	  to	  avoid	  commitment	  to	  such	  fictional	  entities.	  Treating	  the	  quantifier	  as	  ontologically	  neutral,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  His	   actual	   example	   is:	   “A	   child	   asks	   to	   look	   at	   a	   book,	   actually	   the	   Classical	  Dictionary,	  and	  I	  hand	  it	  to	  him,	  saying:	  ‘A	  good	  proportion	  of	  the	  characters	  listed	  are	  mythical,	   of	   course;	   but	  most	   of	   them	  existed’.”	   Strawson	   (1967)	  p13.	  Here,	   ‘a	   good	  proportion’	  and	  ‘most’	  can	  be	  translated	  as	  meaning	  ‘some’	  as	  quantificational	  terms.	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  and	  distinguishing	  ‘some’	  as	  a	  quantifier	  and	  ‘exists’	  as	  a	  predicate,	  will	  gain	  expressive	  resources	  for	  sentences	  which	  contain	  both	  ‘some’	  and	  ‘not	  exist’	  (like	  the	  examples	  above143)	  so	  as	  to	  prevent	  contradictions.	  	  	  	  A	   realist	  may	   protest	   that	   actually	   ‘some’	   just	   by	   definition	  means	   ‘at	  least	  one	  existent	  thing’	  and	  that	  these	  examples	  can	  thus	  be	  dealt	  with	  by	   being	   not	   strictly	   speaking	   true.	   They	   could	   argue	   that	   all	   such	  examples	  are	  a	  misuse	  of	  language	  that	  is	  parasitic	  on	  their	  realist	  use	  of	   ‘some’,	   and	   are	   properly	   interpreted	   as	   involving	   a	   cancelling	  (perhaps	  fictional)	  prefix	  to	  create	  a	  more	  accurate	  sentence	  such	  as	  ‘in	  
Disney	  there	  exists	  at	   least	  one	  mouse	  that	  has	  an	  American	  accent’	   to	  make	   it	   true.	   These	   realists	   will	   argue	   that	   all	   uses	   of	   ‘some’	   are	  ontologically	  committing	  until	  it	  is	  cancelled	  by	  such	  a	  prefix,	  otherwise	  the	  sentence	  will	  just	  be	  false	  if	  it	  involves	  non-­‐existent	  things.	  However	  such	  a	  strategy	  will	  not	  work	  for	  Priest	  and	  Strawson’s	  examples,	  which	  involve	  a	  true	  sentence	  and	  a	  neutral	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘some’,	  where	  no	  prefix	   will	   fit.	   These	   examples	   give	   cases	   when	   you	   quantify	   over	   a	  domain	  of	  objects,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  existent	  and	  some	  are	  not,	  so	  you	  cannot	   prefix	   your	   quantification	   with	   a	   fictionality	   operator	   (for	  instance)	   to	  explain	  what	   is	  going	  on.	  This	   is	  because	  only	  part	  of	   the	  sentence	   will	   pertain	   to	   non-­‐existent	   (perhaps	   fictional)	   things	   and	  another	  part	  of	  the	  same	  sentence	  pertains	  to	  existent	  things,	  and	  so	  an	  overarching	  cancelling	  prefix	   for	   the	  whole	   sentence	  will	  not	  do	   since	  only	  part	  of	  the	  sentence	  will	  require	  the	  commitment	  to	  be	  cancelled.	  	  	  	  Azzouni144	  claims	   that	   the	   debate	   over	   ontologically	   loaded	   language	  becomes	   irresolvable	   in	   this	  way	  of	   looking	   to	   intuitions	   in	   examples,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  If	  those	  examples	  were	  unconvincing,	  then	  take	  our	  ordinary	  talk	  of	  past	  or	  future	  objects,	  such	  as	  my	  dead	  parrot,	  or	  unborn	  baby,	  which	  demonstrate	  that	  we	  speak	  of	  things	  that	  do	  not	  exist	  now.	  Otherwise,	  true	  negative	  existentials	  and	  talk	  of	  fictional	  entities	  are	  clearly	  demonstrative	  of	  a	  need	  for	  neutral	  quantification.	  Bueno	  (2009).	  	  	  144	  Azzouni	  (1997)	  p208	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  since	  any	  example	  given	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  ontological	  significance	  (or	  lack	  of)	  will	  not	  convince	  the	  opponent	  who	  will	  deny	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  that	   example.	   It	   is	   here	   that	   the	   realist	   and	   the	   quietist	   come	   to	   be	  talking	   past	   each	   other,	   since	   they	   will	   hear	   the	   use	   of	   ‘some’	   in	  different	  ways	   to	   each	  other	   in	   these	  examples,	   and	  deny	   the	   truth	  of	  the	   sentence	   unless	   the	   ‘some’	   is	   being	   used	   in	   the	   way	   that	   they	  themselves	   hear	   it.	   However,	   it	   cannot	   be	   considered	   relevant	   to	   the	  debate	  to	  put	  forward	  how	  you	  hear	  things,	  as	  how	  you	  hear	  things	  may	  be	   incorrect	  due	  to	  misleading	   language	  and	  the	  messiness	  of	  English.	  Azzouni	   also	   acknowledges	   that	   our	   ordinary	  ways	   of	   speaking	   about	  ontology	  are	  treacherous.	  Sometimes	  we	  ordinarily	  try	  to	  quantify	  over	  only	   what	   exists.	   Other	   times	   we	   use	   ‘there	   is’	   in	   an	   ontologically	  neutral	  way.	  Even	  the	  word	  ‘exists’	  does	  not	  always	  indicate	  ontological	  commitment	   due	   to	   our	   use	   of	   ‘really’145	  to	   emphasize	   commitment.	  Therefore	  Azzouni	  concludes	  that	  we	  cannot	  locate	  the	  word	  ‘exists’	  to	  spot	  our	  ontological	  commitments	  as	  we	  can	  use	  the	  word	  differently,	  sometimes	  ontologically	  neutrally.	  As	  such,	  there	  is	  no	  committal	  phrase.	  	  	  It	   is	   clear,	   after	   all,	   that	   the	   natural	   language	   of	   English	   is	  messy	   and	  inconsistent	   regarding	   the	   use	   of	   ‘some’	   and	   ‘there	   exists’.	   Our	  intuitions	  about	   language	  can	  therefore	  not	  be	  relevant	  to	  this	  debate.	  Yet	  it	  is	  relevant	  to	  this	  debate	  to	  consider	  that	  this	  messiness	  supports	  the	  quietist	   side	  of	  neutral	  quantification,	   since	   the	   ‘some’	   can	  always	  be	   read	   in	   the	   same	   neutral	   way,	   rather	   than	   being	   loaded	   at	   some	  times	   and	   neutral	   at	   other	   times	   (as	   the	   realist	  would	   have	   to	   state).	  The	   I-­‐realist	   sees	   a	  distinction	  between	  ontologically	   committing	  uses	  of	  ‘some’	  and	  neutral	  uses	  of	  ‘some’	  whereas	  the	  quietist	  does	  not.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  But	  even	  ‘really’	  is	  sometimes	  ontologically	  irrelevant,	  which	  shows	  that	  English	  is	  always	  ontologically	  neutral	   and	  metaphysically	  quiet,	   as	  Azzouni	  describes:	   “That…	  the	  word	  ‘exist’,	  and	  even	  such	  words	  accompanied	  by	  ‘really’,	  have	  standard	  ontically	  irrelevant	  uses	  is	  what	  motivates	  my	  claim,	  in	  my	  [2004]	  and	  in	  my	  [2007],	  that	  there	  are	  no	  words	  or	  phrases	  in	  the	  vernacular	  that—by	  virtue	  of	  their	  standard	  usage—convey	   ontic	   commitment.	   All	   candidate	   words	   and	   phrases	   that	   I’m	   aware	   of	   are	  routinely	  used	  in	  ontically	  irrelevant	  ways.”	  Azzouni	  (2010)	  p82	  	  
	   108	  quietist	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  way	  we	  use	   ‘some’	  need	  not	  ever	  require	  a	  cancellation	  of	  the	  ontological	  commitment,	  as	  there	  is	  nothing	  ever	  to	  cancel.	  The	  quietists	  reading	  of	   ‘some’	  accommodates	  the	  messiness	  of	  English	  and	  tidies	  it	  up	  somewhat,	  by	  reading	  ‘some’	  consistently	  in	  the	  same	  neutral	  way,	  and	  saving	  ‘exists’	  to	  be	  utilized	  as	  a	  predicate	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  thing	  as	  existing,	  relative	  and	  internal	  to	  frameworks.	  The	  examples	  show	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  quantificational	  neutral	  term	  ‘some’	  and	  the	  non-­‐quantificational	  predicate	  term	  of	  ‘exists’.	  	  	  The	   realist	   default	   is	   to	   have	   loaded	   quantification,	   and	   to	   cancel	   the	  commitments	  with	  a	  prefix	  or	  paraphrase	  at	  the	  appropriate	  times,	  and	  the	  quietist	  default	   is	  neutral	  quantification,	  and	   to	  add	  existence	  as	  a	  predicate	   at	   the	   appropriate	   times.	   Given	   that	   the	   fancy	   footwork	  involved	   in	   cancelling	   ontological	   commitments	   seems	   to	   be	   far	  more	  substantial	  and	  frequent	  than	  the	  minimal	  efforts	  to	  utilize	  an	  existence	  predicate	  instead	  to	  introduce	  a	  commitment,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  quietist	  default	   is	   correct.	   With	   quantification	   being	   shown	   to	   be	   naturally	  ontologically	   neutral,	   it	   is	   therefore	   more	   natural	   to	   treat	   all	  quantification	   as	   neutral	   and	   to	   supplement	   it	   with	   an	   existence	  predicate	  in	  order	  to	  articulate	  some	  form	  of	  commitment.	  And	  so	  far	  I	  have	   argued	   that,	   against	   Quine,	   ∃	   cannot	   be	   a	   regimentation	   of	   the	  natural	   language	   ‘there	   exists’	   in	   virtue	   of	   carrying	   ontological	  commitment,	   since	   ‘there	   exists’	   is	   not	   quantificational	   and	  quantification	  in	  natural	  language	  is	  ontologically	  un-­‐committing.	  	  	  	  In	   the	   next	   section	  V,	   I	   further	   argue,	   against	  Quine,	   that	  ∃	   cannot	   be	  ontologically	  loaded	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  semantics	  alone,	  since	  quantification	  in	  formal	  language	  is	  also	  ontologically	  un-­‐committing.	  I	  will	  show	  that	  quantifiers	  in	  formal	  languages	  like	  first	  order	  logic	  are	  naturally	  quiet	  without	   ontological	   commitment,	   and	   therefore	   the	   unregimented	  quantifiers	  in	  natural	  language	  are	  quiet	  and	  ontologically	  neutral	  too.	  	  
	   109	  V.	  Formal	  language	  quantification	  is	  neutral.	  	  	  Our	  modern	  classical	  logic	  appears	  to	  be	  ontologically	  loaded,	  and	  thus	  metaphysically	  unquiet.	  We	   cite	  ∃x	   as	  meaning	   ‘there	   exists	   an	   x’	   and	  quantification	   is	  as	   such	  a	  mark	  of	  ontological	   commitment.	  However,	  in	   the	   words	   of	   Priest,	   “the	   view	   that	   the	   particular	   quantifier	   is	  ‘existentially	   loaded’	   is	   a	   relatively	   new	   one	   historically	   and…	   it	   has	  become	  entrenched	   in	  modern	  philosophical	   logic	   for	   less	   than	  happy	  reasons.”146	  The	   particular	   quantifier	   that	   Priest	   speaks	   of	   is	   known	  (much	  to	  Priest	  and	  others147	  dismay)	  as	  the	  existential	  quantifier:	  ∃.	  So	  as	   to	  prevent	   confusion,	  Priest	   re-­‐symbolizes	   the	  particular	  quantifier	  as	  S,	  which	  is	  the	  Fraktur	  letter	  ‘S’	  to	  stand	  for	  meaning	  ‘some’,	  instead	  of	  ∃	  which	  has	  come	  to	  stand	  for	  meaning	  ‘there	  exists’.	  As	  a	  quietist,	  in	  order	  to	  remain	  ontologically	  neutral	  one	  must	  resist	  the	   ‘existentially	  loaded’	  reading	  of	  quantifier	  ∃	  and	  use	  only	  the	  neutral	  S.	  I	  aim	  to	  show	  first	  order	  logic	  to	  be	  ontologically	  neutral	  so	  as	  to	  reflect	  the	  quietism	  I	  have	  in	  place	  as	  a	  Neo-­‐Carnapian,	  and	  to	  further	  defeat	  I-­‐realism.	  	  	  	  In	   this	   section	   I	   will	   show	   that	   the	   quantifier	   ∃	   is	   to	   be	   read	   as	   the	  ontologically	  neutral	   ‘some’.	  Reading	  ∃	   as	   ‘there	  exists’	   is	   incorrect,148	  as	  ‘there	  exists’	  is	  not	  a	  quantificational	  phrase.	  ∃	  properly	  understood	  
is	   ‘some’	   which	   Priest	   re-­‐symbolized	   as	  S	   to	   avoid	   confusion,	   and	   is	  named	   the	   ‘particular’	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   misleading	   ‘existential’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  Priest	   (2008)	   p42.	   Priest	   uses	   the	   term	   ‘particular’	   here,	  which	   I	   have	   been	   told	  was	  originally	  used	  by	  the	  Polish	  logicians,	  Lejewski	  (1954)	  and	  Łukasiewicz	  (1921).	  147See	  Azzouni	  (2004),	  Fine	  (2009),	  Berto	  (2012),	  and	  Hofweber	  (2007),	  for	  example.	  	  148	  I	  thank	  an	  anonymous	  reviewer	  for	  pointing	  out	  that	  it	  is	  not	  that	  there	  is	  a	  correct	  or	  incorrect	  way	  of	  reading	  ∃	  of	  predicate	  logic,	  since	  these	  are	  artificial	  languages	  and	  the	  meanings	  of	  the	  symbols	  are	  stipulated,	  not	  discovered.	  They	  claimed	  that	  it	  is	  not	  that	  Quine	  has	  made	  a	  mistake	  in	  understanding	  his	  formal	  language,	  as	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  stipulation	  how	  we	  use	  it.	  They	  further	  claimed	  that	  Quine	  has	  not	  smuggled	  in	  the	  metaphysical	  load,	  rather	  he	  is	  explicitly	  proposing	  a	  certain	  connection	  between	  logic	  and	  ontology.	  They	  say	  that	  the	  connection	  can	  be	  questioned	  but	  not	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  Quine	  is	  making	  a	  mistake	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  ∃.	  I	  disagree	  here,	  since	  I	  argue	  that	  ∃	  is	  a	  quantifier	  that	  must	  symbolize	  quantifier	  terms,	  not	  including	  ‘there	  exists’.	  
	   110	  quantifier	   (because	   existence	   has	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   quantification).	  The	   difference	   between	   ‘some’	   and	   ‘there	   exists’	   is	   that	   ‘some’	   is	   an	  ontologically	   neutral	   quantificational	   term,	   and	   ‘there	   exists’	   is	   not	   a	  quantificational	   term	   (as	   ‘exists’	   is	   a	   predicate).	   ‘Some’	   is	   about	   the	  
number	   of	   things	   (namely	   only	   some	   of	   them),	   and	   so	   is	  quantitative,	  whereas	  ‘there	  exists’	  describes	  the	  way	  things	  are	  (as	  existing	  things),	  and	  so	  is	  qualitative.	  As	  Berto	  states:	  “Existence	  and	  numbering	  should	  not	  be	  confused.”149	  Thus,	  ‘some’	  is	  fit	  for	  numerical	  quantificational	  use,	  and	  ‘there	  exists’	  is	  not	  as	  it	  is	  not	  a	  quantifier	  term.	  ∃	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  the	  logical	  regimentation	  of	  the	  non-­‐quantificational	  ‘there	  exists’.	  	  	  The	   reason	   ‘there	   exists’	   is	   not	   quantificational	   can	   be	   motivated	   by	  looking	   to	  Generalized	  Quantifier	   Theory150.	   According	   to	  Generalized	  Quantifier	   Theory	   a	   quantificational	   noun	   phrase	   is	   made	   up	   of	   a	  determiner	   and	   a	   noun.	   Determiners	   are	   words	   like	   ‘some’,	   ‘all’,	   ‘a’,	  ‘most’,	   ‘five’,	  which	  are	  ontologically	  neutral	  quantitative	  terms.	  Nouns	  include	  words	  like	  ‘numbers’,	  ‘cats’,	  ‘objects’,	  which	  are	  terms	  for	  kinds	  of	  thing.	  So,	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  sentence	  ‘there	  is	  a	  number	  that	  is	  prime	  between	   2	   and	   4’	   is	   a	   quantified	   sentence,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   true	   that	   the	  quantifier	   is	   ‘there	   is’.	   Actually,	   the	   quantifier	   is	   ‘a	   number’,	   with	   ‘a’	  being	  a	  determiner	  and	  ‘number’	  being	  a	  noun.	  The	  ‘there	  is’	  is	  not	  part	  of	   the	   quantification,	   and	   sometimes	   is	   not	   even	   existential	   –	   for	  example	   in	   the	   sentence	   ‘there	   are	   many	   clever	   detectives,	   some	   of	  which	   do	   not	   exist’,	  where	   ‘there	   are’	   and	   ‘some’	   are	   both	   used	   in	   an	  ontologically	   neutral	   way.	   The	   quantification	   itself	   is	   always	   neutral,	  located	   in	   the	   determiner	   and	   noun.	   Therefore,	   according	   to	  Generalized	   Quantifier	   Theory,	   ∃	   translates	   to	   the	   neutral	   quantifier	  ‘some’	  in	  English,	  rather	  than	  the	  non-­‐quantificational	  ‘there	  exists’.151	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  149	  Berto	  (2012)	  pxiv	  150	  Hofweber	  (2007)	  p23	  and	  see	  Gamut	  (1991)	  for	  details.	  151	  The	  Quinean	  conflates	  ‘some’	  with	  ‘there	  exists’,	  making	  both	  quantificational	  and	  both	  ontologically	  committing.	  This	  is	  precisely	  what	  I	  deny,	  since	  it	  over-­‐commits	  one	  to	  everything	  they	  quantify	  over	  which	  includes	  non-­‐existents,	  described	  in	  section	  II.	  
	   111	  The	   argument	   for	   quantifiers	   being	   ontologically	   neutral	   can	   be	  strengthened	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   logical	   connection	   between	   the	   two	  quantifiers	  ∀	  and	  ∃.	  Berto	  asks,	  “why	  existential?	  The	  dual	  of	  ‘universal’	  is	  not	  ‘existential’,	  but	  ‘particular’.”152	  As	  such,	  the	  dual	  of	  ‘all’	  should	  be	  ‘some’	  and	  not	   ‘there	  exists’.	  This	  can	  be	  demonstrated	  by	  considering	  the	   inter-­‐translatability153	  between	   ∀	   and	   ∃	   where	   one	   quantifier	   is	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  other:	  ∀x(Cx)=~∃x(~Cx)	  and	  ∃x(Cx)=~∀x(~Cx).	  Furthermore,	   when	   we	   look	   to	   the	   numerical	   quantities	   of	   these	  quantificational	   words,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   ‘some’	   means	   more	   than	  nothing	   and	  up	   to	   everything,	   and	   as	   such	  ∃	   is	   0%<n≤100%,	   and	   ‘all’	  just	  means	  everything	  and	  as	  such	  ∀	  is	  n=100%.	  So	  ∀	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  ∃,	  since	  the	  ‘all’	  case	  of	  100%	  is	  just	  one	  way	  of	  being	  ‘some’	  (where	  ‘some’	  encompasses	   anything	   greater	   than	   0%	   up	   to	   and	   including	   100%).	  Therefore,	  ∀x(ϕ)x→∃x(ϕ)x	  should	  be	  a	  valid	  inference,	  since	  whatever	  is	  true	  of	  all	  of	  the	  x	  is	  true	  of	  some	  of	  the	  x.	  For	  example	  when	  I	  have	  eaten	  all	  the	  cakes	  it	  is	  true	  that	  I	  have	  eaten	  some	  of	  the	  cakes.	  What	  is	  true	  in	  the	  universal	  case	  ought	  to	  carry	  over	  to	  the	  particular.	  However	  when	   the	   particular	   case	   is	   ontologically	   loaded	   in	   virtue	   of	   reading	  
∃	  (incorrectly)	  as	   ‘there	  exists’,	  then	  when	  we	  infer	  the	  particular	  case	  from	  the	  universal	  we	  therefore	  can	  prove	  that	  something	  exists	  (!).	  We	  can	   thus	   miraculously	   derive	   ontology	   from	   logical	   inferences	   if	   we	  accept	  ∀x(ϕ)x→∃x(ϕ)x	  as	  valid	  and	  take	  ∃	  to	  be	  ontologically	  loaded.	  	  	  The	  above	  inference	  ∀x(ϕ)x→∃x(ϕ)x	  is	  therefore	  taken	  as	  invalid	  when	  you	  allow	   for	  domains	   to	   include	  non-­‐existent	   things,	   or	   to	  be	   empty,	  and	   treat	  ∃	   as	   loaded.	   Classical	   logicians	   respond	   by	   not	   allowing	   for	  empty	   domains,154	  and	   Quineans	   respond	   by	   not	   allowing	   for	   non-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	  Berto	  (2012)	  p21	  153	  Berto	  (2012)	  p21:	  “∀	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  ~∃…~,	  while	  ∃	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  ~∀…~”.	  And	  see	  p71	  for	  how	  the	  quantifiers	  are	  inter-­‐translatable	  when	  ontologically	  neutral.	  154	  Classical	  logic	  assumes	  domains	  are	  non-­‐empty,	  and	  I	  can	  agree	  with	  the	  classical	  logicians	   here.	   But	   whereas	   for	   the	   classical	   logician	   this	   involves	   an	   implausible	  ontological	  assumption,	  for	  me	  it	  begs	  no	  ontological	  questions	  to	  require	  domains	  to	  be	  non-­‐empty,	  since	  domains	  can	  be	  full	  of	  things	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  exist.	  
	   112	  existent	   things	   in	   domains,	   in	   order	   to	   retain	   the	   validity	   of	   the	  inference	  and	  not	  prove	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  things	  they	  do	  not	  want	  in	  their	  ontology.155	  This	  is	  because	  if	  we	  do	  allow	  for	  an	  empty	  domain	  or	  for	  domains	  to	  include	  non-­‐existents,	  whilst	  we	  can	  hypothesize	  about	  what	  all	   the	  x	  would	  be	   like	   in	   the	  universal	  part	  of	   the	   inference,	  we	  cannot	   say	   anything	   about	   a	   particular	   x	   since	   this	   requires	   existence	  when	  we	  read	  ∃	  as	  loaded.	  Yet	  my	  response	  is	  that	  we	  should	  take	  ∃	  to	  be	  ontologically	  neutral	  and	  simply	  to	  mean	  >0%,	  so	  that	  the	  inference	  is	   valid,	   even	  when	   the	   domain	   contains	   non-­‐existents	   (or	   is	   empty).	  This	   ensures	   that	  we	   cannot	  derive	  ontology	   from	   logic.	  We	   can	  keep	  the	   consistency	   and	   inter-­‐translatability	   between	  ∀	   and	  ∃	   by	   treating	  them	  both	  as	  ontologically	  neutral,	  which	  allows	  them	  to	  quantify	  over	  domains	   that	   contain	   whatever	   it	   is	   that	   we	   speak	   about.	   And	   these	  domains	  can	  be	  neutrally	  specified	  by	  a	  meta-­‐language,	  described	  next.	  	  	  	  	  Formal	   languages	   like	   first	   order	   logic	   are	   interpreted	   with	   model	  theory.	  The	  model	  theory	  for	  a	   language	  is	  a	  specification	  for	  a	  model,	  which	  consists	  of	  a	  domain	  and	  for	  every	  1-­‐place	  predicate	  an	  extension	  which	  is	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  domain,	  and	  for	  every	  n-­‐place	  predicate	  a	  set	  of	  n-­‐tuples	   of	   members	   of	   the	   domain.	   There	   are	   two	   rules	   for	   the	  quantifiers	  in	  our	  formal	  language	  of	  first	  order	  logic:	  (∃)	  when	  at	  least	  one	   element	   of	   the	   domain	   is	   in	   the	   extension	   of	   the	   predicate;	   (∀)	  when	  all	  elements	  of	  the	  domain	  are	  in	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  predicate.	  We	   specify	   the	   domain,	   and	   specify	   the	   extension	   of	   the	   predicates.	  Thus	   far	   there	   has	   been	   no	   mention	   of	   existence	   or	   ontology	   in	   the	  meta-­‐language	   of	   model	   theory,	   and	   so	   the	   model	   is	   naturally	  metaphysically	  quiet.	  The	  metaphysical	  noise	  comes	  through	  not	  in	  the	  quantification	   but	   in	   the	   specification	   of	   the	   domain	   to	   be	   quantified	  over	   –	   if	   the	   domain	   is	   specified	   in	   a	   metaphysical	   or	   ontologically	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  Free	   logicians	  respond	  by	  allowing	   for	  empty	  domains	  and	  neutral	  quantification	  over	   these	   domains,	   yet	   my	   position	   differs	   from	   free	   logics	   due	   to	   not	   requiring	  domains	  that	  are	  empty	  but	  insisting	  that	  domains	  include	  existents	  and	  non-­‐existents.	  There	  are	  many	  kinds	  of	  free	  logics	  –	  some	  quantify	  over	  non-­‐existents,	  some	  do	  not.	  	  
	   113	  loaded	  way	  then	  quantifying	  over	   it	  will	  also	  be	  loaded.	  Quantification	  is	  only	  committal	  if	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  domain	  in	  the	  model	  theory	  is	   committal.	  And	  whether	  domain	   specification	   is	   committal	  depends	  upon	  whether	  the	  meta-­‐language	  in	  which	  the	  model	  theory	  is	  couched	  is	   itself	   committal.156	  Model	   theory	   does	   not	   require	   an	   ontology	   and	  ensures	   that	   formal	   languages	   have	   no	   ontological	   commitments,	   so	  that	   quantification	   itself	   is	   ontologically	   neutral.	   There	   is	   therefore	  nothing	   in	   the	   semantics	   of	   ∃	   that	   makes	   it	   ontologically	   loaded.	   Yet	  Quine’s	  rules	  for	  inclusion	  in	  a	  domain	  are	  not	  neutral,	  and	  this	  is	  where	  ontology	  is	  smuggled	  in,	  through	  the	  back	  door	  of	  domain	  specification.	  And	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Quine	  specifies	  and	  restricts	  his	  domain	  is	  faulty.	  	  	   VI.	  Quine’s	  circular	  method.	  	  	  In	  practice,	  whatever	  we	  talk	  about	  goes	  in	  a	  domain,	  and	  according	  to	  Yablo,	  as	  we	  saw	   in	  chapter	  1	  section	   III,	   this	  necessarily	   includes	   the	  non-­‐literal.	  Any	  further	  restriction	  is	  not	  part	  of	  standard	  model	  theory.	  The	  point	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  model	  theoretic	  approach	  to	  semantics	  was	  to	   show	   that	   it	   is	   done	   in	   an	   ontologically	   neutral	   way,	   and	   that	   the	  metaphysics	   is	   an	   unnecessary	   addition.	   Quine	   included	   this	   addition	  due	  to	  his	  preconception	  of	  what	  things	  exist	  (which	  did	  not	  include	  the	  possible	   fat	  man	   in	   the	  doorway).	  He	   thus	   looked	   to	  what	  he	   thought	  existed	  in	  order	  to	  derive	  his	  loaded	  logic	  which	  was	  then	  used	  to	  tell	  us	  what	  exists.	  So	  it	  seems	  he	  constructed	  logic	  to	  fit	  around	  his	  premade	  metaphysical	  ideas.	  Quine’s	  method	  as	  such	  is	  circular	  (although	  Quine	  prefers	   to	   call	   it	   ‘holistic’)	   as	   he	   decides	   on	   his	   ontology	   and	   molds	  identity	   conditions	   to	   fit,	   then	   these	   conditions	   deliver	   ontological	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  Azzouni	  (2004	  p54)	  similarly:	  “[Quine’s]	  line	  of	  reasoning	  contains	  the	  crucial	  and	  unnoticed	  presupposition	  that	   the	   language	   in	  which	  the	  semantics	   for	   the	  objectual	  quantifiers	   is	   couched	   (the	   ‘metalanguage’)	   is	   itself	   one	   with	   quantifiers	   that	  themselves	   carry	   ontological	   commitment.	   That	   is,	   [we	   are	   forced]	   to	   regard	   our	  original	  set	  of	  (objectual)	  quantifiers	  as	  ontologically	  committing	  only	  if	  we	  regard	  the	  quantifiers	  in	  the	  metalanguage	  as	  ontologically	  committing.”	  
	   114	  results.	   Azzouni	  makes	   a	   similar	   remark	   against	   this	   circularity:	   “One	  can’t	   read	   ontological	   commitments	   from	   semantic	   conditions	   unless	  one	  has	  already	  smuggled	  into	  those	  semantic	  conditions	  the	  ontology	  one	  would	  like	  to	  read	  off”157	  and	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  Quine	  does.	  It	  is	  circular	  to	  get	  ontology	  from	  logic	  given	  how	  Quine	  chose	  his	  logic	  –	  to	  fit	  his	  ontology.	  Quine	  thus	  provides	  an	  unhelpful	  criterion	  for	  existing	  (to	  be	  in	  the	  domain)	  and	  a	  criterion	  for	  being	  in	  the	  domain	  (to	  exist).	  	  	  The	  identity	  constraint	  dictates	  what	  can	  go	  in	  a	  domain,	  and	  motivates	  scepticism	  about	  talk	  of	  possible	  fat	  men,	  and	  then	  the	  domain	  is	  loaded,	  but	  without	   the	   constraint	   the	   domain	   is	   neutral.	   So	   it	   is	   the	   identity	  constraint	  that	  is	  loaded,	  rather	  than	  the	  logic	  itself.	  Far	  from	  providing	  us	   with	   a	   metaphysically-­‐neutral	   device	   for	   distilling	   our	   ontological	  commitments,	  then,	  Quine’s	  machinery	  is	  not	  innocent.158	  If	  this	  logical	  machinery	   is	   utilized	   to	   find	   out	  what	   exists,	   then	   the	   answer	   to	   that	  question	   cannot	   already	   be	   presupposed	   in	   that	   machinery’s	  construction.	   Quine	   derives	   an	   ontology	   from	   injecting	   metaphysics	  into	   logic,	   to	   get	   metaphysics	   out	   the	   other	   side.	   Quine	   does	   his	  metaphysics	  first	  to	  make	  his	  logic	  ontologically	  loaded,	  so	  it	  is	  not	  the	  logic	  itself	  that	  is	  loaded,	  rather	  it	  is	  the	  metaphysical	  prerequisites	  on	  domains.	  And	  these	  prerequisites	  can	  be	  rejected	  as	  outlined	  in	  section	  III:	   in	  rejecting	   the	  restriction	   from	  SET	  or	  NE,	  we	  reject	   the	  resulting	  TB,	  and	  end	  up	  with	  quantification	  that	   is	  ontologically	  neutral.	   I	  have	  thus	  argued	  that	  there	  are	  no	  ontological	  commitments	  to	  be	  revealed	  by	   the	   quantifier	   ∃.	   Those	   like	   Quine	   who	   think	   otherwise	   have	   not	  examined	  the	  semantics	  of	  their	  formal	  language	  correctly	  and	  have	  not	  noticed	  that	  they	  have	  smuggled	  that	  metaphysical	  load	  in	  by	  placing	  an	  unnecessary	   constraint	  on	   their	  model	   theory	  via	   SET	  and	  NE.	  Hence,	  ontological	  commitment	  need	  not	  be	  equated	  with	  quantification	  since	  inclusion	  in	  a	  domain	  need	  not	  be	  equated	  with	  ontology.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  157	  Azzouni	  (2004)	  p55	  158	  This	   point	  was	  made	   by	   Carl	  Warom	  who	  was	  my	   respondent	  when	   I	   presented	  this	  idea	  at	  the	  White	  Rose	  Philosophy	  Postgraduate	  Forum	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Leeds.	  	  
	   115	  ‘Some’	  is	  ontologically	  neutral	  in	  first	  order	  logic	  since	  such	  logic	  is	  only	  interested	   in	   quantifying	   over	   a	   formal	   domain,	   and	   this	   only	   has	  ontological	   significance	   depending	   on	   the	   constraints	   on	   (and	  specification	  of)	  inclusion	  in	  a	  domain	  to	  restrict	  that	  domain.	  When	  the	  domain	   is	   restricted,	   the	  quantifiers	  will	  only	  be	  able	   to	  quantify	  over	  those	   things	   that	  made	   it	   through	   that	   constraint.	   Logic,	  without	   such	  constraints,	   is	  ontologically	  neutral.	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  first	  order	  logic	  need	   not	   be	   ontologically	   loaded	   by	   looking	   to	  model	   theory	   to	   show	  how	  quantification	  stripped	  down	  is	  ontologically	  neutral.	   It	   is	  only	   in	  Quine’s	   background	   rules	   from	   SET	   and	  NE	   that	   restrict	  what	   can	   be	  quantified	   over	   to	   give	   quantification	   ontological	   significance.	   Model	  theory	  has	  no	  ontological	  commitments,	  showing	  that	  the	  domain	  is	  not	  the	  set	  of	  existents,	  and	  as	  such	   formal	   languages	   like	   first	  order	   logic	  are	   naturally	   neutral.	   I	   have	  denied	  TB,	   via	   rejecting	   SET	   and	  NE	   and	  showing	  that	  quantification	  is	  neutral,	  as	  it	  is	  not	  the	  logic	  that	  supports	  ontologically	   loaded	   quantification,	   rather	   it	   is	   just	   Quinean	   rhetoric	  about	   possible	   fat	   men	   motivating	   restrictions	   on	   domains,	   making	  them	  ontologically	  loaded.	  Without	  a	  domain	  restriction,	  quantification	  ceases	  to	  have	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  existence.	  As	  Berto	  summarizes:	  	  	   [Neutral]	   quantifiers	   had	   better	   be	   called	   just	   quantifiers.	  ‘Existentially	   committing	   quantification’	   is	   restricted	  quantification.159	  	  	  And	   what	   I	   have	   argued	   in	   this	   chapter	   is	   that	   such	   restricted	  quantification	   to	  only	   include	  existents	   in	   the	  domains	   is	  unmotivated	  and	   incorrect,	   and	   so	   it	   is	   not	   ‘trivial	   and	   obvious’	   that	   ∃	   signifies	  ontological	   commitment	   as	   Quine	   states.	   I	   have	   shown	   that	   ∃	   is	   not	  ontologically	  loaded	  as	  it	  is	  not	  a	  regimentation	  of	  ‘there	  exists’,	  nor	  is	  it	  loaded	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  semantics.	  ∃	  is	  therefore	  ontologically	  neutral	  and	  means	   ‘some’,	  named	  the	  particular,	  rather	  than	  existential,	  quantifier.	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Meinongian	  view	  of	  quantifiers,	  discussed	  next.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  Berto	  (2012)	  p72	  	  
	   116	  VII.	  Quietist	  version	  of	  Meinongianism.	  	  	  I	   hope	   to	   have	   shown	   that	   there	   is	   no	   formal	   obstacle	   to	   having	  non-­‐existents	  as	   legitimate	   things	   to	   talk	  of	  and	  go	   in	  a	  domain,	  and	  Yablo	  has	  shown	  (chapter	  1	  section	  III)	  that	  we	  cannot	  help	  but	  have	  them	  in	  domains.	  In	  reading	  ∃	  as	  ‘some’,	  named	  the	  ‘particular’	  quantifier,	  I	  put	  forward	   quantification	   as	   being	   ontologically	   neutral.	   Quantifiers	   are	  loaded	  when	  the	  domain	  being	  quantified	  over	  is	   loaded	  –	  if	  a	  domain	  contains	  only	  existent	  things	  then	  quantifying	  over	  that	  domain	  will	  be	  ontologically	   committing.	   In	   allowing	   for	   (non-­‐empty)	   domains,	   and	  thus	   quantifiers,	   to	   be	   ontologically	   neutral,	   I	   have	   not	   diverged	   from	  the	  standard	  Tarskian	  account	  of	  objectual	  quantification.	  Rather	  I	  hold	  that	  we	  should	  be	  just	  as	  quiet	  about	  the	  model	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  objects	  in	  the	  domain	  as	  I	  am	  quiet	  about	  anything	  else	  as	  a	  loyal	  Neo-­‐Carnapian.	  Talk	  of	  domains	  is	  as	  quiet	  as	  any	  other	  talk,	  so	  my	  account	  is	  still	  Tarskian	  as	  it	  still	  has	  domains,	  but	  domains	  are	  not	  ontologically	  restricted	  and	  the	  quantifier	  over	  them	  is	  ontologically	  neutral.	  	  	  	  The	   unloaded	   domains	   that	   I	   advocate	   can	   contain	   both	   existent	   and	  non-­‐existent	  objects,	  which	  sounds	  to	  most	  ears	  to	  be	  very	  Meinongian.	  Meinongianism,	   according	   to	   Berto	   and	   Plebani,	   is	   “a	   non-­‐standard	  (meta-­‐)	  ontological	  view	  according	   to	  which	   the	  notion	  of	  existence	   is	  not	   captured	   by	   the	   quantifier.”160 	  In	   this	   respect	   I	   am	   clearly	   in	  agreement	   with	   Meinongianism.	   Berto	   and	   Plebani	   further	   add	   that	  “existence	   is,	   rather,	   a	   fully-­‐fledged,	   non-­‐trivial	   feature	   which	   some	  things	   have	   and	   others	   lack.”161	  Here	   is	  where	   I	   diverge	   slightly	   from	  Meinongianism,	   since	   despite	   agreeing	   that	   existence	   is	   a	   predicate	  which	  some	  things	  have	  and	  others	  lack	  within	  a	  given	  framework,	  I	  do	  not	  put	  forward	  this	  predicate	  as	  being	  ‘fully-­‐fledged’	  or	  being	  anything	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  Berto	  and	  Plebani	  (2015)	  p99	  161	  Berto	  and	  Plebani	  (2015)	  p99	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  metaphysically	   robust.	   ‘Existence’,	   for	   me,	   like	   any	   other	   property,	   is	  internal	   and	   framework	   relative.	   While	   my	   view	   thus	   has	   some	  similarities	   to	   such	  a	  Meinongian	  position,	   this	   label	   should	  be	  placed	  with	   care,	   since	   Meinongians	   traditionally	   provide	   a	   metaphysically	  loud	  answer	  to	  questions	  of	  existence	  (and	  non-­‐existence,	  subsistence,	  and	  being),	  yet	  I	  as	  a	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  stay	  quiet	  on	  all	  such	  matters.	  	  	  	  ‘Meinongianism’	   names	   a	   theory	   stemming	   from	   the	   views	   of	   Alexius	  Meinong,	  which	  is	  often	  unfairly	  met	  with	  ridicule.	  Meinong’s	  ‘theory	  of	  objects’	  (1904)	  is	  a	  theory	  about	  non-­‐existent	  objects	  that	  explains	  how	  we	   can	   say	   true	   things	   about	   them	   and	   quantify	   over	   them	   in	   our	  domains.	  Meinongians	  believe	  that	  we	  can	  refer	  to	  non-­‐existent	  things,	  and	   talk	   of	   them	   truthfully,	   due	   to	   quantifying	   over	   them	   and	   having	  them	  as	  members	  in	  our	  domains	  of	  quantification.	  When	  we	  speak	  of	  non-­‐existents,	   then,	   our	   talk	   refers	   to	   objects	   in	   the	   domain	   that	   are	  non-­‐existent	   things.	  So	   it	   is	  not	   that	  our	   language	  can	  be	   true	  without	  
referring,	  but	  rather	  without	  referring	  to	  an	  existent	   thing.	  The	   ‘theory	  of	  objects’	  thus	  has	  similar	  aims	  to	  mine	  in	  this	  chapter	  –	  to	  show	  that	  we	   can	   speak	   truthfully	   and	  meaningfully	   of	   things	  without	   requiring	  them	  to	  exist.	  The	  ‘theory	  of	  objects’	  is	  famously	  objected	  to	  by	  the	  likes	  of	   Quine	   and	   Russell162	  for	   ending	   up	   in	   paradoxical,	   inconsistent,	   or	  counterintuitive	   situations.	   These	   objections	   rest	   upon	   a	   heavyweight	  realist	   interpretation	   of	   Meinongianism	   such	   that	   the	   Meinongian	  objects	  exist	  or	   fail	   to	  exist	   in	  a	  metaphysically	   substantial	  way.	   I	  will	  discuss	   these	   objections	   and	   my	   quietist	   response	   later	   on	   in	   this	  section.	  What	   I	   propose	   is	   a	   quietist	   version	   of	   Meinongianism	   (with	  neutral	  quantification	  and	  quiet	  predication	  of	  objects	   as	   existent	   and	  non-­‐existent)	  that	  will	  therefore	  defuse	  many	  of	  these	  objections.163	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  Quine	  (1948)	  and	  Russell	  (1905).	  See	  Quine	  especially	   for	  the	  ridicule	  of	  Wyman.	  Currie	  (1990	  p132)	  argues	  Meinongianism	  “must	  be	  rejected”	  due	  to	  scepticism	  issues.	  163	  Other	  types	  of	  Neo-­‐Meinongians	  who	  respond	  to	  these	  objections	  include	  a	  nuclear	  way	   (Parsons	   1980),	   a	   dual	   copula	  way	   (Zalta	   1983),	   and	   a	  modal	  Meinongian	  way	  (Priest	  2005	  and	  Berto	  2008).	  I	  cannot	  discuss	  the	  virtues	  of	  each	  Neo-­‐Meinongianism	  here.	  I	  will	  just	  compare	  my	  version	  to	  Meinongianism	  found	  in	  Berto	  &	  Plebani	  2015.	  
	   118	  For	  the	  Meinongian,	  naïvely	  put,	  there	  are	  existents	  and	  non-­‐existents.	  I	  hold	  that	  both	  are	  types	  of	  thing,	  and	  the	  over-­‐arching	  name	  for	  these	  things	  are	   that	   they	  have	   ‘being’.164	  All	   existent	   things	  have	  being,	  but	  not	   all	   being	   things	   have	   existence.	   Domains	   of	   quantification	   include	  things	  with	  being,	  which	  are	  further	  divided	  up	  into	  the	  existent	  things	  and	   the	  non-­‐existent	   things.	  For	   the	  quietist	  Neo-­‐Carnapian,	  when	   the	  domain	  is	  split	  in	  this	  way,	  these	  existents	  and	  non-­‐existents	  are	  not	  to	  be	  classed	  as	  ontologically	  substantial	  –	  they	  do	  not	  exist	  or	  not	  exist	  in	  any	  metaphysically	  way,	   rather	   existence	   is	   just	   one	   predicate	   among	  many	  that	  can	  apply	  to	  entities	  within	  a	  linguistic	  framework.	  However,	  the	  existence	  predicate	  that	  divides	  the	  domain	  for	  a	  naïve	  Meinongian	  is	  going	  to	  be	  potentially	  much	  more	  metaphysically	  heavy-­‐weight	  than	  that	  proposed	  by	  myself	  for	  a	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietist,	  since	  for	  me	  the	  domains	   are	   themselves	   framework	   relative	   with	   no	   metaphysical	  preference	  for	  one	  framework	  over	  any	  other.	  Thus	  to	  have	  both	  types	  of	  thing,	  the	  existents	  and	  non-­‐existents,	   in	  the	  domain	  together	  is	  not	  such	   a	   big	   deal	   for	   the	   quietist	   as	   it	   may	   be	   for	   a	   naïve	   Meinongian.	  Given	  that	  existents	  and	  non-­‐existents	  in	  the	  domain	  are	  talked	  about	  in	  a	  metaphysically	   quiet	  manner	   by	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian,	   the	   view	   that	   I	  am	  proposing	  could	  be	  classed	  as	  a	  quietist	  version	  of	  Meinongianism.	  	  	  	  Since	  Meinongians	  quantify	  over	  both	  existent	  and	  non-­‐existent	  things,	  their	  quantification	  over	  domains	  containing	  both	  such	  things	  must	  be	  ontologically	  neutral,	  and	  they	  must	  employ	  a	  predicate	  for	  existence	  to	  differentiate	   the	   existents	   from	   the	   non-­‐existents	   (since	   being	   in	   the	  domain	   no	   longer	   makes	   the	   difference).	   Meinongians	   have	   defined	  (misleadingly)	  their	  neutral	  quantifiers	  using	  the	  Quinean	  ontologically	  loaded	  quantifiers	  (∀	  and	  ∃)	  and	  the	  existence	  predicate	  (E!)	  as	  such:165	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  164	  Meinong,	  more	  accurately,	  rather	  held	  that	  concrete	  objects	  exist,	  abstract	  objects	  subsist	  (bestehen),	  and	  some	  objects	  exist	  in	  no	  way	  whatever	  (they	  have	  Nichtsein).	  I	  do	  not	  give	  an	  account	  of	  subsistence,	  hence	  further	  reason	  to	  place	  the	  label	  with	  care.	  165	  Berto	  and	  Plebani	  (2015)	  p103.	  The	  Meinongian	  neutral	  particular	  quantifier	  Σ	   is	  the	  same	  as	  Priest’s	  replacement	  of	  the	  ∃	  with	  the	  symbol	  S,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  section	  V.	  
	   119	  E!	  is	  taken	  as	  a	  first-­‐order	  predicate	  of	  existence	  for	  individuals.	  
Λ	  is	  the	  neutral	  universal	  quantifier.	  	  
Σ	  is	  the	  neutral	  particular	  quantifier.	  	  
∀x	  =df	  Λx(E!x)	  
∃x	  =df	  Σx(E!x)	  	  Therefore,	  to	  say	  ‘all	  existent	  things	  are	  P’	  is	  defined	  as	  such:	  	  
∀x(Px)	  =df	  Λx(E!x	  →	  Px)	  	  And	  to	  say	  ‘some	  existent	  things	  are	  P’	  is	  defined	  as	  such:	  	  
∃x(Px)	  =df	  Σx(E!x	  ∧	  Px)	  	  Using	   these	   neutral	   quantifiers,	   the	   Meinongian	   can	   say,	   without	  contradiction,	  that	  some	  things	  do	  not	  exist	  (because	  ‘thing’	  is	  neutral):	  	  	  
Σx(~E!x)	  	  	  	  This	  Meinongian	  picture	  has	  often	  been	  wrongly	  accused	  of	  employing	  two	   sets	   of	   quantifiers	   –	   one	   set	   as	   ontologically	   neutral	   and	   one	   as	  ontologically	   loaded.	   This	   is	   an	   easy	   mistake	   to	   make	   when	  Meinongians	  try	  to	  define	  one	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  other	  or	  utilize	  both	  in	  the	  same	  equation	  as	  done	  above.	  For	  example,	  van	  Inwagen	  misrepresents	  such	  Meinongianism	  as	  “the	  way	  of	  the	  two	  quantifiers.”166	  The	  reason	  this	   is	  a	  misrepresentation	   is	  because	   for	   the	  Meinongian	   there	   is	   just	  one	   type	   (or	   set)	  of	  quantifier,	   and	   there	  are	   simply	  different	  ways	  of	  
restricting	   this	  quantifier.	  The	  ontologically	   loaded	  quantifier	  ∃	   is	   thus	  identical	  in	  type	  with	  the	  ontologically	  neutral	  quantifier	  Σ,	  but	  ∃	  is	  just	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166	  Van	  Inwagen	  (2003)	  p138	  
	   120	  restricted	   to	   existents.	   There	   is	   only	   one	   quantifier,	   that	  Meinongians	  and	   others	   like	   Quineans	   are	   using,	   but	   there	   are	   many	   ways	   of	  restricting	  what	  it	  can	  quantify	  over	  in	  its	  domain,	  and	  so	  the	  Quinean	  loaded	   version	   of	   quantification	   for	   instance	   is	   simply	   restricted	  quantification	  to	  existent	  things.	  Such	  a	  restriction,	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  this	  chapter,	  is	  due	  to	  restricting	  what	  can	  go	  in	  a	  domain	  by	  restricting	  what	   is	   to	  count	  as	  a	   ‘thing’.	  And	  as	   I	  will	  now	  describe,	   it	   is	  precisely	  this	  disagreement	  over	  what	  is	  to	  count	  as	  a	  ‘thing’	  that	  is	  at	  the	  centre	  of	   the	   debate	   between	   Quineans	   and	  Meinongians,	   and	   thus	   between	  Quineans	  and	  the	  position	  I	  am	  putting	  forward	  as	  Neo-­‐Carnapianism.	  	  	  	  	  According	  to	  Berto,	  “the	  debate	  between	  Quineans	  and	  Meinongians	  is	  largely	  metaontological.”167	  Berto	   explains	   that	   there	   is	   an	   ontological	  debate	  within	   the	   Quinean	   tradition	   over	   whether	   propositions	   exist	  between	  the	  realists	  and	  the	  nominalists	  (which	  is	  made	  possible	  due	  to	  a	   shared	   notion	   of	   existence),	   yet	   there	   is	   a	   metaontological	   debate	  
outside	   the	  Quinean	  tradition	  over	  what	   ‘exists’	  means	  or	  what	  counts	  as	   a	   ‘thing’	   between	   the	   Quineans	   and	  Meinongians.	  Within	   ontology,	  disputants	  argue	  over	  which	  things	  exist	  once	  they	  have	  agreed	  on	  the	  metaontological	  issue	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  exist	  and	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	   thing.	  When	   asked	   ‘what	   exists?’	   the	   Quinean	   answers	   ‘everything’,	  the	  Meinongian	  answers	  ‘not	  everything’168,	  and	  so	  the	  Meinongians	  not	  only	   deny	   Quine’s	   triviality	   thesis	   (that	   it	   is	   ‘trivial	   and	   obvious’	   that	  everything	  exists)	  but	  also	  claim	  Quine’s	  thesis	  to	  be	  untrue	  (since	  it	  is	  not	   the	   case	   that	   everything	   exists).	   I	   believe	   that	   a	   simple	   way	   to	  understand	   the	   dispute	   between	   Quineans	   and	  Meinongians	   is	   to	   see	  the	   disagreement	   between	   them	   as	   most	   fundamentally	   revolving	  around	  what	  they	  are	  counting	  as	  a	  ‘thing’.	  They	  may	  very	  well	  have	  the	  same	  list	  of	  existents,	  but	  not	  the	  same	  list	  of	  things,	  and	  this	   is	  due	  to	  the	  differences	  over	  what	  they	  take	  a	  legitimate	  ‘thing’	  (or	  object)	  to	  be.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  Berto	  (forthcoming)	  p3	  168	  There	  is	  also	  the	  ‘noneism’	  of	  Routley	  (1982)	  or	  Priest	  (2005)	  that	  is	  distinguished	  from	  Meinong	  by	  taking	  abstract	  objects	  not	  to	  subsist,	  but	  to	  simply	  not	  exist	  at	  all.	  	  	  
	   121	  As	  described	   in	  section	   III,	   the	  Quinean	  conflates	   ‘thing’	  with	   ‘existent	  thing’,	  as	  for	  Quine	  an	  entity	  just	  is	  an	  existent	  entity	  and	  there	  are	  no	  other	   types	   of	   entity	   or	   thing	   out	   there.	   As	   such,	   the	   Quineans	   list	   of	  existents	  is	  identical	  to	  their	  list	  of	  things.	  This	  is	  what	  the	  Meinongians	  disagree	   with.	   The	   Meinongian	   does	   not	   equate	   ‘thing’	   with	   ‘existent	  thing’	   as	   they	   believe	   there	   are	   other	   types	   of	   thing,	   namely	   the	   non-­‐existent	  things,	  and	  as	  such	  their	  list	  of	  things	  will	  be	  much	  longer	  than	  (and	  thus	  not	   identical	   to)	   their	   list	  of	  existents.	   I	  will	  use	   the	  general	  term	  ‘being’	  to	  apply	  to	  both	  types	  of	  things	  (the	  existent	  and	  the	  non-­‐existent),	   and	   so	  where	   the	  Quinean	   says	   ‘exists’	   (to	   encompass	   all	   of	  the	  things)	  I	  will	  say	  ‘being’,	  and	  will	  reserve	  existence	  to	  apply	  to	  only	  some	  of	   those	   things	   that	  have	  being,	   in	   a	   simplistic	  Meinongian	  way.	  Quine	  uses	  ‘exists’	  to	  be	  everything	  in	  the	  domain,	  but	  for	  Meinong	  the	  domain	  includes	  things	  that	  do	  not	  exist.	  Therefore	  the	  debate	  between	  Meinong	   and	   Quine	   can	   be	   clarified	   as	   not	   over	  what	   exists	   but	   over	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  thing	  –	  for	  Quine	  ‘thing’	  is	  just	  existent	  things	  and	  for	  Meinong	  ‘thing’	  includes	  both	  existent	  and	  non-­‐existent	  things.	  	  	  	  So	   Meinong	   has	   a	   larger	   domain	   of	   things	   than	   Quine,	   and	   Quine’s	  domain	   may	   be	   the	   same	   size	   as	   Meinong’s	   sub-­‐domain	   of	   existent	  things.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   set	   of	   things	   picked	   out	   by	   the	   Quinean	  existential	  quantifier	  may	  be	  identical	  to	  the	  set	  of	  things	  picked	  out	  by	  the	  Meinongian	  existence	  predicate,	  since	  they	  may	  agree	  on	  what	  is	  to	  be	  counted	  as	   ‘existing’.	  They	  disagree	  here	  on	  whether	   there	  are	  any	  entities	   left	   after	   specifying	   the	   existent	   ones.	   The	   dispute	   between	  them	  is	  thus	  not	  regarding	  ontology,	  since	  it	  is	  not	  regarding	  what	  is	  to	  be	  counted	  on	  the	  list	  of	  existent	  things,	  but	  rather	  more	  fundamentally	  regarding	  what	  is	  to	  be	  counted	  on	  the	  list	  of	  things.	  Both	  the	  Quinean	  and	   this	  Meinongian	   agree	   that	   a	   thing	   needs	   to	   be	   in	   the	   domain	   in	  order	   to	   talk	   truthfully	   of	   it	   (so	   that	   there	   is	   something	   to	   refer	   to,	  unlike	  free	  logicians	  who	  do	  not	  need	  a	  thing	  in	  the	  domain	  to	  refer	  to),	  and	   are	   committed	   to	   this	   thing	   once	   we	   quantify	   over	   it,	   but	   they	  
	   122	  disagree	   as	   to	   what	   counts	   as	   a	   thing	   here,	   and	   they	   disagree	   over	  which	   type	   of	   commitment	   the	   quantifier	   brings	   (for	   the	  Quinean	   the	  commitment	  is	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  thing,	  for	  the	  Meinongian	  it’s	  not).	  	  	  	  I	   argue	   that	  Quinean	  metaontology	  places	  unnecessary	   restrictions	  on	  quantification.	  Meinong	   says	   that	   to	   restrict	   your	   things	   to	   solely	   the	  existents	   in	   this	  way	   is	   to	  have	   “a	   prejudice	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   actual.”169	  What	  Quine	  calls	  the	  study	  of	  ontology	  is	  therefore	  what	  Meinong	  calls	  the	  study	  of	  objects,	  but	  Meinong’s	  study	  of	  objects	  is	  a	  study	  of	  a	  much	  larger	  set	  of	  things	  than	  Quine’s	  study	  of	  ontology	  (which	  is	  restricted	  to	  only	  existent	  objects).	  I	  want	  to	  reserve	  ‘ontology’	  for	  the	  study	  of	  the	  objects	   that	   exist	   (which	   is	   crucially	   not	  all	   objects).	  Quine	   complains	  that	   Meinong	   has	   an	   unlovely	   and	   exploded	   ontology, 170 	  but	   this	  complaint	  is	  inappropriate	  if	  it	  is	  interpreted	  as	  saying	  that	  there	  is	  an	  exploded	  list	  of	  existent	  things	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  complaint	  rather	  only	  states	  that	  Meinong	  has	  a	  larger	  domain	  of	  things,	  since	  there	  may	  be	  no	  more	  or	  no	  less	  existents	  within	  it	  than	  the	  Quinean.	  Meinong	  may	  have	  exactly	  the	  same	  ontology	  as	  Quine	  (the	  same	  list	  of	  existent	  things)	  but	  rather	   have	   an	   exploded	   set	   of	   objects	   in	   general	   (a	   longer	   list	   of	   all	  types	  of	  things).	  To	  me	  it	  is	  far	  more	  ‘unlovely’	  to	  exclude	  non-­‐existents	  from	   our	   domains.	   Rather	   it	   is	   Platonism	   that	   is	   truly	   unlovely	   by	  having	   a	   long	   list	   of	   weird	   existents!	   So,	   the	   debate	   becomes	   over	  whether	   it	   is	   preferable	   to	   stop	   talking	   about	   non-­‐existents	   (Quine’s	  menu	  option	  1	  or	  2),171	  extend	  our	  list	  of	  existents	  (option	  3),	  or	  extend	  our	  list	  of	  things	  in	  domains	  (the	  Meinong	  option–	  Quine	  would	  conflate	  this	  with	  option	  3).	  As	  1	  and	  2	  are	  arguably	  impossible,	  and	  3	  implies	  an	  unlovely	  Platonism,	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  choose	  the	  quiet	  Meinongian	  way.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  Meinong	  (1904)	  170	  Quine	  (1948)	  p23.	  Aimed	  at	  Wyman,	  a	  caricature	  of	  Meinong	  that	  more	  accurately	  represents	  Russell	   in	  his	  Principles	  of	  Mathematics.	  My	   representation	  of	  Meinong	   is	  also	  perhaps	  more	  like	  Wyman	  and	  Russell	  due	  to	  its	  over-­‐simplified	  description	  here.	  Otherwise,	  without	  anything	  subsisting	  but	  only	  either	  existing	  or	  not,	  my	  simplified	  Meinongianism	  has	  similarities	  with	  the	  noneism	  of	  Routley	  (1982)	  and	  Priest	  (2005).	  171	  See	  section	  II	  p91	  for	  this	  menu	  (Yablo	  2001	  p72),	  and	  chapter	  1	  section	  III	  where	  I	  follow	  Yablo	  in	  taking	  options	  1	  (paraphrase)	  and	  2	  (dispensability)	  to	  be	  impossible.	  
	   123	  Since	  I	  have	  followed	  Yablo	  in	  saying	  that	  we	  cannot	  help	  but	  quantify	  over	  non-­‐existent	  things	  (thus	  denying	  options	  1	  and	  2)	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  take	   the	   Meinongian	   option.172	  But	   as	   a	   quietist,	   I	   want	   to	   resist	   the	  traditional	  Meinongian	   claims	   about	   the	  metaphysical	   status	   of	   being,	  existence,	  non-­‐existence,	  and	  subsistence,	  nor	  do	  I	  wish	  to	  make	  claims	  about	   which	   entities	   have	   such	   a	   metaphysical	   status.	   I	   propose	   a	  metaphysically	  quiet	  division	  of	  existent	  and	  non-­‐existent	  things	  within	  frameworks,	  which	  shows	  that	  quiet	  Meinongianism	  is	  not	  unlovely,	  as	  it	  is	  not	  really	  committed	  to	  non-­‐existents,	  and	  I	  will	  now	  go	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  quietist	  Meinongianism	  is	  preferable	  to	  traditional	  Meinongianism.	  	  	  Meinongians	  use	  a	   ‘principle	  of	   comprehension’173	  for	   their	  objects,	   to	  explain	  what	  non-­‐existent	   things	   there	   are	   and	  which	  properties	   they	  can	  bear.	  This	  principle	  of	  comprehension	  will	  restrict	  our	  talk	  of	  non-­‐existent	   things	   and	   will	   explain	   how	   we	   can	   talk	   truthfully	   of	   non-­‐existent	  things.	  It	  is	  this	  principle	  in	  its	  unrestricted	  form	  that	  leads	  the	  Meinongian	  positions	  into	  trouble	  since	  it	  is	  this	  principle	  that	  leads	  the	  Meinongian	  into	  inconsistency	  and	  triviality.	  Different	  Meinongians	  put	  forward	  different	  versions	  of	  the	  principle	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  such	  results	  (and	  those	  with	  a	  different	  versions	  call	  themselves	  Neo-­‐Meinongians),	  but	  what	   I	  will	   argue	   is	   that	   the	  quietist	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  can	  avoid	   the	  principle	   altogether	   (hence	   why	   the	   title	   of	   being	   a	   Neo-­‐Meinongian	  only	   loosely	   applies	   to	  my	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   position	   since	   I	   do	   not	   put	  forward	   a	   different	   version	   of	   the	   principle	   but	   rather	   discard	   the	  principle	  altogether).	  This	  is	  the	  main	  advantage	  of	  my	  quietist	  version	  of	  Meinongianism,	  as	  it	  retains	  the	  Meinongian	  insight	  of	  quantification	  whilst	  avoiding	  the	  problematic	  ‘principle	  of	  comprehension’	  altogether.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  There	  are	  other	  ways	   to	  resolve	  quantifying	  over	  non-­‐existents,	   like	   ‘fictionalism’	  which	  states	   that	  when	  we	  speak	  of	  non-­‐existents	  we	  speak	   fictionally,	   and	   thus	  not	  truly,	  to	  avoid	  commitment.	  This	  was	  Yablo’s	  meal	  4	  on	  Quine’s	  menu	  in	  section	  II	  p91	  that	   I	   endorse	  quietly	   in	   conjunction	  with	  quiet	  Meinongianism:	   I	   retain	   the	   truth	  of	  our	  talk	  in	  a	  Meinongian	  way	  whilst	  judging	  the	  talk	  on	  usefulness	  in	  a	  fictionalist	  way.	  See	  chapter	  3	  for	  fictionalism	  and	  the	  Conclusion	  chapter	  for	  compatibility	  issues.	  173	  Also	  called	  the	  ‘Characterisation	  Principle’	  (CP)	  in	  Priest	  (2005).	  I	  use	  the	  ‘Principle	  of	  Comprehension’	  and	  describe	  it	  as	  it	  is	  found	  in	  Berto	  and	  Plebani	  (2015)	  p108.	  	  
	   124	  The	  basic	  (unrestricted)	   form	  of	   this	  principle	  of	  comprehension	   is:174	  (POC)	  For	  any	  condition	  Ax	  with	  free	  variable	  x,	  some	  object	  satisfies	  Ax.	  POC	  states	  that	  for	  whatever	  property	  you	  ascribe	  there	  will	  be	  a	  thing	  (either	  existent	  or	  non-­‐existent)	  that	   instantiates	  that	  property	  (or	  set	  of	  properties).	  So,	  if	  I	  talk	  of	  a	  pink	  unicorn	  then	  there	  will	  be	  a	  thing	  in	  the	  domain	   that	  has	   the	  properties	  of	  being	  a	  pink	  unicorn.	  Russell175	  famously	   notes	   that	   one	   could	   also	   talk	   of	   the	   round	   square	   or	   other	  contradictory	  objects,	  and	  thus	  end	  up	  with	  contradictory	  things	  in	  the	  domain.	   This	   is	   the	   inconsistency	   objection.	   But	   this	   should	   not	   be	  problematic	  as	  those	  contradictory	  things	  need	  not	  also	  instantiate	  the	  existence	  predicate,	  so	  POC	  does	  not	  directly	  lead	  to	  postulating	  existing	  contradictory	  objects.	  Russell	  however	  also	  notes	  that	  one	  could	  talk	  of	  the	   existing	   God,	   for	   example,	   and	   thus	   end	   up	   defining	   things	   into	  existence	  (which	  is	  ironically	  the	  problem	  that	  I	  set	  out	  for	  Quineans	  in	  deriving	  an	  ontology	  from	  the	  inference	  between	  ∀	  and	  ∃	  in	  section	  V).	  This	   is	  the	  triviality	  objection.	  When	  the	  two	  objections	  are	  combined,	  and	  we	  take	  existence	  a	  property,	  we	  can	  define	  into	  existence	  an	  object	  that	  has	  contradictory	  properties	  as	  well	  as	   the	  property	  of	  existence.	  Together	  the	  inconsistency	  and	  triviality	  objections	  take	  a	  strong	  form,	  as	  it	  is	  counterintuitive	  and	  against	  our	  classical	  laws	  of	  logic	  that	  there	  could	  be	  an	  existent	  thing	  that	  instantiates	  contradictory	  properties.	  	  	  	  	  The	  quietist	  version	  of	  Meinongianism	  that	  I	  put	  forward	  will	  avoid	  the	  inconsistency	  and	   triviality	  objections	  by	  avoiding	  POC	  altogether.	  We	  can	   see	   that	   this	   is	   a	   legitimate	   move	   for	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   by	  recognizing	   that	   the	   position	   that	   I	   am	  putting	   forward	   already	   has	   a	  way	   of	   restricting	   what	   we	   talk	   about	   and	   a	   way	   of	   explaining	   what	  things	   (existent	   and	  non-­‐existent)	   there	   are	  by	   tying	  quantification	   to	  particular	   linguistic	   frameworks	   and	   their	   rules.	  My	  position	   thus	  has	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  The	  CP,	  in	  footnote	  above	  instead	  of	  POC,	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  account	  of	  descriptions.	  Unrestricted	  CP	  is	  something	  like:	  P(ixPx)	  where	  ‘i’	  is	  a	  definite	  description	  operator.	  It	  postulates	  that	  any	  object	  has	  those	  properties	  that	  it	  is	  characterized	  as	  having.	  	  175	  Russell	  (1905)	  p483	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  no	  need	  for	  POC,	  or	  any	  principle	  like	  it,	  since	  POC	  has	  no	  work	  to	  do	  in	  a	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   theory	   of	   linguistic	   frameworks.	   The	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	  utilizes	  framework	  rules	  to	  restrict	  our	  talk,	  and	  looks	  to	  frameworks	  to	  determine	  which	   things	  exist	   and	  do	  not	  exist	   relative	  and	   internal	   to	  those	   frameworks	  and	  what	  properties	   those	   things	  have.	  Framework	  rules	  provide	  the	  restrictions	  on	  such	  things,	  and	  so	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  another	  general	  principle	  like	  POC	  to	  tell	  us	  in	  an	  absolute	  sense	  what	  things	  there	  are,	  as	  objects	  can	  only	  be	  said	  to	  exist	  or	  not	  relative	  and	  
internal	  to	  a	  framework	  whose	  rules	  suffice	  to	  determine	  a	  framework-­‐relative	  criteria	  for	  thingness	  and	  existence.	  Since	  everything	  is	  relative	  to	  the	  framework	  rules	  for	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian,	  there	  is	  nothing	  left	  for	  a	  POC	  to	  determine	  or	  restrict.	  The	  POC	  is	  only	  required	  if	  we	  think	  that	  there	  is	  some	  absolute	  realm	  of	  being,	  and	  want	  to	  ask	  what	  belongs	  to	  that	  realm.	  But	  this	  picture	  is	  abandoned	  in	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  model	  in	  which	  things	  are	  only	  quantified	  over	  within	  rule-­‐governed	  frameworks.	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  is	  quiet	  about	  metaphysics,	  and	  so	  the	  position	  I	  advocate	  does	  not	  have	  a	  view	  of	  reality	  (or	  being)	  but	  rather	  only	  has	  a	  view	  internal	  to	  linguistic	  frameworks.	  The	  pressure	  on	  the	  Meinongian	  of	  putting	   forward	  a	  principle	  of	   comprehension	   like	  POC	  comes	   from	  a	   realist	  perspective	  of	  what	   there	   is	  and	   is	  not	   in	   reality	  and	  what	  those	  things	  are	  like.	  Therefore,	  by	  not	  holding	  a	  realist	  view,	  such	  pressure	  vanishes,	  and	  by	  holding	  a	  quietist	  view	  with	  a	  theory	  of	  frameworks,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  a	  principle	  of	  comprehension.	  Without	  a	  need	  for	  a	  principle	  of	  comprehension	  like	  POC,	  this	  quietist	  version	  of	   Meinongianism	   can	   escape	   the	   usual	   charges	   of	   inconsistency	   and	  triviality	  that	  result	  from	  such	  principles.176	  I	  therefore	  conclude	  that	  in	  putting	   forward	   ontologically	   neutral	   quantification,	   I	   put	   forward	   a	  quietist	  form	  of	  a	  naïve	  Meinongianism	  that	  avoids	  some	  problems	  that	  traditional	  Meinongians	  may	  face,	  and	  trumps	  the	  Quinean	  alternative.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  176	  However	  the	  charge	  of	  contradictory	  objects	  and	  going	  against	  classical	  logic	  could	  be	   re-­‐raised	   against	   the	   quietist	   Meinongian	   internal	   to	   the	   frameworks,	   but	   they	  could	  respond	  that	  these	  frameworks	  could	  just	  be	  dismissed	  as	  not	  helpful	  to	  adopt.	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  VIII.	  Conclusion.	  	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  Quinean	  methodology	  for	  realism	  fails,	  by	  showing	  that	  quantification	  in	  both	  natural	  and	  formal	  languages	  are	  ontologically	  neutral.	  For	  Quine’s	   I-­‐realism	   to	  be	  a	   tenable	  ontological	  position,	  either	  internal	  use	  of	  English	  can	  provide	  us	  with	  ontological	  commitments,	  or	   it	   can	  be	   translated	   into	   first	  order	   logic	   to	  manifest	  those	  commitments,	  in	  order	  to	  derive	  an	  ontology	  to	  be	  a	  realist	  about.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  neither	  of	  these	  options	  are	  possible,	  and	  as	  such	  I-­‐realism	  is	  not	  a	  form	  of	  realism.	  This	  completes	  my	  attack	  on	  Quine’s	  I-­‐realism	  and	  my	  defense	  of	  Carnapian	  quietism.	  Quineans	  may	  think	  that	  quantification	  in	  formal	   languages	   is	  ontologically	  committing	  because	  of	   the	   model	   theoretic	   machinery,	   the	   set	   theory,	   or	   the	   Tarskian	  semantics.	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  such	  machinery	  only	  gives	  us	  an	  ontology	  if	   domains	   are	   not	   allowed	   to	   contain	   non-­‐existent	   things,	   and	   so	   a	  domain	  restriction	  is	  needed.	  This	  restriction	  is	  not	  something	  that	  has	  been	  argued	  for	  successfully	  by	  Quine,	  and	  ∃	  certainly	  is	  not	  trivially	  or	  obviously	   loaded,	   as	   Quine	   initially	   states.	   The	   model	   theoretic,	   set	  theoretic,	   and	   Tarskian	   semantics	   can	   be	   adopted	   just	   fine	   without	  ontological	  commitment,	  since	  there	  is	  no	  good	  (non-­‐question-­‐begging)	  argument	   for	  why	  domain	  membership	   requires	   existence.	   I	   conclude	  that	  we	  can	  have	  classical	  objectual	  quantifiers	  without	  existence,	   in	  a	  quietist	  Meinongian	  way,	  and	   that	  ∃	   is	   the	   ‘particular’	  quantifier	   since	  there	  is	  nothing	  existential	  about	  it	  at	  all.	  	  Having	  motivated	  quietism	  by	  showing	   quantification	   in	   both	   natural	   and	   formal	   languages	   to	   be	  ontologically	   neutral,	   I	   have	   shown	   that	   we	   can	   talk	   about	   things	  meaningfully	   and	   truthfully	   without	   ontological	   commitment	   or	   the	  requirement	   of	   existence.	   Whatever	   can	   be	   spoken	   about	   is	   in	   our	  domain,	   and	   since	   this	   domain	   is	   no	   longer	   ontologically	   loaded	   our	  true	   language	  usage	   is	  no	   longer	  restricted	   to	  be	  about	  only	  existents.	  Many	  have	  assumed	  otherwise,	  and	  this	  has	  been	  a	  main	  motivation	  for	  fictionalism,	  which	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  3	  I	  reframe	  under	  quietism.	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CHAPTER	  3:	  
QUIET	  FICTIONALISM	  	  	  In	  chapter	  1	  I	  outlined	  Carnap’s	  quietism,	  and	  utilized	  Yablo’s	  argument	  from	  the	  metaphorical	  to	  attack	  Quine’s	  I-­‐realism	  and	  to	  defend	  Carnap	  against	  Quine’s	  critique.	  Chapter	  2	  took	  insight	  from	  Meinongianism	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  metaphorical	  and	  non-­‐existents	  enter	  into	  our	  domains.	  This	  chapter	  develops	  Yablo’s	  argument	  into	  a	  type	  of	  quiet	  fictionalism	  in	  order	  to	  describe	  our	  language	  usage	  and	  to	  save	  Carnap’s	  linguistic	  frameworks	  from	  a	  dependence	  on	  the	  analytic.	  Here	  I	  describe	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  fictionalism	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  coupled	  with	  Carnap’s	  quietism.	  I	  believe	  that	  Carnap’s	  quietism	  can	  be	  helpfully	  reinterpreted	  as	  a	  type	  of	  fictionalism,	  and	  also	  that	  fictionalism	  is	  best	  developed	  as	  a	  form	  of	  quietism.	   This	   quietist	   fictionalism	   is	   differentiated	   from	   traditional	  fictionalism	  by	  being	  divorced	  from	  antirealism	  and	  by	  taking	  a	  global	  scope	  rather	  than	  being	  about	  particular	  discourses	  or	  entities	  only.	  	  	  	  I	  will	   start	   this	   chapter	  by	  motivating	   the	   idea	   that	  Carnap’s	  quietism	  can	  be	  reformulated	  as	  a	  type	  of	  fictionalism.	  Then	  in	  section	  II,	  I	  show	  how	  metaontology	  informs	  ontology,	  and	  thus	  how	  our	  metaontological	  fictionalism	   informs	   our	   ontology	   of	   fiction	   and	   not	   the	   other	   way	  around.	  I	  describe	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  effects	  on	  ontology	  regarding	  the	  traditional	   way	   of	   describing	   fictionalism,	   in	   order	   to	   motivate	   how	  fictionalism	  needs	   to	  be	   reframed	  as	   a	  quietist	   position,	   in	   section	   III.	  Then,	   in	   section	   IV,	   I	   put	   forward	   my	   proposed	   quietist	   version	   of	  fictionalism	  and	  describe	  how	  this	  combination	  works,	  differentiating	  it	  from	  antirealist	  fictionalism.	  Sections	  V-­‐VII	  outline	  common	  features	  of	  fictionalisms	   to	   show	   how	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   satisfies	   them	   despite	  being	  quietist	  rather	  than	  traditionally	  antirealist.	  I	  distinguish	  between	  the	  hermeneutic	  and	  revolutionary	  fictionalisms	  in	  section	  VIII,	  and	  will	  conclude	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  position	  and	  its	  allies.	  	  	  
	   128	  I.	  Yablo’s	  path	  through	  fictionalism.	  	  	  In	  chapter	  1	  section	  I.iii,	  I	  presented	  Quine’s	  critique	  of	  Carnap	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  linguistic	  framework	  needs	  an	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction.	  Yablo	  responded	  to	  this	  critique	  and	  argued	  that	  one	  does	  not	  need	  to	  hold	   that	   the	   rules	   making	   up	   linguistic	   frameworks	   are	   analytic	   in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  the	  idea	  that	  some	  ways	  of	  talking	  can	  be	  adopted	   for	  merely	  practical	   reasons.	  Yablo	  defends	  Carnap	  by	  calling	  for	  a	  change	   in	  how	  frameworks	  are	  understood,	  and	   in	   this	  chapter	   I	  follow	  Yablo’s	  suggestion	  and	  redefine	  frameworks	  as	  fictions,	  inspired	  by	  his	  replacement	  of	  the	   internal/external	  with	  a	  metaphorical/literal	  distinction	  which	  can	  be	  made	   independently	  of	   the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction.	   Yablo	   says	  we	   should	   think	   of	   this	   distinction	   as	   between	  assertions	  in	  make-­‐believe	  fictional	  games177	  and	  those	  outside	  of	  them:	  	   The	  usual	   charge	   against	  Carnap’s	   internal/external	   distinction	  is	  one	  of	  ‘guilt	  by	  association	  with	  the	  analytic/synthetic’.	  But	  it	  can	   be	   freed	   of	   this	   association,	   to	   become	   the	   distinction	  between	  statements	  made	  within	  make-­‐believe	  games	  and	  those	  made	   outside	   them	   –	   or	   rather,	   a	   special	   case	   of	   it	   with	   some	  claim	  to	  be	  called	  the	  metaphorical/literal	  distinction.178	  	  	  We	   can	   easily	   free	   the	   internal/external	   distinction	   from	   the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction	  once	  we	  remind	  ourselves	  of	  the	  purpose	  and	  role	  of	  Carnap’s	  original	  distinction	   in	  the	  first	  place.	  The	   internal	  was	  meant	  to	  provide	  a	  way	  in	  which	  we	  can	  assert	  a	  sentence	  S	  (which	  will	   become	   true	   relative	   to	   the	   framework	   it	   is	   internal	   to),	   without	  presupposing	   or	   requiring	   an	   answer	   as	   to	   whether	   S	   is	   really	   true	  (external	  to	  the	  framework).	  The	  internal/external	  distinction	  was	  put	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  For	   Currie	   (1990	   p18-­‐22),	   the	   authors	   of	   fiction	   produce	   phrases	   partly	  with	   an	  intention	  shared	  by	  their	  readers	  to	  make-­‐believe	  the	  propositions	  expressed	  by	  those	  phrases,	  so	  make-­‐belief	  is	  the	  attitude	  towards	  fiction.	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  my	  position.	  178	  Yablo	  (1998)	  p229	  
	   129	  forward	  as	  a	  way	  of	  saving	  our	  internal	  assertions	  from	  being	  bound	  by	  external	  truth-­‐values,	  so	  that	  we	  may	  freely	  assert	  for	  purely	  pragmatic	  purposes	   instead.	   Yablo	   describes	   the	   enterprise	   of	   utilizing	   language	  for	   its	  pragmatic	   features	   rather	   than	   its	   truth-­‐value	   (which	   is,	  by	   the	  way,	  a	  traditional	  fictionalist	  enterprise	  –	  see	  section	  V.iv)	  as	  such:	  	  	   Now,	  what	  is	  our	  usual	  word	  for	  an	  enterprise	  where	  sentences	  are	  put	  at	  the	  service	  of	  something	  other	  than	  their	  usual	  truth-­‐conditions,	   by	   people	   who	  may	   or	   may	   not	   believe	   them,	   in	   a	  disciplined	   but	   defeasible	   way?	   It	   seems	   to	   me	   that	   our	   usual	  word	  is	  ‘make-­‐believe	  game’.179	  	  	  These	  make-­‐believe	   games	   are	  what	   I	   will	   take	   as	   fictions.	   The	   same	  analogy	   can	   be	  made	   for	   fictions,	   since	   in	   fictional	   contexts	  we	  make	  assertions	  internally	  to	  fiction	  without	  a	  care	  for	  whether	  the	  assertions	  are	  true	  independent	  of	  the	  fiction	  (and	  sometimes	  we	  even	  know	  them	  to	  be	  false).	  This	  is	  much	  like	  how	  Carnap	  wishes	  ordinary	  language	  to	  be	  utilized	  internal	  to	  linguistic	  frameworks	  –	  carefree	  of	   independent	  external	   truth-­‐values	   (since	   Carnap	   is	   quiet	   about	   such	   values).	   The	  parallel	  between	  Yablo’s	  proposed	  distinction	  and	  the	  internal/external	  distinction	   is	   also	   made	   clear	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   meaninglessness	   of	  questioning	  truth	  external	  to	  frameworks	  or	  make-­‐believe	  games:	  	   Numerical	   calculation	   does	   not	   answer	   to	   external	   facts	   about	  numbers	   for	   the	   same	   reason	   that	   players	   of	   tag	   don’t	   see	  themselves	  as	  answerable	  to	  game-­‐independent	  facts	  about	  who	  is	  really	  ‘IT’;	  just	  as	  apart	  from	  the	  game	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  being	   ‘IT’,	   apart	   from	   the	   framework	   there	   is	   no	   such	   thing	   as	  being	  ‘the	  sum	  of	  seven	  and	  five’.180	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  179	  Yablo	  (1998)	  p243	  180 	  Yablo	   (1998)	   p240.	   A	   parallel	   here	   to	   fictional	   works	   is	   that	   it	   would	   be	  meaningless	  to	  question	  something	  from	  within	  the	  fiction	  in	  an	  external	  manner,	  i.e.	  ‘Does	   Sherlock	   smoke	   a	   pipe	   externally	   to	   the	   Holmes	   stories?’.	   So,	   questioning	  external	  to	  frameworks	  is	  just	  as	  meaningless	  as	  questioning	  external	  to	  fictions.	  
	   130	  When	  we	   speak	   of	   numbers	   and	  make	   numerical	   calculations	  we	   are	  not	  committed	  to	  the	  ontological	  reality	  of	  numbers,	  just	  like	  when	  we	  are	   involved	   in	   a	   game	   or	   in	   a	   fiction	   we	   are	   not	   committed	   to	   the	  reality	  of	  what	  we	  are	  make-­‐believing	  about.	  Here	  the	  analogy	  is	  clear	  between	  the	  game	  (or	  fiction)	  and	  Carnap’s	  frameworks,	  with	  regard	  to	  what	  is	  external	  to	  them	  –	  being	  external	  to	  the	  fiction	  or	  framework	  is	  to	  be	  external	  to	  where	  the	  game	  or	  language	  gets	  its	  meaning.	  As	  such,	  in	  Yablo’s	  words,	   there	   is	   ‘no	   such	   thing’	   as	   the	   game-­‐	   (or	   fiction-­‐)	   or	  framework-­‐	  independent	  realm.	  So	  the	  realm	  independent	  of	  the	  game	  (or	  fiction)	  becomes	  as	  inaccessible	  and	  meaningless	  as	  the	  external	  is	  for	  Carnap.	  It	  is	  as	  meaningless	  to	  ask	  the	  external	  question	  of	  whether	  the	   sum	  of	   seven	  and	   five	   is	  really	  twelve	   independent	  of	   the	  number	  framework	  as	  it	  is	  to	  ask	  if	  I	  am	  really	  ‘IT’	  independent	  of	  the	  game	  of	  IT.	  	  	  These	  make-­‐believe	   games,	   or	   fictions,	   are	   chosen	   in	   much	   the	   same	  way	  as	  Carnap	  proposes	  to	  choose	  frameworks:	  by	  being	  the	  most	  ‘apt’	  or	  having	  the	  most	  ‘cognitive	  promise’.181	  So	  here	  is	  yet	  another	  analogy	  between	  frameworks	  and	  fictions.	  Fictions	  can	  thus	  be	  used	  in	  place	  of	  frameworks	   to	   make	   Carnap’s	   quietist	   point	   without	   reference	   to	  analyticity.	  The	  analytic	  rules	  that	  were	  problematic	  according	  to	  Quine	  are	  replaced	  by	  presuppositions	  of	  fiction.	  The	  fictions	  are	  generated	  by	  these	   presuppositions,	   whose	   status	   is	   such	   that	   we	   choose	   not	   to	  question	  them.	  The	  principles	  of	  generation	  of	  fictions	  are	  those	  things	  that	  are	  treated	  as	  not	  up-­‐for-­‐grabs,	  like	  presuppositions	  and	  like	  how	  we	  ought	  to	  treat	  frameworks.	  If	  we	  simply	  presuppose	  the	  framework,	  then	  things	  will	  follow	  from	  that	  framework’s	  rules,	  much	  like	  when	  we	  presuppose	  a	  fiction	  with	  a	  story	  that	   follows.	  The	  Carnapian	  now	  has	  no	  need	  for	  analyticity	  in	  their	  internal/external	  distinction	  or	  in	  their	  formulation	  of	  a	  framework	  as	  there	  is	  no	  special	  status	  of	  rules	  –	  they	  just	  have	  things	  following	  from	  presuppositions	  so	  the	  rules	  themselves	  are	  the	  presuppositions.	  See	  sections	  VI-­‐VII	  for	  more	  on	  presupposition.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	  Yablo	  (2005)	  p101	  
	   131	  However	   the	   Quinean	   may	   still	   be	   able	   to	   object	   here.	   The	   Quinean	  objection	  to	   this	  presupposition	  may	  well	  be	   that	  a	   ‘presupposition’	   is	  just	  another	  name	  for	  an	  analytic	  framework	  rule,	  and	  Quine’s	  critique	  will	  apply	  equally	  as	  well	  to	  these.	  The	  Quinean	  may	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	   special	   about	   being	   a	   ‘presupposition’	   –	   in	   the	   context	   of	  theorizing	  we	  will	  sometimes	   find	  ourselves	  altering	  these	   in	   the	   light	  of	  evidence	  too.	  So	  the	  special	  status	  of	  presuppositions	  (as	  being	  things	  that	  are	  taken	  on	  and	  unquestioned)	  may	  be	  attacked	  by	  the	  Quinean,	  as	  anything	   is	  open	  to	  questioning	   in	   light	  of	  such	  evidence.	  However,	  the	  Carnapian	  can	  respond	  to	  this	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  in	  fictional	  works	  the	   presuppositions	   are	   not	   presented	   as	   attempting	   to	   get	   the	   facts	  about	  the	  fiction-­‐independent	  reality	  right,	  and	  so	  this	  is	  why	  we	  do	  not	  question	  such	  presuppositions.	  Sometimes	  in	  fiction	  we	  even	  know	  the	  presuppositions	  to	  be	  false.	  Thus	  the	  special	  status	  of	  the	  unquestioned	  presuppositions	   is	   due	   to	   the	   presuppositions	   not	   being	   the	   type	   of	  thing	   that	   we	   care	   to	   question	   since	   they	   were	   not	   in	   the	   job	   of	  representing	   the	   fiction-­‐independent	   reality	   in	   the	   first	   place	   (and	  hence	  are	  not	  altered	  or	  questioned	  due	  to	  evidence	  from	  this	  reality).	  	  	  	  So	  in	  answer	  to	  Quine’s	  problematic	  question	  of	  what	  a	  framework	  is	  if	  not	   identified	  by	  analytic	   framework	  rules,	  Yablo	  argues	   that	   they	  are	  make-­‐believe	   games,	   which	   I	   will	   construe	   as	   fictions.	   My	   idea	   is	   to	  interpret	   Carnapian	   linguistic	   frameworks	   as	   fictions,	   inspired	   by	  Yablo’s	   construal	  of	   the	   internal/external	  distinction	  being	  made	  with	  regard	   to	   make-­‐believe	   games	   in	   order	   to	   show	   that	   it	   is	   free	   of	   the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction.	   Just	   as	   there	  were	   frameworks	   for	  each	  type	  of	  entity	  (the	  ‘thing’	  framework	  and	  the	  ‘number’	  framework	  etc.),	  so	   there	  will	  now	  be	  a	   fiction	   for	  each	   type	  of	  entity.	  When	  we	  utilize	  number-­‐talk,	   for	   instance,	   we	   employ	   the	   number	   fiction,	   and	   our	  numerical	   calculations	   will	   be	   as	   ontologically	   un-­‐committing	   as	   the	  assertions	  made	  within	  fictional	  contexts	  are.	  Our	  employing	  of	  fictions	  is	  metaphysically	   insignificant,	   and	   is	   only	   evidence	  of	   us	   finding	   that	  
	   132	  fiction	  as	  practical	  to	  employ	  in	  order	  to	  speak	  of	  the	  entities	  internal	  to	  that	   fiction.	   Just	   as	   we	   presuppose	   a	   fiction	   without	   taking	   it	   on	   in	   a	  metaphysically	  serious	  way,	  we	  now	  presuppose	  linguistic	  frameworks.	  	  	  	  This	   fictionalist	   position	   arises	   as	   a	   natural	   progression	   from	   Yablo’s	  critique	  of	  Quine’s	  critique	  of	  Carnap,	  and	  is	  pitched	  by	  Yablo	  (2001)	  as	  a	  strong	  possibility	  in	  escaping	  ontological	  commitment	  from	  language	  usage.	  Yablo	  puts	  forward	  a	  version	  of	  fictionalism	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  Quinean	  method	  of	  paraphrasing	  away	   the	  dispensable	  non-­‐literal	  talk	  (as	  Yablo	  disagrees	  that	  such	  paraphrase	  is	  possible	  –	  see	  chapter	  1	  section	  III.	  These	  methods	  come	  from	  Quine’s	  menu182	  –	  see	  chapter	  2	  section	  II	  page	  91).	  This	  alternative	  is	  required	  to	  avoid	  commitment	  to	  the	   non-­‐literal,	   and	   the	   fictionalist	   proposal	   provides	   a	   fictional	   non-­‐committal	   context	   as	   a	   contrast	   to	   the	   scientific	   context	   in	   which	  we	  take	  talk	  ontologically	  seriously.	  So	  it	  helps	  the	  Carnapian	  explain	  their	  non-­‐committal	   use	   of	   language,	   but	  most	   importantly	   allows	   them	   to	  escape	  Quine’s	  critique	  by	  redefining	  frameworks	  independently	  of	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction.	  Yablo	  gives	  further	  motivation	  as	  such:	  	  	   At	  one	  time	  the	  rationale	   for	   fictionalism	  was	  obvious.	  We	  had,	  or	   thought	  we	  had,	  good	  philosophical	  arguments	   to	   show	  that	  X’s	   did	   not	   exist...	   X’s	   were	   obnoxious,	   so	   we	   had	   to	   find	   an	  interpretation	   of	   our	   talk	   that	   did	   not	   leave	   us	   committed	   to	  them.	  That	  form	  of	  argument	  is	  dead	  and	  gone,	  it	  seems	  to	  me…	  But	   there	   is	   another	   possible	   rationale	   for	   fictionalism.	   Just	  maybe,	  it	  gives	  the	  most	  plausible	  account	  of	  the	  practice.183	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182	  Yablo	  (2001)	  p72.	  In	  chapter	  2	  sections	  II	  and	  VII,	  I	  argued	  that	  we	  dismiss	  Quine’s	  menu	  in	  opting	  for	  a	  Meinongian	  option	  which	  dissolves	  the	  predicament	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  menu.	  Here	  I	  now	  motivate	  the	  fictionalist	  menu	  option,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  in	  place	  of	  the	  Meinongian	  option,	  rather	  it’s	  an	  untraditional	  quiet	  fictionalism	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  quiet	  Meinongianism	  that	  I	  put	  forward	  in	  chapter	  2.	  It	  retains	  the	  truth	  of	  our	  talk	  in	  a	  Meinongian	  way,	  whilst	  judging	  the	  talk	  on	  its	  usefulness	  in	  a	  fictionalist	  way.	  In	  being	  quietist,	  the	  fictionalism	  and	  Meinongianism	  become	  deflated	  and	  compatible.	  I	  discuss	  their	  compatibility	  and	  reconciliation	  in	  the	  Conclusion	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  183	  Yablo	  (2001)	  p87	  	  
	   133	  I	  agree	  that	  fictionalism	  can	  be	  motivated	  without	  appealing	  to	  the	  non-­‐existence	  of	  the	  ‘obnoxious’	  entities,	  as	  I	  believe	  that	  such	  an	  antirealist	  rationale	   can	   be	   met	   by	   quietism	   instead	   (see	   section	   V.i).	   However,	  unlike	   Yablo,	   I	   put	   forward	   fictionalism	   as	   being	   prescriptive,	   rather	  than	  descriptive,	  and	  so	  my	  rationale	  for	  fictionalism	  will	  not	  be	  that	  it	  provides	  ‘the	  most	  plausible	  account	  of	  the	  practice’	  but	  that	  it	  provides	  the	  most	  plausible	  account	  of	  how	  we	  ought	   to	   treat	   the	  practice	   (see	  section	   VIII).	   So	   now	   that	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   takes	   frameworks	   to	   be	  fictions,	  are	  they	  then	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  fictionalists?	  I	  aim	  to	  show	  that	  they	  are.	   First,	   I	  will	   address	   how	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  metaontology	   effects	   the	  traditional	  understanding	  of	  what	   it	   is	   to	  be	  a	   fictionalist,	  before	   then	  describing	  what	  a	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  quietist	  account	  of	  fictionalism	  is	  like.	  	  	  	   II.	  The	  priority	  of	  ‘meta’.	  	  	  As	  Yablo	  states,	  one	  rationale	  for	  fictionalism	  is	  that	  it	  provides	  the	  best	  account	  of	  our	  discourse,	  by	  seeing	  it	  as	  being	  fictional.	  It	  then	  remains	  to	   be	   said	  what	   it	   is	   to	   treat	   a	   discourse	   as	   fictional,	   and	  what	   being	  
fictional	  is	  like.	  This	  may	  require	  looking	  to	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  fiction	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  fictionalist	  position	  in	  terms	  of	  fiction,	  so	  that	  the	  role	  of	  ‘fiction’	  in	  fictionalism	  is	  analogous	  to	  that	  in	  fictional	  works.	  Otherwise,	   if	   fictionalism	   is	   not	   based	   on	   the	   metaphysics	   of	   fiction,	  then	   is	   ‘fictionalism’	   really	   the	   correct	   name	   for	   the	   position	   once	   all	  similarity	  with	   fictional	  works	   is	   lost?	   As	   Bourne	   notes,	   “some	   of	   the	  most	  distinctive	  aspects	  of	  paradigm	   ‘fictionalisms’	  do	  not	   themselves	  have	  much	  to	  do	  with	  fiction”184,	  yet	  for	  Bueno,	  only	  “fictionalism	  based	  on	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  fiction	  is	  ‘truly	  fictionalist’.”185	  	  Sainsbury’s	  book	  
Fiction	  and	  Fictionalism	  is	  dedicated	  to	  this	  issue,	  in	  order	  to	  clarify	  how	  much	  of	  fiction	  there	  really	  is	  in	  philosophical	  fictionalist	  positions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  184	  Bourne	  (2012)	  p2	  185	  Bueno	  (2009)	  p59	  
	   134	  Sainsbury’s	   plan	   is	   “to	   get	   straight	   about	   the	   metaphysics	   of	   fiction	  before	  discussing	  fictionalism,	  to	  see	  how	  one	  affects	  the	  other”186,	  and	  he	   concludes	   that	   the	   fictionalist	   should	   ensure	   that	   their	   ontological	  motivations	   match	   up	   with	   their	   metaphysics	   of	   fiction	   (so	   if	   their	  fictionalism	   is	   motivated	   by	   antirealism,	   then	   they	   ought	   to	   be	   an	  antirealist	  about	  fictional	  entities).	  Here	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  strategy	  of	  looking	   to	   the	  metaphysics	   of	   fiction	   first	   is	   the	  wrong	   starting	   point,	  especially	  as	  a	  quietist	  who	  denies	  meaning	  to	  metaphysics.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	   the	   correct	  direction	   is	   to	  do	   the	  metaontology	   first	   and	   this	  will	  then	   tell	   you	  what	   you	   can	   say	   about	   the	  metaphysics	   of	   fiction	   (so,	   I	  propose	  to	   look	  to	  our	   fictionalism	  before	  our	   fictions).	   Just	  as	  getting	  one’s	   metametaphysics	   clear	   will	   clarify	   one’s	   metaphysics,	   likewise	  getting	   one’s	   metaontology	   clear	   will	   clarify	   one’s	   ontology.	   With	   an	  understanding	   of	   our	  metaontological	   position	   of	   fictionalism,	   we	   can	  then	  understand	  our	  ontological	  position	  on	  fiction.	  So	  we	  clarify	  meta-­‐X	  before	  clarifying	  X.	  In	  this	  sense,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  ‘meta’	  has	  priority.	  	  	  A	  Carnapian	  quietist	  denies	  the	  meaningfulness	  of	  the	  debate	  between	  realists	  and	  antirealists,	  for	  all	  things	  X.	  Included	  in	  the	  quietist’s	  list	  of	  rejected	   debates,	   then,	   is	   the	   debate	   over	   whether	   fictional	   entities	  really	   exist.	   Hence,	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian,	   as	   a	   quietist,	   cannot	   be	  motivated	   by	   an	   account	   of	   the	   metaphysics	   of	   fiction,	   as	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   denies	   the	   meaningfulness	   of	   the	   debates	   over	   the	  metaphysics	  of	  fiction.	  The	  entire	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  fiction	  (whether	  to	  be	  a	  realist	  or	  antirealist	  about	  fictional	  entities)	  is	   faulty	   according	   to	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian.	   Thus	   they	   cannot	   apply	   the	  results	   of	   that	   debate	   to	   inform	   their	   fictionalism,	   rather	   they	   apply	  their	  quietism	  to	  that	  debate	  in	  rejecting	  it.	  The	  metaphysics	  (of	  fiction)	  does	  not	  influence	  the	  metametaphysics	  (of	  quietist	  fictionalism),	  as	  the	  direction	  of	   entailment	   is	   the	  other	  way	   round.	  One	   should	   start	  with	  the	   most	   foundational	   or	   fundamental	   level	   of	   inquiry	   –	   that	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	  Sainsbury	  (2010)	  p205	  
	   135	  metametaphysics	   (where	   quietism	   is	   adopted)	   –	   and	   let	   those	   results	  impact	   the	  metaphysics	   in	   turn.	  Given	  what	   sort	   of	  metaontology	   you	  buy	  into	  will	  prescribe	  what	  sort	  of	  ontology	  you	  will	  consider	  yourself	  as	   being	   able	   to	   do,	   and	   since	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   buys	   into	   quietism,	  this	   entails	   that	   they	   cannot	   take	   a	  metaphysical	   ontological	   stand	  on	  any	   type	   of	   thing	   X	   (including	   fictions).	   Therefore,	   I	   propose	   that	   we	  look	   to	   our	   metaontology	   first	   (that	   of	   quietist	   fictionalism)	   and	   this	  will	   influence	   our	   ontology	   (on	   fictions).	   The	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   cannot	  look	  to	  their	  metaphysics	  of	  fiction	  to	  inform	  their	  fictionalism,	  as	  their	  fictionalism	   is	   metaphysically	   quiet.	   The	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   therefore	   is	  quiet	  about	  the	  ontology	  of	  fiction,	  and	  their	  fictionalism	  will	  be	  related	  to	  fictions	  in	  senses	  other	  than	  ontological	  status	  (see	  sections	  V-­‐VII).	  	  	  	  An	   understanding	   of	   fictions	   was	   meant	   to	   help	   us	   in	   understanding	  fictionalism,	   but	   as	   we	   have	   seen	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case	   when	   your	  fictionalism	  is	  motivated	  by	  a	  metametaphysical	  view	  like	  quietism.	  The	  fictionalism	  here	  will	  motivate	  what	  we	  can	  say	  about	  fictional	  entities,	  and	  not	   the	  other	  way	  around.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   cannot	   look	   to	   the	  realist/antirealist	  debate	  in	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  fiction	  to	  help	  elucidate	  their	  fictionalism	  (as	  they	  stay	  quiet	  on	  this	  debate),	  but	  they	  can	  look	  to	  other	  aspects	  of	  fiction	  that	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  their	  reality	  to	  clarify	  what	   they	  mean	  by	  a	   fiction.187	  Fictionalisms	   can	  draw	  on	   these	   ideas	  about	   fiction,	   such	   as	   ideas	   on	   truth	   in	   fiction,	   and	   belief	   in	   fiction,	  which	   are	   discussed	   in	   sections	   VI	   and	   VII	   respectively.	   I	   distinguish	  antirealist	   fictionalism	   from	   quietist	   fictionalism	   in	   section	   IV,	  providing	   their	   similar	   fictionalist	   features	   in	   section	   V	   which	   will	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  term	  ‘fictionalism’	  is	  appropriately	  fitting	  for	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian.	  But	  first,	  in	  order	  to	  motivate	  why	  fictionalism	  requires	  divorcing	   from	   antirealism,	   I	   show	   how	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  metaontology	  affects	  how	  we	  traditionally	  describe	  fictionalism	  in	  an	  ontological	  way.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187	  What	  happens	  when	  this	  fictionalist	  is	  fictional	  about	  fictions?	  Simply,	  fictionalism	  about	  fictions	  is	  just	  a	  fiction	  within	  a	  fiction.	  I	  do	  not	  spend	  time	  giving	  an	  account	  of	  fiction	  here,	  rather	  I	  just	  see	  fictional	  works	  as	  fictions	  within	  fictional	  frameworks.	  
	   136	  III.	  Antirealist	  fictionalism.	  	  	  An	  antirealist	  in	  the	  traditional	  ontological	  sense,	  according	  to	  Carnap’s	  model,	   is	   just	  someone	  who	  answers	   the	  external	  question	  with	  a	   ‘no’	  (and	   thus	   does	   not	   adopt	   the	   framework	   that	   governs	   that	   particular	  entity).	  But	  someone	  who	  does	  not	  adopt	  the	  framework	  for	  an	  entity	  X	  cannot	  take	  any	  stance	  on	  X	  at	  all	  for	  they	  cannot	  meaningfully	  speak	  of	  X	  without	  its	  framework.	  Therefore	  traditional	  antirealism	  is	  no	  longer	  considered	   a	   viable	   position	   (see	   Introduction	   chapter	   section	   IV.ii).	  Traditionally,	   fictionalism	   is	   motivated	   by	   antirealism:188	  “The	   typical	  motivation	  for	  fictionalism	  is	  ontological.”189	  But	  fictionalism	  cannot	  be	  so	  understood	  as	   antirealist	   anymore	  given	   that	   antirealism	   is	   at	  best	  meaningless	  and	  at	  worst	  an	   impossible	  position	   to	  hold.	  Fictionalism	  must	   then	   be	   removed	   from	   any	   antirealist	   foundation.	   Since	   I	   follow	  Carnap	   in	  rejecting	  the	  external	  question	  (EQ),	  rather	   than	  concluding	  that	   Carnap’s	  metaontology	   rules	   out	   fictionalism	   I	  will	   instead	   show	  that	  the	  traditional	  way	  of	  formulating	  fictionalism	  is	  faulty	  and	  will	  put	  forward	   my	   own	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   type	   of	   fictionalism190	  with	   quietist	  foundations.	  The	  divorce	  of	  fictionalism	  from	  antirealism,	  and	  the	  new	  combination	  of	  fictionalism	  with	  quietism,	  is	  discussed	  in	  section	  IV.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	  Such	  traditional	  fictionalists	  that	  are	  motivated	  by	  antirealism	  include	  Leng	  (2010)	  on	  mathematics,	  Joyce	  (2001)	  on	  morality,	  van	  Fraassen	  (1980)	  on	  scientific	  theories,	  Field	  (1980)	  also	  on	  mathematics,	  Rosen	  (1990)	  on	  possible	  worlds,	  Brock	  (2002)	  on	  fictional	   entities,	   Kroon	   (2001)	   on	   temporal	   parts,	   and	   Yablo	   (2000)	   on	   abstract	  entities.	  These	  are	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  likes	  of	  Eklund	  (2005)	  who	  suggests	  that	  we	  can	  be	  indifferent	  towards	  ontology	  whilst	  utilizing	  a	  way	  of	  talking,	  Jay	  (2011)	  who	  puts	  forward	  a	  realist	  fictionalism,	  and	  agnostic	  fictionalists	  like	  Bueno	  (2009)	  for	  example.	  These	  agnostic	  fictionalists	  like	  Bueno	  (2009)	  would	  be	  similar	  to	  my	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  quietist	  fictionalism	  in	  spirit	  but	  would	  be	  different	  in	  motivation.	  Bueno’s	  view	  is	  also	  Neo-­‐Meinongian,	  and	  so	  has	  similarities	  to	  my	  view	  in	  chapter	  2.	  The	  Neo-­‐Meinongian	  is	  actually	  similar	  to	  the	  fictionalist	  since	  they	  both	  take	  discourses	  at	  face	  value,	  and	  the	  discourses	  are	  useful	  and	  in	  some	  sense	  true	  without	  being	  about	  existent	  things.	  I	  thus	  take	  fictionalism	  and	  Meinongianism	  to	  be	  compatible	  together	  with	  quietism	  too.	  I	  will	  discuss	  their	  compatibility	  further	  in	  the	  Conclusion	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis.	  189	  Eklund	  (2005)	  p558	  190	  One	  way	  of	  articulating	  fictionalism	   internal	   to	  a	  Carnapian	  model	  that	  I	  have	  not	  considered	  is	  as	  such:	  within	  a	  framework,	  an	  entity	  X	  is	  described	  to	  not	  exist	  (by	  not	  instantiating	  the	  existence	  predicate).	  This	  internal	  fictionalist	  could	  say	  they	  want	  to	  talk	  as	  if	  X	  instantiates	  the	  existence	  predicate	  for	  its	  usefulness	  in	  doing	  so.	  I	  do	  not	  think	  this	  works	  since	  there	  would	  be	  no	  use	  in	  mis-­‐describing	  X,	  as	  opposed	  to	  just	  changing	  to	  a	  more	  useful	  framework	  where	  X	  does	  instantiate	  the	  existence	  predicate.	  
	   137	  Traditional	   fictionalists	  hold	   that	   it	   is	   acceptable	   to	   say	   (1)	   ‘there	   is	   a	  prime	  between	  2	  and	  4’	  as	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  internal	  question	  (IQ),	  even	  though	  they	  strictly	  regard	  this	  answer	  as	  false	  given	  that	  they	  too	  say	  (2)	   ‘numbers	  do	  not	  exist’	  as	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  external	  question	  (EQ).	  However,	  since	  the	  Carnapian	  rejects	   this	  metaphysical	  understanding	  of	  the	  EQ	  as	  meaningless,	  the	  traditional	  fictionalist	  position	  cannot	  be	  meaningfully	  formed.	  One	  could	  not	  answer	  the	  EQ	  because	  to	  do	  so	  is	  meaningless	  unless	  construed	  as	  the	  acceptance	  of	  a	  framework,	  and	  so	  in	   answering	   the	   EQ	   negatively	   the	   traditional	   fictionalist	   makes	   a	  meaningless	  claim	  and	  does	  not	  accept	  the	  language	  framework	  within	  which	  they	  would	  then	  go	  on	  to	  answer	  the	  IQ.	  In	  denying	  the	  EQ	  they	  deny	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  IQ,	  and	  as	  such	  say	  meaningless	  things.	  	  	  	  What	  distinguishes	   fictionalism	  from	  other	  antirealist	  positions	   is	   that	  the	  fictionalist	  continues	  to	  utilize	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  entity	  that	  they	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	   for	  its	  usefulness.	  So	   traditionally,	   fictionalists	  do	  adopt	   the	   framework	   for	  an	  entity	  X	  (by	  talking	  about	  X)	  even	  though	  they	  answer	  the	  EQ	  ‘no’	  by	  being	  antirealist	  about	  X.	  This	  now	  does	  not	  make	  sense	  on	  the	  Carnapian	  picture,	  since	  answering	  the	  EQ	  ‘no’	  is	  to	  not	  adopt	  the	  framework.	  The	  traditional	  fictionalist	  about	  mathematics	  for	  instance,	  is	  antirealist	  since	  they	  deny	  that	  there	  are	  objects	  in	  their	  ontology	   that	   are	   numbers,	   but	   is	   distinguished	   by	   further	   saying	  we	  should	  still	  talk	  ‘as	  if’	  there	  are	  objects	  in	  the	  ontology	  that	  are	  numbers	  since	  it	  is	  useful.	  This	  fictionalist	  therefore	  encounters	  some	  tension	  in	  their	  double	  standards	  between	  what	  they	  believe	  and	  how	  they	  talk.191	  So,	  they	  strictly	  answer	  the	  EQ	  negatively	  (that	  there	  are	  no	  such	  things	  existing	  to	  which	  their	  talk	  refers	  to,	  and	  so	  are	  antirealist	  about	  those	  things)	  but	  continue	  talking	  about	  such	  things	  for	  its	  use	  so	  pretend	  to	  answer	  the	  EQ	  positively.	  They	  talk	  like	  a	  realist	  without	  being	  a	  realist.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  191	  This	  double	  standard	  is	  conveyed	  in	  sayings	  like	   ‘wanting	  their	  cake	  and	  eating	  it	  too’,	  ‘talking	  with	  the	  vulgar	  and	  thinking	  with	  the	  learned’	  (Berkeley),	  ‘philosophical	  double	  talk	  which	  repudiates	  an	  ontology	  whilst	  simultaneously	  enjoying	  its	  benefits’	  (Quine	  1960	  p242).	  But	  this	  double	  standard	  is	  blurred	  if	  the	  EQ	  is	  seen	  as	  pragmatic.	  
	   138	  This	   is	  not	  an	  attractive	  way	  of	  being	  a	  fictionalist	  since	  it	  motivates	  a	  certain	   type	   of	   dishonesty.	   I	   put	   forward	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Quietist	  way	   as	   a	   better	   way	   of	   construing	   fictionalism,	   as	   it	   will	   not	   require	  such	  phenomenologically	  problematic	  and	  dishonest	  double	  standards.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  will	  stay	  quiet	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  EQ,	  and	  will	  simply	  have	  one	  attitude	  towards	  the	  thing	  in	  question	  which	  will	  be	   in	  answer	   to	   the	   IQ.	   (Although	   they	  will	   answer	   the	  pragmatic	  EQ	  positively	  so	  as	   to	  adopt	   the	   framework	   for	   its	  practical	  utility).192	  For	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   to	  be	   classed	   as	   fictionalist	  whilst	  maintaining	  their	  quietism	  will	  require	  fictionalism	  to	  be	  divorced	  from	  antirealism,	  which	  I	  will	  now	  go	  on	  to	  describe	  in	  section	  IV.	  Section	  V	  will	  motivate	  how	   this	   quietist	   fictionalism	   is	   continuous	   enough	   with	   traditional	  fictionalism	  to	  be	  deserving	  of	  the	  name	  fictionalism.	  Having	  motivated	  that	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  metaontology	  affects	  traditional	  fictionalism,	  I	  will	  now	  show	  what	  a	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  account	  of	  fictionalism	  would	  be	  like.	  	  	  	   IV.	  Quietist	  version	  of	  fictionalism.	  	  	  Carnap’s	  motivation	   for	   his	   quietism	  was	   to	   allow	  people	   to	   speak	   as	  they	  feel	  is	  useful	  without	  the	  constraint	  of	  ontological	  commitments,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  tolerant	  of	  free	  speech	  without	  ontological	  scruples	  getting	  in	  the	  way.	  This	  description	  of	  Carnap	  makes	  him	  sound	  very	  much	  like	  a	  fictionalist	  indeed	  –	  the	  value	  of	  language	  as	  being	  useful	  independent	  of	  existence,	  and	  to	  have	   the	   freedom	  of	  speech	  (talking	   like	  a	  realist)	  without	  being	  ontologically	  committed	  to	  the	  things	  that	  you	  talk	  about	  (not	  being	  a	   realist).	  These	   typical	   characteristics	  of	   fictionalism,	   such	  as	   the	   value	   of	   discourse	   as	   being	   useful	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   ontological	  commitment	  to	  what	  we	  speak	  of,	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section	  V.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  192	  This	  seems	  to	  trivialize/simplify	  quiet	  fictionalism,	  as	  it	  encompasses	  anyone	  who	  speaks	  of	  an	  entity	  X	  and	  has	  adopted	  the	  X-­‐framework	  for	  its	  usefulness.	  Fictionalism	  does	  not	  describe	  any	  particular	  way	  of	  being	  other	  than	  talking	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  useful.	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  my	  aims	  to	  show	  that	  the	  position	  is	  global	  and	  applies	  to	  everyone.	  	  
	   139	  Despite	   the	   fictionalist	   features	   in	   Carnap,	   Yablo193	  states	   that	   Carnap	  would	  have	  most	   likely	  resisted	   the	  comparison	  between	  his	  quietism	  and	  fictionalism,	  since	  Carnap	  is	  trying	  to	  defend	  ordinary	  internal	  talk	  which	  people	  do	  not	  consider	  as	  being	  fictional.	  However	  I	  believe	  that	  Carnap’s	   quietism	   can	   be	   helpfully	   re-­‐interpreted	   as	   a	   type	   of	  fictionalism,	  and	  that	  Yablo’s	  concern	  is	  misguided,	  given	  the	  distinction	  between	  hermeneutic	  and	  revolutionary	  fictionalism	  that	  I	  will	  describe	  in	  section	  VIII.	  Given	  that	  the	  ordinary	  inquirer	  that	  Carnap	  is	  trying	  to	  defend	  may	  not	  consider	  their	  talk	  as	  being	  fictional,	  I	  would	  prefer	  not	  to	   impute	   so	   much	   error	   into	   their	   ways	   and	   so	   will	   be	   opting	   for	  revolutionary	   fictionalism	   which	   states	   how	   we	   ought	   to	   treat	   the	  discourse	   rather	   than	   how	   we	   do	   treat	   it.194	  Carnap	   may	   also	   have	  denied	  any	  likening	  to	  fictionalism	  due	  to	  the	  traditional	  association	  of	  fictionalism	   with	   antirealism	   –	   an	   unviable	   ontological	   position	   to	   a	  Carnapian	  quietist.	  But	  by	   the	  end	  of	   this	  chapter	   I	  will	  have	  given	  an	  account	  of	  how	  fictionalism	  need	  not	  depend	  on	  antirealism	  and	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  quietist	  position,	  thus	  being	  acceptable	  to	  a	  Carnapian.	  	  	  	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  construes	  frameworks	  as	  fictions,	  and	  is	  quiet	  about	  the	  area	  outside	  of	   them	  (the	  metaphysical	  external	  reality).	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   is	   not	   a	   fictionalist	   about	   this	   external	   reality,	   and	   so	   does	  not	   treat	   talk	   of	   external	   reality	   as	   fictional.	   Rather	   the	   fictionalism	  manifests	  with	  the	   idea	  that	  all	  our	   internal	   talk	   is	   internal	   to	   fictions,	  and	   is	   therefore	   presented	   as	   a	  way	   of	   construing	   the	   frameworks	  as	  
fictions.	  Given	  that	  Carnapian	  quietism	  is	  global,	  so	  will	  the	  fictionalism	  be	  global,195	  as	  all	  frameworks	  will	  be	  considered	  as	  fictions.	  Therefore,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  193	  Yablo	  (1998)	  p243	  194	  Standardly	   revolutionary	   fictionalism	   is	   described	   as	   imputing	  more	   error	   than	  hermeneutic,	   since	  hermeneutic	   fictionalists	   say	   that	  people	  already	  are	   talking	   in	  a	  fictionalist	  way	  (and	  so	  are	  not	  getting	  anything	  wrong	  in	  how	  they	  speak).	  However,	  I	  regard	  the	  error	  in	  hermeneutic	  as	  greater	  than	  that	  in	  revolutionary.	  See	  section	  VIII.	  195	  This	   global	   aspect	   distinguishes	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   from	   traditional	   fictionalisms	  about	  certain	  entities	  or	  discourses,	  like	  morality	  (Joyce	  2001),	  science	  (van	  Fraassen	  1980),	  mathematics	   (Field	  1980),	  possible	  worlds	   (Rosen	  1990),	   fictional	  characters	  (Brock	  2002),	  temporal	  parts	  (Kroon	  2001),	  and	  abstracta	  (Yablo	  2000),	  for	  example.	  
	   140	  this	   is	   a	   fictionalist	  way	   of	   dismissing	   all	   EQ’s	   concerning	  what	   really	  exists,	  and	  treating	  all	  IQ’s	  as	  relative	  to	  fictions.	  All	  talk	  is	  fictional	  and	  the	   contrast	   class	   is	   lost.	   All	   frameworks	   are	   treated	   as	   fictions,	   and	  sentences	   can	  be	   true	  or	   false	   internally	   to	   them.	   Internal	   talk	   is	   thus	  truth-­‐evaluable	  from	  a	  quietist	  point	  of	  view,	  and	  what	  makes	  the	  talk	  true	  or	  false	  is	  the	  fiction,	  rather	  than	  any	  external	  reality.	  So	  the	  IQ	  ‘is	  there	  a	  prime	  between	  2	  and	  4?’	   is	  a	   fictional	  question,	  and	  when	  one	  answers	  that	  3	  is	  a	  prime	  number	  they	  are	  answering	  according	  to	  the	  mathematics	  fiction.	  Talk	  of	  3	  will	  not	  be	  about	  the	  number	  3	  externally,	  as	  this	  is	  meaningless.	  If	  our	  talk	  about	  numbers	  is	  not	  about	  numbers	  in	  the	  external	  world,	  then	  we	  may	  ask	  what	  it	  is	  about,	  and	  my	  version	  of	  fictionalism	  says	  that	  it	  is	  about	  the	  mathematics	  fiction,	  referring196	  to	  things	  in	  that	  fiction.	  Sentences	  will	  be	  made	  true	  in	  an	  internal	  sense	  in	  virtue	  of	  fiction	  presuppositions,	  like	  Carnap’s	  frameworks	  had	  rules	  for	  usage	  which	  made	  sentences	  true	  or	   false	  according	  to	   it.	  All	   truth	  becomes	  relativized	  to	  fiction,	  and	  as	  Currie	  explains,	  what	  is	  true	  in	  the	  fiction	  is	  “what	  is	  part	  of	  the	  story.”197	  (See	  section	  V.iii	  and	  VI).	   I	  now	  describe	  how	  quiet	  fictionalism	  compares	  to	  traditional	  fictionalism.	  	  	   V.	  Traditional	  features	  of	  fictionalisms.	  	  	  Traditional	   fictionalism,	  as	  defined	   in	  section	   III,	   tends	   to	  be	  based	  on	  antirealist	  foundations.	  The	  antirealist	  aspect	  of	  traditional	  fictionalism	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  motivating	  the	  fictionalist	  ideology	  of	  using	  a	  discourse	  for	  its	  usefulness.	  It	  is	  influenced	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  one	  cannot	  speak	  truthfully	  of	  an	  entity	  X	  unless	  X	  exists,	  and	  so	  if	  X	  is	  non-­‐existent	  then	  any	  discourse	  purporting	  to	  refer	  to	  X	  will	  be	  false.	  The	  fictionalist	  move	  is	  to	  then	  continue	  to	  utilize	  this	  discourse	  even	  though	  it	  is	  false,	  
because	  it	  is	  useful.	  The	  fictionalist	  motivation	  is	  thus	  derived	  as	  such:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  196	  Against	  my	  view,	  Currie	  (1990	  p180)	  argues	  that	  fictional	  terms	  do	  not	  refer	  at	  all.	  	  197	  Currie	  (1990)	  p56.	  In	  his	  1990	  Currie	  clarifies	  that	  to	  be	  true	  in	  the	  story	  it	  must	  be	  reasonable	  for	  the	  informed	  reader	  to	  infer	  that	  the	  fictional	  author	  believed	  it.	  (p80)	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Antirealism:	  Xs	  do	  not	  exist.	  	  
Predicament:	  If	  Xs	  do	  not	  exist	  then	  Xs	  cannot	  truthfully	  be	  spoken	  of.	  
Error	  theory:	  X-­‐discourse	  is	  false,	  so	  we	  are	  in	  error	  when	  speaking	  of	  X.	  
Pragmatism:	  X-­‐discourse	  is	  valued	  as	  useful,	  despite	  being	  false.	  	  Traditional	   fictionalisms	  are	  united	   in	   the	   following	  common	  features:	  (i)	  antirealism;	  (ii)	  the	  predicament;	  (iii)	  error	  theory;	  (iv)	  pragmatism;	  (v)	   involving	   something	   less	   than	   absolute	   truth;	   and	   (vi)	   involving	  something	   less	   than	   belief.	   The	   truth	   involved	   in	   (v)	   can	   be	   relative	  truth,	   or	   true	   under	   a	   presupposition,	   discussed	   in	   section	   VI.	   The	  attitude	   involved	   in	   (vi)	   can	   be	   acceptance,	   where	  we	   accept	  what	   is	  presupposed	  and	  believe	  what	  it	  derives,	  discussed	  in	  section	  VII.	  I	  will	  go	   through	   each	   of	   the	   common	   features	   in	   turn	   to	   show	   how	   the	  motivation	   for	   fictionalism	   is	   somewhat	  undermined	  as	   a	  quietist,	   yet	  how	   quietism	   can	   still	   maintain	   the	   ideology	   of	   fictionalism	   in	   many	  ways.	  The	  positive	  component	  of	  fictionalism	  (that	  discourse	  is	  valued	  as	  useful)	  is	  retained	  by	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian,	  despite	  lacking	  the	  negative	  component	  (of	  antirealism).	  And	  hence	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  is	  fictionalist.	  	  	  V.i.	  Antirealism.	  	  	  The	   typical	   motivation	   for	   traditional	   fictionalisms	   is	   ontological,	  namely	  to	  be	  an	  antirealist	  but	  talk	  like	  a	  realist,	  so	  that	  one	  may	  reap	  the	   benefits	   of	   the	   discourse	  without	   “paying	   an	   ontological	   bill”.198	  A	  traditional	   fictionalist	   about	   a	   type	   of	   entity	   X	   claims	   that	   X	   is	   like	   a	  fictional	   entity	   in	   being	   unreal,	   and	   so	   we	   are	   ontologically	  uncommitted	   to	   the	   fictional	   claims	   about	   X.	   Fictionalism	   is	   thus	  traditionally	   antirealist	   because	   statements	   about	   X	   are	   considered	  fictional	  and	  X	  is	  considered	  unreal	  rather	  than	  factual	  and	  real.	  Despite	  being	   antirealist	   in	   theory,	   this	   fictionalist	   appears	   as	   a	   realist	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	  Woodward	  (2008)	  274	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  practice,	  because	  in	  practice	  they	  use	  the	  language	  as	  they	  would	  if	  they	  were	  realist	  for	  its	  practical	  advantages.	  However,	  the	  fictionalist	  need	  not	   be	   realist	   in	   practice	   all	   of	   the	   time	   as	   they	   may	   assert	   their	  antirealist	   beliefs	   in	   critical	   contexts.	   The	   defining	   aspect	   of	   the	  fictionalist	   is	   that	   they	   adopt	   a	   fiction	   some	   of	   the	   time	   in	   order	   to	  continue	  using	   a	   realist-­‐like	   discourse	   despite	   their	   antirealist	   beliefs,	  so	  as	  to	  talk	  without	  ontological	  commitment	  to	  something	  they	  count	  as	  unreal.	  The	  discourse	  is	  seen	  as	  useful	  so	  that	  dispensing	  of	  it	  due	  to	  antirealism	  is	  not	  preferable.	  The	  fictionalist	  thus	  engages	  in	  realist	  talk	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  fiction	  so	  as	  to	  speak	  without	  ontological	  commitment.	  	  	  	  Despite	   taking	   antirealism	   to	   be	  meaningless,	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  may	  still	   fulfill	  a	  good	  proportion	  of	   the	   fictionalist	   ideology	  by	  arguing	   for	  the	   value	   of	   utilizing	   a	   discourse	  without	   ontological	   commitment,	   by	  being	  ontologically	  quiet	  (rather	  than	  by	  being	  antirealist).	  They	  would	  thus	   also	   pay	   no	   ontological	   bill	  when	   talking	   in	   a	   useful,	   realist-­‐like,	  way.	  The	  Carnapian	  has	  no	  ontological	   commitments199	  since	   they	  are	  quiet	  about	  ontology,	  and	  so	  like	  an	  antirealist	  fictionalist	  they	  can	  talk	  about	  all	   sorts	   of	   things	  without	   being	   ontologically	   committed	   to	   the	  things	  talked	  about.	  The	  role	  antirealism	  plays	  in	  fictionalism	  (to	  refrain	  from	  ontological	  commitments)	  can	  thus	  be	  successfully	  performed	  by	  quietism,	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  can	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  fictionalist	  despite	   rejecting	  antirealism	  and	  being	  quietist	   instead.	  All	  commitments	  to	  a	  metaphysical	  reality	  are	  merely	  apparent,	  and	  so	  all	  discourses	   have	   the	   same	   status	   as	   fictional	   discourses.	   The	   status	   of	  the	   fictional	   discourse	   is	   not	   antirealist	   (since	   this	   is	  meaningless	   for	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian)	  but	  rather	  is	  non-­‐committal	  ontologically,	  which	  is	  what	   quietism	   provides.	   The	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   therefore	   still	   fulfills	   the	  role	   played	   by	   antirealism	   in	   fictionalism	  with	   their	   quietism,	   and	   so	  can	  be	  said	  to	  retain	  the	  fictionalist	  rationale	  of	  adopting	  a	  discourse	  for	  its	  practical	  utility	  without	  paying	  ontological	  bills	  for	  how	  they	  talk.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199	  But	  they	  do	  have	  quiet	  internal	  existential	  commitments	  from	  the	  predicate	  ‘exists’.	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  V.ii.	  Predicament.	  	  	  The	   ‘Predicament’	   says	   ‘If	  Xs	  do	  not	  exist	   then	  Xs	  cannot	   truthfully	  be	  spoken	  of’.	  This	  can	  be	  split	  into	  two	  parts:	  (1)	  ‘If	  Xs	  do	  not	  exist	  then	  a	  domain	  of	   quantification	   cannot	   contain	  Xs’;	   and	   (2)	   ‘If	   the	  domain	  of	  quantification	  does	  not	  contain	  Xs	  then	  Xs	  cannot	  truthfully	  be	  spoken	  of’.	  In	  chapter	  2	  I	  attacked	  part	  (1)	  of	  this	  predicament,200	  since	  I	  argued	  in	  a	  Meinongian	  way	  that	  domains	  need	  not	  be	  restricted	  to	  existents,	  and	  so	  quantification	   is	  ontologically	  neutral.	   I	  concluded	  that	   there	   is	  no	   entry	   requirement	   of	   existence	   to	   be	   included	   in	   a	   domain,	   and	  anything	  that	  we	  talk	  of	  (existent	  or	  non-­‐existent)	  can	  be	  in	  a	  domain.	  	  	  	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   therefore	  undercuts	   the	  motivation	   for	   traditional	  fictionalism	  from	  antirealism,	  since	  not	  only	  is	  antirealism	  not	  a	  viable	  position	  but	  also	  this	  antirealism	  would	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  our	   discourse	   is	   false	   (due	   to	   the	   Meinongian	   aspect	   dismissing	   the	  predicament	  –	  see	  chapter	  2	  p91).	  The	  connection	  between	  antirealism	  and	   error	   theory,	   via	   this	   predicament,	   is	   broken,	   since	   not-­‐existing	  does	   not	   entail	   not-­‐being-­‐in-­‐a-­‐domain,	   so	   not-­‐existing	   does	   not	   entail	  not-­‐being-­‐able-­‐to-­‐be-­‐truthfully-­‐or-­‐meaningfully-­‐spoken-­‐of.	   Regardless	  of	  whether	  antirealism	  is	  true,	  then,	  we	  cannot	  get	  to	  error	  theory	  since	  the	   predicament	   that	   connects	   them	   is	   rejected.	   In	   this	  way,	   is	   seems	  Meinongianism	   is	   incompatible	   with	   fictionalism,	   as	   the	   Meinongian	  allows	  for	  talk	  of	  non-­‐existents	  to	  be	  true	  by	  allowing	  them	  in	  domains,	  yet	  the	  fictionalist	  explains	  why	  talk	  of	  non-­‐existents	  is	  false	  by	  treating	  them	   as	   fictions.	   However	   under	   quietism	   they	   are	   compatible,	   since	  truth	  and	  falsity	  is	  internal.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  is	  a	  quietist	  Meinongian,	  yet	   can	   still	   be	   fictionalist	   by	   adopting	   a	   discourse	   for	   its	   usefulness	  rather	  than	  its	  external	  truth.	  More	  on	  this	  in	  the	  Conclusion	  chapter.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	  I	  do	  not	  attack	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  predicament,	  since	  to	  allow	  for	  truthful	  talk	  without	  reference	  to	  anything	  is	  to	  allow	  for	  empty	  domains,	  like	  in	  free	  logics.	  
	   144	  The	   very	   point	   of	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Quietism	   is	   to	   retain	   our	   ability	   to	  speak	  about	  things	  regardless	  of	  their	  ontological	  status,	  as	  we	  are	  to	  be	  quiet	  about	  this	  status,	  yet	  it	  need	  not	  follow	  that	  we	  then	  stop	  talking	  about	  things	  altogether.	  The	  point	  was	  to	  be	  able	  to	  continue	  to	  talk	  in	  a	  useful	  way	  without	  ontological	  constraint,	  but	   it	  was	  not	   the	  case	  that	  without	  the	  ontology	  the	  talk	  is	  automatically	  false.	  This	  is	  very	  much	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  fictionalist	  ‘Predicament’	  that	  without	  entity	  X	  existing	  the	  X-­‐discourse	  will	  be	  faulty	  in	  some	  way,	  and	  in	  need	  of	  rescuing	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	   it	   still	  being	  useful.	  However	   in	  denying	   that	  existence	  has	   any	   effect	   on	   a	   truth	   evaluation	   we	   need	   not	   conclude	   that	   a	  discourse	  is	  faulty	  just	  because	  its	  terms	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  existent	  things.	  So	   having	   denied	   antirealism	   and	   the	   ‘Predicament’,	  we	   then	   lack	   the	  error	  that	  motivates	  traditional	  fictionalism.	  Without	  this	  predicament,	  there	   is	   no	   entailment	   from	   antirealism	   to	   error	   theory,	   and	  without	  reason	   to	  be	   in	  error	   there	   is	  no	  reason	   to	  be	  a	   fictionalist.	  The	  error,	  according	   to	   traditional	   fictionalism,	  was	   due	   to	   antirealism,	  with	   the	  predicament	  making	  the	  connection.	  In	  order	  for	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  to	  be	   a	   fictionalist	   then	   they	   will	   need	   to	   arrive	   at	   their	   error	   theory	  independently	  of	  the	  predicament	  and	  the	  antirealism	  that	  they	  deny.201	  	  	  V.iii.	  Error	  theory.	  	  	  The	   traditional	   fictionalist,	  motivated	  by	   an	   antirealism	   that	   leads	   the	  discourse	  about	  X	  to	  be	  untrue	  (under	  the	  ‘Predicament’),	  will	  state	  that	  the	   discourse	   user	   is	   in	   error,	   and	   as	   such	   antirealist	   fictionalism	   is	  based	  on	  an	  error	  theory.	  If	  all	  of	  the	  X-­‐discourse	  is	  untrue,	  then	  when	  we	  use	  it	  to	  make	  positive	  claims	  about	  X	  we	  say	  something	  false.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  201	  Some	  fictionalists	  deny	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  discourse	  being	  false	  and	  being	  in	  error	  about	   the	  discourse,	   since	   they	   take	   it	   that	   speaking	   in	   fictional	   terms	  does	  not	   always	   involve	   being	   in	   error:	   Joyce	   (2001)	   p197	   “When	   a	   child	  make-­‐believes	  that	  the	  upturned	  table	  is	  a	  ship,	  she	  is	  thinking	  the	  proposition	  ‘the	  table	  is	  a	  ship’…	  without	  believing	   that	  proposition.	  The	  proposition	   is,	  of	   course,	   false,	  but	  we	  could	  not	  on	  that	  account	  accuse	  the	  child	  of	  any	  error”.	  Thanks	  to	  Stephen	  Ingram	  for	  this.	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  discourse	  user	  may	  be	  in	  error	  also	  in	  one	  of	  two	  ways:	  (1)	  by	  believing	  their	  discourse	  is	  true	  when	  it	  is	  false;	  or	  (2)	  by	  treating	  the	  discourse	  in	   a	   realist	   way	   rather	   than	   an	   antirealist/fictional	   way.	   So,	   speakers	  can	  be	  in	  error	  by	  believing	  their	  talk	  of	  X	  to	  be	  true	  when	  it	  is	  actually	  false,	  or	  by	  using	  X-­‐talk	   in	  a	  realist	  way	  when	  they	  ought	   to	  be	  or	  are	  unknowingly	  using	  the	  term	  for	  entity	  X	  in	  a	  fictional	  way.	  According	  to	  the	  traditional	  antirealist	  fictionalist,	  under	  the	  mistaken	  ‘Predicament’,	  if	  Xs	  do	  not	  exist	  then	  all	  our	  positively	  quantified	  talk	  of	  X	  is	  false.	  Our	  
discourse	   is	   in	  error	  (by	  being	   false),	  and	  the	  discourse	  user	   is	   in	  error	  (by	  believing	  it	  to	  be	  true	  or	  at	  least	  by	  not	  believing	  that	  it	  is	  fictional).	  It	  is	  these	  two	  stages	  of	  error	  that	  then	  motivates	  the	  fictionalist	  to	  find	  something	  positive	  about	  the	  discourse	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  still	  be	  justified	  in	  using	  it,	  despite	  the	  error.	  The	  error	  theory	  thus	  motivates	  pragmatism.	  	  	  	  As	  shown	  above,	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  does	  not	  get	  to	  error	  theory	  from	  antirealism,	  since	  they	  reject	  antirealism	  and	  the	  predicament	  that	  links	  it	  to	  error	  theory.	  However	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  still	  locates	  error	  in	  the	  discourse	  user.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  thus	  fulfills	  this	  criterion	  for	  being	  a	  fictionalist	   by	   locating	   the	   error	   in	   language	   users	   either	   by	   thinking	  they	  are	  speaking	  about	  the	  external	  world	  (but	  actually	  they	  are	  being	  metaphysically	   quiet),	   or	   by	   not	   treating	   linguistic	   frameworks	   as	  fictions.	  Their	  error	  is	  in	  believing	  realism	  to	  be	  true	  and	  thinking	  they	  are	   speaking	   in	   a	   realist	   way	   accordingly,	   or	   by	   not	   acknowledging	  frameworks	  as	   fictions.	   (The	  differences	  between	  attributions	  of	  error	  will	   be	   discussed	   further	   in	   section	  VIII	  which	  describes	   two	   types	   of	  fictionalism,	   hermeneutic	   and	   revolutionary,	   which	   attribute	   these	  different	  types	  of	  errors	  to	  their	  users	  of	  the	  fictional	  discourse.)	  	  	  The	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   can	   thus	   retain	   the	   error	   theory	   aspect	   of	  fictionalism	   by	   treating	   ordinary	   discourse	   users	   as	   being	   in	   error	   in	  some	  way.	   But	   as	   shown	   above,	   the	   traditional	   fictionalist	   also	   treats	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  the	  discourse	  itself	  as	  being	  in	  error,	  not	  just	  the	  discourse	  user,	  since	  the	  discourse	  itself	  will	  be	  false.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  can	  too	  here	  meet	  this	  fictionalist	  criterion,	  if	  being	  ‘in	  error’	  is	  just	  being	  ‘not	  externally	  true’,	  since	   the	   frameworks	   themselves	  will	  not	   be	   externally	   true	   (yet	   this	  does	   not	   make	   them	   false	   as	   for	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   being	   externally	  true	  or	  false	  is	  meaningless).	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  treats	  the	  frameworks	  themselves	  as	  non-­‐cognitive	  because	  they	  are	  to	  be	  adopted	  for	  purely	  pragmatic	   reasons	   and	   are	   not	   based	   on	   external	   truth.	   Given	   the	  rejection	   of	   external	   truth,	   the	   frameworks	   have	   nothing	   to	   be	   true	  according	   to,	   and	   so	   they	   are	   not	   externally	   true	   (or	   false).	   So	   the	  discourse	  itself	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  ‘not	  externally	  true’	  on	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  model.	  The	  difference	  is	  the	  reason	  for	  it	  not	  being	  externally	  true,	   as	   it	   is	   not	   due	   to	   being	   externally	   false	   but	   due	   to	   not	   being	  externally	  truth-­‐apt.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  therefore	  also	  fulfils	  the	  error	  theory	  aspect	  of	  traditional	  fictionalism,	  making	  it	  worthy	  of	  the	  title.	  	  	  The	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   hence	   distinguishes	   between	   internal	   truth	   (true	  according	   to	   the	   internal	   rules	   of	   the	   framework)	   and	   external	   Truth	  (with	   a	   capital	   T,	   Truth	   in	   the	   external	   metaphysical	   realm).	   The	  traditional	  fictionalist	  takes	  the	  discourse	  in	  question	  to	  be	  in	  error	  by	  not	  being	  True.	  Such	  fictionalists	  talk	  about	  ‘true	  in	  the	  fiction’	  for	  what	  the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   calls	   ‘internal	   truth’,	   so	   the	   traditional	   fictionalist	  view	   is	   that	   a	   claim	   such	   as	   2+2=4	   is	   not	   True,	   but	   is	   true	   in	   the	  fiction.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  proposal	  is	  to	  call	  ‘true	  in	  the	  fiction’	  simply	  ‘true’,	   and	   to	   reject	   the	   meaningfulness	   of	   Truth	   talk	   (as	   this	   is	  meaningless	  by	  being	  external	  and	  independent	  of	  the	  frameworks).	  	  So	  the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   follows	   the	   traditional	   fictionalist	   in	   saying	   that	  claims	  within	   a	   framework	   are	   true	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   being	   ‘true	   in	   the	  fiction’,	  but	  rejects	   the	  assumption	  behind	  such	   fictionalism	  that	   there	  is	   a	   value	  of	  Truth	   that	   goes	  beyond	   that.	   So,	   like	   the	   traditional	  non-­‐
global	   fictionalist,	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  rejects	  the	  Truth	  of	  these	  claims,	  but	   unlike	   the	   non-­‐global	   fictionalist,	   they	   do	   not	   think	  any	   discourse	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  meets	   the	   external	  Truth	   standard.	   So	   all	   that	   is	   left	   is	   the	   fictionalist	  assessment	  of	  the	  pragmatic	  value	  (see	  next	  section	  V.iv)	  of	  speaking	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  that	  does	  not	  appeal	  to	  Truth	  –	  this	  value	  is	  usefulness.	  	  	  	  V.iv.	  Pragmatism.	  	  	  A	  key	  positive	  aspect	  of	  being	  a	  fictionalist	  about	  an	  entity	  X	  is	  that	  X-­‐talk	   does	   not	   have	   to	   be	   literally	   or	   externally	   True	   in	   order	   to	   be	  valuable.	   In	   terms	   of	   the	   antirealist	   fictionalist,	   X-­‐talk	  will	   actually	   be	  False,	  yet	  they	  retain	  X-­‐talk	  as	  it	  is	  still	  useful	  to	  speak	  as	  if	  X	  exists.	  The	  ideology	   here	   is	   that	   literal	   external	   Truth	   is	   not	   the	   only	   value	   to	  discourse,	  and	  usefulness	  is	  a	  value	  that	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  such	  Truth.	  Fictional	  discourse	  is	  considered	  useful,	  and	  so	  the	  fictionalist	  about	  X	  can	   say	   that	  discourse	  about	  X	   is	   fictional,	   and	   is	  useful,	   regardless	  of	  whether	  X	  exists	  which	  entails	  whether	  X-­‐talk	  is	  True	  (according	  to	  the	  ‘Predicament’).	  A	  discourse	  about	  X	   can	  be	   classed	  as	  valuable	   simply	  for	  being	  useful,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  fictionalist’s	  pragmatic	  ideology,	  which	  I	  believe	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   can	   fulfill.	   It	   is	   this	   positive	  pragmatism	  of	  fictionalism	  that	  I	  believe	  is	  the	  most	  important	  aspect	  to	  retain.	  	  	  Despite	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   rejecting	   the	   ‘Predicament’	   (that	   non-­‐existence	  implies	  false	  discourse)	  due	  to	  their	  Meinongian	  aspect,	  they	  still	   agree	   that	   a	   discourse	   can	   be	   valued	   as	   being	   simply	   useful.	   The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   meets	   this	   fictionalist	   criterion	   by	   holding	   that	   the	  frameworks	   we	   speak	   within	   are	   useful	   to	   employ	   as	   a	   whole	   even	  though	   they	   are	   not	   Truth-­‐evaluable	   as	   a	  whole.	   The	   reason	   they	   are	  not	  Truth-­‐evaluable	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  because	  in	  order	  to	  be	  so	  they	  would	  have	  to	  be	  evaluated	  by	  something	  outside	  of	  those	  frameworks,	  which	  is	   an	   external	   realm	   to	   language	   that	   the	   quietist	   denies	   and	   states	   is	  meaningless.	   Therefore,	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   is	   fictionalist	   about	   a	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  discourse	   that	   on	   the	   whole	   is	   not	   Truth-­‐apt,	   whereas	   the	   antirealist	  fictionalist	   takes	   the	   discourse	   to	   be	   not	   True	   (and	   thus	   False).	   The	  Carnapian	  frameworks	  are	  considered	  as	  useful	  to	  utilize	  their	  language	  within,	  and	  so	  they	  are	   fictional	  and	  have	  value	   independent	  of	  Truth.	  Furthermore,	  the	  discourse	  internal	  to	  the	  fictional	  framework	  is	  useful	  despite	  not	  being	  based	  on	  an	  existing	  external	  reality	  to	  make	  it	  True,	  and	   so	   the	   discourse	   is	   valued	   as	   useful	   independent	   of	  whether	   it	   is	  based	  on	  metaphysically	  existent	  things.	  So	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian,	  like	  the	  traditional	   fictionalist,	   maintains	   that	   the	   discourse	   in	   question	   does	  not	   refer	   to	   existing	   things	   in	   the	   metaphysical	   realm.	   For	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   this	   is	   because	   such	   a	   realm	   is	   meaningless	   and	   for	   the	  traditional	   fictionalist	   this	   is	   because	   that	   realm	   does	   not	   contain	   the	  entities	   in	   question.	   Thus	   despite	   lacking	   the	   traditional	   route	   to	  pragmatism,	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  still	  maintains	  the	  fictionalist	  ideology.	  	  	  	  The	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   therefore	   picks	   up	   on	   the	   positive	   pragmatic	  element	  of	  fictionalism	  by	  saying	  the	  only	  virtue	  that	  matters	  (or	  even	  that	  there	  is)	  for	  evaluating	  a	  discourse	  is	  the	  pragmatic	  one.	  	  There	  is	  thus	   no	   need	   to	   find	   fault	   with	   the	   discourses,	   but	   rather,	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	  can	  provide	  a	   fictionalist	  account	  of	  what	   is	  valuable	  about	  them	  –	  namely	  their	  usefulness.	  The	  discourses	  in	  question	  have	  a	  value	  that	   is	   independent	   of	   their	   Truth,	   since	   for	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   this	  Truth	  is	  external	  and	  thus	  meaningless	  and	  not	  relevant	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	   discourses.	   This	   is	   enough	   to	   maintain	   the	   fictionalist	   pragmatic	  ideology	   to	  show	  how	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	   fictionalist.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  has	  therefore	  demonstrated	  their	  fictionalism	  by	  (i)	  maintaining	   the	   appeal	   to	   lack	   of	   ontological	   commitment	   (through	  quietism	  rather	   than	  antirealism);	   (ii)	   their	   attribution	  of	   error	   to	   the	  discourse	   and	   the	   discourse	   user	   (through	   it	   being	   quiet	   and	   not	  realist);	   and	   (iii)	   valuing	   a	   discourse	   for	   being	   useful	   (despite	   it	   not	  being	   True).	   I	   will	   now	   show	   how	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   maintains	  fictionalist	  aspects	  in	  truth	  and	  belief	  in	  the	  next	  two	  sections	  VI-­‐VII.	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  VI.	  Truth	  and	  Presupposition.	  	  	  Fiction	  is	  often	  contrasted	  with	  fact,	  so	  that	  ‘fictional’	  means	  something	  like	  ‘False’.	  This	  is	  how	  the	  antirealist	  fictionalist	  treats	  fictions,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  ontologically	  uncommitted	  to	  the	  fictional	  statements	  and	  for	  the	  speaker	   to	  be	   in	  error.	  Traditionally	   speaking,	   the	   fiction	   is	   treated	  as	  overall	   to	   be	   unreal	   in	   some	   way.	   However,	   Currie	   has	   argued	   that	  “fictional	   works	   often	   contain	   true	   sentences”202	  and	   can	   reveal	   facts	  about	   reality,	   and	   so	   it	   may	   perhaps	   not	   be	   fitting	   to	   equate	   fiction	  completely	  with	  Falsity.	  This	  counts	  against	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  fiction	  and	  fictionalism,	  since	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  fiction	  shows	  that	  fictions	  are	  not	  strictly	  speaking	  entirely	  False	  or	  unreal,	  yet	  traditional	   fictionalism	   treats	   the	   ‘fictional’	  discourse	  as	  being	  entirely	  False	  and	  unreal.	  This	  also	  counts	  against	   the	  analogy	  to	   fiction	  that	  a	  quietist	  fictionalist	  like	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  can	  make,	  since	  they	  cannot	  compare	  what	  is	  true	  in	  the	  fiction	  to	  what	  is	  True	  in	  reality	  for	  they	  are	  quiet	  about	  such	  an	  external	  reality.	  Nevertheless,	  hopefully	  this	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  more	  of	  a	  connection	  between	  quietist	  fictionalism	  and	  the	  metaphysics	   of	   fiction	   than	   between	   antirealist	   fictionalism	   and	   the	  metaphysics	   of	   fiction,	   as	   the	   quietist	   does	   not	   demand	   fictions	   to	   be	  entirely	   false	   or	   unreal,	   but	   rather	   only	   demands	   that	   they	   not	   be	  judged	  on	  those	  features	  since	  they	  are	  quiet	  about	  such	  external	  facts.	  	  	  	  When	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   states	   that	   linguistic	   frameworks	   are	   to	   be	  treated	   as	   fictions,	   they	   do	   not	   mean	   that	   they	   should	   be	   treated	   as	  False	  or	  their	  objects	  seen	  as	  non-­‐existent,	  (because	  to	  be	  evaluated	  as	  False	  would	  require	  an	  external	  Truth	  to	  assess	  the	  fiction	  against,	  and	  for	   their	   objects	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   non-­‐existent	   is	   to	   be	   unquiet	   about	  reality).	   Rather,	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   treats	   frameworks	   as	   fictions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  202	  Currie	   (1990)	   p9.	   He	   argues	   against	   Lamarque	   and	   Olson	   (1994)	   that	   truth	   is	   a	  value	   in	   fiction,	  and	  that	  “[fictions]	  are	  sensitive	  to	  aspects	  of	   the	  real	  world.”	  (2012	  p23),	  and	  furthermore	  that	  “fictions…	  may	  lead	  indirectly	  to	  knowledge.”	  (1998	  p161)	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  because	  they	  are	  valued	  aside	  from	  their	  Truth.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  does	  not	   claim	   that	   fictions	   are	  not	  True	  and	  are	   therefore	  False,	  instead	  they	  claim	  that	  fictions	  are	  not	  True	  or	  False	  and	  thus	  are	  not	   Truth-­‐apt.	   The	   frameworks	   for	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   are	   therefore	  fictions	  that	  are	  not	  Truth-­‐evaluable	  as	  a	  whole	  (as	  they	  are	  quiet	  about	  Truth),	  however	  the	  sentences	   that	  make	  up	  the	   fiction	  are	  capable	  of	  truth	   and	   falsity	   internally	   to	   the	   fiction.	   Absolute	   Truth	   is	   given	   up	  along	   with	   external	   reality,	   so	   the	   quietism	   extends	   its	   target	   from	  metaphysics	   to	   Truth.	   What	   remains	   is	   existence	   relative	   to	   fictional	  frameworks	   and	   truth	   relative	   to	   fictional	   frameworks.	   There	   can	   be	  nothing	  to	  be	  said	  to	  exist	  externally,	  and	  nothing	  to	  be	  said	  to	  be	  True	  absolutely.	  This	  is	  because	  to	  be	  True	  absolutely	  would	  mean	  to	  be	  true	  not	   relative	   to	   the	   framework	   but	   independently	   and	   externally,	   and	  thus	  delves	  into	  the	  meaningless	  external	  reality	  that	  quietists	  deny.	  	  	  So	  how	  are	  sentences	  internal	  to	  a	  fictional	  framework	  meant	  to	  be	  true	  or	   false	   according	   to	   it?	  203	  Byrne	   explains	   that	   what	  we	   cannot	   do	   is	  simply	  read	  off	  what	  is	  true	  by	  what	  is	  stated	  (explicitly	  or	  entailed)	  in	  the	  fiction	  as	  this	  provides	  neither	  a	  necessary	  nor	  sufficient	  condition	  for	   truth	   according	   to	   a	   fiction.204	  The	   reasons	   given	   are	   that	   some	  things	  stated	  may	  be	  false	  (by	  an	  unreliable	  narrator,	  for	  instance),	  and	  not	   all	   truths	   are	   stated	   (because	   there	   are	   too	  many	   truths	   to	   state).	  The	   first	  of	   these	  worries	  may	  be	  put	   aside	   for	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian,	   as	  there	  can	  be	  no	  way	  that	  the	  fiction	  states	  something	  that	  is	  false,	  as	  the	  falsity	  would	   have	   to	   come	   from	   an	   independent	   source	   of	   judgment,	  and	   all	   truth	   is	   relative	   to	   the	   fiction	   so	   what	   the	   fiction	   dictates	   is	  automatically	  what	   is	   true	   relative	   to	   that	   fiction.	  As	   for	  not	  all	   truths	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	  Problematic	   cases	   include	   sentences	   like	   ‘Holmes	   is	   famous’,	   which	   according	   to	  the	  Holmes	  fiction,	  it	  is	  false	  that	  he	  is	  famous	  (as	  in	  the	  story	  he	  is	  not	  famous),	  and	  according	  to	   ‘real	   life’	   fiction,	   it	   is	   true	  that	  he	   is	   famous.	  This	  may	  be	  solved	  by	   just	  stipulating	   which	   fiction	   you	   mean	   or	   are	   speaking	   within,	   so	   that	   the	   sentence	   is	  assessed	  relative	  to	  whichever	  one	  is	  presupposed:	  false	  in	  novel	  fiction,	  true	  in	  real	  life	  fiction.	  Walton	  (1990)	  resolves	  this	  with	  cross-­‐fictional	  games	  as	  extended	  fictions.	  204	  Byrne	  (1993)	  p1	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  being	  stated,	  this	  is	  the	  incompleteness	  problem,205	  and	  again	  I	  believe	  this	  not	  to	  be	  a	  worry	  for	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  as	  the	  only	  truths	  that	  may	  be	  assertable	  are	  going	  to	  be	  relative	  to	  a	  fiction	  and	  so	  there	  must	  be	  some	  fiction	  that	  states	  it	  otherwise	  it	  would	  not	  be	  classed	  as	  a	  truth.	  So,	  for	  all	  truths	  asserted,	  they	  are	  relative	  to	  a	  fiction	  which	  states	  it	  in	  some	  way,	  and	  no	   falsehoods	  will	  be	  stated	  by	   the	   fiction	  as	   this	  goes	  against	   the	   definition	   of	   relative	   truth	   that	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   is	  working	  with.	  Of	  course,	  something	  can	  be	  false	  relative	  to	  a	  fiction,	  but	  that	  will	   be	  when	   the	   fiction	   states	   it	   as	  being	   false	   (according	   to	   the	  framework	   rules).	   The	   difference	   between	  what	   is	   stated	   and	  what	   is	  true	  in	  the	  fiction	  is	  more	  a	  problem	  for	  literary	  fictions,	  rather	  than	  the	  type	  of	  fictionalism	  in	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  picture.	  This	  is	  because	  what	  I	  mean	  by	   fiction	   is	   simply	  what	   falls	  out	  of	   the	  sets	  of	  presuppositions	  and	  principles	  of	   generation	  and	   so	   the	  analogy	  breaks	  down	  and	   the	  problems	  faced	  by	  literary	  fictions	  are	  not	  faced	  by	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian.	  	  	  	  This	  fictionalist-­‐style	  relative	  truth	  adopted	  by	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  goes	  faithfully	  back	  to	  Carnap:	  the	  linguistic	  frameworks	  have	  rules	  for	  usage	  and	  meaning	  of	  the	  terms	  in	  that	  framework,	  where	  sentences	  about	  an	  entity	  X	   are	   internal	   to	   the	  X-­‐framework	   and	   responsible	   only	   to	   that	  framework’s	   rules	  of	  assertion,	  where	   ‘true’	   is	  a	   label	  we	  apply	   to	   the	  sentences	  the	  rules	  let	  us	  assert.	  So,	  truth	  is	  relative	  to	  the	  frameworks	  (or	   fictions)	   rules.	   Sentences	   that	   are	   internal	   to	   the	   framework	   are	  then	  divided	  into	  the	  ones	  that	  become	  (i)	  trivialized	  (i.e.	  are	  true	  as	  a	  trivial	   consequence	   of	   the	   framework	   itself);	   and	   others	   that	   become	  (ii)	   empirical	   (or	  by	  being	  non-­‐trivial	   consequences	  of	   the	   framework	  rules).	   If	  we	   have	   adopted	   a	   framework	   for	   the	   system	  of	   X,	   then	   the	  sentence	  ‘there	  are	  Xs’	  says	  X	  exists	  internally	  to	  the	  X-­‐framework	  and	  so	   is	  of	   the	  former	  category	  (trivial).	  More	  specific	  sentences	  however	  are	  not	  so	  trivial	  and	  fall	  into	  the	  latter	  category:	  they	  would	  be	  true	  or	  false	  empirically,	  or	  relative	  to	  the	  rules	  governed	  by	  the	  X-­‐framework.	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  Currie	  (1990	  p54)	  calls	  it	  ‘indeterminacy’	  as	  there	  are	  indeterminate	  parts	  of	  fiction.	  
	   152	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  will	  follow	  Carnap’s	  approach	  to	  relative	  truth	  with	  regard	   to	   fictions	   in	   place	   of	   the	   frameworks,	   and	   will	   include	   the	  notion	   of	   presupposition	   to	   explain	   how	   people	   can	   assert	   the	  sentences	  truly	  (relative	  to	  a	  framework)	  without	  a	  prefix	  of	  ‘according	  to	  the	  fiction	  it	  is	  true	  that…’,	  for	  example.	  The	  presupposition	  is	  about	  the	   fiction,	   such	   that	   sentences	   in	   a	   fiction	   are	   true	  when	   they	   follow	  from	  the	  presupposition	  of	  that	  fiction.	  This	  is	  parallel	  to	  Sainsbury’s206	  approach,	  to	  work	  under	  the	  presupposition	  of	  a	  fiction	  and	  see	  what	  is	  true	  relative	  to	  and	  according	  to	  it.	  No	  talk	  will	  be	  presupposition	  free,	  as	   all	   talk	   (in	   order	   to	   be	  meaningful)	   will	   be	   internal	   from	  within	   a	  fiction,	   and	   as	   such	   the	   fiction	   will	   be	   presupposed	   in	   order	   for	   the	  sentence	   to	   be	   asserted	  meaningfully	   by	   a	   speaker.	   The	   sentence	  will	  then	  be	  true	  if	  it	  is	  true	  relative	  to	  the	  fiction	  that	  has	  been	  presupposed.	  	  	  	  In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   assertion,	   the	   presupposition	   itself	   is	   not	   up	   for	  debate,	  rather	  it	  serves	  much	  like	  a	  Carnapian	  framework	  against	  which	  various	   sentences	   are	   evaluated,	   some	   as	   true	   and	   some	   false.207	  This	  status	  of	  the	  presuppositions	  as	  not	  being	  up	  for	  debate	  was	  discussed	  in	  section	  I	  of	  this	  chapter,	  to	  show	  that	  in	  fictions	  the	  presuppositions	  are	   not	   the	   types	   of	   thing	   that	   we	   question	   in	   response	   to	   evidence	  (since	  the	  for	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  there	  is	  no	  such	  evidence	  or	  external	  Truth	   to	   judge	   the	   presupposition	   against).	   So	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	  position	   involves	   relative	   truth	   instead	   of	   absolute	   Truth,	   where	  relative	   truth	   is	   like	   fidelity	   (to	  be	   faithful	   to	   the	   fiction	  presupposed)	  and	  is	  true	  under	  the	  presupposition	  of	  the	  fiction.	  (Such	  relativity	  was	  discussed	   in	   chapter	  1	   section	   IV	  where	   I	   argue	   that	  both	  Carnap	  and	  Quine	  ought	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  quiet	  relativists.)	  Next	  I	  discuss	  belief.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  206	  Sainsbury	  (2010).	  Another	  parallel	  between	  Sainsbury’s	  approach	  and	  mine	  is	  that,	  as	  Sainsbury	  notes,	   the	  notion	  of	   truth	  under	  a	  presupposition	  needs	   cashing	  out	   in	  more	  detail	  –	  Sainsbury	  provides	  no	  such	  cash,	  and	  neither	  do	  I.	  Instead	  I	  can	  defer	  to	  Yablo’s	  account	  (2006,	  2009,	  2010,	  and	  2014)	  where	  he	  has	  replaced	  games	  of	  make-­‐believe	  with	  presuppositions	  and	  simply	  spells	  these	  out	  as	  being	  the	  things	  we	  take	  for	  granted	  in	  the	  process	  of	  evaluating	  a	  claim.	  (See	  Berto	  and	  Plebani	  (2015)	  p81).	  	  207	  Sainsbury	  (2010)	  p146	  
	   153	  VII.	  Belief	  and	  Assertion.	  	  	  According	  to	  Sainsbury	  you	  do	  not	  believe	  what	  you	  presuppose,	  rather	  you	  may	  merely	  accept	  it.208	  Presupposition	  is	  distinct	  from	  pretense,	  as	  presupposition	  produces	  genuine	  assertions	  yet	  pretense	  as	  pretending	  produces	  utterances	   that	  are	  not	   to	  be	   taken	  as	  genuine	  assertions.209	  Once	   a	   presupposition	   is	   accepted,	   all	   sentences	   uttered	   under	   it	   are	  genuine.	  You	  do	  not	  pretend	  to	  assert	  the	  internal	  claims,	  as	  you	  mean	  and	  believe	   them	   to	  be	   true	   (relative	   to	  presuppositions	  of	   the	   fiction	  that	  they	  are	  internal	  to).	  Once	  you	  have	  accepted	  the	  presupposition	  of	  the	   fiction,	  you	  can	  assert	  and	  believe	  all	   the	  sentences	   that	  are	  made	  relative	  to	  it.	  The	  decision	  of	  whether	  to	  accept	  the	  fiction	  that	  will	  then	  be	  presupposed	  will	  be	  a	  choice	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  fruitful	  and	  conducive	  to	  the	  aim	  for	  which	  the	  language	  is	  intended	  (parallel	  to	  how	  Carnap’s	  frameworks	  are	  chosen).	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  will	  argue	  that	  we	  should	  accept	   the	  best	   fictions	   and	  adopt	   them	  as	  presuppositions	  which	   are	  not	   to	   be	   believed	   to	   be	   True	   or	   False,	   but	   rather	   we	   should	   believe	  what	  these	  fictions	  state	  as	  being	  true	  according	  to	  that	  fiction.	  This	  is	  a	  feature	  typical	  of	  fictionalists	  -­‐	  that	  the	  fiction	  itself	  is	  not	  to	  be	  believed,	  but	   something	   less	   than	   belief,	   like	   acceptance.	   This	   acceptance	   and	  presupposition	  of	  the	  fiction	  is	  parallel	  to	  that	  found	  in	  fictional	  works,	  in	  order	  to	  work	  within	  and	  talk	  internally	  to	  that	  fiction.	  	  	  	  	  There	  has	  to	  be	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  acceptance	  and	  belief,210	  as	  the	   fictionalist	   can	   fully	  accept	   the	   fiction	  F	  without	  F-­‐talk	  being	  True	  (and	  in	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  case,	  without	  F-­‐talk	  being	  Truth-­‐apt),	  and	  so	  accepting	   F	   cannot	   be	   the	   same	   as	   believing	   F	   (as	   belief	   requires	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  208	  Sainsbury	  (2010)	  p146	  209	  Currie	  (1990	  p13)	  agrees	  that	  pretense	  is	  not	  the	  correct	  attitude	  towards	  fictions.	  210	  Cohen	   argues	   (1989)	  belief	   is	   thinking	   that	   something	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   true,	  whilst	  acceptance	  is	  taking	  it	  as	  a	  premise	  in	  one’s	  reasoning	  without	  making	  a	  claim	  about	  its	  truth.	  Stalnaker	  (1973,	  1974)	  treats	  acceptance	  as	  the	  appropriate	  attitude	  toward	  the	  stuff	  taken	  as	  presuppositions	  in	  conversation.	  These	  are	  in	  line	  with	  my	  proposal.	  
	   154	  thing	   to	   be	   at	   least	   capable	   of	   truth).	   Furthermore,	   there	   must	   be	   a	  difference	   between	   the	   fictionalist	   acceptance	   of	   the	   fiction	   F	   and	   the	  realist	   belief	   in	   the	   theory	   T,	   otherwise	   there	   would	   be	   no	   way	   of	  spelling	  out	  what	   the	  difference	   is	  between	   something	  being	   true	  and	  something	   being	   useful.	  Without	   a	   sharp	   distinction	   here,	   as	  Horwich	  argues	  against	  Van	  Fraasen,211	  there	  is	  no	  way	  of	  distinguishing	  a	  realist	  attitude	   from	  a	   fictionalist	  attitude,	  and	  no	  way	  of	  demonstrating	  why	  the	  fictionalist’s	  attitude	  falls	  short	  of	  belief	  and	  thus	  why	  they	  should	  fall	  short	  of	  being	  a	  realist.	  This	  could	  be	  used	  as	  an	  argument	  to	  try	  to	  show	  how	   the	   fictionalist	   is	   really	   a	   realist,	   since	   if	  we	   cannot	  merely	  accept	  without	   belief	   then	   our	   acceptance	   of	   a	   theory	   is	   to	   believe	   in	  that	  theory	  and	  to	  be	  a	  realist	  about	  that	  theory’s	  entities.	  However,	  as	  argued	  in	  chapter	  1	  against	  Quine’s	  I-­‐realism,	  it	  is	  actually	  the	  case	  that	  arguments	  like	  this	  show	  how	  the	  realist	  is	  really	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  quietist	   fictionalist.	   If	   there	   is	   no	   difference	   between	   the	   quietist	   and	  the	  Quinean	  I-­‐realist,	  the	  burden	  lies	  with	  the	  I-­‐realist	  to	  say	  why	  their	  attitude	  is	  strong	  enough	  to	  derive	  ontology	  from	  it	  to	  be	  realist	  about.	  	  	  	  But	   anyhow,	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   can	   make	   the	   required	   distinction	  between	   acceptance	   and	   belief,	   in	   order	   to	   distinguish	   the	   quiet	  fictionalist	  attitude	  from	  that	  of	  the	  realist.	  Taking	  fiction	  F	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  frameworks	  accepted	  by	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian,	  the	  sentence	  (1)	  ‘F-­‐talk	  is	  True’	   and	   the	   sentence	   (2)	   ‘F-­‐talk	   is	  useful’	  have	  different	   contents.	  This	   is	   because	   the	   fictionalist	   sees	   value	   in	   F-­‐talk	   other	   than	   Truth,	  such	  as	  usefulness,	  which	  is	  independent	  of	  Truth,	  so	  that	  to	  be	  useful	  is	  not	  simply	   to	  be	  True	  and	  visa	  versa.212	  Therefore	   (1)	  and	  (2)	  are	  not	  equivalent	  because	  Truth	  and	  usefulness	  are	  distinct	  virtues.	  Fiction	  F	  is	   merely	   accepted,	   by	   being	   believed	   to	   be	   useful	   (but	   not	   being	  believed	   to	   be	   True),	   whereas	   the	   realist’s	   theory	   T	   is	   believed	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  211	  Horwich	  (2004)	  and	  van	  Fraasen	  (1980)	  212	  Perhaps,	  however,	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  conflates	  internal	  truth	  (with	  a	  non-­‐capital	  t)	  with	  usefulness,	  since	  if	  the	  framework	  is	  adopted	  as	  useful	  then	  anything	  that	  comes	  out	  true	  relative	  to	  that	  framework	  is	  only	  true	  because	  of	  the	  frameworks	  usefulness.	  
	   155	  conflates	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  which	  is	  precisely	  what	  the	  fictionalist	  denies.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   will	   deny	   (1)	   as	   it	   is	   meaningless,	   since	   a	   fictional	  framework	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  be	  externally	  True	  or	  False	  but	  can	  only	  be	  said	   to	   be	   useful.	   Since	   usefulness	   is	   a	   value	   independent	   of	   Truth,	  according	   to	   the	   fictionalist,	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   does	   not	   derive	   (1)	  from	  (2).	  Fiction	  F	  can	  be	  accepted	  as	  useful,	  but	  it	  cannot	  be	  assessed	  as	  True	  as	  this	  is	  meaningless.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  asserts	  and	  believes	  internal	  sentences	  of	  F	  (which	  can	  be	  true	  with	  a	  non-­‐capital	  ‘t’),	  whilst	  only	  accepting	  Fs	  and	  not	  making	  assertions	  about	  Truth	  or	  belief	  in	  Fs.	  	  	  	  So,	  to	  summarize,	  the	  rules	  of	  fictional	  frameworks	  (F)	  are	  not	  True	  or	  False,	  and	  they	  are	  non-­‐cognitive.213	  They	  are	  to	  be	  presupposed	  so	  that	  internal	   statements	   are	   true	   or	   false	   relative	   to	   that	   presupposition	  which	   is	   itself	  not	  up	   for	  debate.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  can	  ask	   the	   IQ	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  true-­‐in-­‐F	  that	  there	  are	  Xs,	  and	  rejects	  the	  EQ	  about	  which	  F	  is	  objectively	  True.	  So,	  a	  sentence	  S	  is	  true-­‐relative-­‐to-­‐a-­‐fiction-­‐F	  iff	  S	  is	  part	  of	  the	  content	  (or	  follows	  from	  the	  rules	  for	  meaning	  and	  usage)	  of	  F.	  Then	  there	  is	  no	  further	  question	  of	  whether	  S	  is	  True	  absolutely:	  all	  we	  can	  say	  is	  that	  S	  is	  true	  or	  false	  relative	  to	  this	  or	  that	  F,	  and	  that	  this	  F	  is	  more	  useful	  than	  that	  F*.	  Furthermore,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  does	  not	  believe	  what	  they	  presuppose	  (the	  frameworks	  F),	   they	   just	  accept	   them.	  Then	  under	   that	  presupposition	  of	  F,	   things	  can	   be	   fully	   asserted	   and	   believed	   within	   F.	   We	   accept	   the	   Fs,	   but	  believe	  the	  sentences	  that	  are	  true	  relative	  to	  this	  presupposed	  F.	  This	  nearly	  completes	  my	  description	  of	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  as	  a	  fictionalist,	  so	   all	   that	   is	   left	   is	   to	   describe	   if	   the	   position	   is	   revolutionary	   or	  hermeneutic	  fictionalism,	  and	  to	  defend	  this	  from	  a	  quietist	  viewpoint.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  213 	  Kalderon	   (2005a)	   helpfully	   distinguishes	   between	   non-­‐cognitivism	   and	   non-­‐factualism.	  Usually	  non-­‐cognitivism	  is	  taken	  to	  mean	  not	  truth-­‐apt	  and	  therefore	  is	  not	  fit	  to	  be	  believed,	  which	  is	  how	  I	  have	  used	  the	  term	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Yet	  Kalderon	  splits	  cognitivism	   to	   be	   about	   attitudes	   and	   factualism	   to	   be	   about	   truth,	   such	   that	   being	  truth-­‐apt	  is	  to	  be	  factual	  and	  being	  believed	  is	  to	  be	  cognitive.	  Non-­‐cognitivism	  should	  thus	   be	   taken	   to	   only	  mean	   ‘not	   fit	   for	   belief’,	   rather	   than	   conflated	  with	   being	   ‘not	  truth-­‐apt’.	  His	  fictionalism,	  unlike	  mine,	  is	  non-­‐cognitivist	  and	  factualist.	  I	  thank	  Chris	  Jay	  for	  pointing	  this	  out	  to	  me	  and	  for	  helpful	  feedback	  on	  this	  chapter	  in	  general.	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  VIII.	  Hermeneutic	  and	  Revolutionary	  Fictionalism.	  	  	  Fictionalism	  comes	  in	  two	  forms	  –	  Hermeneutic	  (HF)	  and	  Revolutionary	  (RF)	   –	  where	   the	   distinction	   between	   them	   lies	   in	   their	   claims	   about	  what	  we	  do	  and	  what	  we	  ought	  to	  do,	  respectively,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  our	  use	  of	   a	  discourse.	  HF	   tells	  us	   that	  our	   talk	   is	  properly	  understood	  as	  fictional,	  whether	  we	  know	  it	  or	  not,	  whereas	  RF	  tells	  us	  that	   if	  we	  do	  not	  already	  talk	  in	  this	  fictional	  way	  then	  we	  should	  do.	  Fictionalism	  is	  meant	  to	  be,	  according	  to	  HF,	  the	  best	  explanation	  of	  our	  current	  usage	  of	   the	   language,	  and,	  according	   to	  RF,	   the	  best	  explanation	  of	  how	  we	  ought	   to	   use	   the	   language.	   I	   describe	   HF	   and	   RF	   and	   their	   problems,	  arguing	  non-­‐traditionally	  that	  HF	  imputes	  more	  error	  than	  RF	  does.	  	  	  VIII.i.	  Hermeneutic	  Fictionalism	  (HF).	  	  	  HF	   says	   that	   there	   are	   good	   reasons	   to	   think	   that	   we	   are	   already	  engaging	  in	  a	  fiction,	  where	  we	  adopt	  a	  fictionalist	  attitude	  when	  using	  the	   language	   that	   is	   proposed	   to	   be	   fictional	   yet	   sounds	   realist.	   HF	  attempts	   to	   explain	   what	   it	   is	   that	   our	   seemingly	   realist	   utterances	  mean.	  HF	  argues	  that	  if	  no	  entity	  X	  exists	  to	  which	  our	  X-­‐talk	  is	  meant	  to	  refer	   to,	   then	   the	   best	   explanation	   of	   X-­‐talk	   is	   that	   it	   is	   fictional.	  According	  to	  one	  possible	  articulation	  of	  HF,	  what	  we	  really	  mean	  when	  we	   say	   ‘abortion	   is	  wrong’	   is	   ‘in	   the	  moral	   fiction,	   abortion	   is	  wrong’.	  This	   is	   meant	   to	   be	   the	   best	   account	   of	   our	   language	   usage	   on	   the	  assumption	  that	  the	  discourse	  is	  false	  to	  begin	  with.	  HF	  is	  traditionally	  intended	  to	  avoid	  imputing	  error	  to	  the	  discourse	  user,	  as	  it	  claims	  that	  we	   are	   not	   in	   error	  when	  we	   say	   ‘abortion	   is	  wrong’	   since	  we	   never	  meant	  it	  as	  an	  assertion	  of	  objective	  morality	  –	  it	  was	  relative	  to	  a	  moral	  fiction	  all	  along.	  However	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  still	  an	  unacceptable	  amount	  of	  error	  imputed	  to	  the	  discourse	  user	  by	  HF,	  more	  so	  than	  RF.	  	  
	   157	  HF,	  like	  RF,	  is	  traditionally	  motivated	  by	  antirealism.	  HF	  tells	  us	  that	  as	  language	  users	  we	  already	  have	  employed	  a	  fiction	  as	  there	  are	  no	  facts	  for	  our	  language	  to	  refer	  to.	  If	  HF	  and	  antirealism	  about	  a	  type	  of	  entity	  X	  are	   true,	   then	  when	  we	  engage	   in	  X-­‐talk	  we	  engage	   in	  a	   fiction	  of	  X,	  whether	  we	   are	   aware	   of	   the	   latter	   engagement	   or	   not.	   If	  we	   are	  not	  aware	  of	   our	   fictional	   engagement	   then	  we	  are	  wrong	  about	  our	  own	  beliefs	   as	  we	   did	   not	   know	   that	  we	  were	   referring	   to	   a	   fiction	   –	   this	  option	   I	   call	   ‘the	   fictionalist	   in	   error’.	   If	  we	  are	   aware	   of	   our	   fictional	  engagement	   then	  we	  do	  know	  that	  when	  we	  make	  a	  seemingly	  realist	  claim	  we	   do	   not	   really	  mean	   it	   –	   this	   option	   I	   call	   ‘the	   self-­‐conscious	  fictionalist’.	  I	  will	  now	  argue	  that	  both	  of	  these	  options	  of	  knowing	  and	  not	  knowing	  about	  our	  use	  of	  a	  fiction	  are	  unlikely	  and	  undesirable,	  and	  thus	  HF	  does	  not	  best	  explain	  our	  current	  use	  of	  language.214	  	  	  	  
• The	  Fictionalist	  in	  Error.	  	  	  If	  HF	   is	   correct	   in	   saying	   our	   use	   of	   language	   is	   that	   of	   engaging	   in	   a	  fiction,	  then	  it	  seems	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  some	  of	  us	  would	  be	  shocked	  upon	  being	  informed	  of	  this.	  Some	  would	  argue	  that	  it	  just	  does	  not	  feel	   like	  they	  are	  saying	  ‘in	  the	  moral	  fiction,	  abortion	  is	  wrong’	  when	  they	  claim	  that	  abortion	  is	  wrong	  and	  would	  refuse	  to	  accept	  that	  they	  are	  engaged	  in	   a	   fiction	   as	  HF	   says.	  Moreover	   they	  may	   argue	   that	   they	  would	   be	  appalled	  at	  the	  lack	  of	  access	  they	  would	  have	  to	  their	  own	  beliefs	  if	  it	  really	  were	  the	  case	  that	  they	  were	  actually	  referring	  to	  a	  fiction	  rather	  than	   reality.	  They	  would	   thus	  be	   in	   error	   about	   two	   things:	   (1)	   about	  abortion	   being	  wrong,	   as	   abortion	   is	   not	   actually	  wrong	   according	   to	  the	   traditional	   fictionalist;	   (2)	   about	   themselves	   believing	   and	   saying	  that	  abortion	  is	  actually	  wrong,	  as	  HF	  states	  their	  belief	  and	  assertion	  is	  rather	  something	  like	  ‘in	  the	  moral	  fiction,	  abortion	  is	  wrong’.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  This	  section	  VIII	  is	  inspired	  by	  work	  that	  I	  did	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Nottingham	  on	  my	  Masters	  course	  from	  2010-­‐11	  in	  the	  Ethics	  module	  with	  Andy	  Fisher	  who	  I	  thank.	  
	   158	  According	   to	   HF	   the	   language-­‐user	   who	  was	   unaware	   of	   the	   truth	   of	  antirealism	  would	  not	  only	  be	   in	  error	  about	  what	   they	  were	  using	  (a	  fictional	   rather	   than	   factual	   discourse)	   but	  would	   also	   be	  deceived	   by	  what	   they	  were	   using.	   For	   them	   not	   to	   know	   that	   they	   did	   not	  mean	  ‘abortion	   is	   wrong’	   (but	   only	   meant	   ‘in	   the	   moral	   fiction,	   abortion	   is	  wrong’),	   the	  moral	   fiction	  would	   have	   to	   deceive	   them	   into	   believing	  that	  abortion	  was	  in	  fact	  wrong.	  The	  ‘fictionalist	  in	  error’	  would	  have	  to	  be	   described	   as	   someone	  who	   is	   deceived	   by	   the	   fiction,	   or	   else	   they	  would	  not	  be	  in	  error	  about	  their	  use	  of	  the	  language	  and	  their	  beliefs	  as	   to	  what	   their	   language	  refers	   to.	   If	   they	  were	  not	  so	  deceived,	   they	  would	  be	  described	  as	  a	  ‘self-­‐conscious	  fictionalist’.	  It	  is	  undesirable	  to	  be	  deceived	  and	  in	  a	  state	  of	  ignorance	  about	  the	  facts	  and	  what	  beliefs	  we	   hold.	   And	   if	   we	   are	   unknowingly	   speaking	   in	   a	   fictional	  way,	   this	  would	  be	  a	  surprising	  failure	  of	  first	  person	  authority,	  and	  supposedly	  could	  not	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  our	  use	  of	  language.	  	  	  	  
• The	  Self-­‐Conscious	  Fictionalist.	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  someone	  is	  aware	  that	  when	  they	  say	  ‘abortion	  is	  wrong’	   they	   are	   really	   saying	   ‘in	   the	  moral	   fiction,	   abortion	   is	  wrong’	  then	   this	   person	   knows	   the	  morality	   they	   use	   is	   fictional:	   this	   person	  uses	   the	   moral	   fiction	   consciously,	   hence	   is	   described	   as	   the	   self-­‐conscious	   fictionalist.	   When	   this	   person	   says	   to	   someone	   that	   they	  believe	  abortion	  is	  wrong,	  this	  person	  is	  speaking	  deceitfully215	  as	  they	  do	  not	  really	  believe	  that	  abortion	  is	  wrong,	  they	  just	  accept	  it	  as	  being	  true	   in	   a	   fiction.	   They	   are	   deceiving	   others	   into	   thinking	   they	   are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  215	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  all	  utterances	  of	  fiction	  are	  deceiving.	  When	  someone	  tells	  me	  that	  Bugs	  Bunny	  loves	  Lola	  Bunny	  they	  are	  not	  deceiving	  me	  because	  both	  them	  and	  I	  are	   aware	   that	   they	   are	   talking	   about	   something	   fictional.	   In	   the	  moral	   fiction	   case	  however,	  when	   the	   ‘self-­‐conscious’	  moral	   fictionalist	   (A)	   tells	   a	  moral	   fictionalist	   ‘in	  error’	  (B)	  that	  abortion	  is	  wrong,	  A	  is	  deceiving	  B	  in	  that	  B	  would	  believe	  that	  A	  meant	  what	  A	  said.	  A	  talks	  in	  a	  way	  that	  others	  like	  B	  take	  literally	  (as	  they	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  the	  fictional	  engagement),	  when	  A	  does	  not	  take	  it	  literally	  themselves.	  
	   159	  speaking	   about	   morality	   rather	   than	   a	   fiction,	   and	   such	   a	   conscious	  deceit	  looks	  somewhat	  suspect	  to	  being	  called	  a	  lie.	  Is	  the	  self-­‐conscious	  fictionalist	  a	  liar?	  Joyce	  claims	  “it	  would	  be	  nice	  to	  avoid	  the	  conclusion	  that	   fictionalists	  are	   liars”216	  and	  offers	   the	  response	   that	   they	  are	  not	  because	  they	  have	  “no	  malevolent	  agenda.”217	  However	  some	  liars	  also	  have	   no	  malevolent	   agenda,	   like	   the	   liar	  who	   says	   their	   friend’s	   bum	  does	   not	   look	   big	   in	   that	   dress	   (when	   it	   actually	   does	   and	   the	   friend	  does	  not	  want	  it	  to	  be	  so),	  but	  this	  does	  not	  stop	  them	  from	  being	  a	  liar.	  	  	  	  Joyce	  also	  offers	  the	  response	  that	  the	  fictionalist	  is	  free	  to	  assert	  their	  
real	  beliefs,	  (antirealism	  and	  the	  fictional	  engagement),	  but	  does	  not	  do	  so	  as	  it	  “is	  inappropriate	  for	  99%	  of	  conversations.”218	  So,	  it	  is	  therefore	  apparently	   appropriate	   to	   lie	   99%	   of	   the	   time,	   and	   truth	   is	   deemed	  inappropriate	   for	   most	   conversations,	   thus	   diminishing	   the	   value	   of	  truth.	  Garner	  describes	   this	   as	   “dangerous	  because	   it	   undermines	  our	  integrity	   by	   forcing	   us	   to	   find	   ways	   to	   defend	   things	   we	   know	   to	   be	  false”219	  for	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  our	  interactions.	  Further,	  Garner	  asks:	  	  	   What	  serious	  philosopher	  can	  long	  recommend	  that	  we	  promote	  a	   policy	   of	   expressing	   and	   supporting,	   for	   an	   uncertain	   future	  advantage,	   beliefs,	   or	   even	   thoughts,	   that	  we	   understand	   to	   be	  totally,	  completely,	  and	  unquestionably	  false?220	  	  The	   response	   would	   be	   that	   the	   recommendation	   is	   grounded	   in	   the	  usefulness	   of	   upholding	   a	   fiction	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	   usefulness	   of	  abandoning	   the	   talk	   altogether.	   But	   now	   the	   question	   is,	   how	   useful	  would	  a	  fiction	  be	  when	  its	  users	  are	  self-­‐conscious?	  Can	  a	  fiction	  do	  the	  job	   it	   is	  meant	   to	  do	   for	   the	  people	  who	  know	  they	  are	  engaged	   in	   it?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	  Joyce	  (2005)	  p297	  217	  Joyce	  (2005)	  p297	  218	  Joyce	  (2005)	  p297	  219	  Garner	  (2007)	  p512	  220	  Garner	  (2007)	  p512	  
	   160	  Because	  if	  not,	  then	  it	  cannot	  be	  recommended.	  	  Joyce	  answers	  that	  in	  a	  group	  scenario	  where	  every	  member	  of	  the	  group	  was	  a	  ‘self-­‐conscious’	  fictionalist	  these	  troubles	  would	  ease	  away.	  Conversation	  would	  be	  held	  at	  an	  equal	  level	  between	  them	  as	  they	  would	  all	  understand	  what	  they	  meant	  by	   ‘abortion	   is	  wrong’,	  namely	   ‘in	   the	  moral	   fiction,	  abortion	   is	  wrong’.	  Furthermore,	  they	  would	  all	  be	  accepting	  that	  we	  should	  talk	  in	  this	  pretend-­‐realist	  way	  as	  it	   is	  more	  useful	  than	  not	  doing	  so,	  despite	  all	   knowing	   that	   their	   actual	   beliefs	  were	   antirealist.	   A	   community	   of	  ‘self-­‐conscious’	   fictionalists	   would	   be	   able	   to	   reap	   the	   benefits	   of	   a	  realist	  society	  more	  so	  than	  an	  eliminativist	  community	  could	  in	  light	  of	  antirealism.	  Therefore,	  according	  to	  the	  rationale	  of	  HF,	  we	  all	  ought	  to	  accept	   a	   fictionalist	   approach	   to	   become	   part	   of	   the	   flourishing	   ‘self-­‐conscious’	  fictionalist	  community.	  This	  is	  the	  ‘ought’	  of	  RF	  –	  if	  we	  do	  not	  already	  engage	  in	  a	  fictional	  way,	  then	  we	  ought	  to	  do	  so.	  But	  ought	  we?	  	  	  VIII.ii.	  Revolutionary	  Fictionalism	  (RF).	  	  	  RF	   is	   in	   part	   motivated	   by	   error	   theory.	   In	   acknowledging	   our	  previously	   error	   laden	   discourse	  we	   have	   the	   option	   to	   dispose	   of	   it,	  however	   RF	   argues	   that	   despite	   its	   error	   we	   should	   recognize	   its	  usefulness	   and	   adopt	   it	   as	   a	   fiction.	   In	   light	   of	   antirealism,	   the	   best	  explanation	  of	  how	  we	  ought	  to	  proceed	  in	  our	  use	  of	  the	  language	  is	  by	  way	  of	  fictionalism,	  so	  RF	  claims,	  where	  we	  retain	  our	  realist	  discourse	  in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   HF	   says	   we	   already	   do.	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   we	  would	  have	  to	  deny	  our	  antirealist	  beliefs	  because	  we	  would	  still	  assert	  them	   in	  critical	   contexts	   (in	   the	  philosophy	  staffroom,	  perhaps).	  What	  RF	  argues	   is	   that	   it	   is	  useful	   to	   adopt	  a	   fictional,	   as-­‐if	   ‘realist’	   attitude	  towards	   an	   entity	   X	   outside	   of	   these	   critical	   contexts,	   instead	   of	  adopting	  eliminativism	  as	  we	  may	  think	  our	  antirealist	  beliefs	  demand.	  	  	  	  
	   161	  RF	  claims	  that	  realists	  are	  in	  error	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  belief	  in	  a	  fact	  of	  the	   matter,	   and	   once	   they	   have	   come	   to	   know	   this	   error	   (and	   thus	  believe	   antirealism	   to	   be	   the	   case)	   they	   should	   not	   abandon	   their	  practice	  but	  instead	  treat	  it	  as	  fictional	  practice	  instead.	  HF	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  I	  have	  stated	  above,	   locates	  the	  error,	  not	  just	  in	  our	  belief	   in	  facts,	   but	   in	   our	   belief	   in	  our	  belief	   in	   facts	   (i.e.,	   in	  what	  we	   think	  our	  beliefs	  are),	  as	  apparently	  our	  actual	  belief	  is	  in	  a	  fiction.	  So,	  according	  to	  RF	  we	  are	  wrong	  about	  there	  being	  facts,	  and	  according	  to	  HF	  we	  are	  also	  wrong	  about	  what	  we	  think	  we	  believe	  (that	  we	  believe	  in	  facts).	  It	  seems	  more	  plausible	  to	  be	  wrong	  just	  about	  some	  piece	  of	  information	  external	   to	   us	   rather	   than	   to	   be	  wrong	   about	  what	   our	   own	   thoughts	  are.	   I	   therefore	   am	   arguing,	   non-­‐traditionally,	   that	   HF	   should	   be	  rejected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  imputing	  more	  error	  than	  RF,	  and	  that	  RF	  can	  be	  defended	  from	  a	  quietist	  point	  of	  view	  for	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  position.	  	  	  	  In	   this	   section	   I	   have	   argued	   against	   HF.	   According	   to	   HF,	   the	   best	  explanation	  of	  our	  current	  discourse	   is	   that	   it	   is	   fictional,	  and	  thus	  we	  already	  engage	  in	  fictions.	  I	  then	  presented	  two	  options	  for	  a	  discourse	  user:	   the	   fictionalist	   ‘in	   error’	   and	   the	   ‘self-­‐conscious’	   fictionalist.	   I	  argued	  that	  neither	  of	  these	  options	  would	  be	  plausible	  or	  attractive,	  as	  they	  describe	  the	  language	  user	  as	  being	  deceived	  or	  as	  being	  deceiving.	  RF	  under	  quietism	  however	  would	  not	  prescribe	  a	  culture	  of	  deception,	  as	   no	   falsehoods	   are	   being	   advised	   to	   be	   told.	   Rather,	   the	   quietist	   RF	  states	  that,	   if	  quietism	  is	  true,	  then	  we	  ought	  to	  consider	  our	  language	  use	  as	  being	  internal	  to	  fictions.	  The	  way	  we	  talk	  will	  not	  be	  deceiving	  or	  lying,	  as	  it	  will	  be	  true	  relative	  to	  the	  fiction.	  A	  quietist	  RF	  therefore	  escapes	   the	   problems	   associated	  with	   a	  more	   traditional	   fictionalism,	  especially	  HF,	  and	  I	  therefore	  hope	  to	  have	  shown	  how	  quietism	  can	  be	  coupled	  with	  fictionalism	  as	  a	  Neo-­‐Carnapian.	  I	  will	  now	  provide	  a	  brief	  recap	   of	   the	  main	   features	   of	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   position	   that	   I	   have	  described	   in	   this	   chapter,	   comparing	   it	   to	   similar	   positions	   in	   the	  literature	  from	  Thomasson	  (2015)	  and	  Price	  (2011),	  before	  concluding.	  	  
	   162	  IX.	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism	  as	  fictionalism.	  	  	  In	   this	   section	   I	   go	   over	   the	  main	   aspects	   of	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  fictionalist	  position.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  is	  still	   a	  Carnapian	   in	  as	  much	  as	   they	  state	   that	  philosophers	  should	  be	  quiet	  with	  regard	  to	  metaphysical	  matters.	  So	  they	  are	  quietist,	  because	  serious	  ontology	  read	  from	  our	  metaphysical	  external	  questions	  cannot	  be	   done.	   They	   are	   neither	   traditionally	   realist	   nor	   antirealist,	   as	  statements	   of	   reality	   are	   external	   and	   meaningless,	   and	   therefore	   so	  must	   be	   statements	   of	   irreality: “it	   is	   obvious	   that	   the	   apparent	  negation	  of	  a	  pseudo-­‐statement	  must	  also	  be	  a	  pseudo-­‐statement.”221	  	  	  	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   says	   the	   existence	   of	   things	   cannot	   be	   questioned	  externally,	  and	  that	  they	  only	  exist	  relative	  to	  frameworks	  in	  as	  much	  as	  the	   framework	   is	   useful.	   Therefore,	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   is	   a	   relativist:	  truth	  is	  relative	  to	  frameworks	  that	  are	  chosen	  pragmatically.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   is	   externally	   non-­‐cognitive	   and	   non-­‐factual:222	  the	   fictional	  frameworks	   themselves	   are	   to	   be	   accepted	   rather	   than	   believed,	   and	  are	  not	  Truth-­‐apt,	   since	   there	   is	  no	   such	  external	  Truth.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   is	   internally	   cognitive	   and	   factual:	   once	  fictional	  frameworks	  are	  presupposed,	  anything	  internal	  to	  them	  can	  be	  believed	   and	   taken	   as	   truth-­‐apt	   relative	   to	   its	   rules.	   Given	   that	  frameworks	   are	   now	   to	   be	   considered	   as	   fictions,	   ultimately	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   position	   is	   fictionalist.	   The	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   fulfills	   the	  fictionalist	   requirements	   of	   escaping	   from	   ontological	   commitment	   in	  language	   usage,	   valuing	   language	   for	   its	   usefulness	   regardless	   of	   its	  Truth,	  and	  by	  attributing	  some	  level	  of	  error	  to	  the	  language	  user	  too.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  221	  Carnap	  (1950)	  p30	  222	  Here	   I	   use	   Kalderon’s	   (2005a)	   distinction	  which	   I	  mentioned	   in	   footnote	   213	   in	  section	   VII	   between	   being	   factual	   (about	   truth)	   and	   cognitive	   (about	   attitude).	   If	   I	  were	  to	  hold	  factual	  fixed	  to	  be	  about	  internal	  truth	  (rather	  than	  external	  Truth)	  then	  the	  frameworks	  would	  always	  be	  factual,	  as	  they	  say	  of	  themselves	  that	  they	  are	  true.	  	  	  
	   163	  The	  error	  is	  attributed	  as	  such.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  quietism	  of	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  be	  quiet	  about	  the	  external	  reality,	  rather	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  we	  are	  quiet	  about	  it	  since	  our	  attempts	  to	   speak	   about	   it	   are	   meaningless	   as	   terms	   cannot	   have	   meaning	  outside	  of	  their	  language	  framework.	  We	  are	  thus	  mistaken	  if	  we	  think	  that	  we	  do	  talk	  meaningfully	  about	  the	  metaphysical	  external	  reality,	  as	  actually	   we	   are	   never	   more	   than	   quiet	   about	   it.	   And	   we	   are	   not	  mistaken	  if	  we	  already	  intend	  our	  talk	  to	  be	  as	  metaphysically	  quiet	  as	  it	  is.	  Therefore,	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  can	  be	  considered	  hermeneutic	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  quietism	  (as	  language	  is	  described	  as	  quiet).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian’s	  fictionalism,	  I	  have	  opted	  for	  a	  
revolutionary	   account	   to	   avoid	   imputing	   too	  much	  error	   to	   those	  who	  do	   not	   think	   they	   already	   are	   talking	   about	   fictions	   and	   rather	  more	  weakly	   I	  have	  stated	   that	   they	  ought	   to	   think	  of	   themselves	  as	   talking	  within	   fictions	   (as	   language	   is	  prescribed	   as	   fictional).	   In	  not	  doing	   so	  already,	  the	  language	  user	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  in	  error	  here	  as	  well.	  	  	  The	  quietism	  of	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   is	  with	  regard	  to	  metaphysics,	  and	  the	  fictionalism	  of	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  is	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  frameworks	  (to	  treat	  the	  frameworks	  as	  fictions).	  Thus	  the	  hermeneutic	  descriptive	  aspect	   applies	   to	   metaphysics	   (we	   are	   quiet	   about	   it)	   and	   the	  revolutionary	  prescriptive	   aspect	   applies	   to	   frameworks	   (we	  ought	   to	  treat	   them	  as	   fictions).	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   is	  hermeneutically	  quietist,	  as	   we	   are	   quiet	   about	   metaphysical	   reality,	   yet	   is	   revolutionarily	  fictionalist,	  as	  we	  ought	  to	  consider	  our	  frameworks	  as	  fictions	  in	  order	  to	  give	  use	  and	  meaning	  to	  our	  internal	  talk	  if	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  to	  be	  about	  metaphysical	  reality.	  Our	  talk	  internal	  to	  fictions	  can	  be	  about	  existents	  and	  non-­‐existents	  which	  make	  up	  a	  domain,	   split	   by	   a	  metaphysically	  quiet	   existence	   predicate,	   and	   thus	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   has	   a	   quietist	  Meinongian	   view	   of	   quantification.	   This	   completes	   my	   description	   of	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism	  as	  a	  fictionalist	  position	  and	  now	  I	  compare	  it	  to	  positions	  in	  the	  recent	  literature	  from	  Thomasson	  and	  Price.	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  IX.i.	  Comparison	  to	  Thomasson’s	  Simple	  Realism.	  	  	  The	   position	   of	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Quietism	   can	   be	   compared	   to	  Thomasson’s	  ‘simple	  realism’	  position	  with	  regard	  to	  her	  ‘easy	  ontology’	  found	   in	   her	   recent	   book	   Ontology	   Made	   Easy.223	  Simple	   realism	   is	  motivated	  by	  Carnap’s	   deflationism	   (or	   quietism	  as	   I	   have	   called	   it	   in	  this	   thesis	   –	   though	   Thomasson’s	   reason	   for	   usage	   of	   the	   word	  ‘deflationism’	  instead	  of	  ‘quietism’	  will	  soon	  be	  made	  clear),	  and	  as	  such	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  fellow	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  position.	  However	  my	  position	  differs	  from	  Thomasson’s	  simple	  realism	  in	  a	  few	  important	  respects.	  	  	  	  To	   briefly	   describe	   Thomasson’s	   position:	   ontological	   questions	   are	  easy	   to	   answer,	   and	   in	   this	   way	   ontology	   is	   deflated.	   The	   ontological	  questions	   that	   are	   meaningful	   on	   Thomasson’s	   account	   are	   akin	   to	  Carnap’s	   internal	   questions	   (IQ’s),	   despite	   Carnap	   stating	   that	   it	   is	  misleading	  to	  call	  internal	  use	  ‘ontological’.	  This	  is	  the	  first	  place	  where	  my	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Quietism	   differs	   from	   simple	   realism	   –	   for	   me,	  answers	  to	  IQ’s	  are	  ontologically	  quiet,	  for	  Thomasson,	  answers	  to	  IQ’s	  are	  ontological	  answers	  (and	  as	  such	  she	  calls	  herself	  a	  ‘realist’	  and	  not	  a	   ‘quietist’).	  For	  Thomasson,	  we	  can	  get	  our	  ontological	  answers	  –	  our	  easy	   ontology	   –	   from	   trivial	   inferences	   in	   our	   language	   usage	   (where	  certain	   ‘application	   conditions’224	  are	   fulfilled	   for	   the	   terms	  used).	  We	  can	   derive	   an	   ontology	   including	   numbers	   from	   the	   sentence	   ‘I	   have	  two	  hands’	  by	  making	  an	  analytic	  inference	  to	  another	  sentence	  where	  numbers	   are	   quantified	   over,	   such	   as	   ‘the	   number	   of	   hands	   I	   have	   is	  two’.	   Here	   is	   the	   second	   place	   where	   my	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Quietism	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  223	  Thomasson	  (2015)	  224	  For	  Thomasson	  (2015	  p90),	  a	  term	  refers	  if	  its	  application	  conditions	  are	  fulfilled,	  but	   the	   conditions	   under	   which	   different	   kinds	   of	   thing	   exist	   are	   as	   various	   as	   the	  application	  conditions	  are,	  so	  she	  denies	  that	  there	  are	  any	  shared	  criteria	  of	  existence.	  Application	  conditions	  are	  among	  the	  semantic	  rules	  of	  use	  for	  terms	  we	  master	  as	  we	  acquire	   language,	  but	  they	  need	  not	  be	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  and	  need	  not	   be	   stateable,	   as	   they	   are	   simply	   conditions	   under	   which	   the	   term	   would	   be	  correctly	  applied,	  entitling	  us	  to	  truly	  say	  ‘there	  is	  an	  entity	  X’	  for	  instance.	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  differs	  from	  simple	  realism	  –	  for	  me,	  quantificational	  use	  of	  language	  is	  ontologically	   non-­‐committal,	   whereas	   for	   Thomasson	   such	   usage	   is	  committal	  (and	  thus	  I	  regard	  her	  as	  Quinean	  in	  that	  respect).	  For	  all	  the	  same	  reasons	  that	  I	  rejected	  Quinean	  metaontology	  in	  chapter	  2,	  I	  also	  reject	  these	  trivial	  inferences	  that	  lead	  Thomasson	  to	  her	  easy	  ontology.	  	  	  	  Thomasson	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  ontology	  she	  derives	  is	  one	  not	  to	  be	  fretted	  over	  –	  it	  is	  the	  not	  the	  heavy	  duty	  metaphysical	  ontology	  that	  we	  would	  like	  to	  avoid	  commitment	  to.	  I	  argue,	  however,	  that	  such	  commitments	  derived	   from	   such	   inferences	   are	   merely	   quantificational	   and	   not	  ontological,	   so	   any	   use	   of	   ‘ontology’	   or	   ‘realism’	   is	   potentially	  misleading	  as	  a	  faithful	  Carnapian.	  It	   is	  because	  of	  this	  that	  she	  avoids	  using	   the	   term	   ‘quietism’	   to	  describe	  her	  Carnapian	  position,	  as	  she	   is	  
not	  actually	  quiet	  when	  she	  calls	  herself	  a	  realist.	  However	  she	  regards	  this	   realism	  as	  being	  sufficiently	  deflated	   to	   justify	  her	  using	   the	   term	  ‘deflationism’	   to	   describe	   her	   Carnapian	   position.	   In	   my	   view,	   this	  deflated	  realism	  is	  not	  the	  ontological	  realism	  that	  metaphysicians	  were	  after,	  and	  furthermore	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  chapter	  1	  sections	  II,	  IV	  and	  V,	  that	  such	  a	  deflated	  or	   internal	  realism	  (such	  as	  Quine’s	   I-­‐realism	  and	  Thomasson’s	  simple	  realism)	  is	  not	  worthy	  of	  the	  title	  ‘realism’.	  	  	  	  Not	   only	   do	   I	   believe	   it	   to	   be	  misleading	   to	   call	   her	   position	   a	   simple	  ‘realism’	  doing	  easy	  ‘ontology’,	  but	  also	  I	  believe	  it	  to	  be	  misleading	  for	  her	  to	  regard	  her	  position	  as	  deflationary.	  Thomasson,	  as	  noted	  above,	  tells	  us	  that	  commitments	  in	  her	  simple	  realism	  are	  not	  heavy	  duty,	  yet	  she	  also	  rejects	  them	  being	  called	  ‘thin’225	  –	  she	  argues	  instead	  that	  the	  existence	   derived	   is	   existence	   full	   stop,	   thus	   denying	   a	   distinction	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  225	  Thomasson	   (2015	  p146)	   explicitly	   and	   revealingly	   states:	   “I	   think,	   however,	   that	  we	   should	   not	   suggest	   that	   the	   entities	   to	   which	   we	   become	   committed	   via	   trivial	  inferences	   are	   in	   general	   ‘thin	   and	   inconsequential’,	   ‘ontologically	   shallow’	   or	   that	  their	   existence	   is	   somehow	   to	   be	   understood	   in	   a	   deflationary	  manner.	   Instead	  we	  should	  simply	  say	  that	  such	  entities	  exist	  –	  full	  stop.”	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  between	  the	  heavy	  and	  the	  thin	  commitments.	  If	  the	  commitments	  from	  simple	  realism	  are	  not	  thin,	  then	  ontology	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  deflated	  but	  merely	  redefined,	  and	   in	   that	  sense	  Thomasson	  moves	  away	   from	  the	  Carnapian	  incentive	  and	  defining	  feature	  of	  rejecting	  ontology.	  	  	  Thomasson	   regards	   her	   easy	   approach	   to	   ontology	   as	   in	   competition	  with	   fictionalism,	   traditionally	   construed.	   But	   she	   also	   recognizes	   the	  similarities	   between	   fictionalism	   and	   her	   simple	   realism,	  which	   could	  motivate	   my	   marriage	   of	   a	   deflationary	   view	   like	   Carnap’s	   with	  fictionalism	  in	  my	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietist	  position.	  Thomasson	  states:	  	  	   In	  many	  ways,	   the	   fictionalist	   approach	   and	   the	   easy	   approach	  are	   similar.	   Both	   are	   equally	   opposed	   to	   both	   traditional	  Platonism	  and	  to	  traditional	  nominalism	  or	  eliminativism	  about	  disputed	  entities.	  Both	  bring	  to	  ontological	  debates	  a	  ‘no	  worries’	  attitude	   that	   suggests	   that	   we	   can	   preserve	   the	   discourse	   in	  question	  without	  saddling	  ourselves	  with	  a	  heavy-­‐duty	  ontology	  (such	  as	  Platonism	  in	  mathematics).	  Both	  reject	  the	  assumption	  that	   the	   function	   of,	   say,	   mathematical	   discourse	   is	   to	   track	  objects…	   And	   they	   tend	   to	   appeal	   to	   the	   same	   sort	   of	  philosopher:	   someone	   who	   suspects	   the	   heavyduty	   realist	   of	  taking	  the	  discourse	  in	  question	  too	  seriously,	  and	  suspects	  the	  eliminativist	   of	   overreacting	   by	   rejecting	   a	   perfectly	   functional	  range	  of	  discourse.226	  	  It	   is	   here	   clear	   to	   see	   how	   traditional	   fictionalism	   could	   be	   seen	   as	  similar	   to	   a	   deflationary	   view	   like	   Thomasson’s	   easy	   realism	   or	  Carnapian	   quietism,	   and	   thus	   clear	   to	   see	   how	   fictionalism	   could	   be	  treated	   itself	   as	  deflationary	  or	  quiet.	  However	  Thomasson	  also	  notes	  where	  the	  positions	  crucially	  differ:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  226	  Thomasson	  (2015)	  p178	  	  
	   167	  The	   views	   are	   clearly	   in	   conflict,	   for	   taking	   the	   easy	   approach	  leads	  us	  to	  the	  simple	  realist	  view	  that	   there	  are	  entities	  of	   the	  disputed	   kind,	   while	   the	   fictionalist	   does	   not	   assert	   that	   there	  are	  such	  entities.227	  	  This	   takes	   the	   difference	   to	   be	   that	   fictionalism	   traditionally	   is	  antirealist,	   and	   Thomasson’s	   position	   is	   realist.	   My	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietist	   position	   is	   neither.	   Traditional	   fictionalists	   thought	   that	  ontologists	  took	  ontology	  too	  seriously	  as	  the	  language	  usage	  is	  actually	  just	   fictional,	   whereas	   Thomasson	   says	   that	   fictionalists	   take	   it	   too	  seriously	   as	   there	   is	   no	  need	   to	   avoid	   the	   commitments	  derived	   from	  language	  usage.	  Since	  Carnap	  did	  want	  to	  avoid	  such	  commitments,	  and	  avoided	   realist	   and	   antirealist	   branding,	   again	   I	   believe	   my	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	  position	  to	  be	  closer	  to	  Carnap’s	  quietism	  than	  Thomasson’s	  simple	  realism	  is.	  To	  summarize,	  I	  take	  my	  position	  to	  have	  important	  differences	  to	  Thomasson’s	  simple	  realism,	  yet	  since	  my	  position	  is	  not	  traditionally	  fictionalist	  (as	  it	  is	  quietist)	  such	  differences	  do	  not	  include	  those	   noted	   by	   Thomasson	   between	   traditional	   fictionalism	   and	  deflationary	  approaches.	  Otherwise,	  I	  agree	  that	  we	  are	  Carnapian	  allies.	  	  	  IX.ii.	  Comparison	  to	  Price’s	  Naturalism	  without	  Mirrors.	  	  	  Price,	  like	  Thomasson,	  cites	  Carnap	  as	  an	  ally	  to	  his	  position.228	  Price	  is	  a	  discourse	  pluralist,	  and	  so	  is	  pluralist	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Carnap	  has	  a	  plurality	   of	   linguistic	   frameworks.229	  Yet	   Price	   deviates	   significantly	  from	  Carnap	  in	  putting	  forward	  his	  position	  as	  a	  type	  of	  realism,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Thomasson	  does	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  Price	  states:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  227 	  Thomasson	   (2015)	   p180.	   However	   it	   is	   curious	   that	   Thomasson	   cites	   this	  difference	  when	  she	  goes	  on	  to	  claim	  that	  “where	  ontological	  issues	  are	  concerned	  the	  two	  views	  are	  on	  a	  par.”	  Thomasson	  (2015)	  p182.	  	  228	  Price	  (2011)	  p13	  229	  Price	  (2011)	  p37	  and	  p283	  
	   168	  Discourse	   pluralism	   is	   not	   an	   irrealist	   position.	   The	   pluralist	  accepts	  with	   all	   sincerity	   that	   there	   are	  moral	   states	   of	   affairs,	  possible	  worlds,	  numbers,	  or	  whatever.	  What	  he	  or	  she	  rejects	  is	  the	  additive	  monist’s	  attempt	  to	  put	  a	  further	  metaphysical	  gloss	  on	  such	  existential	  claims.	  Without	  the	  gloss,	  discourse	  pluralism	  sits	   quite	   happily	   with	   a	   non-­‐metaphysical	   or	   ‘minimal’	  realism.230	  	  So	   in	   this	   way,	   like	   we	   saw	   with	   Thomasson,	   the	   faithful	   Carnapian	  would	  say	  that	  such	  use	  of	  the	  title	   ‘realism’	   is	  misleading	  if	   it	   is	  not	  a	  metaphysical	   position.	   Price	   calls	   his	   position	   ‘Naturalism	   without	  Mirrors’	  because	  it	  is	  a	  naturalist	  position	  without	  representationalism.	  Naturalism	   is	   taken	   to	   be	   the	   view	   that	   natural	   science	   constrains	  philosophy	  in	  some	  sense,	  and	  representationalism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  our	  language	   represents	   the	  world.	   Since	  naturalism	   is	   traditionally	   taken	  as	   holding	   representationalism,	   in	   denying	   representationalism	   Price	  puts	  forward	  a	  new	  type	  of	  naturalism.231	  The	  naturalist	  part	  of	  Price’s	  position	   is	  not	   something	   that	   I	   have	   attributed	   to	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietist	   position,	   however	   it	   is	   plausible	   that	   Carnap	   himself	   would	  have	   embraced	   such	   naturalism	   (but	   not	   in	   the	   Quinean	   way	   of	  privileging	  the	  scientific	  framework	  as	  delivering	  metaphysical	  results).	  Price’s	   naturalism	   is	   globally	   expressivist	   and	   pragmatist,	   and	   so	   has	  some	   important	   connections	   worth	   noting	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   global,	  non-­‐cognitivist,	  and	  pragmatist	  aspects	  of	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietist.	  	  	  Price’s	  position	   is	  expressivist	   since	   it	   regards	   language	  as	  being	  non-­‐cognitive,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  not	  being	  truth-­‐apt	  nor	  fit	  for	  belief.	  He	  notes	  the	   following	  difference	  between	  his	  non-­‐cognitivist	   expressivism	  and	  traditional	  fictionalism:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  230	  Price	  (2011)	  p49	  231	  Price	  (2011)	  p11	  and	  p184	  
	   169	  It	   is	  worth	  noting	  an	   important	  difference	  between	  fictionalism	  and	   expressivism…	   A	   [moral]	   fictionalist	   [for	   example]	   thinks	  that	   moral	   claims	   have	   an	   everyday	   use	   and	   a	   literal	   use…	   In	  contrast,	  an	  expressivist	  has	  no	  need	  to	  admit	   that	   there	   is	  any	  sense	   in	  which	   such	   a	   statement	   is	   literally	   false...	   It	   is	   not	   the	  kind	  of	  speech	  act	  that	  has	  a	  literal	  truth-­‐value,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  fictionalist	  intends.232	   	   	  	  The	   traditional	   fictionalist,	   as	   described	   in	   section	   V,	   regards	   the	  language	  in	  question	  as	  being	  literally	  False	  due	  to	  the	  non-­‐existence	  of	  the	  entities	  it	  aims	  to	  refer	  to	  (or	  fails	  to	  refer	  to),	  and	  as	  such	  provides	  a	  fictional	  everyday	  use	  for	  the	  language.	  This	  is	  not	  something	  that	  the	  traditional	  fictionalist	  and	  my	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietist	  have	  in	  common,	  since	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  does	  not	  take	  the	  discourse	  to	  be	  False.	  Rather,	  the	   discourse	   is	   truth-­‐evaluable	   internally	   to	   the	   fiction,	   such	   that	  sentences	   can	   be	   true	   or	   false	   relative	   to	   the	   fiction,	   and	   also	  will	   be	  cognitive.	   However,	   the	   discourse	   as	   a	   whole	   is	   not	   Truth-­‐evaluable	  
externally	  to	  the	  fiction,	  since	  it	  is	  just	  adopted	  as	  being	  helpful,	  and	  so	  is	   non-­‐cognitive	   like	   Price’s	   expressivism.	   For	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian,	  frameworks	  are	  non-­‐cognitive	  (yet	  internal	  language	  usage	  is	  cognitive),	  and	   for	   Price’s	   expressivism,	   the	   language	   used	   is	   non-­‐cognitive.	   This	  shows	   a	  difference	   to	   be	   that	  Price	   is	   thoroughly	  non-­‐cognitive,	   yet	   it	  also	  shows	  a	  similarity:	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietist	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  language	  as	  internally	  factual	  and	  externally	  non-­‐Factual,	  and	  likewise	   Price	   makes	   a	   distinction	   between	   language	   as	   internally	  representational	  and	  externally	  non-­‐representational.233	  It	   is	   therefore	  not	   such	   a	   difference	   for	   Price	   to	   call	   himself	   a	   non-­‐cognitivist	  whilst	  the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   calls	   themself	   only	   a	   non-­‐cognitivist	   externally,	   as	  both	   agree	   that	   internally	   we	   get	   a	   new	   role	   for	   the	   language	   which	  allows	   for	   it	   to	   be	   representational	   in	   an	   internal	   way	   for	   Price	   and	  factual	  in	  an	  internal	  way	  for	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  232	  Price	  (2011)	  p8	  233	  Price	  (2011)	  p20	  
	   170	  Price	   defends	   a	   global	   expressivism,	   which	   provides	   a	   significant	  similarity	   between	   his	   position	   and	   my	   own	   global	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism.	  For	  Price	  there	   is	  no	  barrier	  to	  extending	  the	  normally	   local	  expressivism	   to	  being	   global,	   since	  he	   considers	  no	   language	   as	  being	  representational,	  and	  as	  such	   it	   is	  all	  non-­‐cognitive	   in	   the	  expressivist	  way.	   Similarly,	   I	   extend	   what	   is	   normally	   a	   local	   fictionalism	   about	  particular	   entities	   or	  discourses	   to	   a	   global	   fictionalism.	   Furthermore,	  the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   is	   quiet	   with	   regard	   to	   how	   language	   fits	   or	  represents	   the	  world,	   for	  all	   language	   usage,	   and	   so	   defends	   a	   global	  position	  by	  attacking	  representationalism.	  As	  Price	  clearly	  explains:	  	   Local	   versions	   of	   expressivism	   accept	   Representationalism	   in	  some	  domains.	   I	  want	  to	  go	  a	  stage	   further…	  The	  right	  thing	  to	  do,	   as	   theorists,	   is	  not	   to	   say	   that	   it	   turns	  out	   that	  none	  of	   our	  statements	  is	  a	  genuine	  representation;	  it	  is	  to	  stop	  talking	  about	  representation	   altogether,	   to	   abandon	   the	  project	   of	   theorizing	  about	  word-­‐world	  relations	  in	  these	  terms.234	  	  Such	  an	  abandonment	  is	  what	  I	  have	  called	  ‘quietism’	  –	  to	  abandon	  the	  project	  of	  how	  our	  language	  Truly	  describes	  the	  world	  is	  to	  abandon	  the	  metaphysical	  implications	  of	  our	  language	  usage.	  Price	  insists	  that	  it	  is	  not	  that	  our	  language	  is	  misrepresenting	  the	  world,	  but	  rather	  that	  this	  is	   the	   wrong	   way	   to	   think	   about	   the	   role	   of	   our	   language.	   Likewise,	  Carnap	  insists	  that	  it	  is	  not	  that	  our	  frameworks	  are	  False	  if	  their	  terms	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  metaphysical	  realm.	  For	  Carnap,	  our	  choice	  of	  language	  is	  pragmatic,	  rather	  than	  to	  represent	  the	  world.	  And	  for	  Price,	  our	  use	  of	   language	   is	  non-­‐cognitive,	  rather	   than	  to	  represent	   the	  world.	  Price	  considers	   his	   position	   to	   be	   a	   form	  of	   global	   (and	   quiet)	   pragmatism,	  since	   he	   emphasizes	   the	   pragmatic	   utility	   of	   language	   and	   what	   the	  practical	   role	   for	   language	   is,	  without	  such	  roles	  being	  metaphysically	  loaded	  in	  some	  way.235	  Price	  links	  pragmatism	  to	  quietism	  as	  such:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  234	  Price	  (2011)	  p10	  235	  Price	  (2011)	  p231	  	  
	   171	  The	   relevant	   contrast	   is	   between	   views	   that	   reject	   the	  metaphysical	   issues	   altogether,	   and	   the	   views	   that	   allow	  antirealist,	   existence	   denying	   metaphysics.	   Orthodox	  fictionalism	  is	  the	  latter	  view,	  the	  pragmatism	  we	  have	  in	  mind	  is	  the	  former.	  Pragmatism	  in	  our	  sense	  is	  thus	  a	  ‘no	  metaphysics’	  view	  rather	  than	  an	  antirealist	  view,	   in	  the	  metaphysical	  sense.	  Pragmatists	  are	  metaphysical	  quietists.236	   	  	  Here	   we	   can	   see	   that	   Price	   construes	   the	   traditional	   (‘orthodox’)	  fictionalist	   as	   an	   antirealist,	   as	   I	   argued	   in	   section	   III.	   Yet	   I	   construe	  fictionalism	   in	   a	   quietist	   fashion	   to	   avoid	   the	   antirealist	   foundations	  that	  are	  meaningless	  for	  a	  Carnapian	  in	  formulating	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietist	  position.	  Much	  like	  Price	  takes	  pragmatism	  in	  a	  quietist	  fashion,	  so	   do	   I	   take	   fictionalism	   in	   a	   quietist	   fashion,	   thus	  providing	   a	   strong	  similarity	   between	   Price’s	   version	   of	   naturalism	   and	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism.	  However,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  opening	  of	  this	  section,	  Price	  also	  strangely	   considers	   his	   position	   to	   be	   a	   defensible	   type	   of	   realism,	  which	  is	  not	  very	  quiet,	  and	  is	  certainly	  not	  very	  Carnapian.	  As	  such,	  we	  get	  a	  terminological	  dispute	  with	  regard	  to	  what	  realism	  can	  plausibly,	  and	   un-­‐misleadingly,	   be	   said	   to	   be.	   Otherwise,	   there	   is	   significant	  similarity	   between	   Price’s	   naturalism	   without	   mirrors	   and	   my	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Quietism	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   global,	   pragmatist,	   and	   non-­‐cognitivist	   elements,	   along	   with	   the	   distinction	   between	   being	  internally	   factual/representational	   and	   externally	   non-­‐Factual/non-­‐representational.	   It	   is	   plausible	   that	   Carnap	   (and	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian)	  could	   adopt	   the	   anti-­‐representationalism	   and	   naturalism	   of	   Price	   too.	  The	   larger	   differences	   between	   Price’s	   naturalism	   and	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism	   lie	   with	   Price’s	   expressivism	   at	   the	   internal	   level	   where	  language	   is	   non-­‐cognitive	   yet	   representational	   in	   an	   internal	   sense,	  whereas	   for	   Carnap	   language	   is	   cognitive	   at	   the	   internal	   level.	   But	  overall,	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism	  finds	  an	  ally	  in	  some	  sense	  with	  Price,	  and	  shares	  Carnapian	  motivations	  and	  foundations	  with	  Thomasson.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  236	  Price	  (2011)	  p234	  
	   172	  X.	  Conclusion.	  	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	   have	   described	  my	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Quietist	   position.	  After	  demonstrating	   in	  the	  Introduction	  chapter	  how	  a	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  study	   of	   ‘ontology’	   would	   be	   pursued	   and	   the	   resulting	   realist	   and	  antirealist	  positions	  that	  would	  come	  out	  of	  it,	  here	  I	  showed	  the	  effects	  of	  quietism	  on	  fictionalism	  to	  show	  that	  it	  required	  being	  divorced	  from	  antirealist	  foundations.	  Then	  I	  provided	  a	  fictionalist	  picture	  of	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  position,	  married	  to	  quietism	  instead.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  was	   to	   present	  why	   I	   consider	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   position	   under	   the	  fictionalist	   umbrella.	   The	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   is	   quiet	   with	   regard	   to	  metaphysics,	   and	   fictional	   with	   regard	   to	   linguistic	   frameworks.	   To	  construe	  the	  frameworks	  as	  fictions	  is	  to	  say	  they	  have	  value	  by	  being	  useful	  to	  adopt,	  and	  that	  they	  are	  to	  be	  treated	  similar	  to	  how	  we	  treat	  fictions	   –	   presupposing	   them	   in	   order	   to	   engage	   in	   them	   and	   assess	  claims	  relative	  to	  them,	  and	  accepting	  what	  we	  presuppose	  in	  order	  to	  believe	  the	  claims	  that	  are	  true	  relative	  to	  them.	  The	  account	  is	  typically	  fictionalist	   in	   its	   escape	   from	   ontological	   commitment	   whilst	  maintaining	   the	   discourse	   that	   may	   seem	   to	   sound	   realist;	   and	   in	   its	  attribution	  of	  error	  to	  the	  discourse	  users	  in	  thinking	  it	  is	  realist;	  and	  of	  course	   its	   citing	   value	   in	   the	   discourse	   by	   being	   useful	   to	   adopt	  independent	   of	   its	   Truth.	   Furthermore	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	  is	  hermeneutic	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  quietism,	  holding	  that	  we	  
are	  quiet,	  but	  is	  revolutionary	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  fictionalism,	  holding	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  treat	  frameworks	  as	  fictions	  (even	  though	  we	  may	  not	  have	  done	  so	  thus	  far).	  This	  concludes	  my	  description	  of	  my	  global	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Quietism,	   which	   has	   important	   similarities	   yet	   crucial	  differences	   from	   Thomasson’s	   simple	   realism	   and	   Price’s	   naturalism.	  The	  next	  and	  final	  chapter	  4	  addresses	  the	  self-­‐reference	  problem	  for	  a	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Quietist	   which	   leads	   the	   Carnapian	   into	   contradictory	  realms	  and	  thus	  towards	  dialetheism.	  The	  upshot	  will	  be	  that	  in	  order	  to	  meta-­‐theorize	  globally,	  in	  a	  Carnapian	  way,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  dialetheist.	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CHAPTER	  4:	  
QUIET	  DIALETHEISM	  	  	  In	   this	   final	  main	   chapter	   I	   reflect	   on	  metametaphysics	   and	   as	   such	   I	  develop	  a	  metametametaphysical	  view:	  that	  metametaphysics	  requires	  dialetheism.	  I	  show	  this	  using	  Carnap’s	  metametaphysics	  as	  an	  example,	  with	  regard	  to	  how	  it	  encounters	  the	  paradox	  of	  self-­‐reference.	  I	  argue	  that	   a	   common	   location	   for	   self-­‐referential	   paradoxes	   is	  within	  meta-­‐theories	  with	  global	  scope,	  as	  the	  ‘meta’	  approach	  aims	  to	  transcend	  the	  scope	  of	  that	  which	  it	  is	  theorizing	  about,	  whilst	  the	  ‘global’	  nature	  will	  place	   itself	   back	  within	   the	   scope	  of	   that	  which	   it	   is	   theorizing	   about,	  which	   together	   result	   in	   the	   theory	   referring	   to	   itself	   whilst	   refuting	  itself.	  I	  aim	  to	  show	  that	  any	  sceptical	  global	  meta-­‐theory,	  like	  Carnap’s	  quietism	   and	   other	   metametaphysical	   positions,	   will	   face	   such	  problems	  leading	  to	  contradictory	  realms.	  It	  appears	  that	  if	  we	  want	  to	  meta-­‐philosophize	  in	  such	  a	  way,	  then	  we	  will	  need	  to	  be	  dialetheist.	  	  	  The	  paradox	  of	  self-­‐reference	  occurs	  for	  Carnap	  when	  we	  question	  the	  status	  of	  his	  own	  position	  and	  ask	  whether	  he	  considers	  his	   theory	  of	  frameworks	  itself	  to	  be	  presented	  as	  internal	  or	  external	  to	  frameworks.	  I	   structure	   this	   problem	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   dilemma,	  where	   both	   horns	  result	  in	  contradiction.	  In	  section	  I,	  I	  show	  how	  self-­‐reference	  problems	  occur	   for	   global	   meta-­‐theories.	   Section	   II	   explores	   the	   internal	   horn,	  and	  section	  III	  the	  external	  horn,	  of	  Carnap’s	  dilemma,	  both	  exhibiting	  paradoxes	  of	  the	  self-­‐referential	  kind.	  I	  follow	  Priest	  in	  his	  formalisation	  of	   self-­‐referential	   paradoxes	   exhibiting	   contradictions	   in	   theories	   that	  draw	  a	  limit	  to	  thought	  in	  section	  IV.	  Finally	  I	  show	  how	  the	  Carnapian	  can	   bite	   the	   contradictory	   bullet	   in	   the	   form	  of	   dialetheism	   to	   escape	  the	   dilemma.	   I	   conclude	   by	   explaining	  why	   dialetheism	   is	   a	   plausible	  move	   for	   the	   Carnapian,	   and	   I	   will	   construe	   Carnap	   as	   an	   ‘implicit’	  dialetheist	  and	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietist	  as	  an	  ‘explicit’	  dialetheist.	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  I.	  The	  self-­‐reference	  problem.	  	  	  I.i.	  For	  global	  meta-­‐theories.	  	  	  The	  problem	  of	  self-­‐reference	   is	  encountered	  by	  global	  scale	  positions	  such	  as	  Carnap’s	  quietism.	  For	  example,	  global	  relativism:	  If	  everything	  is	  relative,	  then	  the	  sentence	  ‘everything	  is	  relative’	  will	  be	  relative	  too.	  And	  global	  scepticism237:	   If	  we	  cannot	  know	  anything,	   then	  we	  cannot	  know	   ‘we	   cannot	   know	  anything’.	   And	   likewise	   for	   global	   quietism:	   If	  we	  should	  be	  quiet	  about	  metaphysics,	   then	  we	  should	  be	  quiet	  about	  
being	   quiet	   about	   metaphysics.	   A	   theory	   that	   references	   itself	   often	  refutes	  itself,	  and	  so	  the	  general	  structure	  of	  such	  a	  theory	  encounters	  a	  Liar-­‐style	  paradox	  –	  if	  what	  the	  theory	  says	  is	  correct,	  then	  the	  theory	  turns	  out	   to	  be	   false,	  or	  at	   least	   is	  undermined	   in	  some	  way.	  So,	   if	  we	  hold	  that	  everything	  is	  relative	  then	  this	  undermines	  the	  absolute	  truth	  of	  relativism	  itself,	  and	   if	  we	  hold	   that	  we	  cannot	  know	  anything	  then	  this	  undermines	  our	  knowledge	  of	  scepticism	  itself.	  Likewise,	  if	  we	  hold	  that	   we	   are	   metaphysically	   quiet	   then	   this	   undermines	   the	  metaphysical	  significance	  and	  assertability	  of	  quietism	  itself.	  	  	  	  Meta-­‐theories	   aim	   to	   speak	  about	   a	   theory	  or	  way	  of	   theorizing,	   from	  above.	  Metametaphysical	  positions	  are	  a	  prime	  example,	  as	  they	  aim	  to	  speak	  about	  metaphysics	   from	  a	  higher-­‐order	  metametaphysical	  point	  of	  view.	  Some	  metametaphysical	  positions	  speak	  about	  metaphysics	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  237	  There	  are	  different	  forms	  of	  scepticism	  that	  I	  do	  not	  consider	  here.	  A	  ‘pyrrhonian’	  sceptic	   about	   Y	   suspends	   judgment	   about	   whether	   or	   not	   anyone	   knows	   anything	  about	  Y,	  while	  an	  ‘academic’	  sceptic	  about	  Y	  claims	  that	  nobody	  ever	  knows	  anything	  about	  Y.	  (This	  pyrrhonian/academic	  distinction	  is	  borrowed	  from	  Sinnott-­‐Armstrong	  (2006)	  p10-­‐11).	  A	  global	  pyrrhonian	  scepticism	  may	  be	  less	  problematic	  than	  a	  global	  academic	   scepticism.	   A	   global	   academic	   scepticism	  would	   seem	   to	   involve	   saying	   ‘I	  know	   that	   no	   one	   knows	   anything,’	  which	   is	   paradoxical	   and	   self-­‐defeating.	   But	   the	  pyrrhonian	  can	  say	  ‘I	  suspend	  judgment	  on	  whether	  anyone	  knows	  anything.’	  If	  this	  is	  just	  the	  claim	  that	  one	  does	  not	  know	  whether	  anyone	  knows	  anything,	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  internally	  coherent.	  I	  thank	  Stephen	  Ingram	  for	  this	  point.	  
	   175	  a	  negative	  way	   and	   as	   such	   are	   ‘anti-­‐metaphysical’.	   Anti-­‐metaphysical	  positions	  such	  as	  Carnap’s	  quietism	  in	  his	  paper	  ‘Empiricism,	  Semantics	  and	  Ontology’	  (hereon	  ‘ESO’)	  encounter	  self-­‐reference	  problems	  as	  they	  can	  be	  accused	  of	  doing	  metaphysics	  whilst	  rejecting	  metaphysics,	  and	  so	   appear	   to	   be	  metaphysically	   loud	   when	   prescribing	   being	   quiet.	   It	  seems	  that	  one	  cannot	  do	  metametaphysics	  without	  doing	  metaphysics,	  which	  is	  a	  problem	  if	  one’s	  metametaphysical	  view	  is	  anti-­‐metaphysical.	  As	   Bradley	   famously	   claimed,	   the	   anti-­‐metaphysician	   is	   simply	   “a	  brother	  metaphysician	  with	  a	  rival	  theory.”238	  Classic	  examples	  of	  such	  anti-­‐metaphysical	   positions	   are	   Kant’s	   transcendental	   doctrine,	   the	  Vienna	   Circle’s	   Verificationism,	   and	   Wittgenstein’s	   Tractatus.	   The	  common	  factor	  among	  these	  is	  that	  they	  aim	  to	  spell	  out	  a	  limit	  –	  a	  limit	  to	  what	  we	   can	  experience	  or	   a	   limit	   to	  what	   is	  meaningful,	   and	   then	  place	  metaphysics	  outside	  this	  limit.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  show	  that	  when	  metametaphysical	   theories	  draw	  such	   limits	   they	  are	   led	  to	  contradictory	  realms	  via	  self-­‐referential	  paradoxes.	  First	  I	  will	  describe	  Verificationism’s	   self-­‐reference	  problem	   to	  get	   clear	  on	   its	   similarities	  to	  Carnap’s	  problem	  and	  to	  show	  that	  ESO	  is	  not	  a	  Verificationist	  theory.	  	  	  I.ii.	  For	  Verificationism.	  	  	  Verificationism	   is	   associated	   with	   the	   Vienna	   Circle,	   which	   of	   course	  included	   Carnap.239	  Yet	   it	   is	   not	   due	   to	   Verificationism	   that	   Carnap’s	  ESO	   experiences	   self-­‐reference	   problems.	   However,	   looking	   to	   the	  parallel	  issues	  in	  Verificationism	  can	  help	  us	  understand	  Carnap’s	  self-­‐reference	   problem	   and	   his	   possible	   responses,	   since	   Verificationism	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  238	  Bradley	  (1897)	  p1	  239	  Burgess	  explains	  that	  Carnap’s	  negative	  association	  with	  Verificationism	  probably	  contributed	  to	  the	  dismissal	  of	  the	  Carnapian	  quietism	  from	  ESO:	  “I	  suspect	  the	  reason	  Carnap’s	  presentation	  of	  the	  [quietist]	  case	  failed	  to	  convince	  was	  largely	  that	  he	  was	  too	   much	   identified	   with	   the	   infamous	   ‘empiricist	   criterion	   of	   meaningfulness’	  [Verificationism],	  which	  certainly	  has	  by	  now	  been	  consigned,	  if	  not	  to	  the	  rubbish	  bin,	  then	   at	   least	   to	   archives,	   where	   it	   may	   be	   studied	   by	   historians	   of	   philosophy,	   but	  where	  it	  no	  longer	  influences	  current	  philosophical	  debate.”	  (2004	  p34)	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  and	  ESO	  are	  both	  anti-­‐metaphysical	  in	  that	  both	  argue	  that	  metaphysics	  is	  meaningless.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Carnap’s	  criterion	  for	  being	  meaningful	  is	  different	  to	  that	  of	  the	  Verification	  principle,	  and	  as	  such	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  Carnap	  in	  ESO	  need	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  Verificationist	  as	  he	   is	   often	   accused	   of	   being.	   For	   Carnap	   in	   ESO	   all	   language	  must	   be	  utilized	  internal	  to	  frameworks	  to	  be	  meaningful.	  For	  Verificationists	  a	  sentence	  is	  meaningful	  if	  it	  is	  verifiable,	  either	  in	  practice	  or	  in	  principle,	  by	  being	  empirically	  testable	  or	  logically	  necessary.	  For	  Carnap	  internal	  sentences	  are	  made	  true	  by	  similar	  empirical	  or	  logical	  means,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  such	  sentences	  are	  made	  meaningful	  in	  this	  way.	  Thus,	  the	  problems	  of	  Verificationism	  need	  not	  carry	  over	  to	  Carnap’s	  ESO,	  as	  they	  give	  different,	  independent	  criterions	  for	  meaningfulness.	  But	  their	  self-­‐reference	  problems	  are	  parallel	  and	  are	  therefore	  worth	  comparing.	  	  	  Verificationism	  has	  largely	  been	  rejected,	   in	  part	  due	  to	  self-­‐reference.	  When	  we	  apply	   the	  Verification	  principle	   to	   itself	   it	   turns	  out	   that	   the	  principle	   does	   not	   meet	   its	   own	   criterion:	   it	   is	   not	   itself	   empirically	  testable	  or	  logically	  necessary.	  Verificationism	  thus	  fails	  its	  own	  test	  for	  meaningfulness,	   and	   so	   encounters	   the	   self-­‐reference	   problem.	   As	  we	  will	   see,	   the	   Carnapian	  will	   end	   up	   in	   a	   similar	   situation	  where	   their	  own	  theory	  does	  not	  meet	  their	  own	  standards	  for	  meaningfulness,	  yet	  this	   is	   not	   because	   the	   Carnapian	   has	   the	   same	   standards	   for	  meaningfulness	   as	   the	   Verificationists,	   but	   rather	   because	   both	   the	  Carnapian	   and	   the	   Verificationist	   attempts	   to	   draw	  a	   limit	   to	   what	   is	  meaningful	   and	   thus	   they	   encounter	   similar	   limitation	   problems.	   The	  Vienna	   Circle	   eventually	   saw	   a	   way	   out	   of	   their	   problem	   by	   altering	  what	   the	  Verification	   principle	  was	  doing.	   If	   the	  Verification	   principle	  judges	  propositions,	  then	  the	  principle	  itself	  cannot	  be	  a	  proposition	  fit	  to	  be	  judged.	  Instead	  of	  proposing	  the	  principle	  then,	  the	  Vienna	  Circle	  simply	  recommended	  it.	  The	  principle	  is	  thus	  un-­‐asserted	  as	  it	  ceases	  to	  be	  a	  proposition	  fit	  for	  assertion	  or	  judgment.	  A	  Carnapian	  may	  respond	  similarly,	  discussed	  in	  section	  III.	  But	  next	  I	  describe	  Carnap’s	  problem.	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  I.iii.	  For	  Carnap.	  	  	  The	  paradox	  of	  self-­‐reference	  occurs	  for	  Carnap	  when	  we	  question	  the	  status	  of	  his	  own	  position	   in	  ESO	  and	  apply	   it	   to	   itself.	  Given	  Carnap’s	  distinction	   between	   the	   internal	   question	   (IQ)	   and	   the	   external	  question	   (EQ),	   we	   may	   ask	   whether	   Carnap	   is	   utilizing	   language	  internally	   or	   externally	  when	   putting	   forward	   his	   theory	   in	   ESO.	   The	  main	   point	   of	   ESO	   is	   that	   all	   language	   usage	   has	   to	   be	   internal	   to	   a	  framework	   in	  order	   to	  be	  meaningful,	   so	  all	   external	  propositions	  are	  meaningless.	  ESO	  thus	  has	  global	  scope	  and	  can	  be	  summarized	  in	  the	  following	   way:	   ‘all	   external	   propositions	   are	  meaningless’	   (name	   this	  <ESO>).	  Now	  is	  this	  sentence	  <ESO>	  internal	  or	  external	  to	  frameworks?	  I	  present	  this	  as	  a	  dilemma	  for	  Carnap,	  the	  internal	  and	  external	  horns	  both	  resulting	  in	  a	  contradiction.	  I	  detail	  the	  possibilities	  for	  each	  horn	  in	  sections	  II-­‐III	  to	  show	  how	  Carnap’s	  theory	  ends	  up	  in	  contradiction.	  But	  before	  detailing	  these	  possibilities	  I	  will	  note	  them	  briefly	  here	  now.	  	  	  	  Firstly,	   if	   <ESO>	   is	   correct	   and	   meaningful,	   and	   if	   Carnap	   is	   to	   be	  consistent,	   then	   <ESO>	  must	   itself	   be	   internal	   (because	   <ESO>	   states	  that	   if	   it	  were	  external	   then	   it	  would	  be	  meaningless).	  But	   if	  <ESO>	   is	  internal	  then	  it	  is	  true	  only	  relative	  to	  that	  framework	  that	  it	  is	  internal	  to.	  We	  may	  then	  ask	  which	  framework(s)	  <ESO>	  is	  true	  internally	  to,	  as	  there	   may	   be	   some	   framework(s)	   where	   <ESO>	   is	   false	   or	   not	   even	  mentioned.	   This	   denies	   the	   intended	   global	   scope	   of	   ESO,	   and	   denies	  that	  <ESO>	  is	  universally	  true	  about	  all	  frameworks.	  In	  order	  to	  retain	  the	  global	  scope	  so	  that	  <ESO>	  is	  true	  about	  all	  frameworks,	  we	  can	  say	  that	   <ESO>	   is	   internal	   to	   an	   all-­‐encompassing	   global	   framework	   that	  describes	   all	   others.	  Here	  we	  get	   a	   semantically	   closed	   framework-­‐of-­‐all-­‐frameworks	  (much	  like	  the	  set-­‐of-­‐all-­‐sets)	  and	  hence	  a	  set-­‐theoretic	  kind	   of	   paradox,	   Russell’s	   Paradox	   (see	   section	   II.i),	   leading	   towards	  contradiction.	  The	  alternative	  to	  avoid	  Russell’s	  Paradox	  is	  to	  allow	  for	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  a	   hierarchy	   of	   frameworks,	   much	   like	   a	   hierarchy	   of	   Tarski’s	   meta-­‐languages	  (see	  section	  II.ii),	  each	  with	  their	  own	  version	  of	  <ESO>	  and	  a	  hierarchy	  of	   truth	  so	  as	   to	  not	  be	  problematically	  semantically	  closed.	  However	   this	   leads	   to	  a	  regress	  where	   there	   is	  no	  one	  notion	  of	   truth	  and	  no	  one	  global	  version	  of	  <ESO>,	  which	  would	  lead	  to	  contradiction	  as	   <ESO>	   is	   never	   fully	   globally	   asserted	   yet	   Carnap	   asserts	   it	   fully	  globally	   in	  ESO.	  This	   is	  horn	  1	  of	   the	  dilemma:	  by	   taking	  <ESO>	   to	  be	  internal	  we	  deny	  the	  intended	  global	  scope	  of	  ESO	  or	  end	  up	  attempting	  to	  globalise	  the	  scope	  internally	  which	  results	  in	  contradiction.	  	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  horn	  2	  takes	  <ESO>	  as	  external.	  Then,	  if	  <ESO>	  were	  correct,	  <ESO>	  itself	  would	  be	  meaningless,	  since	  it	  would	  not	  conform	  to	   the	  criterion	   that	  <ESO>	  spells	  out	   for	  something	   to	  be	  meaningful.	  This	  clearly	  self-­‐references	  directly,	  and	  then	  self-­‐refutes,	  since	  <ESO>	  states	   that	   external	   sentences	   are	  meaningless	  which	   includes	   <ESO>	  itself.	   Given	   the	   intended	   global	   scope	   of	   ESO,	   to	   show	   that	   all	  meaningful	   language	   usage	  must	   be	   internal	   to	   frameworks,	   it	   seems	  Carnap	  attempts	  to	  say	  something	  about	  all	  of	  language	  usage,	  and	  to	  do	  so	  he	  is	  attempting	  to	  transcend	  such	  usage	  in	  describing	  it.	  His	  position	  is	  metametaphysical	  since	  it	  aims	  to	  talk	  about	  metaphysics	  from	  above,	  yet	   is	   is	   also	   intended	   to	   be	   global,	   and	   so	   applies	   to	   all	   sentences	  including	  <ESO>	   itself.	  So	   it	   turns	  out	   that	   if	  <ESO>	   is	  meaningful	  and	  true,	   then	  <ESO>	  is	  meaningless	  and	  false	  –	   this	   is	  structurally	  similar	  to	   the	   Liar	   Paradox.	   Here	   Carnap	   either	   ends	   up	   in	   contradiction,	   or	  could	   respond	   that	   he	   is	   not	   really	   saying	   something	   at	   all	   by	   not	  asserting	  <ESO>	  but	  merely	   recommending	   it,240	  or	  putting	   it	   forward	  as	  a	  pragmatic	  statement	  (see	  section	  III).	  So,	  the	  four	  main	  options	  for	  <ESO>	  are	  that	   it	   is:	   (i)	   internal	   to	  a	  global	   framework;	  (ii)	   internal	   to	  each	   individual	   framework;	   (iii)	   external	   as	   a	   recommendation;	   (iv)	  external	  without	  assertion.	  I	  will	  go	  through	  each	  option	  showing	  how	  they	  lead	  to	  contradiction,	  hence	  Carnap’s	  route	  towards	  dialetheism.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  240	  This	  is	  parallel	  to	  the	  Verificationist	  self-­‐reference	  solution	  (sections	  I.ii	  and	  III.i).	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  II.	  Horn	  1	  –	  Internal.	  	   	  When	  Carnap	  gave	  his	  views	  in	  ESO,	  he	  meant	  to	  convey	  that	  external	  language	  is	  meaningless,	  not	  just	  according	  to	  his	  framework,	  but	  really	  
is	  meaningless.	   If	  <ESO>	  is	  correct	  and	  meaningful,	  and	   if	  Carnap	   is	   to	  be	   consistent,	   then	   <ESO>	  must	   be	   internal.	   But	   if	   <ESO>	  were	  made	  internal	  to	  a	  framework	  then	  Carnap’s	  message	  in	  ESO	  seems	  to	  lose	  its	  power	  somewhat.	  This	  is	  because	  <ESO>’s	  truth	  will	  then	  be	  relative	  to	  the	   particular	   framework	   rules	   of	   the	   framework	   to	  which	   it	   belongs.	  Another	   framework	   could	   be	   created	   for	   talking	   about	   frameworks,	  within	   which	   <ESO>	   is	   false.	   This	   entails	   that	   <ESO>,	   if	   internal	   to	   a	  framework,	   may	   not	   be	   true	   in	   all	   frameworks,	   as	   other	   frameworks	  may	  have	  rules	  that	  regard	  <ESO>	  as	  false,	  or	  just	  do	  not	  say	  anything	  about	  <ESO>	  at	   all.	   If	  <ESO>	   is	  only	   relatively	   true,	   it	   seems	  plausible	  that	  it	  is	  also	  not	  universally	  true,	  as	  it	  may	  only	  be	  true	  relative	  to	  some	  frameworks	  and	  not	  all	  of	  them	  (yet	  <ESO>	  was	  meant	  to	  describe	  all	  of	  them).	   There	   also	   may	   be	   frameworks	   in	   which	   <ESO>	   is	   absolutely	  true,	  or	  more	  problematically	  absolutely	  false,	  which	  is	  bad	  for	  Carnap	  because	   not	   only	   does	   this	   count	   against	   relativity,	   it	   also	   says	   that	  <ESO>	   is	   false.	   Moreover,	   frameworks	   according	   to	   which	   <ESO>	   is	  relatively	  true	  are	  frameworks	  that	  are	  selected	  as	  being	  useful,	  not	  true.	  So	  Carnap’s	  position	   is	  reduced	  to	  being	  usefully	  adopted	  as	  relatively	  true	  –	  a	  much	  weaker	  conclusion	  than	  what	  he	  actually	  proposes	  in	  ESO.	  	  	  This	   certainly	   seems	   to	   misrepresent	   Carnap’s	   views	   in	   ESO,	   as	   he	  meant	  that	  for	  all	  frameworks	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  language	  usage	  external	  to	   them	   is	  meaningless,	  not	   just	  some.	  If	   it	  were	  only	   the	  case	   that	   for	  some	  frameworks	  external	  language	  is	  meaningless	  then	  there	  is	  some	  framework	  for	  which	  external	  language	  is	  meaningful,	  and	  so	  why	  could	  this	  framework	  not	  be	  the	  framework	  for	  metaphysical	  ontology?	  How	  would	  one	  make	  the	  divide	  between	  those	  frameworks	  whose	  external	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  language	  is	  meaningless	  and	  those	  whose	  is	  meaningful?	  Taking	  <ESO>	  as	  internal	  in	  this	  way	  thus	  crucially	  denies	  the	  global	  scope	  of	  ESO,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  such	  scope	  <ESO>	  would	  need	  to	  be	  internal	  to	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  global	  framework	  so	  that	  <ESO>	  is	  true	  universally.241	  If	  we	  are	  to	  treat	  <ESO>	  as	  being	  internal,	  then	  it	  will	  be	  true	  relative	  to	  the	   framework	   that	   it	   is	   internal	   to,	   and	   this	   framework	   needs	   to	   be	  global.	   Such	   a	   global	   framework	   would	   need	   to	   say	   of	   itself	   that	  language	  external	   to	   it	   is	  meaningless,	  and	   thus	   the	   framework	  would	  be	   said	   to	   be	   semantically	   closed,	   as	   described	   in	   the	   next	   section	   II.i	  and	   attacked	  by	  Tarski	   in	   section	   II.ii.	   This	   global	   semantically	   closed	  framework	  preserves	  the	  global	  scope	  of	  ESO	  and	  the	  universal	  truth	  of	  <ESO>	  and	  is	  the	  first	  option	  for	  horn	  1,	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  	  II.i.	  A	  global	  framework.	  	  	  In	   order	   to	   retain	   the	   global	   scope	   of	   ESO	   whilst	   treating	   <ESO>	   as	  internal,	  the	  framework	  that	  <ESO>	  is	  internal	  to	  must	  be	  a	  framework	  with	   global	   scope.	   This	   global	   framework	   is	   an	   all-­‐encompassing	  framework	   that	   is	   the	   framework	   containing	   and	   describing	   all	   other	  frameworks.242	  It	  is	  therefore	  a	  higher-­‐order	  framework	  that	  is	  utilized	  for	  talking	  about	  frameworks	  themselves.	  This	  global	  framework	  would	  be	   fully	   semantically	   closed	   as	   it	  would	   have	   the	   capability	   of	   talking	  about	  itself	  from	  within	  itself,	  making	  true	  claims	  about	  the	  truth	  of	  its	  own	  claims	   from	  within	   itself.	  Tarski	  considers	  all	   semantically	  closed	  languages	  to	  be	  inconsistent,	  as	  it	  is	  these	  languages	  that	  contain	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  241	  The	  other	  option	  is	  for	  <ESO>	  to	  be	  true	  in	  each	  and	  every	  framework,	  discussed	  in	  section	  II.iii,	  which	  collapses	  into	  the	  global	  framework	  option.	  This	  global	  framework	  however	  may	  not	  be	  a	  good	  option	  for	  Carnap	  as	  it	  would	  be	  plausibly	  the	  framework	  where	  we	  actually	  do	  metaphysics.	  We	  would	   therefore	  have	   to	  choose	  whether	   the	  metaphysics	  we	  do	  internally	  to	  this	  global	  framework	  is	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  –	  if	  it	  is	  taken	  seriously	  then	  it	  trivializes	  Carnap’s	  position	  which	  was	  meant	  to	  show	  that	  we	  cannot	  do	  metaphysics.	  So	  the	  internal	  horn	  just	  never	  seems	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  ESO.	  242	  This	  global	  framework	  is	  similar	  to	  Eklund’s	  maximalism	  (2009	  p153),	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  is	  a	  maximal	  theory,	  however	  what	  it	  is	  to	  exist	  is	  different	  on	  the	  two	  approaches.	  
	   181	  own	  ‘truth’	  predicate	  and	  can	  talk	  about	  sentences	  of	  themselves	  in	  the	  same	  language,	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  Liar	  Paradox.243	  It	  is	  in	  response	  to	   this	   that	  Tarski	  put	   forward	  his	  meta-­‐languages	  as	  described	   in	   the	  next	   section	   II.ii.	   Yet	   having	   a	   theory	   that	   is	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   that	  very	   same	   theory	   need	   not	   be	   problematic	   in	   all	   cases.	   Some	   circular	  justifications	   are	   acceptable,	   and	   some	   theories	   are	   self-­‐reflexive.	   The	  question	  is	  whether	  ESO	  is	  like	  this,	  and	  whether	  this	  is	  problematic.	  	  	  	  This	   closed	   global	   framework	   is	   similar	   to	   Carnap’s	   approach	   to	   the	  syntax	  of	  language,	  where	  a	  language	  can	  speak	  of	  its	  own	  syntax,	  and	  as	  such	  it	  seems	  plausible	  that	  Carnap	  himself	  would	  be	  sympathetic	  to	  this	  global	  option.	  Plus	  Carnap	  believes	  there	  is	  no	  inconsistency	  in	  it:	  	  	   Up	   to	   the	   present,	   we	   have	   differentiated	   between	   the	   object-­‐language	   and	   the	   syntax-­‐language	   in	   which	   the	   syntax	   of	   the	  object-­‐language	   is	   formulated.	   Are	   these	   necessarily	   two	  separate	   languages?	   If	   this	   question	   is	   answered	   in	   the	  affirmative	   (as	   it	   is	   by	   Herbrand	   in	   connection	   with	  metamathematics),	   then	   a	   third	   language	  will	   be	   necessary	   for	  the	  formulation	  of	   the	  syntax	  of	   the	  syntax-­‐language,	  and	  so	  on	  to	   infinity.	  According	   to	  another	  opinion	  (that	  of	  Wittgenstein),	  there	  exists	  only	  one	   language,	  and	  what	  we	  call	   syntax	  cannot	  be	  expressed	  at	  all	  –	  it	  can	  only	  ‘be	  shown’.	  As	  opposed	  to	  these	  views,	  we	  intend	  to	  show	  that,	  actually,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  manage	  with	  one	  language	  only;	  not,	  however,	  by	  renouncing	  syntax,	  but	  by	   demonstrating	   that	   without	   the	   emergence	   of	   any	  contradictions	   the	   syntax	   of	   this	   language	   can	   be	   formulated	  within	  this	  language	  itself.244	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  243	  Against	   Tarski,	   there	   are	   some	   philosophers	   such	   as	   Kripke	   (1975)	   and	   Field	  (2008)	  who	  think	  that	  a	  theory	  can	  contain	  its	  own	  truth	  predicate	  consistently	  if	  one	  gives	  up	  the	  law	  of	  excluded	  middle,	  for	  example.	  I	  do	  not	  have	  space	  to	  discuss	  these.	  244	  Carnap	  (1934a)	  p53	  
	   182	  The	   first	   thing	   to	   note	   about	   this	   quote	   is	   the	   way	   in	   which	   Carnap	  disagrees	   with	   Wittgenstein’s	   approach	   to	   self-­‐reference	   problems	   –	  this	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  section	  III.ii.	  The	  second	  thing	  to	  note	  is	  that	  he	  recognizes	  that	  closed	  languages	  experience	  contradictions	  that	  emerge	  from	  Liar-­‐style	  paradoxes	  yet	  believes	  his	  version	  will	  avoid	  it.	  Without	  assessing	  his	  proposal	  of	  the	  logical	  syntax	  of	  language,	  we	  can	  still	  see	  whether	   this	   is	   a	   viable	   option	   with	   regard	   to	   ESO’s	   self-­‐reference	  problem,	  by	  taking	  note	  thirdly	  of	  the	  emphasis	  on	  syntax	  –	  it	  is	  only	  the	  syntax	   that	  can	  be	  expressed	   in	   the	   language	   itself	   for	  Carnap.	  Where,	  then,	  do	  the	  other	  things	  about	  the	  language	  get	  expressed?	  And	  is	  it	  the	  syntax	  of	  <ESO>	  that	  we	  are	  interested	  in?	  When	  a	  syntactical	  sentence	  speaks	  of	  itself,	  what	  is	  it	  able	  to	  say	  about	  itself?	  Carnap	  clarifies	  this:	  	   If	   the	  syntax	  of	  a	   language	   is	   formulated	   in	   that	   language	   itself,	  then	  a	  syntactical	  sentence	  may	  sometimes	  speak	  about	  itself,	  or	  more	   exactly,	   it	   may	   speak	   about	   its	   own	   design	   –	   for	   pure	  syntax,	   of	   course,	   cannot	   speak	   of	   individual	   sentences	   as	  physical	  things,	  but	  only	  of	  designs	  and	  forms.245	  	  But	  are	  we	  interested	  in	  only	  the	  design	  and	  form	  of	  <ESO>?	  If	  not,	  then	  having	  syntax	  in	  the	  same	  language	  as	  the	  object	  language	  will	  be	  of	  no	  help.	  With	  syntax	  only,	  <ESO>	  applies	   to	   itself	  with	  regard	   to	   its	   form	  rather	   than	  meaning,	   and	   frameworks	  will	   be	   able	   to	   talk	   about	   their	  own	  well-­‐formed	   formulas.	   Yet	  <ESO>	  gets	   its	  meaning	   from	  within	   a	  framework,	  and	  it	   is	  this	  meaning	  and	  the	  relative	  truth	  of	  <ESO>	  that	  we	  are	   interested	   in	  deriving	   from	  the	   framework,	  which	  requires	   the	  framework	  to	  speak	  of	  semantics	  rather	  than	  syntax.	  <ESO>	  states	  that	  external	   propositions	   are	   meaningless,	   and	   thus	   it	   is	   invoking	   the	  semantic	   notion	   of	  meaning.	   <ESO>	   is	   thus	   required	   to	   talk	   about	   its	  own	  semantics	  and	  so	  we	  cannot	  understand	  <ESO>	  only	  syntactically.	  Being	   internal	   to	  a	   framework	   is	  equivalent	   to	  being	   true	   (and	  having	  meaning)	  in	  a	  framework	  and	  so,	  for	  <ESO>	  to	  talk	  meaningfully	  about	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  245	  Carnap	  (1934a)	  p129	  
	   183	  meaning	   within	   a	   framework,	   the	   framework	   must	   contain	   its	   own	  ‘truth’	   (and	   ‘meaningful’)	   predicate	   and	   be	   semantically,	   not	   just	  syntactically,	  closed.	  If	  we	  take	  the	  frameworks	  to	  be	  fully	  closed,246	  and	  not	   just	   limited	   to	   the	   syntax,	   then	   I	   will	   show	   that	   we	   end	   up	   in	  contradiction.	   This	   is	   due	   to	   the	   framework-­‐of-­‐all-­‐frameworks	   being	  like	  the	  set-­‐of-­‐all-­‐sets,	  which	  Russell	  has	  shown	  leads	  to	  a	  paradox.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  way	  that	  the	  global	  framework	  derives	  a	  contradiction.	  	  	  An	   analogue	   of	  Russell’s	   Paradox	  will	   derive	   a	   contradiction	   from	   the	  global	  framework	  as	  such:	  If	  you	  can	  talk	  within	  this	  global	  framework	  about	  all	   frameworks	  then	  it	  must	  be	  possible	  for	  a	  framework	  to	  talk	  about	   itself.	   This	   is	   because,	   as	   a	   framework	   of	   all	   frameworks,	   it	  includes	   itself	   in	   its	   global	   scope	   over	   all	   frameworks.	   Since	   it	   is	   a	  framework	  that	  talks	  about	   frameworks,	   it	   therefore	  talks	  about	   itself.	  Plausibly,	   there	   will	   be	   some	   frameworks	   that	   this	   global	   framework	  ranges	   over	  which	   do	   not	   talk	   about	   themselves	   –	  we	   can	   talk	   about	  these	  frameworks	   in	  a	  sub-­‐framework	  F	  of	  our	  global	   framework.	  The	  sub-­‐framework	  F	  will	  not	  be	  empty,	  as	  there	  will	  surely	  be	  frameworks	  that	  do	  not	  talk	  of	  themselves	  which	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  from	  within	  others.	  F	  therefore	  talks	  about	  all	  and	  only	  frameworks	  that	  do	  not	  talk	  about	  themselves.	   The	   paradoxical	   question	   is:	   does	   F	   talk	   about	   itself?	   If	   F	  talks	  about	  itself	  then	  F	  does	  not	  talk	  about	  itself.	  This	  is	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  F’s	   scope	  disqualifying	  F	   from	   its	  scope	  –	   if	  F	   talks	  about	  itself	   then	   it	   is	   not	   one	   of	   those	   frameworks	   that	   fall	   under	   its	   scope.	  However,	  if	  F	  does	  not	  talk	  about	  itself	  then	  F	  does	  talk	  about	  itself.	  This	  is	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  F’s	  scope	  including	  F	   in	   its	  scope	  –	   if	  F	  does	  not	  talk	  about	  itself	  then	  it	  qualifies	  to	  be	  one	  of	  those	  frameworks	  that	   F	   talks	   about.	   We	   thus	   have	   a	   paradoxical	   situation	   involving	   F,	  such	  that	  considering	  a	  global	  framework	  derives	  a	  contradiction.247	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  246	  Can	   a	   fictional	   framework	   be	   fully	   semantically	   closed?	   If	   not	   then	   this	   option	   is	  unavailable	  to	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  who	  treats	  frameworks	  as	  fictions	  even	  if	  it	  may	  be	  an	  option	  to	  Carnap.	  This	  need	  not	  be	  pursued	  as	  the	  option	  is	  contradictory	  anyway.	  247	  Special	  thanks	  to	  Mary	  Leng	  for	  this	  suggestion	  of	  a	  parallel	  to	  Russell’s	  Paradox.	  	  
	   184	  This	  is	  structurally	  similar	  to	  Russell’s	  Paradox,	  where	  the	  set	  of	  all	  sets	  is	   taken	   to	   be	   a	  member	   of	   itself,	   and	   then	  we	   consider	   the	   subset	   of	  those	   sets	   that	   are	  not	  members	   of	   themselves	   and	  question	  whether	  that	  subset	  is	  a	  member	  of	  itself.	  Set	  theorists	  have	  taken	  the	  lesson	  to	  be	  to	  rid	  of	  the	  set	  of	  all	  sets,	  and	  instead	  have	  an	  infinite	  hierarchy	  of	  sets	  that	  is	  never	  completed,	  thus	  avoiding	  the	  totality	  of	  sets	  entirely.	  This	  ends	  up	  in	  a	  regress,	  described	  in	  the	  next	  section	  II.ii,	  that	  instead	  of	   a	   framework	   to	   encompass	   all	   frameworks,	  we	  have	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  meta-­‐frameworks	   to	  encompass	   lower	   level	   frameworks	  at	  every	  level	  
of	  the	  hierarchy.	  This	  may	  avoid	  the	  paradox	  that	  results	  from	  the	  global	  framework,	   however	   as	   we	   will	   see	   this	   in	   unsatisfactory	   for	   Carnap	  since	  it	  denies	  the	  global	  scope	  of	  ESO.	  Thus	  Carnap	  cannot	  respond	  to	  Russell’s	  Paradox	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  set	  theorists	  do	  (by	  denying	  the	  totality)	  and	  so	  must	  either	  embrace	  the	  paradoxical	  global	  framework	  or	  find	  another	  way	  of	  retaining	  ESO’s	  global	  scope	  internally.	  Such	  an	  option	  will	  be	  to	  have	  a	  global	  sentence	  rather	  than	  a	  global	  framework,	  discussed	  in	  section	  II.iii,	  but	  first	  I	  will	  address	  the	  hierarchy	  option.	  	  	  II.ii.	  A	  hierarchy	  of	  meta-­‐languages.	  	  	  If	  we	   are	   to	   treat	   <ESO>	   as	   being	   internal,	   then	   it	  will	   be	  meaningful	  relative	  to	  the	  framework	  that	  it	  is	  internal	  to,	  and	  this	  framework	  will	  now	  not	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  global	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  paradox.	  The	  regress	  of	  higher-­‐order	  frameworks	  can	  go	  on	  infinitely,	  each	  statement	  about	   other	   statements	   being	   internal	   to	   frameworks	   being	   made	  internal	  to	  higher-­‐order	  frameworks.	  The	  frameworks	  will	  each	  require	  their	  own	   ‘meaningful’	  predicate,	  since	  <ESO>	  speaks	  of	  meaning.	  The	  picture	   is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  meta-­‐languages,	  described	  by	  Tarski	   in	  his	  avoidance	  of	  the	  Liar	  Paradox,	  and	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  sets,	  like	  set	  theory’s	  avoidance	  of	  Russell’s	  Paradox.	  I	  now	  discuss	  Tarski’s	  hierarchy	  as	  an	  option	  for	  Carnap	  to	  avoid	  ESO’s	  self-­‐reference	  problem.	  	  	  
	   185	  Tarski248	  puts	   forward	   his	   ‘convention	   T’	   or	   ‘T	   schema’	   as	   the	   truth	  conditions	  for	  a	  sentence:	  ‘snow	  is	  white’	  (x)	  is	  true	  iff	  snow	  is	  white	  (p).	  The	   ‘p’	  replaces	  any	  sentence	  of	  the	   language	  to	  which	   ‘true’	  refers	  to,	  and	  ‘x’	  stands	  for	  the	  name	  of	  the	  sentence.	  The	  predicate	  ‘is	  true’,	  when	  applied	  to	  sentences	  of	  a	   language	  L,	  cannot	  be	  considered	  part	  of	   the	  language	  L.	   Instead	  we	  have	  a	  proliferation	  of	   truth	  predicates	   ‘is	   true	  in	  L’,	  one	  for	  each	  language	  L,	  where	  each	  truth	  predicate	  belongs	  to	  a	  meta-­‐language	   L*	   whose	   role	   is	   to	   talk	   about	   sentences	   of	   L.	  Semantically	   closed	   languages	   are	   thus	   rejected	   by	   Tarski,	   as	   these	  languages	   contain	   not	   only	   expressions	   but	   also	   names	   for	   those	  expressions,	  as	  well	  as	  semantic	  terms	  like	  ‘true’	  referring	  to	  sentences	  of	   the	   language	   where	   all	   true	   sentences	   can	   be	   asserted	   in	   that	  language.	   So,	   convention	   T	   will	   not	   be	   formulated	   in	   a	   semantically	  closed	   language,	   but	   rather	  will	   include	   elements	   of	   two	   independent	  languages	  (one	  for	  the	  expressions	  and	  one	  for	  the	  truth	  predicate).	  	  	  	  Tarski	  calls	  these	  languages	  the	  ‘object	  language’	  which	  is	  the	  language	  talked	   about,	   and	   the	   ‘meta-­‐language’	   which	   is	   the	   language	   we	   talk	  
within	  in	  order	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  object	  language.	  So,	  the	  meta-­‐language	  is	  used	  to	  assert	  truth	  for	  the	  object	  language,	  and	  as	  such	  convention	  T	  is	   formulated	   in	   the	  meta-­‐language,	   and	   ‘p’	   is	   in	   the	   object	   language.	  ‘Object’	  and	  ‘meta’	  are	  relative	  and	  can	  apply	  at	  higher	  levels,	  which	  will	  involve	  embarking	  on	  a	  regress	  of	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  languages.	  One	  can	  say	  what	   is	   true	   of	   the	   object	   language	   in	   the	  meta-­‐language,	   and	   then	   to	  say	   whether	   that	   is	   true	   they	   will	   resort	   to	   a	   higher-­‐order	   meta-­‐language	   for	   that	   meta-­‐language	   (which	   will	   now	   become	   the	   object	  language).	  The	   reason	   this	  helps	  with	   the	  Liar	  Paradox	   is	  by	   applying	  the	  meta-­‐linguistic	  trick	  of	  having	  the	  Liar	  sentence	  itself	   in	  the	  object	  language,	   and	   its	   being	   true	   or	   false	   in	   the	   meta-­‐language.	   The	   Liar	  sentence	  then	  seems	  ungrammatical,	  as	  it	  is	  not	  in	  the	  object	  language	  since	  it	  applies	  the	  truth	  predicate	  to	  a	  sentence	  of	  the	  object	  language.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  248	  Tarski	  (1944)	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  The	  Carnapian	   could	  use	  a	   similar	  meta-­‐linguistic	   trick	   in	   legitimizing	  its	   own	   regress	   of	   higher-­‐order	   frameworks.	   To	  question	   the	   truth	  or	  usefulness	   of	   a	   framework	   will	   have	   to	   be	   formulated	   in	   a	   language	  from	   a	   higher-­‐order	   framework,	   and	   its	   truth	   or	   usefulness	   will	   be	  relative	  to	  that	  higher-­‐order	  framework.	  In	  utilizing	  Tarski’s	  theory,	  the	  Carnapian	   could	   construe	   the	   framework	   in	   question	   as	   the	   object	  language,	   and	   the	   framework	   doing	   the	   questioning	   as	   the	   meta-­‐language.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  truth	  becomes	  relativized	  to	  a	  language	  in	  Tarski’s	   theory,	   so	   for	  Carnapian	   truth	   (and	  meaning,	   including	   the	  meaning	  of	  ‘usefulness’)	  becomes	  relativized	  to	  linguistic	  frameworks.	  	  	  	  For	  Tarski	   the	  problematic	   element	   of	   a	   semantically	   closed	   language	  was	  that	  it	  contained	  its	  own	  truth	  predicate,	  and	  Tarski’s	  solution	  was	  to	   relativize	   truth,	   which	  we	   can	   likewise	   propose	   for	   the	   Carnapian.	  But	  furthermore	  for	  the	  Carnapian,	  meaning	  also	  becomes	  relativized	  as	  the	  frameworks	  will	  not	  contain	  their	  own	  ‘meaningful’	  predicate.	  This	  allows	   for	   the	  meta-­‐framework	   to	   talk	   about	   the	  meaningfulness	   of	   a	  sentence	   in	   the	   object-­‐framework,	   in	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   put	   forward	  <ESO>	  sentences	  without	  leading	  to	  paradoxical	  situations.	  This	  retains	  the	  Carnapian’s	  quietism	  by	  not	  stating	  anything	  genuinely	  external	  (as	  any	  attempt	  will	  be	  to	  just	  shift	  up	  to	  a	  meta-­‐language	  and	  be	  internal	  to	  that	  meta-­‐language),	  and	  will	  also	  retain	  ESO’s	  rejection	  of	  absoluteness.	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  Carnap’s	  ESO	   is	   really	   correct	  will	   be	   just	   as	  nonsensical	   as	   asking	   if	   Tarski’s	   T	   schema	   is	   really	   true.	   The	   point	   is	  that	   such	   ‘really’	   statements	   are	   meaningless	   as	   they	   attempt	   ascent	  into	  an	  absolute	  realm.	  To	  demand	  absolute	  truth	  from	  the	  Carnapian	  is	  to	  beg	  the	  question	  against	  them,	  as	  that	  is	  precisely	  what	  they	  deny.249	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  249	  Benningson	  (1999)	  makes	  a	  similar	  claim:	  “The	  most	  remarkable	  feature	  of	  many	  anti-­‐relativist	   arguments	   is	   their	   brevity;	   they	   often	   consist	   of	   little	   more	   than	  announcing	   that	   to	   assert	   global	   relativism	   is	   implicitly	   to	   claim	   absolute	   truth	   for	  one's	   assertion,	   resulting	   in	   immediate	   self-­‐contradiction.	   Certainly,	   the	   relativist	   is	  claiming	  truth	  for	  her	  assertion.	  But	  the	  absolutist	  begs	  the	  question	  by	  assuming	  that	  truth	   simpliciter	   equals	   absolute	   truth	   -­‐	   precisely	   what	   the	   relativist	   should	   be	  understood	  to	  be	  denying.”	  (p215)	  
	   187	  So	  in	  opting	  for	  an	  infinite	  regress	  of	  internal	  assertions,	  perhaps	  this	  is	  just	   what	   the	   Carnapian	   is	   prescribing	   –	   full	   scale	   relativity.	   We	   will	  always	  be	  trapped	  inside	  language	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  even	  our	  theories	  like	  ESO	  will	  be	  stated	  internal	  to	  a	  framework.	  And	  perhaps	  ESO	  is	  not	  absolutely	  true,	  since	  if	  it	  were	  then	  it	  would	  be	  a	  metaphysical	  theory	  about	   the	   external	   world,	   which	   the	   quietist	   rejects.	   Rather	   the	  Carnapian	   should	   say	   their	   theory	   is	  not	   to	  be	   regarded	  as	   absolutely	  true,	  and	  thus	  is	  not	  to	  be	  believed,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  most	  useful	  theory	  and	  as	  such	  should	  be	  accepted.250	  Such	  an	  option	  based	  on	  the	  acceptance	  of	  a	  useful	  theory	  rather	  than	  belief	  in	  a	  true	  theory	  is	  described	  further	  in	   section	   III.i.	   Without	   being	   able	   to	   get	   to	   absolute	   truth,	   as	   ESO	  describes,	   perhaps	   the	   Carnapian	   position	   construed	   as	   an	   internal	  infinite	  regress	  may	  be	  the	  best	  we	  can	  do	  in	  order	  to	  show	  this.	  	  	  	  With	  this	  hierarchy	  regress	  option	  the	  theory	  ESO	  is	  never	  fully	  stated,	  or	   at	   least	   there	   is	   no	   simple	   statement	   of	   the	   theory,	   as	   it	  would	   be	  expressed	  by	  an	   infinite	   series	  of	   relative	   statements	   at	   each	  order	   in	  the	  hierarchy.	  Does	  this	  infinite	  chain	  mean	  the	  theory	  is	  not	  stateable?	  Even	  though	  Carnap	  clearly	  had	  stated	  it	  in	  ESO?	  This	  will	  be	  explored	  further	  in	  section	  III.	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  contradictory	  that	  <ESO>	  becomes	  un-­‐stateable	  aside	   from	  an	   infinite	   chain	  of	   relative	   statements,	   and	   it	  further	  seems	  unfaithful	  to	  Carnap’s	  position	  that	  <ESO>	  be	  internal	  to	  such	   a	   regressive	   picture	   when	   it	   was	   intended	   as	   a	   singular	   global	  statement.	   A	   vertical	   regress	   of	   the	  meta-­‐framework	   hierarchy	  where	  <ESO>	   is	   true	   relative	   to	   a	   higher-­‐order	   framework	   does	   not	   account	  for	  the	  horizontal	  global	  truth	  of	  <ESO>	  in	  all	  of	  the	  hierarchies.	  <ESO>	  needs	  to	  have	  horizontally	  global	  scope	  across	  all	   frameworks,	  not	  just	  to	   be	   true	   vertically	   up	   through	   all	   of	   the	   meta-­‐languages	   of	   one	  framework.	   I	   thus	  move	  on	   to	   the	   final	   option	  on	   the	   internal	  horn:	   a	  global	  sentence	  that	  retains	  global	  scope	  without	  a	  global	  framework.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  250	  Bentham	  (1932)	  similarly	  states	  that	  his	  global	  fictionalism	  is	  a	  useful	  fiction.	  The	  commitment	  to	  fictionalism	  is	  at	  the	  meta-­‐level	  as	  the	  theory	  isn’t	  put	  forward	  as	  true.	  	  	  
	   188	  II.iii.	  A	  global	  sentence.	  	  	  If	   we	  wish	   to	   treat	   <ESO>	   as	   internal,	   then	   the	   two	   options	  we	   have	  addressed	   so	   far	   for	   doing	   so	   were	   to	   treat	   it	   as	   internal	   to	   a	  semantically	   closed	   global	   framework	   or	   internal	   to	   an	   infinitely	  regressive	  hierarchy	  of	  meta-­‐level	   frameworks.	   The	  hierarchy	  did	  not	  retain	  global	  scope	  and	  so	   is	   to	  be	  rejected,	   leaving	  us	  with	   the	  global	  framework.	  This	   global	   framework	   is	   semantically	   closed	  and	   so	  does	  not	   experience	   regress	   problems	   as	   it	   does	   not	   make	   a	   distinction	  between	   object	   and	   meta-­‐language,	   by	   containing	   its	   own	   truth	  predicate.	  Yet	  this	  global	  framework	  suffered	  from	  Russell’s	  Paradox.	  So	  the	  next	  option	  is	  to	  deny	  a	  global	  framework	  and	  instead	  aim	  to	  retain	  ESO’s	  global	  scope	  in	  a	  non-­‐paradoxical	  way	  with	  a	  global	  sentence.	  	  	  We	   will	   take	   <ESO>	   as	   our	   global	   sentence	   by	   being	   schematic	   for	  instances	   that	   are	   true	   individually	   in	   each	   and	   every	   framework.	  Rather	  than	  having	  one	  global	  framework	  there	  are	  now	  a	  multitude	  of	  frameworks,	   and	   in	   each	   and	   every	   one	   of	   these	   frameworks	   that	  framework’s	  version	  of	  <ESO>	  comes	  out	  as	  true.	  This	  global	  sentence	  retains	  global	   scope	   in	  a	   slightly	  different,	  weaker	  sense	   than	  a	  global	  framework,	  by	  having	  a	  sentence	  form	  that	  has	  instances	  that	  are	  true	  in	  all	  frameworks.251	  We	  acknowledged	  earlier,	  at	  the	  start	  of	  section	  II,	  the	   possibility	   of	   frameworks	   that	   do	   not	   mention	   <ESO>	   or	   whose	  rules	  entail	  that	  <ESO>	  is	  false.	  What	  we	  are	  considering	  now	  stipulates	  (or	   assumes)	   that	   there	   are	   no	   such	   frameworks,	   and	   that	   for	   every	  framework,	   a	   framework	   relative	   instance	   of	   <ESO>	   is	   true.	   <ESO>	   is	  therefore	  true	  in	  every	  framework	  by	  treating	  frameworks	  as	  languages,	  and	   we	   generate	   <ESO>	   axiomatically	   in	   all	   languages	   that	   have	   a	  predicate	  for	  being	  meaningful	  and	  a	  predicate	  for	  being	  a	  language.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  251	  Hales	   (2006)	   defends	   global	   scale	   relativism	   in	   a	   similar	   way	   –	   that	   it	   is	   true	  relative	  to	  all	  perspectives,	  so	  globally	  true	  in	  relativistically	  kosher	  way.	  
	   189	  All	   propositions	   that	   are	   not	   rendered	   meaningful	   in	   a	   language	   are	  meaningless	   (as	   the	   predicate	   of	   meaningfulness	   does	   not	   apply	   to	  them).	  This	  itself	  is	  an	  internal	  proposition,	  and	  an	  analytic,	  trivial	  truth.	  With	  the	  predicate	  of	  being	  a	  language	  we	  can	  conceive	  of	  the	  language	  used	  as	  a	  language,	  and	  furthermore	  as	  a	  language	  among	  many.	  From	  a	  language	   that	   contains	  both	   the	  predicate	   for	  meaningfulness	   and	   the	  predicate	  for	  being	  a	  language,	  we	  can	  generate	  the	  following	  claim:	  ‘in	  any	  language	  with	  a	  predicate	  of	  meaningfulness	  I	  can	  generate	  <ESO>	  in	  that	  language	  as	  an	  internal	  truth’.	  That	  is	  also	  an	  internal	  statement,	  within	  the	  language	  talking	  about	  any	  language.	  Using	  the	  predicate	  of	  being	  a	   language	  with	  the	  universal	  quantifier	  gives	  the	  Carnapian	  the	  global	  scope	  to	  talk	  of	  all	  languages	  from	  within	  one	  language,	  such	  that	  each	   language	   can	   truthfully	   assert	   a	   framework-­‐relative	   version	   of	  <ESO>.	  And	  therefore	  <ESO>	  becomes	  global	  in	  an	  internal	  way.252	  	  	  We	   have	   ended	   up	   retaining	   global	   scope	  with	   an	   internal	   <ESO>	   by	  having	   multiple	   <ESO>	   sentences,	   one	   coming	   out	   true	   for	   each	   and	  every	   language.	  The	  problem	  with	   this	  option	   is	   that	  Carnap	  presents	  himself	   as	   saying	   one	   thing	   about	   all	   frameworks,	   rather	   than	  many	  things	  (one	  thing	  in	  each	  framework).	  Do	  each	  of	  the	  individual	  <ESO>	  sentences	  capture	  what	  is	  being	  said	  in	  ESO?	  It	  seems	  not	  as	  ESO	  puts	  forward	   a	   global	   claim	   about	   all	   sentences.	   We	   would	   want	   to	   know	  what	  is	  common	  to	  all	  of	  the	  individual	  <ESO>	  sentences	  and	  we	  cannot	  do	  that	  without	  appeal	  to	  a	  global	  framework.	  We	  seem	  to	  be	  able	  to	  say	  meaningfully	  that	  <ESO>	  is	  true	  in	  all	  frameworks	  so	  we	  end	  up	  saying	  something	  about	  the	  totality	  of	  those	  frameworks	  again.	  We	  recognize	  the	   truth	   of	   this	   global	   statement	   about	   all	   frameworks	   but	   cannot	  assert	   it	   here	   as	  we	   only	   can	   assert	   each	   individual	   <ESO>.	   If	  we	   are	  willing	   to	   assert	   each	   individual	   <ESO>	   then	  we	   should	   be	  willing	   to	  assert	   the	  universal	  statement	   that	  describes	  how	  <ESO>	   is	   true	   in	  all	  frameworks,	  otherwise	  we	  unnecessarily	  restrict	  what	  we	  can	  assert.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  252	  Special	  thanks	  goes	  to	  Tom	  Stoneham	  for	  this	  suggestion	  of	  individual	  <ESO>’s.	  
	   190	  In	  acknowledging	  that	  in	  every	  framework	  we	  have	  got	  this	  framework	  relative	  <ESO>	  sentence,	  we	  should	  be	  able	  to	  say	  that	  <ESO>	  is	  true	  in	  all	  of	  them.	  We	  have	  all	  the	  particular	  <ESO>	  sentences,	  which	  together	  entail	  the	  universal	  claim,	  but	  we	  cannot	  assert	  the	  universal	  claim	  as	  it	  needs	  a	  global	  framework	  to	  assert	  it	  within.	  The	  sum	  of	  all	  the	  <ESO>	  sentences	   just	   gives	   you	   the	   statement	   that	   <ESO>	   is	   true	   in	   every	  framework.	   Given	   that	   <ESO>	   is	   the	   same	   sentence	   in	   all	   of	   the	  frameworks,	  we	  have	  one	   sentence	   that	   is	   true	   for	  all	  of	   them,	  but	  we	  cannot	   assert	   this	   sentence	   as	   it	   would	   be	   global,	   requiring	   a	   global	  framework.	  We	  want	  to	  assert	  that	  <ESO>	  is	  true	  for	  all	  of	  them	  but	  we	  cannot	   talk	  about	  all	   of	   them	  without	   totalizing	  and	   speaking	  of	   all	   of	  them	  from	  within	  a	  global	  framework.	  We	  do	  not	  escape	  the	  totalisation	  problem	  that	  we	  saw	  with	  the	  global	   framework	  as	  we	  still	   talk	  about	  the	  totality	  of	  all	  the	  frameworks	  –	  the	  framework	  of	  all	  frameworks.	  If	  we	   take	   all	   the	   individual	   <ESO>	   sentences,	   and	   quantify	   over	   them,	  then	   that	   quantificational	   sentence	   must	   belong	   to	   some	   framework.	  But	  it	  cannot	  belong	  to	  any	  of	  the	  individual	  frameworks	  and	  so	  has	  to	  belong	  to	  the	  global	  framework,	  which	  encounters	  Russell’s	  Paradox.	  	  	  An	  interesting	  parallel	  can	  be	  made	  here	  with	  regard	  to	  axioms	  and	  an	  axiom	  schema.	  Arguably,	  we	  only	  accept	  the	  schema	  because	  we	  accept	  the	  general	  claim,	  as	  we	  only	  believe	  individual	  instances	  of	  the	  schema	  because	   we	   believe	   the	   generalizations	   from	   which	   they	   follow.	  Therefore,	  the	  analogy	  is	  that	  once	  we	  have	  accepted	  all	  the	  individual	  instances,	  much	   like	  we	  accept	  all	   the	   individual	  <ESO>	  sentences,	  we	  ought	   to	  accept	   the	  general	  schema,	  much	   like	  we	  ought	   to	  accept	   the	  global	   <ESO>.	   Having	   recognized	   the	   truth	   of	   all	   the	   individual	  instances	  we	  thus	  recognize	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  global	  generalization,	  and	  if	  we	  do	  not	  then	  we	  could	  not	  have	  derived	  all	  of	  the	  individual	  instances.	  This	  is	  made	  clear	  in	  the	  debate	  between	  first	  order	  and	  second	  order	  logicians,	  where	  Hilbert	   (as	   a	   first	   order	   logician)	   does	   not	   assert	   the	  general	   claim	   even	   when	   he	   asserts	   the	   instances,	   and	   Kreisel	   and	  
	   191	  Shapiro	   (as	   second	   order	   logicians)	   argue	   that	  we	   have	   to	   accept	   the	  generalization	   with	   its	   instances.253	  When	   in	   first	   order	   logic,	   we	   can	  only	   accept	   every	   instance	   of	   an	   induction	   schema	   but	   not	   the	  generalization	   (due	   to	   the	   limitations	   in	   the	   language	   of	   first	   order	  logic),	   whereas	   in	   second	   order	   logic,	   we	   can	   also	   accept	   the	   global	  general	  claim	  as	  the	  language	  is	  richer.	  Shapiro	  describes	  this	  situation:	  	   In	   the	   theory	   itself,	   as	   formulated	   in	   the	   object-­‐language,	   each	  instance	  of	  the	  scheme	  is	  a	  (separate)	  axiom.	  Kreisel	  argued	  that	  this	   is	   an	   un-­‐natural	   way	   to	   codify	   a	  mathematical	   theory	   like	  that	   of	   arithmetic	   of	   real	   analysis.	   Suppose,	   for	   example,	   that	  someone	   is	   asked	   why	   he	   believes	   that	   each	   instance	   of	   the	  completeness	   scheme	   of	   first-­‐order	   real	   analysis	   is	   true	   of	   the	  real	   numbers.	   It	   is,	   of	   course,	   out	   of	   the	   question	   to	   give	   a	  separate	   justification	   for	  each	  of	   the	  axioms.	  Nor	  can	  one	  claim	  that	   the	   scheme	   characterizes	   the	   real	   numbers	   since,	   as	   we	  have	   seen,	   no	   first-­‐order	   axiomatization	   can	   characterize	   any	  infinite	  structure.	  Kreisel	  argued	  that	  the	  reason	  mathematicians	  believe	  the	   instances	  of	   the	  axiom	  scheme	  is	   that	  each	   instance	  follows	  from	  the	  single	  second-­‐order	  completeness	  axiom.254	  	  This	  second	  order	  axiom	  is	  the	  generalization,	  the	  global	  statement,	  and	  it	   is	  required	  (and	  entailed)	  by	  the	  totality	  of	   the	   individual	   instances.	  From	  all	  of	  our	  individual	  <ESO>’s	  then,	  we	  derive	  the	  one	  global	  <ESO>.	  	  	  	  We	  should	  thus	  be	  able	  to	  make	  the	  global	  statement	  (if	  we	  were	  willing	  to	  make	  all	  of	  the	  individual	  statements),	  and	  so	  should	  resort	  back	  to	  having	   a	   global	   framework	   (in	   order	   to	   make	   the	   global	   statement	  within	  it).	  It	  does	  not	  make	  sense	  to	  deny	  the	  global	  statement	  just	  for	  the	   sake	   of	   avoiding	   the	   paradoxical	   situation	  we	   end	   up	   in	  with	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  253	  Shapiro	  (2005)	  p776,	  Kreisel	  (1967),	  Hilbert	  (1928)	  	  254	  Shapiro	  (2005)	  p776	  
	   192	  global	   framework.	   In	   holding	   that	   paradoxical	   contradictions	   are	  completely	   unacceptable	   one	   then	   rejects	   the	   global	   sentence	   <ESO>	  and	  the	  global	  framework	  it	  is	  made	  within.	  But	  in	  acknowledging	  that	  the	   global	   sentence	   is	   completely	   acceptable	   (by	   accepting	   all	   of	   the	  individual	   instances),	   we	   must	   also	   accept	   the	   paradoxical	   global	  framework	   and	   the	   contradiction	   that	   is	   derived	   from	   it.	   The	   debate	  then	  becomes	  over	  which	  starting	  point	  is	  more	  plausible	  –	  whether	  we	  accept	  contradictions	  or	  reject	  globally	  true	  statements.	  It	  simply	  comes	  down	   to	  what	   is	  more	   palatable	   to	   accept,	   a	   true	   contradiction	   (from	  the	  paradoxical	  global	   framework)	  or	   the	  (unmotivated)	  rejection	  of	  a	  true	   global	   statement.	   Since	   I	   believe	   that	   the	   truth	   of	   the	   individual	  <ESO>	   sentences	   in	   each	   and	   every	   framework	   entails	   the	   universal	  <ESO>	   sentence	   in	   the	   global	   framework,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   option	   of	  looking	  to	  this	  global	  sentence	  does	  not	  escape	  the	  paradox.	  	  	  What	  I	  have	  shown,	  therefore,	  is	  that	  the	  internal	  horn	  has	  two	  options	  (which	  collapse	  into	  one)	  if	  we	  want	  to	  preserve	  the	  global	  scope	  of	  ESO	  –	  with	  a	  global	  framework,	  or	  with	  a	  global	  sentence	  that	  then	  entails	  a	  global	  framework.	  Otherwise,	  we	  deny	  the	  global	  scope	  of	  ESO	  with	  an	  infinite	  regressive	  hierarchy	  of	   frameworks.	  All	   these	  options	  resulted	  in	   a	   contradiction,	   since	   the	   hierarchy	   results	   in	   <ESO>	   never	   being	  fully	  asserted	   (yet	   it	   is	  asserted	   in	  ESO),	  and	  a	  global	   sentence	  entails	  the	  global	  framework	  which	  encounters	  Russell’s	  Paradox.	  Since	  Carnap	  put	  forward	  ESO	  as	  having	  global	  scope,	  the	  most	  faithful	  solution	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  his	  position	  so	  far	  would	  be	  that	  of	  a	  global	  framework.	  This	  is	  in	   line	   with	   his	   views	   on	   languages	   being	   closed,	   and	   preserves	   the	  intended	   universal	   truth	   of	   <ESO>.	   Since	   this	   results	   in	   a	   paradoxical	  state	  that	  led	  to	  contradiction,	  Carnap	  would	  then	  need	  to	  embrace	  such	  a	   contradiction	   –	   hence	   his	   route	   towards	   dialetheism.	   I	   now	   explore	  the	  second	  horn	  of	  Carnap’s	  dilemma,	  taking	  <ESO>	  as	  external,	  which	  also	   presents	   two	   options:	   a	   Verificationist	   and	   a	   Wittgensteinian	  approach.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  show	  that	  these	  too	  lead	  to	  contradiction.	  
	   193	  III.	  Horn	  2	  –	  External.	  	  	  III.i.	  Verificationist’s	  recommendation.	  	  	  Given	   that	   Carnap	   seemed	   to	   put	   forward	   his	   theory	   in	   ESO	   as	  describing	  what	  all	  frameworks	  are	  like,	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  <ESO>	  must	  be	   framework	   independent,	   and	   as	   such	   external.	   In	   order	   to	   capture	  the	  point	  that	  <ESO>	  is	  making,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  true	  not	  relative	  to	  only	  some	  frameworks.	  However,	  if	  <ESO>	  is	  itself	  external,	  and	  if	  <ESO>	  is	  correct,	   then	   <ESO>	   becomes	   meaningless,	   and	   we	   are	   involved	   in	   a	  contradictory	  or	  paradoxical	  situation	  when	  <ESO>	  self-­‐references	  and	  self-­‐refutes.	   Similarly	   to	   how	  we	   saw	   that	   Verificationism	   encounters	  self-­‐reference,	  due	   to	   the	   standards	   set	   in	  <ESO>,	  <ESO>	   itself	   fails	   to	  meet	  such	  standards.	  The	  standards	  are	  that	  in	  order	  to	  be	  meaningful	  it	  must	  be	  internal,	  yet	  if	  <ESO>	  is	  external	  then	  it	  must	  be	  meaningless	  
according	  to	  <ESO>	  itself.	  As	  we	  saw	  with	  the	  Verificationists	  in	  section	  I.ii,	  their	  way	  out	  of	  their	  self-­‐reference	  problem	  was	  to	  argue	  that	  their	  position	  was	  not	  in	  fact	  asserted	  as	  a	  proposition,	  but	  rather	  merely	  as	  a	  recommendation,	  so	  as	  a	  suggestion	  as	  such	  it	  was	  not	  held	  to	  the	  same	  standards	  as	  it	  prescribed	  for	  propositions.	  The	  Carnapian	  can	  make	  a	  parallel	  move	  to	  the	  Verificationists	  stating	  that	  <ESO>	  is	  not	  a	  sentence	  to	   be	   asserted	   and	   so	   need	   not	   meet	   the	   conditions	   for	   meaningful	  sentences.	  As	  Carnap	  describes,	  some	  things	  are	  just	  not	  assertable:	  	  	  	   The	   thesis	   of	   the	   reality	   of	   the	   thing	   world	   cannot	   be	   among	  these	  [assertable]	  statements,	  because	  it	  cannot	  be	  formulated	  in	  the	   thing	   language	   or,	   it	   seems,	   in	   any	   other	   theoretical	  language.255	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  255	  Carnap	  (1950)	  p	  23.	  However	  the	  parallel	  cannot	  be	  exactly	  made,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Carnap’s	  quote	  he	  concludes	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thesis,	  not	  that	  it	  is	  somehow	  true	  but	  un-­‐assertable.	  Since	  there	  is	  such	  a	  thesis	  as	  ESO,	  and	  <ESO>	  is	  asserted,	  it	  seems	  that	  this	  route	  is	  not	  available	  to	  the	  Carnapian	  without	  contradiction.	  
	   194	  So,	   there	  are	   just	  some	   ideas	   that	  are	   inexpressible	   in	  a	   language,	  and	  perhaps	   <ESO>	   is	   one	   of	   those	   things.	   More	   likely,	   Carnap	  may	   have	  thought	   that	   his	  whole	   theory	   in	  ESO	  as	   a	   theory	   is	   not	   an	   assertable	  statement	  since	  it	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  theoretical	  questioning,	  and	  as	  such	  would	   be	   rendered	   (in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   other	   EQ’s	   or	   external	  statements)	   as	   simply	   the	  pragmatic	   choosing	   and	   acceptance	   of	   ESO.	  To	   try	   and	   assert	   this	   theory	   is	   like	   trying	   to	   assert	   the	   thesis	   of	   the	  reality	  of	  the	  thing	  world	  –	  it	  cannot	  be	  done	  meaningfully.	  So	  it	  seems	  like	   his	   own	   theory	   too	   cannot	   be	   formulated	   in	   any	   theoretical	  language.	   To	   be	   reduced	   to	   this	   sort	   of	   external	   statement	   about	  practicality	   is	   a	   concession	   that	   <ESO>	   cannot	   be	   up	   for	   truth	  evaluation	  as	  the	  theory	  ESO	  is	  non-­‐cognitive	  in	  an	  external	  way.	  On	  the	  external	   horn	   in	   this	  way,	   Carnap	   could	   simply	   adopt	   a	   non-­‐cognitive	  attitude	  towards	  <ESO>,	  and	  suggest	  that	  we	  should	  accept	  it	  because	  it	  is	  useful.	  Carnap	  would	  then	  have	  to	  put	  forward	  ESO	  only	  as	  practical	  to	  do	  so,	   in	  that	  there	  are	  other	  theories	  but	  ESO	  should	  be	  chosen	  on	  pragmatic	  grounds,	  as	  a	  recommendation	  much	  like	  the	  Verificationist	  response.	  However,	  ESO	  claimed	  to	  tell	  us	  what	  meaningful	  language	  is,	  not	   how	   it	   is	  useful	   to	   conceive	   of	   language,	   as	   it	  was	  meant	   to	   show	  metaphysics	  to	  be	  meaningless	  rather	  than	  it	  just	  be	  helpful	  to	  describe	  metaphysics	   that	   way.	   In	   terms	   of	   truth,	   we	   may	   ask	   if	   <ESO>	   is	  externally	  True	  or	  relatively	  true	  internal	  to	  a	  framework,	  and	  if	  <ESO>	  is	   external	   then	   it	  would	  be	  appear	   to	  be	  True,	   and	   it	   seemed	  Carnap	  put	  it	  forward	  as	  being	  True	  rather	  than	  just	  a	  practical	  way	  of	  thinking.	  	  	  If	  we	  take	  acceptance	  of	  theories	  (like	  ESO)	  as	  similar	  to	  acceptance	  of	  frameworks	  then	  we	  could	  take	  <ESO>	  as	  external	  but	  not	  assertable:	  	   The	   acceptance	   [of	   a	   framework]	   cannot	   be	   judged	   as	   being	  either	  true	  or	  false	  because	  it	  is	  not	  an	  assertion.256	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  256	  Carnap	  (1950)	  p29	  	  
	   195	  This	  may	  prevent	  <ESO>	  from	  being	  asserted	  and	  hence	  prevent	  it	  from	  being	  something	  that	  is	  said	  either	  internal	  or	  external	  to	  a	  framework,	  and	   as	   such	   is	   a	   technical	   solution	   to	   the	   self-­‐reference	   problem.	   ESO	  can	  no	  longer	  apply	  to	  itself	  if	  ESO	  is	  not	  something	  that	  can	  be	  true	  or	  false.	  However,	  if	  ESO	  is	  non-­‐cognitive	  in	  this	  way	  then	  ESO	  is	  not	  true,	  whereas	  Carnap	  appeared	  to	  be	  putting	  forward	  a	  theory	  in	  ESO	  that	  he	  believed	   to	  be	   true.	  The	  concession	  here	  would	  again	  be	   that	  ESO	   is	  a	  merely	  pragmatic	  theory.	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  a	  Verificationist	  response:	  	   The	  use	  of	  the	  material	  mode	  of	  speech	  leads,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  to	   a	   disregard	   of	   the	   relativity	   to	   language	   of	   philosophical	  sentences;	   it	   is	   responsible	   for	   an	   erroneous	   conception	   of	  philosophical	   sentences	  as	  absolute.	   It	   is	  especially	   to	  be	  noted	  that	   the	   statement	   of	   a	   philosophical	   thesis	   sometimes	  represents	  not	  an	  assertion	  but	  a	  suggestion.	  Any	  dispute	  about	  the	  truth	  or	  falsehood	  of	  such	  a	  thesis	  is	  quite	  mistaken,	  a	  mere	  empty	  battle	  of	  words;	  we	  can	  at	  most	  discuss	  the	  utility	  of	  the	  proposal	  or	  investigate	  its	  consequences.257	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  accept	  ESO	  we	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  account	  for	  its	  usefulness.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  solution	  is	  that	   it	  appears	  to	  be	  in	  tension	  with	  what	   Carnap	   actually	   put	   forward	   in	   ESO.	   As	   discussed	   above,	   he	  seemed	  to	  intend	  to	  show	  that	  ESO	  was	  true.	  Furthermore,	  he	  did	  assert	  <ESO>,	  he	  asserted	  it	  within	  the	  ESO	  paper!	  In	  this	  sense	  Carnap	  ends	  up	  in	  contradiction	  with	  himself,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  assertion	  and	  non-­‐assertion	   of	   <ESO>.	   In	   trying	   to	   prevent	   <ESO>	   from	   being	   both	  meaningful	  and	  meaningless	   (by	  avoiding	   the	  Liar	  Paradox	   that	  arises	  from	   taking	   <ESO>	   as	   external	   and	   correct),	   <ESO>	   becomes	   both	  assertable	  and	  non-­‐assertable	  (by	  being	  claimed	  to	  be	  un-­‐asserted	  but	  is	  asserted	  by	  Carnap).	  So	  in	  trying	  to	  escape	  one	  contradiction	  Carnap	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  Carnap	  (1934a)	  p299	  
	   196	  ends	  up	  in	  another.258	  If	  this	  is	  to	  be	  the	  preferred	  solution	  to	  the	  self-­‐reference	   problem	   then	   Carnap	   needs	   to	   adopt	   this	   contradictory	  conclusion.	   Such	   contradictions	   lead	   him	   to	   dialetheism,	  which	   is	   the	  topic	   of	   section	   V.	   Next	   I	  move	   onto	   the	  Wittgensteinian	   response	   to	  self-­‐reference	  which	  is	  the	  alternative,	  but	  related,	  option	  for	  horn	  2.	  	  	  III.ii.	  Wittgenstein’s	  non-­‐assertion.	  	  	  We	   saw	   in	   section	   II.i	   that	   Carnap	   rejected	  Wittgenstein’s	   account	   of	  language	  –	  that	  there	  should	  be	  only	  one	  language	  (no	  meta-­‐language)	  and	  that	  there	  is	  no	  language	  of	  syntax.	  Wittgenstein	  holds	  that	  we	  only	  ‘show’	   syntax	   as	   it	   cannot	   be	   ‘said’,	   so	   there	   is	   similarity	   between	  Wittgenstein’s	  ‘showing’	  with	  the	  external	  option	  of	  ‘non-­‐assertion’	  and	  the	  Verificationist’s	   ‘recommendation’.	  They	  all	  prescribe	  to	  not	  assert	  (say)	  the	  theory	  but	  rather	  to	  do	  something	  less	  than	  assertion	  (to	  show,	  suggest,	   or	   recommend)	   in	  order	   to	  avoid	   self-­‐reference.	  Wittgenstein	  resorts	  to	  showing	  since	  he	  conceded	  that	  any	  saying,	  including	  his	  own,	  is	  meaningless.	  But	  Carnap	  explicitly	  rejects	  this	  Wittgensteinian	  move:	  	  	   Wittgenstein’s	   second	   negative	   thesis	   states	   that	   the	   logic	   of	  science	  (‘philosophy’)	  cannot	  be	  formulated…	  According	  to	  this,	  the	   investigations	   of	   the	   logic	   of	   science	   contain	   no	   sentences,	  but	   merely	   more	   of	   less	   vague	   explanations	   which	   the	   reader	  must	  subsequently	  recognise	  as	  pseudo-­‐sentences	  and	  abandon.	  Such	   an	   interpretation	   of	   the	   logic	   of	   science	   is	   certainly	   very	  unsatisfactory.259	  	   Wittgenstein	  has	  represented	  with	  especial	  emphasis	  the	  thesis	  of	  the	  meaninglessness	  of	  metaphysical	  propositions	  and	  of	  the	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  This	  is	  described	  by	  Priest	  as	  the	  ‘persistence	  of	  contradiction’	  (2002	  p229).	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  identity	   of	   philosophy	   and	   the	   logic	   of	   science;	   especially	  through	  him	  has	  the	  Vienna	  Circle	  been	  developed	  on	  this	  point.	  How	   now	   does	   Wittgenstein	   dispose	   of	   the	   objection	   that	   his	  own	   propositions	   are	   also	   meaningless?	   He	   doesn’t	   at	   all;	   he	  agrees	   with	   it!	   He	   is	   of	   the	   opinion	   that	   the	   non-­‐metaphysical	  philosophy	  also	  has	  no	  propositions;	  it	  operates	  with	  words,	  the	  meaninglessness	   of	   which	   in	   the	   end	   it	   itself	  must	   recognise…	  We	   shall	   try	   in	   the	   following	   to	   give	   in	   place	   of	   this	   radically	  negative	   answer	   a	   positive	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	   the	  character	  of	  the	  propositions	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  science	  and	  thereby	  of	  philosophy.260	  	  So	   from	   these	   quotes	   it	   seems	  we	   cannot	   take	   the	   option	   of	   treating	  <ESO>	  as	  meaningless	  as	  a	  plausible	  option	  for	  Carnap	  since	  he	  rejects	  it	   as	   being	   very	   unsatisfactory	   in	   Wittgenstein’s	   case.	   His	   positive	  answer	  in	  place	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  negative	  answer	  was	  simply	  the	  other	  Wittgensteinian	  move	  of	   ‘showing’	  not	   ‘saying’	   the	   theory,	   rather	   than	  further	   stating	   that	   it	   is	   meaningless.	   It	   is	   not	   meaningless	   if	   it	   is	  reframed	  as	   the	  non-­‐cognitive	   suggestion	  of	   adopting	  ESO,	   so	   there	   is	  no	  need	  to	  take	  the	  extra	  step	  of	  treating	  ESO	  as	  itself	  meaningless.	  The	  strategy,	  then,	  is	  to	  take	  <ESO>	  as	  external,	  but	  to	  reframe	  it	  in	  the	  same	  way	   as	   EQ’s	   are	   reframed,	   and	   to	   pose	   them	   as	   being	   the	   pragmatic	  question	   as	   to	   whether	   to	   adopt	   the	   framework	   at	   hand.	   So,	   <ESO>	  being	  external	  is	  simply	  the	  pragmatic	  issue	  of	  whether	  ESO	  is	  useful	  to	  adopt.	   <ESO>	   continues	   not	   to	   be	   asserted	   as	   it	   is	   not	   a	   theoretical	  matter	   fit	   for	   assertion,	   but	   this	   is	  not	   because	   <ESO>	   is	   conceded	   as	  meaningless	  in	  the	  Wittgensteinian	  way.	  <ESO>	  is	  meaningful	  but	  only	  on	   the	   pragmatic	   grounds	   that	   ESO	   is	   useful.	   Yet	   this	   also	   leads	   to	  contradiction,	  since	  Carnap	  does	  assert	  <ESO>	   in	  ESO,	  so	   to	  claim	  that	  the	  theory	  is	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  assertion	  is	  to	  lead	  Carnap	  once	  more	  back	  to	  contradiction.	  Contradictions	  thus	  occurred	  on	  both	  horns,	  and	  I	  recommend	  that	  Carnap	  embrace	  them	  in	  a	  dialetheist	  fashion.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  260	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  IV.	  Priest	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Thought.	  	  	  For	   Carnap’s	   ESO,	   and	   other	   meta-­‐theoretical	   positions,	   such	   as	   the	  Vienna	   Circle’s	   Verificationism,	   Wittgenstein’s	   Tractatus,	   and	   Kant’s	  transcendental	  dialectic,	  the	  main	  point	  is	  to	  draw	  a	  limit	  by	  providing	  a	  boundary	   to	   legitimate	   thought.	   Carnap’s	   IQ/EQ	   distinction	   in	   ESO	  draws	  a	  limit	  to	  thought,	  namely	  a	  limit	  to	  meaningful	  language	  usage,	  with	  linguistic	  frameworks	  providing	  the	  boundaries.	  When	  language	  is	  used	  internal	  to	  frameworks	  it	  is	  meaningful,	  when	  we	  attempt	  to	  use	  it	  external	   to	   frameworks	   it	   is	  meaningless,	   so	   the	   framework	  boundary	  between	   the	   internal	   and	  external	   is	   the	   limit.	  Carnap	  argues	   that	   the	  limit	   to	  meaningful	   language	   is	  bound	  by	   frameworks,	   and	   this	   leaves	  him	  in	  a	  dilemma	  of	  whether	  his	  own	  theory	  is	  within	  or	  without	  those	  limits.	  This	  dilemma	   is	  produced	   from	  the	  self-­‐reference	  problem,	  but	  this	  has	   its	  own	  roots	   in	  something	  deeper,	  and	   that	   is	   to	  do	  with	   the	  aim	  of	  drawing	  a	  limit	  to	  thought	  (‘thought’	  construed	  very	  widely	  here	  to	  include	  language,	  concepts,	  iteration,	  expression,	  etc.).	  	  	  	  As	   Wittgenstein	   describes:	   “in	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   draw	   a	   limit	   to	  thought,	  we	  should	  have	  to	  find	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  limit	  thinkable.”261	  So	  when	   Carnap	   attempts	   to	   draw	   a	   limit	   to	   meaningful	   language	   he	   is	  required	  to	  transcend	  that	  limit	  in	  order	  to	  place	  it.	  He	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  use	   language	  to	  describe	  where	  that	   limit	   is,	  and	   in	  so	  doing	  has	  gone	  beyond	   the	   limit	   that	   he	   placed.	   For	   Carnap	   to	   say	   what	   cannot	   be	  expressed	  meaningfully	  he	  has	  to	  express	  that	  very	  thing:	  “whereof	  one	  cannot	  speak,	  thereof	  one	  has	  just	  contradicted	  oneself.”262	  This	  idea	  of	  going	   beyond	   the	   limits	   of	   thought	   is	   described	   at	   length	   in	   Priest’s	  (2002)	  book	  Beyond	  the	  Limits	  of	  Thought	  (hereon	  ‘BLT’).	  Priest	  argues	  that	   the	   limits	   of	   thought	   are	   boundaries	   beyond	   which	   certain	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  261	  Found	  in	  Pears	  and	  McGuinness	  (trans.)	  (1961)	  introduction	  262	  Priest	  (2002)	  p233	  	  
	   199	  conceptual	  processes	  cannot	  go,	  and	  are	  subject	  to	  true	  contradictions	  by	   simultaneously	   going	   beyond	   the	   boundary,	   so	   boundaries	   are	   the	  sites	  of	  dialetheias.	  BLT	  shows	  a	  necessary	  relationship	  between	  limits	  and	  contradiction,	  and	  I	  hope	  to	  show	  a	  relationship	  between	  sceptical	  global	  meta-­‐theories	   and	   self-­‐reference,	   so	  metametaphysical	   theories	  like	  ESO	  result	  in	  contradiction.	  Carnap’s	  views	  fit	  a	  pattern	  established	  by	   Priest	   in	   BLT,	   and	   this	   is	   problematic	   for	   other	  metametaphysical	  views	  (as	  views	   that	  are	  sceptical	  and	  have	  global	  scope)	  since	  unless	  they	  adopt	  dialetheism	  they	  wont	  be	  able	  to	  meta-­‐theorize	  globally.	  	  	  	  Contradictions	   that	  arise	  at	   the	   limits	  of	   thought	  are	  generated	  by	   the	  ‘Inclosure	  Schema’263	  (outlined	  on	  the	  next	  page).	  For	  Priest	  in	  BLT,	  the	  limits	  of	  thought	  come	  together	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  self-­‐reference	  paradoxes,	  each	  instantiating	  this	  Inclosure	  Schema.	  The	  contradictions	  that	  follow	  from	  the	  Schema	  are	  generated	  by	  creating	  totalising	  sets	  of	  properties	  and	  breaking	  out	  of	  the	  totalities	  with	  a	  diagonaliser.	  This	  diagonaliser	  is	  of	  the	  sort	  in	  Cantor’s	  Theorem.264	  The	  purpose	  of	  diagonalisation	  is	  to	  break	  through	  boundaries	  of	  totalities,	  sets,	  or	  lists.	  Priest	  describes	  the	  process	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  Given	  a	  list	  of	  objects	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  we	   have	   a	   construction	   which	   defines	   a	   new	   object	   of	   this	   kind	   by	  systematically	  destroying	  the	  possibility	  of	  its	  identity	  with	  each	  object	  on	  the	  list.	  The	  new	  object	  may	  be	  said	  to	  ‘diagonalise	  out’	  of	  the	  list.265	  	  	  	  The	  nature	  of	  a	  diagonaliser	  gives	   it	   the	  power	  to	   transcend	  totalities.	  When	   we	   consider	   a	   totality,	   there	   is	   nowhere	   consistent	   for	   the	  diagonaliser	  to	  go.	  Once	  given	  a	  totality	  we	  can	  then	  use	  the	  totality	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  263	  Priest	   (2002)	   p276.	   There	   have	   been	   many	   papers	   challenging	   this	   Inclosure	  Schema	  as	  not	  encompassing	  all	  such	  paradoxes,	  which	  I	  do	  not	  have	  space	  to	  address.	  264	  Cantor	  (1892)	  clarified	  that	  contradictions	  occur	  by	  giving	  a	  formal	  understanding	  of	   boundary	   transcendence	   with	   diagonalisation.	   His	   theorem	   states	   that	   for	   any	  collection	   there	   is	   a	   bigger	   one.	   His	   paradox	   states	   for	   any	   set	   x	   there	   is	   no	   1-­‐1	  mapping	  between	  x	  and	  the	  power	  set	  of	  x.	  	  265	  Priest	  (2002)	  p119	  	  
	   200	  define	  a	  new	  element,	  which	   then	  can	  be	  shown	  by	  diagonalisation	   to	  be	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  that	  totality.	  A	  contradiction	  arises	  when	  the	  diagonalisation	  operation	  generates	  an	  object	  that	  it	  is	  both	  in	  and	  not	  
in	   that	   totality	   in	   this	   way.	   There	   will	   always	   be	   a	   thing	   that	   is	   both	  within	  the	  totality	  (a	  state	  called	  ‘Closure’)	  and	  without	  it	  (a	  state	  called	  ‘Transcendence’)	  -­‐	  this	  thing	  is	  produced	  by	  the	  diagonaliser.	  Whenever	  there	  is	  a	  totality,	  or	  a	  global	  scope,	  there	  will	  always	  be	  something	  that	  is	  both	  included	  and	  not	  included	  in	  the	  totality	  and	  so	  included	  and	  not	  included	   in	   the	   global	   scope.	  As	  Priest	   describes	   “an	   immovable	   force	  [the	  diagonaliser]	  meets	   an	   irresistible	   object	   [the	   totality].”266	  Due	   to	  diagonalisation,	   then,	   all	   global	   theories	   will	   have	   problems	   with	   the	  object	  produced	  by	  the	  diagonaliser,	  and	  will	  be	  left	  in	  contradiction.	  	  	  	  The	  Inclosure	  Schema	  is	  formulated	  as	  such,	  where	  ϕ	  is	  a	  property,	  δ	  is	  a	  diagonaliser,	  Ω	  is	  the	  totality,	  and	  ψ	  is	  a	  condition:	  	  	   (1)	  Ω={y	  :	  ϕ(y)}	  exists,	  and	  ψ(Ω)	  (2)	  if	  x	  is	  a	  subset	  of	  Ω,	  and	  ψ(x):	  (a)	  δ(x)	  ∉	  x;	  (b)	  δ(x)	  ∈	  Ω	  Therefore,	  δ(Ω)	  ∉	  Ω	  and	  δ(Ω)	  ∈	  Ω	  	  	  Clause	  1	  states	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  totality	  of	  things	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  that	  meet	  a	  certain	  condition,	  whilst	  2a	  provides	  us	  with	  Transcendence	  and	  2b	  with	  Closure	  for	  every	  subset	  of	  the	  totality.	  The	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  diagonaliser	  ensures	  that	  the	  value	  the	  diagonaliser	  assigns	  to	  a	  subset	  x	  of	  Ω	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  subset	  x,	  as	  it	  goes	  beyond	  the	  subset	  x	  by	  diagonalising	   out	   of	   it,	   giving	   Transcendence.	   Simultaneously,	   the	  nature	   of	   the	   totality	   that	   is	   guaranteed	   in	   clause	   1	   ensures	   that	   this	  diagonalised	  value	   remains	  a	  member	  of	   that	   totality.	  When	  we	  apply	  this	  schema	  to	  itself,	  when	  subset	  x	  is	  Ω,	  a	  contradiction	  is	  generated.	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  The	  problematic	  element	  here	  is	  the	  totality.	  Given	  that	  global	  theories	  wish	   to	   theorize	   about	   a	   totality,	   they	   will	   encounter	   a	   diagonalised	  object	   that	   destroys	   that	   totality.	   For	   Carnap,	   his	   problematic	   totality	  was	   the	   framework	   of	   all	   frameworks,	   or	   the	   set	   of	   all	   meaningful	  sentences,	   with	   a	   global	   scope	   encompassing	   that	   totality.	   On	   the	  external	   horn,	   considering	   the	   totality	   of	   all	   sentences,	   we	   found	   a	  sentence	   that	   came	   out	   both	  meaningful	   and	  meaningless	   (<ESO>).267	  On	   the	   internal	   horn,	   considering	   the	   totality	   of	   all	   frameworks,	   we	  found	  a	  framework	  that	  both	  spoke	  about	  itself	  and	  did	  not	  speak	  about	  itself	  (F).	  Thus,	  when	  we	  considered	  a	  totality,	  we	  found	  something	  that	  was	  both	  within	  (Closure)	  and	  without	  (Transcendent)	  it.	  This	  destroys	  the	  global	  nature	  of	  the	  theory.	  The	  lesson	  is	  that	  if	  we	  want	  to	  theorize	  globally,	   the	   totality	   that	   the	  global	   scope	   ranges	  over	  will	  be	  open	   to	  diagonalisation	  and	  contradiction,	  hence	  leading	  towards	  dialetheism.	  	  	  	  Usually,	  when	  a	  contradiction	   is	  derived	   from	  a	   theory	   it	   is	   taken	  as	  a	  reductio	  ad	  absurdum	  for	  that	  theory,	  since	  contradictions	  are	  treated	  as	  bad	   things.268	  But,	   if	  we	  have	  good	  reasons	   for	  accepting	  a	  position	  and	   can	   see	   its	   virtues,	   like	   I	   have	   tried	   to	   show	   in	   this	   thesis	   with	  regard	   to	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Quietism,	   then	   why	   should	   a	   contradiction	  spoil	   it	   all	   and	   lead	   to	   its	   rejection?	   I	   have	   not	   aimed	   to	   defend	  dialetheism,	  but	  rather	  to	  show	  that	  contradictions	  may	  be	  inevitable	  in	  metametaphysics.	  Priest	  argues	  in	  BLT	  that	  to	  use	  the	  contradiction	  as	  a	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  Given	  that	  Carnap	  allows	  for	  the	  same	  set	  of	  words	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  internal	  or	  external,	  perhaps	  <ESO>	  coming	  out	  as	  both	  meaningful	  and	  meaningless	   is	   just	  due	  to	  two	  different	  interpretations	  of	  the	  one	  sentenece	  <ESO>	  -­‐	  one	  as	  internal	  and	  one	  as	  external.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  defuse	  the	  paradoxical	  situation	  since	  we	  derived	  the	   contradiction	   even	  when	   holding	  one	   interpretation	   fixed:	  when	  we	   interpreted	  <ESO>	  as	  external,	  we	  derived	  that	  it	  was	  meaningful	  and	  meaningless.	  268	  We	   tend	   to	  use	  Russell’s	   Paradox	   to	   show	   the	   totality	   of	   the	   set	   of	   all	   sets	   is	   not	  tenable.	  And	  we	   tend	   to	  use	   the	  Liar	  Paradox	   to	   show	   that	   a	  universal	   semantically	  closed	   language	   is	  not	   tenable.	  But	  here	   I	  have	  used	   the	  paradoxes	   to	  show	  that	   the	  standard	   intuition	   to	  use	   them	  as	   reductios	   is	  not	   tenable,	   as	  we	  need	  not	  deny	   the	  totality	   or	   the	   universal	   language	   (as	   doing	   so	   is	   rejecting	   too	   much).	   So	   what	   is	  needed	   is	  a	  general	   criterion	  of	  when	   to	   treat	   contradictions	  as	   reductios	  and	  when	  they	   are	   acceptable.	   Here	   I	   have	   just	   given	   an	   example	   of	  when	   it	   is	   acceptable	   (in	  Carnap’s	  case).	  The	  value	  in	  Carnap’s	  theory	  makes	  it	  worth	  keeping	  the	  contradiction.	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  reductio	   may	   only	   misplace	   the	   contradiction	   elsewhere	   rather	   than	  removing	   the	  problem	  altogether,	  as	  a	  contradiction	   from	  one	   limit	  of	  thought	   may	   simply	   reappear	   as	   a	   contradiction	   at	   another	   limit	   of	  thought,	   and	   so	   rejecting	  one	  may	   just	   lead	   to	   another.	  We	  have	   seen	  that	  contradictions	  result	  from	  positions	  that	  discuss	  totalities	  or	  limits,	  such	  as	  global	  meta-­‐theories,	  and	  so	  rejecting	  one	  position	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   the	   contradiction	   is	   futile	  when	   all	   the	   other	   positions	   of	   that	   type	  (which	  we	  do	  not	  want	  to	  reject)	  will	  encounter	  similar	  contradictions.	  	  	  	  As	  Priest	  has	  shown,	  we	  cannot	  simply	  reject	  this	  result	  by	  rejecting	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  are	  limits	  or	  totalities.269	  He	  states:	  “it	  is	  without	  doubt	  that	  there	  are	  limits”;	  “given	  notions	  like	  set	  or	  ordinal,	  reason	  forces	  us	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  totality	  of	  things	  satisfying	  it”;	  and	  even	  cites	  Kant	  as	  stating	   that	   “totalisation	   is	   conceptually	  unavoidable.”270	  Furthermore,	  we	  seem	  to	  be	  happy	  with	  quantification,	  yet	  quantifying	  presupposes	  a	  corresponding	  totality	  of	  what	  to	  quantify	  over,	  namely	  a	  domain.	  The	  standard	   model	   theoretic	   account	   of	   quantification	   says	   that	   we	  quantify	   over	   domains	   as	   sets,	   and	   as	   soon	   as	  we	   start	   talking	   about	  sets	  we	  start	   to	   think	  of	   these	  sets	  as	  having	  boundaries	  and	  as	  being	  totalities.	  Limits	  and	  totalities	  therefore	  are	  integral	  to	  the	  way	  that	  we	  talk	   and	   do	   philosophy,	   and	   cannot	   so	   easily	   be	   dispensed	   of.	  Consequently,	   theories	   that	   discuss	   limits	   and	   totalities	   ought	   not	   be	  rejected	  on	  this	  basis.	  Since	  these	  theories	  lead	  to	  contradiction,	  we	  end	  up	  having	  to	  bite	  some	  dialethic	  bullets,	  and	  having	  to	  concede	  to	  Priest	  that	  “there	  are	  contradictory	  statements	  about	  limits	  that	  are	  true.”271	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  269	  Other	  responses	  to	  the	  problem	  are:	  Zermelo-­‐Frankel	  set	  theory	  which	  states	  that	  the	  totality	  does	  not	  exist;	  parameterisation	  to	  prevent	  the	  paradox;	  Russell’s	  vicious	  circle	  principle	  which	  states	  that	  whatever	  involves	  all	  of	  a	  collection	  must	  not	  be	  one	  of	   that	   collection.	   Priest	   argues	   that	   the	   latter	   responses	   do	   not	   cease	   to	   result	   in	  contradiction.	   And	   with	   regard	   to	   denying	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   totality,	   this	   goes	  against	   Cantor’s	  Domain	   Principle	  which	   states	   that	  whenever	   there	   are	   things	   of	   a	  certain	   kind	   there	   are	   all	   of	   those	   things,	   and	   for	   every	   potential	   infinity	   there	   is	   a	  corresponding	  actual	  infinity.	  Priest	  (2002	  p280)	  finds	  the	  Domain	  Principle	  patent.	  	  	  270	  Priest	  (2002)	  p3,	  p162,	  and	  p86	  271	  Priest	  (2002)	  p295	  
	   203	  It	  seems	  that	  if	  we	  want	  to	  theorize	  globally	  about	  totalities	  and	  limits	  at	  all,	   like	  ESO	  does,	  then	  we	  must	  expect	  to	  encounter	  contradictions.	  Any	   theory	  with	   global	   scope	   that	   tries	   to	   place	   limits	  will	   encounter	  diagonalisation	   issues,	   as	   the	  diagonaliser	  destroys	   the	   global	   totality.	  The	  metametametaphysical	  contribution	  that	  I	  am	  making	  here	  is	  that	  if	  we	   want	   to	   accept	  metametaphysical	   theories,	   then	   we	   need	   to	   also	  accept	  contradictions,	  and	  as	  such	  we	  need	  dialetheism.	  If	  we	  accept	  a	  theory	  and	  a	  contradiction	  that	  comes	  with	  it,	  then	  we	  need	  to	  consider	  ourselves	  dialetheist,	  since	  this	  is	  the	  position	  that	  allows	  for	  such	  true	  contradictions.	   I	   will	   spend	   the	   next	   section	   V	   defending	   dialetheism	  and	  true	  contradictions	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietist.	  	  	  	   V.	  Dialetheism.	  	  	  It	   is	  worth	   noting	   a	   few	   important	   aspects	   of	   dialetheism	  which	  may	  help	   to	   reduce	   the	   knee-­‐jerk	   reaction	   against	   it.	   First,	   dialetheism	   is	  about	  negation,	  and	  does	  not	  interfere	  with	  our	  account	  of	  predication.	  A	  contradiction	  may	  be	  true	  not	  because	  of	  the	  predicate	  involved	  but	  because	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  negation	  involved,	  and	  this	  notion	  of	  negation	  need	   not	   be	   considered	   as	   objectionable.272 	  Second,	   dialetheism	   is	  committed	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  some	  contradictions,	  and	  not	  all	  of	  them,	  and	  may	  in	  fact	  not	  be	  committed	  to	  any	  more	  than	  one.	  So	  if	  a	  theory	  that	  is	  worth	  holding	   exhibits	   a	   contradiction,	  we	  may	  hold	  on	   to	   the	   theory	  and	  the	  contradiction	  with	  dialetheism,	  and	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  then	   believe	   all	   contradictions	   are	   true.	   Third,	   dialetheism	   has	   a	  paraconsistent	   logic	   where	   ‘explosion’	   fails	   and	   as	   such	   when	   a	  contradiction	  is	  said	  to	  be	  true	  this	  does	  not	  entail	  everything.	  Nothing	  more	   follows	   from	   the	   contradiction	   being	   true	   other	   than	   that	   one	  contradiction	  being	   true.	   Fourth,	   dialetheism	  does	  not	   just	   accept	   any	  old	  contradiction,	  only	   the	  ones	  worth	  accepting,	  and	  so	  each	   is	   taken	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  272	  This	  objection	  from	  predication	  was	  found	  in	  Priest	  (2002	  p272-­‐273)	  from	  Zalta.	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  on	  its	  own	  merits	  and	  assessed	  accordingly.	  So,	  the	  Carnapian	  need	  not	  commit	  themselves	  to	  a	  weird	  account	  of	  predication,	  nor	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  all	   contradictions,	   nor	   to	   the	   entailment	   of	   everything	   from	   a	   true	  contradiction,	  and	  also	  may	  choose	  not	  to	  hold	  any	  other	  contradictions	  as	   being	   true	   except	   for	   the	   one	   that	   they	   need	   to	   be	   true	   –	   the	  contradiction	  that	  arises	  from	  their	  drawing	  of	  a	  limit	  to	  thought.	  	  	  So	   is	   there	  anything	  objectionable	  about	  these	  contradictions	   found	  at	  the	  limits	  of	  thought?273	  	  Well,	  these	  are	  contradictory	  statements	  about	  
limits,	  they	  do	  not	  state	  that	  there	  are	  existing	  contradictory	  objects,	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  is	  contradictory	  in	  these	  cases	  is	  the	  statement	  itself.	  It	  cannot	   be	   objected	   then	   that	   there	   cannot	  exist	   contradictory	   objects,	  since	   the	   contradictions	   associated	   with	   the	   limits	   of	   thought	   do	   not	  entail	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  contradictory	  objects.	  Furthermore,	  for	  the	  Carnapian,	   existence	   is	   not	   even	   metaphysical	   due	   to	   quietism,	   so	  contradictory	  objects	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  be	  metaphysically	  objectionable	  when	  metaphysically	  quiet.	  Many	  objections	  to	  true	  contradictions	  have	  stemmed	   from	   a	   metaphysical	   realism	   and	   the	   thought	   that	   reality	  cannot	   contain	   such	   things,	   but	   in	   not	   having	   such	   a	   reality	   then	   this	  objection	   does	   not	   hold.	   Bearing	   in	   mind	   that	   the	   law	   of	   non-­‐contradiction	  originates	  from	  metaphysics,	  and	  then	  the	  logical	  law	  was	  made	  to	  fit,	  without	  the	  metaphysical	  considerations	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  such	  a	  logical	  law,	  and	  without	  the	  metaphysical	  objections,	  there	   is	   nothing	   wrong	   with	   not	   having	   such	   a	   logical	   law.	   Not	   all	  contradictions	  need	  to	  be	  said	  to	  be	  false	  when	  you	  are	  a	  quietist,	  as	  the	  original	  reasons	  for	  saying	  they	  are	  false	  were	  metaphysically	  motivated.	  	  	  If	   dialetheism	   is	   accepted,	   then	   a	   paraconsistent	   logic	   must	   be	  subscribed	  to,	  as	  Priest	  states:	  “One	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  a	  dialetheist	  to	  subscribe	  to	  the	  correctness	  of	  a	  paraconsistent	  logic,	  though	  if	  one	  is,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  273	  See	  Priest	  (1987)	  (1998)	  (2006)	  where	  he	  argues	  against	  contradictions	  being	  bad.	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  one	  will.”274	  Paraconsistent	  logic	  is	  a	  logic	  very	  much	  like	  classical	  logic,	  with	  only	  a	  few	  modifications.	  Firstly,	  negation	  is	  not	  explosive,	  and	  so	  Boolean	   negation	   is	   rejected.	   This	   is	   because	   if	   some	   and	   only	   some	  contradictions	   are	   said	   to	   be	   true	   then	   these	   contradictions	   cannot	  imply	  everything	   else	   including	  other	   contradictions.	   Secondly,	   a	   truth	  evaluation	  is	  a	  relation	  and	  not	  a	  function,	  and	  there	  will	  be	  four	  truth	  values	   instead	  of	   two,	  namely	  T,	  F,	  TF,	  and	  neither	  T	  nor	  F.	  Truth	  and	  falsity	  are	  therefore	  not	  exclusive	  and	  exhaustive	  which	  is	  what	  allows	  for	  some	  contradictions	  to	  be	  true.	  Since	  paraconsistent	  logic	  allows	  for	  some	  contradictions	  to	  be	  true,	  then	  a	  dialetheist	  (who	  is	  committed	  to	  the	   truth	   of	   some	   contradictions)	   requires	   a	   paraconsistent	   logic	   to	  make	  sense	  of	  their	  dialetheism	  in	  a	  formal	  way.	  As	  Carnap	  employed	  a	  principle	  of	  tolerance	  towards	  logic	  he	  allowed	  one	  to	  accept	  whichever	  logic	  they	  felt	  was	  useful	  to	  their	  cause,	  and	  as	  such	  he	  may	  have	  been	  tolerant	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   paraconsistent	   logic.	   This	   is	   one	  way	   in	  which	  Carnap	  may	  be	  shown	  to	  be	  open	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  dialetheism.	  	  	  	  Carnap	  never	  considers	  a	  nonclassical	  logic	  like	  that	  of	  paraconsistency	  however	  he	  does	  seem	  to	  embrace	  a	  logical	  pluralism	  that	  would	  allow	  for	   the	  adoption	  of	  nonclassical	   logics.	  His	   logical	  pluralism	   is	  derived	  from	  his	  principle	  of	  tolerance,	  as	  he	  famously	  stated:	  “In	  logic	  there	  are	  no	   morals.	   Everyone	   can	   construct	   his	   logic,	   i.e.	   his	   language	   form,	  however	  he	  wants.”275	  So	  there	  is	  no	  restriction	  on	  which	  logic	  you	  may	  adopt,	  and	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  linguistic	  frameworks	  we	  may	  just	  select	  the	  one	  we	  find	  to	  be	  most	  useful	  to	  us	  without	  having	  to	  consider	  if	  it	  is	  the	   ‘correct’	   one	   or	   not,	   as	   there	   are	   no	   ‘morals’.	   So,	   there	   is	   nothing	  stopping	   someone	   from	   adopting	   a	   paraconsistent	   framework	   or	   a	  dialetheist	   framework.	  And,	   there	   is	  nothing	  to	  suggest	   that	  one	  could	  not	  hold	  inconsistent	  frameworks	  (especially	  since	  they	  are	  fictions)276,	  and	  so	  the	  overarching	  logic	  must	  be	  paraconsistent	  in	  order	  to	  account	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  Priest	  (1998)	  p416	  275	  Carnap	  (1934a)	  p52	  276	  Currie	  (1990	  p55)	  explains	  that	  fictions	  can	  be	  inconsistent	  and	  even	  impossible.	  
	   206	  for	  the	  inconsistency.	  The	  only	  rejection	  that	  Carnap	  may	  have	  made	  to	  such	  a	  picture	  would	  be	  that	  it	  was	  not	  practical	  to	  adopt,	  but	  that	  still	  ought	  not	  get	  in	  the	  way	  of	  his	  tolerance	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  adopting	  them.	  With	  such	  tolerance	  towards	  linguistic	  frameworks	  and	  logics,	  it	  seems	   like	   Carnap	   needs	   to	   be	   dialetheist	   in	   order	   to	   allow	   for	   these	  possibilities	  and	  need	  not	  be	  opposed	  to	  endorsing	  dialetheism.277	  	  	  	  	  Dialetheism	   allows	   for	   Carnap’s	   quietism	   to	   not	   extend	   to	   his	   theory	  ESO	   itself,	   so	   that	   Carnap	   can	   state	   the	   theory	   about	   quietism	   in	   a	  meaningful	  way	  whilst	  everything	  else	  remains	  quiet.	  This	  is	  the	  way	  to	  overcome	  the	  Wittgensteinian	  quietist	  concession	  that	  the	  theory	  itself	  is	   meaningless.	   Since	   we	   saw	   that	   Carnap	   explicitly	   rejects	   the	  Wittgensteinian	   move,	   he	   automatically	   flips	   to	   the	   dialetheist	  alternative.	  We	   saw	   that	   in	   taking	   the	   first	   horn	   of	   the	   dilemma	   and	  treating	   <ESO>	   as	   internal	   also	   would	   lead	   to	   an	   acceptance	   of	  dialetheism,	   since	   if	   we	   embarked	   on	   a	   hierarchy	   regress	   then	   the	  position	  would	  become	  un-­‐assertable	  (yet	  Carnap	  asserts	  it),	  and	  if	  we	  rejected	  the	  regress	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  global	  semantically	  closed	  framework	  then	   we	   encounter	   Russell’s	   Paradox	   (and	   we	   saw	   that	   a	   global	  sentence	  led	  to	  this	  too).	  In	  taking	  the	  second	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma	  and	  treating	   <ESO>	   as	   external,	   we	   were	   again	   led	   to	   contradiction	   from	  encountering	  a	  Liar-­‐style	  paradox	  or	  by	  again	  claiming	  the	  position	  to	  be	   un-­‐assertable	  whilst	   asserting	   it.	   So,	   any	   option	   that	   Carnap	   takes	  forces	   him	   into	   one	   contradiction	  or	   another,	   as	   Priest	   expects	  would	  happen,	  since	  contradictions	  at	  one	  limit	  can	  show	  up	  at	  another	  limit.	  Therefore,	  Carnap	  ought	  to	  be	  interpreted	  in	  a	  dialetheist	  way	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  for	  such	  contradictions	  that	  derive	  from	  his	  ESO	  when	  the	   theory	   references	   itself.	   I	   should	   emphasize	   that	   I	   am	   not	  attempting	  to	  put	  forward	  a	  more	  accurate	  historical	  reading	  of	  Carnap,	  but	   rather	   I	  am	  attempting	   to	  put	   forward	  a	  new	   interpretation	   that	   I	  believe	  is	  inevitable	  due	  to	  his	  ESO	  aiming	  to	  draw	  a	  limit	  to	  thought.	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  But	  there	  is	  the	  issue	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  dialetheism	  is	  internal	  or/and	  external.	  
	   207	  In	  order	  to	  help	  clarify	  that	  I	  am	  not	  trying	  to	  rewrite	  the	  history	  books,	  I	   look	   to	   Priest,	   Routley,	   and	  Norman	  who	   distinguish	   between	   those	  who	  explicitly	  embrace	  contradictions	  and	  those	  who	  do	  so	  implicitly:	  	   An	   author	  may	   not	   explicitly	   say	   that	   both	   A	   and	   ~A	   hold,	   or	  hold	   in	   a	   given	   theory,	   but	  what	   is	   said	   obviously	   implies	   that	  they	  do,	  and	  the	  author	  can	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  aware	  that	  they	  do,	  or	  a	   case	  can	  be	  made	   that	   the	  author	   is	  aware	  of	   this.	   In	   such	  cases	  the	  approach	  is	  still	  explicitly	  paraconsistent.	  But	  an	  author	  may	   not	   be	   (clearly)	   apprised	   of	   what	   his	   or	   her	   position	  (obviously)	   implies,	   in	   which	   event	   the	   position	   will	   be	   either	  
implicitly	   paraconsistent	   or	   else	   trivial,	   depending	   on	   the	  underlying	  logic	  adopted.278	  	  	  We	   could	   therefore	   reinterpret	   Carnap	   as	   being	   implicitly	   dialetheist	  (or	  paraconsistent),	   since	  he	  does	  not	  openly	  endorse	  such	  a	  view	  yet	  his	  position	  requires	  him	  to	  do	  so.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  I	  can	  put	  forward	  and	   stipulate	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Quietist	   position	   as	   being	   explicitly	  dialetheist	  (or	  paraconsistent)	  by	  showing	  the	  contradictions	  that	  arise	  and	  how	  this	  can	  be	  accounted	   for.	  This	  need	  not	  be	  a	  reductio	  of	   the	  position	  since	  such	  an	  issue	  would	  occur	  for	  any	  position	  that	  draws	  a	  limit	  to	  thought,	  and	  we	  (or	  at	  least	  I)	  have	  good	  reasons	  to	  otherwise	  believe	   Carnap’s	   position	   is	   plausible	   in	   the	   form	   of	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism.	  And	  also	  it	  seems	  plausible	  that	  a	  Carnapian	  need	  not	  object	  to	   such	   a	   reading	   of	   this	   position	   as	   being	   dialetheist,	   given	   Carnap’s	  principle	  of	  tolerance.	  The	  self-­‐referential	  paradox	  inherent	  in	  Carnap’s	  theory	  thus	  need	  not	  lead	  someone	  to	  reject	  it,	  as	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Quine:	  	   One	   man’s	   antinomy	   can	   be	   another	   man’s	   veridical	   paradox,	  and	   one	   man’s	   veridical	   paradox	   can	   be	   another	   man’s	  platitude.279	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  Priest,	  Routley,	  and	  Norman	  (1989)	  p1	  279	  Quine	  (1976)	  p14	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  VI.	  Conclusion.	  	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	  hope	   to	  have	  shown	   that	  Carnap’s	   theory	  encounters	  the	  self-­‐reference	  problem	  which	  leads	  him	  into	  contradictions	  that	  are	  typical	  of	  those	  found	  at	  the	  limits	  of	  thought.	  I	  explored	  different	  ways	  of	  formulating	  Carnap’s	  position	  suggesting	  the	  most	  faithful	  one	  as	  one	  that	  derives	  a	  contradiction	  at	  these	  typical	  places.	  In	  Carnap’s	  attempt	  to	   draw	   a	   limit	   to	   the	   meaningfully	   expressible,	   he	   finds	   himself	  straddling	  both	  sides	  of	  this	  limit	  in	  expressing	  it	  in	  ESO.	  Metaphysics	  is	  argued	   to	   be	   beyond	   those	   limits,	   and	   as	   such	   is	   described	   as	  Transcendent,	   but	   in	   describing	   it	   meaningfully	   as	   such	   it	   is	  automatically	  placed	  back	  in	  the	  Closure.	  <ESO>	  therefore	  experiences	  both	  Transcendence	  and	  Closure,	  by	  being	  both	  within	  and	  without	  the	  totality	  of	  meaningful	  sentences	  of	  the	  framework.	  So,	  Carnap’s	  theory	  goes	   beyond	   the	   limits	   of	   thought,	   leading	   to	   contradiction.	   The	   self-­‐reference	  problem	  presented	  itself	  as	  a	  dilemma	  to	  Carnap	  –	  for	  him	  to	  treat	  <ESO>	  itself	  as	  an	  internal	  or	  external	  statement.	  I	  explained	  this	  dilemma	  as	  generating	  contradictions	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  described	  in	  Priest’s	   BLT,	   showing	   that	   Carnap’s	   theory	   fits	   the	   self-­‐referential	  paradoxical	   structure	   of	   theories	   that	   draw	   a	   limit	   to	   thought.	   Since	  both	   of	   these	   options	   result	   in	   contradiction,	   I	   have	   concluded	   that	  Carnap	  ought	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  an	  ‘implicit’	  dialetheist	  and	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietist	  as	  an	  ‘explicit’	  dialetheist.	  I	  have	  shown	  how	  global	  meta-­‐theories	   encounter	   Transcendence	   and	   Closure,	   which	   together	  are	   contradictory	   and	   typical	   of	   self-­‐referential	   paradoxes	   found	   in	  theories	   that	   aim	   to	   draw	   a	   limit	   to	   thought.	   (However,	   this	   general	  metametametaphysical	   conclusion,	   being	   global	   and	   meta-­‐theoretical,	  will	  also	  be	  contradictory	  if	  it	  applies	  to	  itself!)	  With	  the	  recent	  surge	  of	  interest	  in	  Carnap	  and	  metametaphysical	  inquiry	  from	  Metametaphysics	  (2009),	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  self-­‐referential	  problems	  they	  may	  encounter	  and	  the	  dialetheist	  solutions	  that	  may	  be	  offered.	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CONCLUSION	  	  	  In	  this	  thesis	  I	  have	  put	  forward	  a	  new	  metaontological	  position	  that	  I	  have	  called	  ‘Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism’.	  This	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  view	  rejects	  ontology	  unless	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  pragmatic	  decision	  rather	  than	  metaphysical	  discovery.	  In	  chapter	  1,	  I	  set	  the	  scene	  for	  this	  position	  by	  outlining	   the	   Quine-­‐Carnap	   debate,	   defending	   Carnap	   against	   Quine’s	  critiques	  with	  the	  help	  of	  Yablo	  in	  order	  to	  motivate	  Carnapian	  quietism	  as	  a	  live	  metaontological	  position.	  In	  chapter	  2,	  I	  applied	  this	  quietism	  to	  natural	  and	  formal	  languages,	  taking	  insight	  from	  Meinongianism	  to	  show	  quantification	  to	  be	  ontologically	  neutral,	  and	  attacking	  Quinean	  metaontology	   that	   requires	   otherwise.	   In	   chapter	   3,	   I	   described	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  position	  in	  detail	  with	  regard	  to	  how	  fictionalism	  can	  be	  construed	   in	  a	  quietist	  manner	   that	   is	   suitable	   for	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian.	  Chapter	  4	  focused	  on	  one	  of	  the	  main	  problems	  for	  a	  Carnapian,	  namely	  the	   self-­‐reference	   problem,	   which	   is	   due	   to	   the	   Carnapian	   aim	   of	  drawing	  a	  limit	  to	  meaningful	  metaphysics	  whilst	  simultaneously	  going	  beyond	  such	  a	   limit.	   I	   suggested	  at	   the	  end	  of	   this	   thesis	   that	   the	  self-­‐reference	   problem	   could	   be	   solved	   by	   an	   appeal	   to	   dialetheism.	   This	  opens	   up	   a	   new	   route	   for	   metametaphysics	   as	   dialetheist	   and	  metaphysics	  as	  quietist,	  which	  I	  hope	  to	  develop	  in	  my	  future	  research.	  	  	  In	  this	  thesis	  I	  aimed	  to	  resolve	  some	  historically	  mistaken	  assumptions	  –	   that	  Quine	   and	   Carnap	   are	   rivals,	   and	   that	  Quine’s	   criticisms	   defeat	  Carnap’s	   position,	   resulting	   in	   Quine	   being	   hailed	   as	   the	   reviver	   of	  ontology.	   Quine,	   having	   conceded	   that	   ontology	   is	   metaphysical,	   and	  further	   argued	   that	   it	   is	   meaningless	   unless	   relative,	   is	   thus	   in	   all	  important	   respects	   on	   the	   same	   team	   as	   Carnap,	   and	   what	   I	   have	  argued	  is	  that	  this	  team	  should	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  quietist	  relativist	  team.	  Ultimately,	   they	   are	   both	   anti-­‐metaphysics,	   and	   with	   ontology	   being	  
	   210	  located	   as	   within	   the	   domain	   of	   metaphysics	   as	   either	   absolute	   and	  meaningless	   or	   relative	   and	   meaningful,	   the	   difference	   between	  Quinean	   I-­‐realism	   and	   Carnapian	   quietism	   simply	   becomes	   one	   of	  terminology.	  Having	   shown	   that	  Quine’s	   attacks	   on	   Carnap’s	   quietism	  fail,	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  shown	  that	  Carnap’s	  position	  is	  not	  to	  be	  ignored	  or	  standardly	   assumed	   as	   defeated.	   The	   Carnapian	   position	   is	   therefore	  still	  on	  the	  table,	  ready	  to	  be	  reframed	  as	  my	  ‘Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism’.	  	  	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  is	  quietist,	  because	  serious	  ontology	  read	  from	  our	  metaphysical	  external	  questions	  cannot	  be	  done.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  is	  neither	  realist	  nor	  antirealist,	  as	  statements	  of	  reality	  are	  external	  and	  meaningless,	  and	  therefore	  so	  must	  be	  statements	  of	  irreality.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   says	   the	   existence	   of	   things	   cannot	   be	   meaningfully	  questioned	  externally,	  and	  that	  things	  only	  exist	  relative	  to	  frameworks	  in	  as	  much	  as	  the	  framework	  is	  useful.	  Therefore,	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  is	  also	   a	   type	   of	   relativist:	   existence	   questions	   are	   answerable	   only	  relative	   to	   frameworks	   that	   are	   chosen	   pragmatically.	   The	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	  is	  externally	  non-­‐cognitive:	  external	  existence	  questions	  are	  non-­‐cognitive	  because	  pragmatic	   considerations	  are	  not	   evidential	   for	  any	  external	   truth	   and	  as	   such	  are	  not	   truth-­‐apt	   and	  do	  not	  have	  any	  metaphysical	   implications.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   is	  
internally	  cognitive	  because	  a	  framework	  can	  provide	  right	  and	  wrong	  answers	   to	   questions,	   giving	   propositions	   truth-­‐values	   against	   the	  backdrop	   of	   the	   framework’s	   presuppositions.	   And	   finally,	   since	  Carnap’s	  linguistic	  frameworks	  are	  construed	  as	  fictions,	  ultimately	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  position	  is	   fictionalist.	  This	  quietist	   fictionalist	  position	  redirects	   metaphysical	   debates	   about	   ontology	   towards	   pragmatism,	  and	   has	   bearing	   on	   any	   area	   of	   philosophy	   that	   discusses	   realism	   or	  antirealism	  about	  a	  certain	  entity	  or	  discourse.	  Thus	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  reframing	   is	   far	   reaching,	   from	   moral	   realism	   to	   modal	   realism	   and	  Platonism,	   for	  example,	  which	  will	  now	  be	   said	   to	   revolve	  around	   the	  utility	  of	  a	  discourse	  rather	  than	  the	  metaphysical	  existence	  of	  its	  posits.	  
	   211	  I	  argue	  that	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism	  trumps	  Quinean	  I-­‐realism.	  I	  have	  shown	   that	   not	   only	   do	   Quine’s	   attacks	   on	   Carnap	   fail,	   but	   also	   that	  Quinean	  methodology	   for	   realism	   fails,	  by	   showing	   that	  quantification	  in	   both	   natural	   and	   formal	   languages	   are	   ontologically	   neutral	   and	  metaphysically	   quiet.	   Quantificational	   terms	   in	   natural	   language	   like	  ‘some’,	   and	   quantifiers	   in	   formal	   language	   like	   ‘∃’,	   are	   ontologically	  neutral,	   and	   thus	   domains	   need	   not	   be	   restricted	   to	   include	   only	  existent	   things.	  Rather	   the	  domain	   can	   contain	  all	   sorts	  of	   things,	   and	  those	   that	  exist	  are	   those	   in	   the	  domain	   that	   instantiate	   the	  predicate	  for	   ‘exists’.	   Therefore	   Quine’s	  method	   for	   I-­‐realism	   fails	   to	   get	   to	   the	  ontological	   commitments	   of	   natural	   language	   via	   regimenting	   into	  quantified	  first	  order	  logic,	  as	  quantification	  is	  not	  a	  sign	  of	  ontological	  commitment.	  And	  so,	  regardless	  of	  the	  translation	  from	  English	  to	  logic,	  Quine	  cannot	  derive	  ontology	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  from	  language	  use.	  	  	  	  For	  Quine’s	  I-­‐realism	  to	  be	  a	  tenable	  ontological	  position,	  either	  internal	  quantificational	   use	   of	   English	   can	   provide	   us	   with	   our	   ontological	  commitments,	   or	   it	   can	   be	   translated	   into	   quantificational	   first	   order	  logic	   to	   manifest	   the	   ontological	   commitments,	   in	   order	   to	   derive	   an	  ontology	  for	  us	  to	  be	  a	  realist	  about.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  neither	  of	  these	  options	  are	  possible,	  and	  as	  such	  I-­‐realism	  is	  not	  a	  form	  of	  realism	  and	  Quine	   ought	   not	   to	   be	   considered	   a	   realist	   at	   all.	   The	   only	   tenable	  position	   left	   is	  quietism,	  and	  Carnap	  therefore	   triumphs	   in	   the	  alleged	  dispute	  with	   Quine.	   External	   existential	   claims	   are	   impossible	   for	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  as	  a	  quietist,	  and	  only	  internal	  ones	  are	  meaningful,	  but	  these	  are	  not	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  ontological.	  Rather	  I	  put	  forward	  two	  ways	  to	  understand	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  internal	  claims	  of	  ‘existence’:	  (1)	  by	  the	   rules	  of	   the	   fictional	   framework	   implying	  existence,	   or;	   (2)	  by	   the	  instantiation	  of	  the	  existence	  predicate	  (which	  is	  metaphysically	  quiet)	  that	  makes	  the	  claim	  true.	  With	  ontologically	  neutral	  quantification	  and	  a	  predicate	  for	  the	  metaphysically	  quiet	  ‘exists’,	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  taking	  insight	  from	  a	  basic	  form	  of	  Meinongianism.	  	  
	   212	  Having	   motivated	   quietism	   by	   showing	   quantification	   to	   be	  ontologically	   neutral,	   I	   have	   shown	   that	   we	   can	   talk	   about	   things	  meaningfully	   and	   truthfully	   without	   ontological	   commitment	   or	   the	  requirement	  of	  existence.	  Many	  have	  assumed	  otherwise,	  as	  in	  classical	  logic	  and	  standard	  philosophical	  theories	  of	  language	  one	  cannot	  refer	  to	  or	  speak	   truthfully	  of	  non-­‐existent	   things,	   so	  non-­‐existents	  have	  no	  place	  in	  domains	  of	  quantification.	  The	  impact	  of	  rejecting	  this	  is	  huge,	  since	  debates	  in	  scientific	  realism,	  between	  Nominalists	  and	  Platonists	  for	  example,	  rest	  on	  and	  are	  motivated	  by	  the	  ‘predicament’	  that	  we	  are	  realist	  about	  what	  our	  scientific	  theories	  refer	  to	  which	  problematically	  includes	  abstract	  entities.	  Once	  we	  accept	  that	  we	  can	  refer	  truthfully	  to	  non-­‐existents	   then	   the	   predicament	   vanishes:	   there	   is	   no	   need	   to	   say	  that	  our	  theories	  are	  false,	  or	  that	  we	  are	  committed	  to	  abstract	  entities,	  or	  to	  try	  to	  dispense	  of	  the	  entities.	  By	  taking	  a	  Meinongian	  perspective,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  debates	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  and	  others	  rest	  on	  the	  mistaken	  predicament	  that	  truth	  and	  reference	  require	  existence.	  	  	  This	   predicament	   has	   also	   been	   the	  main	  motivation	   for	   fictionalism,	  which	  traditionally	  explains	  how	  we	  can	  avoid	  ontological	  commitment	  to	  unwanted	  entities	  whilst	  retaining	  a	  useful	  theory	  or	  way	  of	  talking.	  I	  reframe	   fictionalism	  under	  quietism	  by	  divorcing	   fictionalism	   from	   its	  traditional	   antirealist	   roots.	   This	   new	   quietist	   fictionalism	   has	   global	  scope	   as	   opposed	   to	   traditionally	   being	   fictionalist	   only	   for	   specific	  entities	   or	   discourses	   only.	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   fictionalist	  aspect	  of	  this	  position	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  ‘meta’	  takes	  priority.	  This	  is	  my	  methodological	  contribution.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  does	  not	  look	  to	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  fiction	  for	  clarification	  on	  their	  fictionalism,	  because	  as	   a	  quietist	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  denies	  metaphysics.	   I	   therefore	   argue	  that	   we	   should	   do	   metametaphysics	   before	   metaphysics,	   and	   put	   a	  metaontological	   theory	   in	   place	   before	   ontological	   questions	   are	  answered.	   The	   quietism	   of	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   will	   thus	   inform	   their	  fictionalism	  and	  ontology	  of	  fiction	  in	  turn,	  not	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  	  
	   213	  I	  have	  described	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  as	  quiet	  with	  regard	  to	  metaphysics,	  and	   fictional	   with	   regard	   to	   linguistic	   frameworks.	   To	   construe	   the	  frameworks	  as	  fictions	  is	  to	  say	  that	  they	  have	  value	  by	  being	  useful	  to	  adopt,	  and	  that	  they	  are	  to	  be	  treated	  similar	  to	  how	  we	  treat	  fictions	  –	  presupposing	   them	   in	   order	   to	   engage	   with	   them	   and	   assess	   claims	  relative	  to	  them,	  and	  accepting	  what	  we	  presuppose	  in	  order	  to	  believe	  the	   claims	   that	   are	   true	   relative	   to	   them.	   Fictional	   frameworks	   are	  adopted	   based	   on	   which	   are	   most	   useful,	   yet	   this	   usefulness	   is	   not	  evidential	   for	   truth.	   Usefulness	  will	  mean	   how	   fruitful	   and	   conducive	  the	  fiction	  is	  to	  the	  aim	  for	  which	  the	  language	  within	  that	  framework	  is	  intended.	  There	  will	  be	  no	  single	  fiction	  that	  is	  privileged,	  because	  as	  a	  quietist,	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   will	   deny	   the	   very	   idea	   of	   there	   being	   a	  ‘right	  one’	  due	  to	  all	  the	  fictional	  frameworks	  being	  as	  ‘correct’	  as	  each	  other	  (in	  that	  none	  are	  up	  for	  being	  true	  due	  to	  their	  non-­‐cognitivism).	  The	  only	  way	  frameworks	  are	  chosen	  is	  on	  pragmatic	  considerations,	  so	  they	  can	  be	  ‘better’	  than	  each	  other	  but	  the	  ‘best’	  will	  not	  be	  the	  ‘right	  one’.	  The	  account	   is	   typically	   fictionalist	   in	   its	  escape	   from	  ontological	  commitment	  whilst	  maintaining	  the	  discourse	  that	  may	  seem	  to	  sound	  realist,	  and	  in	  citing	  value	  in	  the	  discourse	  by	  it	  being	  useful	  to	  adopt.	  I	  have	   argued	   that	   the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	   is	  hermeneutic	  with	   regard	   to	   its	  quietism	  such	  that	  we	  are	  quiet	  and	  are	  in	  error	  if	  we	  think	  we	  are	  not,	  but	  is	  revolutionary	  with	  regard	  to	  its	  fictionalism	  such	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  treat	  frameworks	  as	  fictions	  and	  are	  in	  error	  by	  not	  doing	  so	  already.	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  position	  thus	  incorporates	  elements	  from	  Quietism,	  Meinongianism,	   and	   Fictionalism,	  which	  may	   seem	  at	   first	   sight	   to	   be	  incompatible.	  It	  is	  therefore	  worth	  emphasizing	  here	  that	  the	  quietism	  is	  the	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  coherency	  of	  the	  position,	  in	  particular	  how	   it	  adapts	   insights	   from	  traditional	  Meinongianism	  and	   traditional	  fictionalism	   without	   being	   identical	   with	   either.	   It	   is	   the	   quietist	  foundation	   of	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   position	   that	   allows	   for	   seemingly	  incompatible	  elements	  to	  be	  reconciled	  and	  consistently	  held	  together.	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  Putting	   the	   quietism	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   position	   results	   in	   the	  Meinongianism	  and	   fictionalism	  becoming	  rather	  deflated	  and	  as	  such	  compatible	  with	  each	  other.	  Therefore	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  a	  quietist	  position,	  and	  under	  quietism	  it	  can	  draw	  upon	  ideas	  from	  both	  Meinongianism	  and	  fictionalism	  without	  inconsistency.	  	  	  In	   taking	   quantification	   to	   be	   ontologically	   neutral	   in	   the	  Meinongian	  way,	  the	  predicament	  over	  how	  to	  avoid	  ontological	  commitment	  to	  the	  unwanted	   things	   we	   quantify	   over	   becomes	   dissolved.	   Therefore	   the	  main	  motivation	   for	   fictionalism	   also	   becomes	   dissolved.	   There	   is	   no	  need	   to	   talk	   as	   if	   the	   unwanted	   things	   are	   merely	   fictional	   to	   avoid	  commitment,	  when	  talking	  of	  things	  does	  not	  bring	  commitment	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  It	  is	  here	  that	  Meinongianism	  and	  fictionalism	  seem	  to	  be	  in	  tension	  with	   each	   other.	   However,	   I	   utilize	   fictionalism	   not	   simply	   to	  avoid	  ontological	  commitment,	  but	  rather	  to	  explain	  what	  our	  linguistic	  frameworks	   are	   (fictions)	   and	   to	   show	   that	  we	   adopt	   certain	  ways	   of	  talking	   for	   their	   practical	   utility	   rather	   than	   their	   external	   truth.	   The	  Meinongian	   aspect	   does	   the	   work	   in	   allowing	   us	   to	   talk	   truthfully	   of	  things	  that	  we	  do	  not	  take	  to	  exist,	  whilst	  the	  quietism	  does	  the	  work	  in	  allowing	  us	  to	  talk	  without	  ontological	  commitment	  of	  things	  that	  we	  do	  take	  to	  exist.	  The	  fictionalism	  then	  does	  the	  work	  in	  explaining	  what	  it	  is	  that	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  by	  interpreting	  frameworks	  as	  fictions,	  and	  justifies	  our	  adoption	  of	  such	  frameworks	  due	  to	  their	  pragmatic	  utility.	  	  	  	  The	   fictionalist	   element	   is	   thus	   not	   an	   attempt	   to	   say	   our	   ordinary	  theories	  are	   false	   but	  useful,	   since	   the	  position	   is	  quiet	   about	  external	  Truth.	   	  What	  the	  fictions	  are	  doing	  are	  replacing	  Carnap’s	  frameworks	  as	   ways	   of	   talking	   with	   internal	   standards	   of	   truthfulness,	   that	   are	  (unlike	  Carnap’s	  frameworks)	  not	  characterized	  by	  analytic	  framework	  rules	  (so	  as	  to	  escape	  Quine’s	  critique).	  So	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  position	  is	   fictionalist	   as	   it	   sees	   frameworks	   as	   analogous	   with	   fictions	   in	   the	  
	   215	  sense	   that	   their	   standards	   of	   truthfulness	   are	   internal	   and	  by	   judging	  ways	  of	  talking	  on	  usefulness,	  rather	  than	  appealing	  to	  external	  Truth.	  Meinongianism	  becomes	  relevant	  because	  within	  some	  frameworks	  we	  seem	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  things	  we	  quantify	  over	  that	  we	  take	  to	  exist	  and	  those	  that	  we	  take	  not	  to	  exist.	  An	  internal	  understanding	  of	  the	  ontology	  of	  those	  frameworks	  (what	  it	  is	  those	  frameworks	  claim	  to	  exist)	  would	  seem	  to	  misread	  them	  if	  it	  was	  to	  take	  all	  quantification	  as	  being	  committing.	  The	  quiet	  Meinongian	  can	   respect	   these	   features	  of	  our	   discourses	   by	   separating	   quantification	   from	   internal	   ontological	  commitment,	   and	   allowing	   that	   some	   discourse	   may	   have	   internal	  standards	   of	   existence	   that	   do	   not	   track	   quantifications.	   This	   is	   quiet	  Meinongianism	  –	   the	   things	   that	  an	   internal	  existence	  predicate	  apply	  to	  do	  not	  have	  any	  substantial	  metaphysical	  existence,	  as	  they	  are	  just	  things	  that	  a	  framework	  finds	  useful	  to	  single	  out	  for	  special	  treatment.	  Fictionalism	  is	  thus	  about	  viewing	  frameworks	  as	  analogous	  to	  fictions	  in	  having	  their	  own	  internal	  standards	  of	  correctness	  even	  if	  these	  are	  not	  given	  by	  analytic	  meaning	  postulates,	  and	  Meinongianism	  is	  about	  recognising	  a	  distinction	  within	  frameworks	  between	  that	  framework’s	  internal	  ontology	  and	   its	  quantified	  commitments.	  The	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  thus	  retains	  the	  truth	  of	  our	  talk	  of	  all	  sorts	  of	   things	   in	  a	  Meinongian	  way,	  whilst	  judging	  the	  talk	  on	  its	  usefulness	  in	  a	  fictionalist	  way,	  with	  the	  quietist	  basis	  of	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  position	  creating	  consistency.	  	  	  	  The	  biggest	  problem	  for	  Neo-­‐Carnapian	  Quietism	  has	  been	  that	  of	  self-­‐reference.	  This	   leads	  the	  Carnapian	  (and	  thus	  the	  Neo-­‐Carnapian)	   into	  contradictions	   that	   are	   typical	   of	   those	   found	  at	   the	   limits	   of	   thought.	  The	   self-­‐reference	  problem	  presented	   itself	   as	   a	   dilemma	   to	  Carnap	  –	  for	   him	   to	   treat	   his	   theory	   itself	   as	   being	   proposed	   internally	   or	  externally.	  I	  formalized	  this	  dilemma	  as	  generating	  contradictions	  in	  the	  typical	  ways	  described	  by	  Priest,	  showing	  that	  Carnap’s	  theory	  fits	  the	  self-­‐referential	   paradoxical	   structure	   of	   theories	   that	   draw	   a	   limit	   to	  thought.	   On	   both	   horns	   of	   the	   dilemma,	   we	   end	   up	   in	   contradiction,	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  derived	  from	  analogues	  of	  the	  Liar	  Paradox	  and	  Russell’s	  Paradox	  –	  i.e.	  paradoxes	  of	  self-­‐reference.	   In	  Carnap’s	  attempt	  to	  draw	  a	   limit	   to	  the	  meaningfully	  expressible,	  he	  finds	  himself	  straddling	  both	  sides	  of	  this	  limit	  in	  expressing	  it.	  Metaphysics	  is	  argued	  to	  be	  beyond	  those	  limits,	  and	  as	  such	  is	  described	  as	  Transcendent,	  but	  in	  describing	  it	  as	  such	  it	  is	   automatically	   placed	   back	   in	   the	   Closure.	   The	   Carnapian	   theory	  therefore	  experiences	  both	  Transcendence	  and	  Closure,	  by	  being	  both	  within	   and	   without	   the	   totality	   of	   meaningful	   sentences.	   As	   a	   result,	  Carnap’s	  attempt	  to	  put	  forward	  an	  anti-­‐metaphysical	  view	  ends	  up	  in	  such	   contradictory	   realms	   that	   are	   typical	   of	   other	   anti-­‐metaphysical	  views	   that	   also	   aim	   to	   draw	   a	   limit	   to	   thought.	   I	   therefore	   concluded	  that	   Carnap	   be	   considered	   as	   an	   ‘implicit’	   dialetheist	   and	   the	   Neo-­‐Carnapian	   Quietist	   as	   an	   ‘explicit’	   dialetheist	   where	   the	   dialetheism	  speaks	  of	  truth	  and	  reality	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  acceptable	  to	  a	  quietist.	  	  	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  this	  thesis,	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  shown	  how	  global	  metatheories,	  such	   as	   the	  metametaphysical	   theory	   of	   Carnap’s	   quietism,	   encounter	  Transcendence	   and	   Closure,	   which	   together	   are	   contradictory	   and	  typical	  of	  self-­‐referential	  paradoxes	  found	  in	  theories	  that	  aim	  to	  draw	  a	  limit	   to	   thought.	   Dialetheism	   is	   thus	   inevitable	   in	   metametaphysics,	  since	   metametaphysical	   views	   aim	   to	   draw	   a	   limit	   to	   thought,	  particularly	  to	  metaphysics.	  This	  is	  my	  metametametaphysical	  result	  –	  that	  metametaphysics	   is	   dialetheist.	   I	   therefore	   end	  my	   thesis	   on	   this	  bombshell:	   in	   redirecting	   metaphysics	   towards	   quietism,	  metametaphysics	   is	   redirected	   towards	   dialetheism.	   In	   order	   to	   do	  metametaphysics	   and	   be	   quiet,	   we	   need	   to	   be	   dialetheist.	   With	   the	  recent	   surge	   in	   global	   positions	   and	   metametaphysical	   inquiry,	   and	  therefore	   in	   anti-­‐metaphysical	   views	   such	   as	   Carnap’s	   quietism,	   it	   is	  important	   to	   understand	   the	   self-­‐referential	   problems	   that	   they	   may	  encounter	  and	  the	  dialetheist	  solutions	  that	  may	  be	  offered.	  I	  hope	  that	  in	  future	  work	  I	  can	  research	  these	  aspects	  of	  Carnapian	  theories,	  and	  look	  further	  into	  the	  consequences	  of	  dialetheism	  for	  metametaphysics.	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GLOSSARY	  
	  
X,	  F,	  T,	  S,	  P,	  L	  	   An	  entity	  X,	  a	  fiction	  or	  framework	  F,	  a	  theory	  T,	  	  a	  sentence	  S,	  a	  predicate	  P,	  and	  a	  language	  L	  	  
∃ ,	  ∀ ,	  Σ ,	  Λ ,	  S Existential,	  Universal,	  Meinongian	  ‘Existential’,	  Meinongian	  ‘Universal’,	  and	  Particular	  Quantifiers	  	  
E!,	  ϕ ,	  Ω ,	  δ ,	  ψ 	  	   The	  existence	  predicate,	  a	  property,	  the	  totality,	  the	  diagonaliser	  function,	  and	  a	  condition	  
	  
true/false	   	   true	  or	  false	  internally	  and	  relative	  to	  frameworks	  
True/False	   	   True	  or	  False	  externally	  and	  independently	  
	  
E-­‐realism	   	   External	  Realism	  (realism	  in	  a	  metaphysical	  way)	  
I-­‐realism	   	   Internal	  Realism	  (realism	  derived	  internally)	  
	  
IQ/EQ	  	   	   Internal	  Question/External	  Question	  
	  
SET	   	   	   Domains	  are	  sets	  (set-­‐theoretic	  model	  theory)	  
	  
NE	   	   	   No	  entity	  without	  identity	  (Quine)	  
	  
TB	   	   	   To	  be	  is	  to	  be	  a	  value	  of	  a	  bound	  variable	  (Quine)	  
	  
POC	   	   	   Principle	  of	  Comprehension	  (Meinongianism)	  
CP	   	   	   Characterisation	  Principle	  (Meinongianism)	  
	  
HF	   	   	   Hermeneutic	  Fictionalism	  (descriptive)	  	  
RF	   	   	   Revolutionary	  Fictionalism	  (prescriptive)	  	   	  
	  
ESO	   	   	   Carnap’s	  paper	  ‘Empiricism,	  Semantics	  &	  Ontology’	  
<ESO>	  	   	   ‘All	  external	  propositions	  are	  meaningless’	  
	  
BLT	  	   	   	   Priest’s	  book	  Beyond	  the	  Limits	  of	  Thought	  
	   218	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY	  	  	  Alspector-­‐Kelly,	  M.	  (2001)	  ‘On	  Quine	  on	  Carnap	  on	  Ontology’,	  
Philosophical	  Studies:	  An	  International	  Journal	  for	  Philosophy	  in	  the	  
Analytic	  Tradition,	  102.1,	  93-­‐122.	  	  Ayer,	  A.	  J.	  (1952)	  Language,	  Truth	  and	  Logic,	  Dover	  Publications	  Inc:	  New	  York.	  	  Azzouni,	  J.	  (1997)	  ‘Applied	  mathematics,	  existential	  commitment,	  and	  the	  Quine-­‐Putnam	  indispensability	  thesis’,	  Philosophia	  Mathematica,	  5.3,	  193-­‐209.	  	  Azzouni,	  J.	  (1998)	  ‘On	  “On	  What	  There	  Is”’,	  Pacific	  Philosophical	  
Quarterly,	  79,	  1-­‐18.	  	  	  Azzouni,	  J.	  (2004)	  Deflating	  Existential	  Consequence:	  A	  case	  for	  
Nominalism,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Azzouni,	  J.	  (2007)	  ‘Ontological	  Commitment	  in	  the	  Vernacular’,	  Nous,	  41.2,	  204-­‐226.	  	  	  Azzouni,	  J.	  (2010)	  Talking	  About	  Nothing:	  Numbers,	  Hallucinations,	  and	  
Fictions,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Benaceraff,	  P.	  (1965)	  ‘What	  numbers	  could	  not	  be’,	  Philosophical	  Review,	  74,	  47-­‐73.	  	  Benningson,	  T.	  (1999)	  ‘Is	  Relativism	  Really	  Self-­‐Refuting?’,	  Philosophical	  
Studies,	  94,	  211-­‐236.	  	  Bentham,	  J.	  (1932)	  The	  Theory	  of	  Fictions,	  found	  in	  Ogden,	  C.	  K.	  (ed.)	  (2001)	  Bentham’s	  Theory	  of	  Fictions,	  New	  York:	  Harcourt,	  Brace	  and	  Company.	  	  Berto,	  F.	  (2008)	  ‘Modal	  Meinongianism	  for	  Fictional	  Objects’,	  
Metaphysica,	  9,	  205–218.	  	  Berto,	  F.	  (2012)	  Existence	  as	  a	  Real	  Property,	  Synthese	  Library,	  Springer.	  	  Berto,	  F.	  (forthcoming)	  ‘There	  is	  an	  ‘Is’	  in	  ‘There	  Is’:	  Meinongian	  Quantification	  and	  Existence’	  found	  in	  Torza,	  A.	  (ed.)	  (forthcoming),	  
Quantifiers,	  Quantifiers,	  and	  Quantifiers,	  Synthèse	  Library,	  Springer.	  	  Bird,	  G.	  H.	  (1995)	  ‘Carnap	  and	  Quine:	  Internal	  and	  External	  Questions’,	  
Erkenntnis,	  42.1,	  41-­‐64.	  	  	  
	   219	  Boghossian,	  P.	  (1997)	  ‘Analyticity’	  found	  in	  Hale,	  B.	  and	  Wright,	  C.	  (eds.)	  (1997)	  A	  Companion	  to	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Language,	  331-­‐368,	  Oxford,	  Blackwell.	  	  Bourne,	  E.	  C.	  (2012)	  ‘Fictionalism’,	  Analysis	  Advance	  Access,	  0.0,	  1-­‐16.	  	  	  Bradley,	  F.	  H.	  (1897)	  Appearance	  and	  Reality,	  2nd	  edition,	  Swan	  Sonnenschein:	  London.	  	  Brock,	  S.	  (2002)	  ‘Fictionalism	  about	  Fictional	  Characters’,	  Nous,	  36.1,	  1-­‐21.	  	  Bueno,	  O.	  (2009)	  ‘Mathematical	  fictionalism’	  in	  Bueno.	  O.	  and	  Linnebo,	  Ø.	  (eds.)	  (2009)	  New	  Waves	  in	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Mathematics,	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  59–79.	  	  	  Burgess,	  J.	  P.	  and	  Rosen,	  G.	  (1997)	  A	  Subject	  with	  No	  Object,	  Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press.	  	  Burgess,	  J.	  P.	  (2004)	  ‘Mathematics	  and	  Bleak	  House’,	  Philosophia	  
Mathematica,	  12,	  18-­‐36.	  	  	  Byrne,	  A.	  (1993)	  ‘Truth	  in	  Fiction:	  The	  story	  continued’,	  Australasian	  
Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  71.1,	  24-­‐35.	  	  	  Cameron,	  R.	  P.	  (2008)	  ‘Truthmakers	  and	  Ontological	  Commitment:	  Or	  How	  to	  Deal	  with	  Complex	  Objects	  and	  Mathematical	  Ontology	  without	  Getting	  into	  Trouble’,	  Philosophical	  Studies,	  141,	  1-­‐18.	  	  	  Cantor,	  G.	  (1892)	  ‘Ueber	  eine	  elementare	  Frage	  der	  Mannigfaltigkeitslehre’,	  Jahresbericht	  der	  Deutschen	  Mathematiker-­‐
Vereinigung	  1890–1891,	  1,	  75–78.	  	  Carnap,	  R.	  (1934a)	  Logical	  Syntax	  of	  Language,	  Routledge	  Press.	  	  Carnap,	  R.	  (1934b)	  ‘On	  the	  character	  of	  philosophical	  problems’	  
Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  1.1,	  5-­‐19.	  	  Carnap,	  R.	  (1950)	  ‘Empiricism,	  Semantics,	  and	  Ontology’,	  Revue	  
Internationale	  de	  Philosophie	  4,	  20-­‐40;	  revised	  and	  reprinted	  in	  Carnap,	  R.	  (1956)	  Meaning	  and	  Necessity,	  2nd	  edition,	  205-­‐221.	  	  Carnap,	  R.	  (1956)	  Meaning	  and	  Necessity:	  A	  Study	  in	  Semantics	  and	  
Modal	  Logic,	  2nd	  edition,	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  	  Cei,	  A.	  and	  Stoneham,	  T.	  (2009)	  ‘“Let	  the	  occult	  quality	  go”:	  Interpreting	  Berkeley’s	  Metaphysics	  of	  Science’,	  European	  Journal	  of	  Analytic	  
Philosophy,	  5.1,	  73-­‐91.	  	  
	   220	  Chalmers,	  D.,	  Manley,	  D.	  and	  Wasserman,	  R.	  (eds.)	  (2009)	  
Metametaphysics:	  New	  Essays	  on	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Ontology,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Chalmers,	  D.	  (2011)	  ‘Revisability	  and	  Conceptual	  Change	  in	  “Two	  Dogmas	  of	  Empiricism”’,	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  108.8,	  387-­‐415.	  	  Cohen,	  L.	  J.	  (1989)	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Induction	  and	  
Probability,	  Oxford	  Clarendon	  Press.	  	  Creath,	  R.	  (1990)	  Dear	  Carnap,	  Dear	  Van:	  The	  Quine-­‐Carnap	  
Correspondance	  and	  Related	  Work,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  Berkeley	  and	  Los	  Angeles.	  	  Currie,	  G.	  (1990)	  The	  Nature	  of	  Fiction,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  Currie,	  G.	  (1998)	  ‘Realism	  of	  character	  and	  the	  value	  of	  fiction’,	  in	  Levinson,	  J.	  (ed.)	  (2001)	  Aesthetics	  and	  Ethics:	  Essays	  at	  the	  Intersection,	  Cambride	  University	  Press,	  161-­‐182.	  	  	  Currie,	  G.	  (2010)	  Narratives	  and	  Narrators:	  A	  Philosophy	  of	  Stories,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Currie,	  G.	  (2012)	  ‘Literature	  and	  Truthfulness’,	  in	  Maclaurin,	  J.	  (ed.)	  (2012)	  Rationis	  Defensor:	  Essays	  in	  Honour	  of	  Colin	  Cheyne,	  Springer,	  23-­‐31.	  	  Daly,	  C.	  J.	  (2008)	  ‘Fictionalism	  and	  the	  Attitudes’,	  Philosophical	  Studies,	  139,	  423-­‐440.	  	  	  Davidson,	  D.	  (1973)	  ‘On	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  a	  Conceptual	  Scheme’,	  
Proceedings	  and	  Addresses	  of	  the	  American	  Philosophical	  Association,	  47,	  5-­‐20.	  	  	  Eklund,	  M.	  (2005)	  ‘Fiction,	  Indifference,	  and	  Ontology’,	  Philosophy	  and	  
Phenomenological	  Research,	  71.3,	  557-­‐579.	  	  	  Eklund,	  M.	  (2006a)	  ‘Metaontology’,	  Philosophy	  Compass,	  1.3,	  317-­‐334.	  	  Eklund,	  M.	  (2006b)	  ‘Neo-­‐Fregean	  Ontology’,	  Philosophical	  Perspectives,	  20,	  95-­‐121.	  	  	  Eklund,	  M.	  (2009)	  ‘The	  Frege-­‐Geach	  Problem	  and	  Kalderon’s	  Moral	  Fictionalism’,	  The	  Philosophical	  Quarterly,	  59.237,	  705-­‐712.	  	  	  Eklund,	  M.	  (2011)	  ‘Carnap’s	  Metaontology’,	  Nous,	  0.0,	  1-­‐23.	  	  	  Field,	  H.	  (1980)	  Science	  without	  Numbers:	  A	  Defense	  of	  Nominalism,	  Oxford:	  Blackwell.	  
	   221	  Field,	  H.	  (2008)	  Saving	  Truth	  from	  Paradox,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Fine,	  A.	  (1993)	  ‘Fictionalism’,	  Midwest	  Studies	  in	  Philosophy,	  XVIII,	  1-­‐18.	  	  	  Fine,	  A.	  (1984)	  ‘The	  Natural	  Ontological	  Attitude’,	  found	  in	  Boyd,	  R.,	  Gasper,	  P.	  and	  Trout,	  J.	  D.	  (eds.)	  (1991)	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  MIT,	  261-­‐277.	  	  Fine,	  K.	  (1991)	  ‘The	  Study	  of	  Ontology’,	  Nous,	  25.3,	  263-­‐294.	  	  	  Fine,	  K.	  (2001)	  ‘The	  Question	  of	  Realism’,	  Philosophers’	  Imprint,	  1.1,1-­‐30.	  	  	  Fine,	  K.	  (2009)	  ‘The	  Question	  of	  Ontology’	  in	  Chalmers,	  D.	  et	  al.	  (eds.)	  (2009)	  Metametaphysics:	  New	  Essays	  on	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Ontology,	  157-­‐177.	  	  Frege,	  G.	  (1884)	  Die	  Grundlagen	  der	  Arithmetik:	  eine	  logisch-­‐
mathematische	  Untersuchung	  uber	  den	  Begriff	  der	  Zahl,	  Breslau:	  W.	  Koebner.	  Translated	  by	  Austin,	  J.	  L.	  (1974)	  The	  Foundations	  of	  
Arithmetic:	  A	  logico-­‐mathematical	  enquiry	  into	  the	  concept	  of	  number,	  2nd	  edition,	  Oxford:	  Blackwell.	  	  Frege,	  G.	  (1892)	  ‘Über	  Sinn	  und	  Bedeutung’,	  in	  Zeitschrift	  für	  Philosophie	  
und	  philosophische	  Kritik,	  100:	  25–50.	  Translated	  as	  ‘On	  Sense	  and	  Reference’	  by	  Black,	  M.	  in	  Geach,	  P.	  and	  Black,	  M.	  (eds.	  and	  trans.)	  (1980)	  Translations	  from	  the	  Philosophical	  Writings	  of	  Gottlob	  Frege,	  Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  3rd	  edition.	  	  	  Gamut,	  L.	  (1991)	  Logic,	  Language,	  and	  Meaning,	  volume	  II,	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  	  Garner,	  R.	  (1993)	  ‘Are	  Convenient	  Fictions	  Harmful	  to	  Your	  Health?’,	  
Philosophy	  East	  and	  West,	  43.1,	  87-­‐106.	  	  	  Garner,	  R.	  (2007)	  ‘Abolishing	  Morality’,	  Ethical	  Theory	  and	  Moral	  
Practice,	  10,	  499-­‐513.	  	  	  Gibson,	  R.	  F.	  (2004)	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Quine,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  Grice,	  H.	  P.	  and	  Strawson,	  P.	  F.	  (1956)	  ‘In	  Defense	  of	  a	  Dogma’,	  The	  
Philosophical	  Review,	  65.2,	  141-­‐158.	  	  Hales,	  S.	  (2006)	  Relativism	  and	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Philosophy,	  MIT	  Press.	  	  	  	  Hilbert,	  D.	  and	  Ackermann,	  W.	  (1928)	  Grundzuge	  der	  theoretischen	  
Logik,	  Berlin,	  Springer;	  translated	  by	  Hammond,	  L.,	  Leckie,	  G.	  and	  Steinhardt,	  F.	  (1950)	  Principles	  of	  mathematical	  logic,	  New	  York.	  	  
	   222	  Hirsch,	  E.	  (2002)	  ‘Quantifier	  Variance	  and	  Realism’,	  Realism	  and	  
Relativism,	  12,	  51-­‐73.	  	  	  Hirsch,	  E.	  (2005)	  ‘Physical-­‐Object	  Ontology,	  Verbal	  Disputes,	  and	  Common	  Sense’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research,	  70.1,	  67-­‐97.	  	  Hirsch,	  E.	  (2008)	  ‘Language,	  Ontology,	  and	  Structure’,	  Nous,	  42.3,	  509-­‐528.	  	  	  Hirsch,	  E.	  (2011)	  Quantifier	  Variance	  and	  Realism,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Hofweber,	  T.	  (2005)	  ‘A	  Puzzle	  About	  Ontology’,	  Nous,	  39.2,	  256-­‐283.	  	  	  Hofweber,	  T.	  (2007)	  ‘Innocent	  Statements	  and	  Their	  Metaphysically	  Loaded	  Counterparts’,	  Philosophers’	  Imprint,	  7.1,	  1-­‐33.	  	  	  Horwich,	  P.	  (2004)	  From	  a	  Deflationary	  Point	  of	  View,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Horwich,	  P.	  (2007)	  ‘The	  Quest	  For	  Reality’,	  Dialectica,	  61.1,	  5-­‐16.	  	  	  Jay,	  C.	  (2011)	  Realistic	  Fictionalism,	  PhD	  Thesis	  found	  at	  discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1356103/1/Realistic%20Fictionalism.pdf	  	  Jenkins,	  C.	  S.	  (2006)	  ‘Lewis	  and	  Blackburn	  on	  quasi-­‐realism	  and	  fictionalism’,	  Analysis,	  66.4,	  315-­‐319.	  	  Joyce,	  R.	  (2001)	  The	  Myth	  of	  Morality,	  Cambridge:	  CUP.	  	  Joyce,	  R.	  (2005)	  ‘Moral	  Fictionalism’	  in	  Kalderon,	  M.	  (ed.)	  (2005b)	  
Fictionalism	  in	  Metaphysics,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  287-­‐313.	  	  Kalderon,	  M.	  E.	  (2005a)	  Moral	  Fictionalism,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Kalderon,	  M.	  E.	  (ed.)	  (2005b)	  Fictionalism	  in	  Metaphysics,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Kalderon,	  M.	  E.	  (2008)	  ‘Moral	  fictionalism,	  the	  Frege-­‐Geach	  problem,	  and	  reasonable	  inference’,	  Analysis,	  68.2,	  133-­‐143.	  	  	  Kant,	  I.	  (1772)	  Prolegomena	  to	  any	  future	  Metaphysics,	  translated	  and	  edited	  by	  Ellington,	  J.	  (1977),	  Hackett	  Publishing	  Company	  Inc.	  	  Kant,	  I.	  (1781)	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason,	  translated	  and	  edited	  by	  Guyer,	  P.	  and	  Wood,	  A.	  (1997),	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  Kim,	  J.	  and	  Sosa,	  E.	  (eds.)	  (1999)	  Metaphysics:	  An	  Anthology,	  Blackwell	  Publishers	  Ltd.	  	  
	   223	  Kreisel,	  G.	  (1967)	  ‘Informal	  rigour	  and	  completeness	  proofs’,	  in	  Lakatos,	  I.	  (ed.)	  Problems	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics,	  Amsterdam,	  138-­‐186.	  
	  Kripke,	  S.	  (1975)	  ‘Outline	  of	  a	  Theory	  of	  Truth’,	  The	  Journal	  of	  
Philosophy,	  72,	  690–716.	  	  Kroon,	  F.	  (2001)	  ‘The	  Semantics	  of	  ‘Things	  in	  Themselves’:	  A	  Deflationary	  Account’,	  The	  Philosophical	  Quarterly,	  51.203.	  	  Lamarque,	  P.	  and	  Olsen,	  S.	  (1994)	  Truth,	  Fiction,	  and	  Literature:	  A	  
Philosophical	  Perspective,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Lejewski,	  C.	  (1954)	  ‘Logic	  and	  Existence’,	  British	  Journal	  for	  the	  
Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  5,	  104–119.	  	  Leng,	  M.	  (2005)	  ‘Revolutionary	  Fictionalism:	  A	  call	  to	  arms,	  Philosophia	  
Mathematica,	  13.3,	  277-­‐293.	  	  	  Leng,	  M.,	  Paseau,	  A.,	  and	  Potter,	  M.	  (2007)	  Mathematical	  Knowledge,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Leng,	  M.	  (2010)	  Mathematics	  and	  Reality,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Lewis,	  D.	  (1990)	  ‘Noneism	  or	  Allism?’,	  Mind,	  99.393,	  23-­‐31.	  	  Łukasiewicz,	  J.	  (1921)	  ‘Logika	  dwuwartościowa’	  Przegląd	  Filozoficzny	  23,	  189–205.	  Translated	  as	  ‘Two-­‐valued	  logic’,	  in	  Borkowski,	  L.	  (ed.)	  (1970)	  Selected	  Works,	  Amsterdam:	  North-­‐Holland,	  89–109.	  	  Meinong,	  A.	  (1904)	  ‘Uber	  Gegenstandstheorie’	  Translated	  as	  ‘On	  the	  Theory	  of	  Objects’	  in	  Chisholm,	  R.	  (ed.)	  (1981)	  Realism	  and	  the	  
Background	  of	  Phenomenology,	  Glencoe,	  Ill:	  Free	  Press,	  76–117.	  	  Melia,	  J.	  (1995)	  ‘On	  What	  There’s	  Not’,	  Analysis,	  55.4,	  223-­‐229.	  	  Musgrave,	  A.	  (1989)	  ‘Noa’s	  Ark	  –	  Fine	  for	  Realism’,	  The	  Philosophical	  
Quarterly,	  39.157,	  383-­‐398.	  	  	  Nolan,	  D.,	  Restall,	  G.	  and	  West,	  C.	  (2005)	  ‘Moral	  Fictionalism	  versus	  the	  rest’,	  Australasian	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  83.3,	  307-­‐330.	  	  	  Parsons,	  T.	  (1980)	  Nonexistent	  Objects,	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  	  Pears,	  D.	  F.	  and	  McGuinness,	  B.	  F.	  (trans.)	  (1961)	  Wittgenstein,	  L.	  
Tractatus	  Logico-­‐Philosophicus,	  Routledge	  and	  Kegan	  Paul.	  	  Potter,	  M.	  (2007)	  ‘What	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  mathematical	  knowledge?’,	  found	  in	  Leng,	  M.	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  Mathematical	  Knowledge,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  16-­‐32.	  
	   224	  Price,	  H.	  (1992)	  ‘Metaphysical	  Pluralism’,	  The	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  89.8,	  387-­‐409.	  	  	  Price,	  H.	  (2006)	  ‘Quining	  Naturalism’,	  The	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  104.8,	  375-­‐402.	  	  Price,	  H.	  (2011)	  Naturalism	  Without	  Mirrors,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Priest,	  G.	  (1987)	  In	  Contradiction,	  Dordrecht:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff.	  	  	  Priest,	  G.,	  Routley,	  R.	  and	  Norman,	  J.	  (eds.)	  (1989)	  Paraconsistent	  Logic:	  
Essays	  on	  the	  Inconsistent,	  Philosophia	  Verlag:	  Munich.	  	  Priest,	  G.	  (1998)	  ‘What’s	  So	  Bad	  About	  Contradictions?’,	  Journal	  of	  
Philosophy,	  95,	  410-­‐426.	  	  Priest,	  G.	  (2002)	  Beyond	  the	  Limits	  of	  Thought,	  2nd	  ed.,	  Clarendon	  Press.	  	  Priest,	  G.	  (2005)	  Towards	  Non-­‐Being.	  The	  Logic	  and	  Metaphysics	  of	  
Intentionality,	  Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press.	  	  Priest,	  G.	  (2006)	  Doubt	  Truth	  to	  Be	  a	  Liar,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Priest,	  G.	  (2008)	  ‘The	  Closing	  of	  the	  Mind:	  How	  the	  particular	  quantifier	  became	  existentially	  loaded	  behind	  our	  backs’,	  The	  Review	  of	  Symbolic	  
Logic,	  1.1,	  42-­‐54.	  	  	  Putnam,	  H.	  (1971)	  Philosophy	  of	  Logic,	  New	  York:	  Harper.	  	  Putnam,	  H.	  (1979)	  ‘Philosophy	  of	  Logic’,	  reprinted	  in	  Mathematics	  
Matter	  and	  Method:	  Philosophical	  Papers,	  Volume	  1,	  2nd	  edition,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  323-­‐357.	  	  	  Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (1948)	  Appendix:	  ‘On	  What	  There	  Is’,	  reprinted	  from	  the	  
Review	  of	  Metaphysics,	  2.5,	  in	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  Society,	  Volume	  25,	  ‘Freedom,	  Language,	  and	  Reality’	  (1951)	  217-­‐234.	  	  	  Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (1951a)	  ‘On	  Carnap’s	  views	  on	  ontology’,	  Philosophical	  
Studies,	  2.5,	  65-­‐73,	  reprinted	  in	  Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (1976)	  The	  Ways	  of	  
Paradox	  &	  Other	  Essays,	  revised	  edition,	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  203-­‐11.	  	  	  	  Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (1951b)	  ‘Two	  Dogmas	  of	  Empiricism’,	  The	  Philosophical	  
Review,	  60.1,	  20-­‐43.	  	  	  Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (1957)	  ‘Speaking	  of	  Objects’,	  Proceedings	  and	  Addresses	  
of	  the	  American	  Philosophical	  Association,	  31,	  5-­‐22.	  	  Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (1960),	  Word	  and	  Object,	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press.	  
	   225	  Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (1961)	  From	  A	  Logical	  Point	  Of	  View,	  second	  edition,	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  	  Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (1964)	  ‘Ontological	  Reduction	  and	  the	  World	  of	  Numbers’,	  The	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  61.7,	  209-­‐216.	  	  Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (1968)	  ‘Ontological	  Relativity’,	  The	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  65.7,	  185-­‐212,	  reprinted	  in	  Quine.	  W.	  V.	  (1969)	  Ontological	  Relativity	  
and	  other	  essays,	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  26-­‐68.	  
	  Quine.	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (1969)	  Ontological	  Relativity	  and	  other	  essays,	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  26-­‐68.	  	  Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (1975)	  ‘On	  Empirically	  Equivalent	  Systems	  of	  the	  World’,	  
Erkenntnis,	  9:	  313-­‐328.	  	  Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (1976)	  The	  Ways	  of	  Paradox	  and	  Other	  Essays,	  Revised	  ed,	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  	  Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (1981)	  Theories	  and	  Things,	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  	  Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (1986)	  Philosophy	  of	  Logic,	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (1992)	  Pursuit	  of	  Truth,	  revised	  edition,	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  	  Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  (2013)	  Word	  and	  Object,	  New	  Edition,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press.	  	  Reicher,	  M.	  (2014)	  ‘Nonexistent	  Objects’,	  The	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  
Philosophy	  (Winter	  2014	  Edition),	  Edward	  N.	  Zalta	  (ed.),	  found	  at	  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/nonexistent-­‐objects/	  accessed	  May	  2015.	  	  	  Rosen,	  G.	  (1990)	  ‘Modal	  Fictionalism’,	  Mind,	  99.395,	  327-­‐354.	  	  Rosen,	  G.	  (1995)	  ‘Modal	  Fictionalism	  Fixed’,	  Analysis,	  55.2,	  67-­‐73.	  	  	  Routley,	  R.	  (1982)	  ‘On	  What	  There	  Is	  Not’,	  Philosophy	  and	  
Phenomenological	  Research,	  43.2,	  151-­‐177.	  	  Russell,	  B.	  (1903)	  Principles	  of	  Mathematics,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  Russell,	  B.	  (1905)	  ‘On	  Denoting’,	  Mind,	  New	  Series,	  14.56,	  479-­‐493.	  	  Sainsbury,	  R.	  M.	  (2010)	  Fiction	  and	  Fictionalism,	  Routledge.	  	  Shapiro,	  S.	  (ed.)	  (2005)	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Philosophy	  of	  
Mathematics	  and	  Logic,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
	   226	  Sider,	  T.	  (2007)	  ‘NeoFregeanism	  and	  Quantifier	  Variance’,	  Aristotelian	  
Society,	  Supplementary	  Volume	  81,	  201-­‐232.	  	  Sinnott-­‐Armstrong,	  W.	  (2006)	  Moral	  Skepticisms,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Soames,	  S.	  (2007)	  ‘The	  Quine-­‐Carnap	  Debate	  on	  Ontology	  and	  Analyticity’,	  Soochow	  Journal	  of	  Philosophical	  Studies,	  16,	  17-­‐32.	  	  	  Stalnaker,	  R.	  (1973)	  ‘Presuppositions’,	  The	  Journal	  of	  Philosophical	  
Logic,	  2,	  447-­‐457.	  	  	  Stalnaker,	  R.	  (1974)	  ‘Pragmatic	  presuppositions’,	  in	  Munitz,	  M.	  and	  Unger,	  P.	  (eds.),	  (1980)	  Semantics	  and	  Philosophy,	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  197–214.	  	  Strawson,	  P.	  F.	  (1967)	  ‘Is	  Existence	  Never	  a	  Predicate?’	  Critica,	  1,	  5-­‐15.	  	  Stroud,	  B.	  (1984)	  The	  Significance	  of	  Philosophical	  Scepticism,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Tarski,	  A.	  (1944)	  ‘The	  semantic	  conception	  of	  truth:	  And	  the	  foundations	  of	  semantics’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research	  4.3,	  341-­‐376.	  	  Thomasson,	  A.	  (2007)	  Ordinary	  Objects,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Thomasson,	  A.	  (2008)	  ‘Existence	  Questions’,	  Philosophical	  Studies,	  141,	  63-­‐78.	  	  	  Thomasson,	  A.	  (2009)	  ‘The	  Easy	  Approach	  to	  Ontology’,	  Axiomathes,	  19,	  1-­‐15.	  	  Thomasson,	  A.	  (2015)	  Ontology	  Made	  Easy,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Van	  Fraassen,	  B.	  (1980)	  The	  Scientific	  Image,	  Oxford:	  OUP.	  	  Van	  Inwagen,	  P.	  (1998)	  ‘Meta-­‐Ontology’,	  Erkenntnis,	  48,	  233-­‐250.	  	  Van	  Inwagen,	  P.	  (2000)	  ‘Quantification	  and	  Fictional	  Discourse’	  found	  in	  Everett,	  A.	  and	  Hofweber,	  T.	  (eds.)	  (2000)	  Empty	  Names,	  Fiction,	  and	  the	  
Puzzles	  of	  Nonexistence,	  CSLI	  Publications,	  235-­‐247.	  	  	  Van	  Inwagen,	  P.	  (2001)	  Ontology,	  Identity,	  and	  Modality:	  Essays	  in	  
Metaphysics,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Van	  Inwagen,	  P.	  (2003)	  ‘Existence,	  Ontological	  Commitment,	  and	  Fictional	  Entities’,	  found	  in	  Loux,	  M.	  and	  Zimmerman,	  D.	  (eds.)	  (2003)	  
The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Metaphysics,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  131-­‐157.	  
	   227	  Walton,	  K.	  L.	  (1990)	  Mimesis	  as	  Make-­‐Believe,	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  	  Wilson,	  J.	  (2011)	  ‘Much	  Ado	  About	  Something’,	  Analysis,	  71.1,	  172-­‐188.	  	  	  Wittgenstein,	  L.	  (1922)	  Tractatus	  Logico-­‐Philosophicus,	  originally	  published	  as	  ‘Logisch-­‐Philosophische	  Abhandlung’,	  in	  Annalen	  der	  
Naturphilosophische,	  XIV	  (3/4),	  1921.	  	  Woodward,	  R.	  (2008)	  ‘Why	  Modal	  Fictionalism	  is	  not	  Self-­‐Defeating’,	  
Philosophical	  Studies,	  139.2,	  273-­‐288.	  	  Woodward,	  R.	  (2011)	  ‘Truth	  In	  Fiction’	  Philosophy	  Compass,6.3,158-­‐167	  	  Woodward,	  R.	  (2012)	  ‘Fictionalism	  and	  Incompleteness’,	  Nous,	  46.4,	  781-­‐790.	  	  Wright,	  C.	  (1993)	  Realism,	  Meaning,	  and	  Truth,	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Yablo,	  S.	  (1998)	  ‘Does	  Ontology	  Rest	  On	  A	  Mistake?’,	  Aristotelian	  Society	  
Supplementary	  Volume,	  72.1,	  229-­‐262.	  	  	  Yablo,	  S.	  (2000)	  ‘Apriority	  and	  Existence’	  in	  Boghossian,	  P.	  and	  Peacocke,	  C.	  (eds.)	  (2000)	  New	  Essays	  on	  the	  A	  Priori,	  Oxford:	  OUP.	  	  Yablo,	  S.	  (2001)	  ‘Go	  Figure:	  A	  Path	  Through	  Fictionalism’,	  Midwest	  
Studies	  in	  Philosophy,	  XXV,	  72-­‐102.	  	  	  Yablo,	  S.	  (2005)	  ‘The	  Myth	  of	  the	  Seven’,	  in	  Kalderon,	  M.	  (ed.)	  (2005b)	  
Fictionalism	  in	  Metaphysics,	  88-­‐115.	  	  Yablo,	  S.	  (2006)	  ‘Non-­‐Catastrophic	  Presupposition	  Failure’,	  in	  Thomson,	  J.	  and	  Byrne,	  A.	  (eds.)	  (2006)	  Content	  and	  Modality:	  Themes	  from	  the	  
Philosophy	  of	  Robert	  Stalnaker,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Yablo,	  S.	  (2009)	  ‘Must	  Existence	  Questions	  Have	  Answers?’	  in	  Chalmers,	  D.	  et	  al.	  (eds.)	  (2009)	  Metametaphysics:	  New	  Essays	  on	  the	  Foundations	  
of	  Ontology,	  507-­‐526.	  	  Yablo,	  S.	  (2010)	  Things:	  Papers	  on	  Objects,	  Events,	  and	  Properties,	  Philosophical	  Papers,	  Volume	  II,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Yablo,	  S.	  (2014)	  Aboutness,	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  	  Zalta,	  E.	  N.	  (1983)	  Abstract	  Objects.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Axiomatic	  
Metaphysics,	  Dordrecht:	  Reidel	  	  
Thanks	  for	  reading	  J 	  	  
